

**Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, Jennie Olmsted, Grace Mappes, Justin Young, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros with Nate Trotter**


**August 11, 2025, 10:15 pm ET**

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on August 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**US President Donald Trump expressed the United States' willingness to facilitate substantive peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in an effort to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.** Trump commented on August 11 about the upcoming August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska and stated that "it is not up to [Trump]" to make a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin about the end of Russia's war in Ukraine.[1] Trump stated that "a deal should be made for both [Russia and Ukraine]," suggesting that the United States will not pursue a US-Russian brokered agreement that would exclude Ukraine during the Alaska meeting. Trump added that he would notify Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders about his upcoming meeting with Putin. Trump stated that a meeting between Zelensky and Putin or with Zelensky, Putin, and Trump will follow the Alaska summit – suggesting that the United States is interested in facilitating substantive peace talks that include Ukraine in negotiations with Russia.


**Trump signaled that the United States would aim to return some of Ukraine's economically and strategically significant territories during the peace negotiations process.** Trump noted that Russian forces currently occupy "some very prime territory" in Ukraine and that the United States is going to "try and get some of that territory back for Ukraine." [2] Trump did not clarify what he considers to be "prime" territory, only vaguely noting that Russia has taken "largely ocean in real estate" and that Ukraine only maintains control over the coastline in Odesa Oblast. Trump's references to "prime" territory are likely about Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, given his discussions about territory on the ocean or a river and his mention of Odesa Oblast. Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts host an abundance of economically and strategically significant land and offer much broader access to the Black Sea and the Dnipro River. Ukraine's access to the Black Sea is critical for Ukraine's sizeable export market, particularly of agricultural products and minerals.[3] Ukraine is also rich in critical raw materials, and Russia's direct access to the Black Sea may enable Russia to capture significant revenue streams associated with Ukraine's raw material export. Ukraine's access to the Dnipro River and a buffer around that river is operationally significant because the river acts as a naturally defensible barrier. Allowing Russia to maintain control over east (left) bank Kherson Oblast would put Russia in a much more advantageous position to conduct offensive operations against west (right) bank Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts, given how the current Ukrainian positions along the Dnipro River, if frozen, would lack the necessary operational depth to prevent a repeat Russian invasion. Persistent Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes are currently preventing Russian forces from accumulating engineering and bridging equipment to cross the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, but a

future ceasefire would prevent such strikes. Zaporizhzhia Oblast also hosts Europe's largest nuclear power station – the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) - which supplied roughly one-fifth of Ukraine's electricity before Russia's full-scale invasion, and Russian forces have occupied the facility since March 2022.[4] The Trump administration had previously attempted to negotiate an agreement to secure joint Ukrainian and US control over the ZNPP, which Russia explicitly rejected in spring 2025.[5]





## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction August 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Trump indicated that Putin's fear of the impact of US sanctions against Russia and Russia's economic partners drove Putin to propose a bilateral summit.** Trump stated that the Russian economy is "not doing well right now." [6] Trump stated that his announcement imposing 50 percent tariffs on India for importing Russian oil is also not helping the Russian economy and "was a big blow" to countries that purchase Russian oil. Trump stated that he was "all set" to implement much more significant economic restrictions, but that Trump "got a call that [Russian officials] would like to meet." Trump correctly indicated that the Russian economy is a liability that the United States, Europe, and Ukraine can leverage to degrade Russia's ability to continue its war in Ukraine. Putin has long sustained a theory of victory that relies upon the assumption that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West, including by relying on Russia's partners to sustain the Russian economy and war machine. [7] ISW continues to assess that strong US and other Western economic measures against

Russia, in concert with timely and sufficient Western military assistance to Ukraine, can enable Ukraine to inflict more severe battlefield losses on Russia and thereby challenge Putin's theory of victory.[8]

**Putin's decision to reach out immediately before Trump imposed further economic restrictions against Russia or its trading partners undermines the Kremlin's ongoing narrative that sanctions have not and will not affect the Russian economy.** Kremlin officials have routinely claimed that Russia's economy is strong and impervious to further US or other Western sanctions, both in order to portray stability to the domestic Russian audience and to convince Western states not to impose further sanctions against Russia and its trading partners.[9] Putin's decision to reach out to Trump immediately before the United States imposed additional economic restrictions demonstrates the Kremlin's recognition that this narrative is false. The Russian economy is weaker than Russian officials project, and Russia has implemented monetary and economic policies to disguise Russia's economic issues, but that will likely exacerbate Russia's instability instead.[10]

**Kremlin officials continue to emphasize that Russia is unwilling to compromise and remains committed to achieving its original war goals in Ukraine.** State Duma Committee on International Affairs First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 11 that the primary issue of the Putin-Trump meeting will be discussions about solutions to the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine (a common Kremlin reference to Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] expansion) to ensure that these causes "cannot be repeated." [11] Kremlin-affiliated outlet *Izvestiya* published an opinion piece on August 11 by Vice-Rector of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA) Diplomatic Academy Oleg Karpovich claiming that Russia has yet to achieve its objective of protecting the Russian language and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) and reiterating that Russia considers Ukrainian membership in NATO "impossible." [12] Karpovich claimed that Ukraine's "denazification" is a "matter of time." Putin and other Russian officials have continued to demand Ukraine's demilitarization (a demand for the reduction of Ukraine's military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself against future Russian aggression), denazification (a demand for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a Russian puppet government), and alliance neutrality.[13] Putin most recently reaffirmed his uncompromising demands on August 1 when he claimed that his June 2024 demands that Ukraine cede all of the four illegally annexed oblasts before he would agree to a ceasefire are still in place. **Putin's recent demand is notably only about the conditions that Ukraine must meet before Putin will agree to a ceasefire, not war termination. Putin's demands before he agrees to a war termination agreement will likely be even more extensive.**

Putin is reportedly demoting officials within his inner circle who have voiced disagreement with Putin's determination to continue the war. *The New York Times* reported on August 10 that Western and Russian sources indicated that Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Dmitry Kozak lost his influence in the Kremlin after Kozak advised Putin in the past few months to immediately stop fighting in Ukraine, start peace negotiations, and reduce the power of Russia's security services.[14] Kozak was previously one of Putin's closest advisors and oversaw Kremlin strategy in Ukraine before the Kremlin shifted this responsibility to Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko.[15] Kozak's recent opposition to Russia's war and the subsequent reduction in his influence in the Kremlin demonstrate Putin's determination to continue his war to achieve his maximalist demands.

**Russian officials and media are also setting informational conditions for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement to end the war.** Russian State Duma Deputy Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on August 9 that US President Donald Trump is a "temporary person" due to US presidential term limits and that US presidents often renege on agreements that their predecessors reached.[16] Russian ultranationalist outlet *Tsargrad*, which often works to condition the Russian nationalist community to support Russia's war effort, published an opinion piece on August 11 claiming that any peace deal that Russia agrees to with Trump is a deal only with his administration, not the United States or the broader West.[17] The article further claimed that the next US administration will not adhere to any agreement that Trump concludes with Putin and that peace in Ukraine is "just a truce" and the war will resume. Russian State Duma Deputy Leonid Ivlev stated on August 10 that Ukraine's Constitution is meaningless and is simply a result of Ukrainian politicians and oligarchs bargaining.[18] The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, likely to allow Russia to renege on a peace settlement that Russia signs with Ukraine in the future at a time of Russia's choosing.[19]


**Putin may try to use the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to gain concessions from Trump about the war in Ukraine in the August 15 meeting in Alaska.** Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on August 10 that Russia continued research and development of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles while the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was in effect and that Russia has a "fairly solid arsenal" of such missiles.[20] Rybakov claimed on August 11 that Russia's "reliable" sources confirmed that Russia's recent withdrawal from the INF Treaty achieved its "desired result" and a "sobering effect" in the United States.[21] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin was dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks to extract preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[22] Putin may offer to negotiate arms control treaties with Trump during the August 15 bilateral summit in Alaska. The June 2021 summit between Putin and former US President Joe Biden in Geneva in June 2021 notably focused on arms control and largely ignored Ukraine despite the buildup of Russian forces on Ukraine's border at the time.[23] Russia has long violated the INF Treaty and publicly flaunted its use and production of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles banned under the treaty, including the Oreshnik ballistic missile and possibly the Iskander missile.[24] The renewal of the INF Treaty or the establishment of a similar treaty would likely not result in any significant change in Russia's deployment and use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles.

**Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are reportedly infiltrating areas near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian forces likely recently advanced southeast of the settlement.** A Ukrainian source stated on August 11 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating near Dobropillya.[25] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) shows heat anomalies west of Nove Shakhove and in Novyi Donbas (both east of Dobropillya), Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya), and Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk and southeast of Dobropillya), suggesting fire missions in the area.[26] ISW therefore assesses that Russian forces likely recently seized Razine, Sukhetske, Fedorivka, Zatyshok, Boikivka, Novotoretske, Zapovidne (all southeast of Dobropillya), Mayak, and Pankivka (both east of Dobropillya). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 11 that Russian forces seized Fedorivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[27] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that forward Russian assault units and "infiltration" groups are operating near Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya), Nove

Shakhove, and Bilytske.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya) and advanced north of Zapovidne, south of Bilytske, south of Dorozhnie, west of Shakhove, southeast of Vilne (both east of Dobropillya), to Nove Shakhove, south of Kucheriv Yar, and to the outskirts of Zoloty Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy roughly half of Volodymyrivka (south of Shakhove) and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern Pankivka.[30] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have interdicted a roughly 2.5 kilometer wide section of the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Kucheriv Yar and Zoloty Kolodyaz are contested "gray zones" and that Russian forces are likely conducting reconnaissance-in-force missions in these areas.[31] **It is premature to call the Russian advances in the Dobropillya area an operational-level breakthrough, though Russian forces very likely seek to mature their tactical advances into an operational-level breakthrough in the coming days. Russian forces used a similar tactical penetration in mid-April 2024 to facilitate the seizure of operationally significant territory northwest of Avdiivka.**[32] **The next several days in the Pokrovsk area of operations will likely be critical for Ukraine's ability to prevent accelerated Russian gains north and northwest of Pokrovsk.**




## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction August 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russia is likely focusing on advances toward Dobropillya to set informational conditions ahead of the August 15 US-Russian summit.** ISW continues to assess that Putin is attempting to frame Russia's seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as inevitable to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin demands.[33] Russia's occupation of the four oblasts is neither inevitable nor imminent, as Russian forces will face serious operational obstacles, particularly in likely multi-year endeavors in Donetsk Oblast. Putin likely seeks to leverage intensified tactical pushes in Avdiivka to set conditions to seek US concessions on Russia's war in Ukraine.


# Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast

## August 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST





## Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast August 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces have been using drone strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the near rear in recent weeks to set conditions for more rapid advances in the Pokrovsk direction.** ISW recently assessed that Russian drone adaptations are likely achieving some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI).[34] Russian forces have increased their use of first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against the T-0514 Dobropillya-Lyman highway after having significantly improved their tactical drone capabilities to threaten Ukrainian GLOCs deeper in the rear than before. Russian drones have also been targeting Ukrainian vehicles along the T-0515 highway in Rodynske. Russia's persistent drone strikes at longer ranges are likely forcing Ukrainian forces to take alternative roads and further stretch GLOCs, which is likely impacting Ukraine's defensive operations that rely on the consistent flow of equipment, supplies, and manpower.

**Russian forces continue to implement and field technological drone innovations designed to strike Ukrainian forces' rear and near rear.** Russian milbloggers, including a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, claimed on August 11 that Russian forces have adapted their indigenous Geran drone (the Russian analogue to the Iranian Shahed-136) to carry anti-tank mines that enable operators to remotely mine Ukrainian forces' rear and near rear.[35] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov amplified footage on August 11 from a Russian milblogger showing an unspecified Russian drone remotely mining an unspecified logistics route in Ukraine and noted that Russian Shahed-type drones are now capable of carrying two mines.[36] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are achieving partial effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and are advancing on the battlefield by leveraging technological innovations and combined drone strike tactics.[37] Russian forces are now fielding fiber optic controlled sleeper drones to locations such as rooftops, hilltops, and roads for up to several weeks in support of missions targeting Ukrainian positions and logistics; the drones are capable of remaining electronically silent and physically inactive.[38] Russia's war in Ukraine continues to be defined by its dramatically shortened innovation cycle, underscoring the critical importance of continued Western support for Ukraine's development of kinetic drone countermeasures and drone interceptors that are capable of interdicting Russian Shahed-type and tactical drones.[39]

**Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure overnight on August 10 to 11.** Ukrainian broadcaster *Suspilne* reported that sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) stated that Ukrainian forces conducted a long-range drone strike against the Arzamas Instrument-Making Plant in Arzamas, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, which produces components for Kh-32 and Kh-101 missiles. A geolocated photograph shows damage to a building at the plant and footage shows a fire at the building.[40] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin claimed that Ukrainian drones targeted unspecified enterprises in two industrial zones in the oblast on the night of August 10 to 11 and that a drone strike killed one enterprise employee and injured two in Arzamassky Okrug.[41]


Ukrainian official sources confirmed that Ukrainian drone strike against Komi Republic on the night of August 9 to 10. *Suspilne* reported on August 11 that sources in the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed that GUR conducted a drone strike against the Lukoil Refinery in Ukhta, Komi Republic, which supplied fuel and lubricants to Russian forces.[42] The GUR sources reported that the strike damaged a tank with petroleum products and a gas and gas condensate processing plant. Ukhta City Civil Defense and Emergencies Department Head Andrey Dudnikov claimed on August 11 that two drones fell on the oil refinery on August 10, damaging a water tank and smokestack.[43] ISW continues to assess that a possible long-range strikes moratorium will hinder Ukraine's ability to continue its long-range strike campaign against the Russian defense industrial facilities and energy infrastructure — a campaign that is aimed at targeting Russia's defense production and energy revenues, as opposed to the solely civilian infrastructure that the Russian campaign often strikes.[44] Any agreement less than a full and long-term cessation in long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure will pose a great threat to Ukraine's civilian population and infrastructure upon the expiration of the agreement and resumption of long-range Russian strikes.

### **Key Takeaways:**

- **US President Donald Trump expressed the United States' willingness to facilitate substantive peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in an effort to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.**
- **Trump signaled that the United States would aim to return some of Ukraine's economically and strategically significant territories during the peace negotiations process.**
- **Trump indicated that Putin's fear of the impact of US sanctions against Russia and Russia's economic partners drove Putin to propose a bilateral summit.**
- **Putin's decision to reach out immediately before Trump imposed further economic restrictions against Russia or its trading partners undermines the Kremlin's ongoing narrative that sanctions have not and will not affect the Russian economy.**
- **Kremlin officials continue to emphasize that Russia is unwilling to compromise and remains committed to achieving its original war goals in Ukraine.**
- **Russian officials and media are also setting informational conditions for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement to end the war.**
- **Putin may try to use the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to gain concessions from Trump about the war in Ukraine in the August 15 meeting in Alaska.**
- **Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are reportedly infiltrating areas near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian forces likely recently advanced southeast of the settlement.**
- **Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure overnight on August 10 to 11.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.**



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War August 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

### **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

#### **Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on August 11.**

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 10 and 11.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited attacks near Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[46]

#### **Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)**

#### **Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) and southwest of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[47]

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) pushed Ukrainian forces back from Novomykolaivka (north of Sumy City) but have been unable to advance between Oleksiivka and Varachyne (east of Oleksiivka).[48] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command began to introduce elements of the 234th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) that had been in reserve near Yunakivka. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces successfully counterattacked in an unspecified area of Sumy Oblast and advanced up to 400 meters.[49]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Sadky on August 10 and 11.[50] Mashovets and Russian milbloggers stated that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yunakivka, Novokostyantynivka, and Kostyantynivka (all north of Sumy City).[51]


A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that the Russian military command deployed elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) north of Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and that the units are struggling with communication and

cohesion.[52] The milblogger claimed that the Russian command had initially planned to redeploy elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment, 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and 40th Naval Infantry Brigade to unspecified areas in Donetsk Oblast, but then deployed them to attacks near Novokostyantynivka, where they are suffering high personnel and equipment losses. The milblogger further claimed that elements of the 1st Battalion of the 83rd VDV Separate Brigade took up new positions in Yablunivka and immediately fell under friendly fire due to communication issues. The milblogger claimed that the command of the 2nd Battalion of the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment appointed officers to command assault groups near Novomykolaivka due to personnel shortages and that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz in the area turned off communication systems, causing panic.[53]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) are operating in Yunakivka.[54] Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in Fotovyzh (northwest of Sumy City).[55] Drone operators of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[56]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction August 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast** (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 11 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on August 10 and 11.[57] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces are attacking in small assault groups toward Tykhe and Zybyne (both east of Vovchansk).[58]

Order of Battle: Elements of the pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[59] Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Starytsya (northeast of Kharkiv City).[60]

**Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 11.**

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 11 but did not advance.**

Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Radkivka and toward Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 10 and 11.[61]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating in the Kupyansk direction and that elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are attacking toward Putynkove (north of Kupyansk) and Kolodyazne.[62] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly fighting near Stepova Novoselivka.[63]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 11 but did not advance.**

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Hrektivka and Olhivka on August 10 and 11.[64]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are operating in the Druzhelyubivka direction (southeast of Borova).[65]

**Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest and southeast of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[66]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Torske and Dibrova (both east of Lyman) and north and southeast of Serednie (northwest of Lyman).[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Myrne (northeast of Lyman).[68]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman near Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near


Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 10 and 11.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kolodyazi and near Myrne.[70]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that the bulk of Russian forces operating in this direction only signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) one month ago and received only two weeks of training.[71] The spokesperson added that the Russian forces are intensifying their attacks before road conditions worsen during the autumnal muddy season. A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces attack Ukrainian forward positions in pairs simultaneously from different directions, allowing Russian forces to gradually concentrate entire detachments against one position.[72] The servicemember added that Russian forces are deploying drone operators near infantry positions to hit targets as deep into the Ukrainian rear as possible, and that the risk the Russian military command is willing to put Russian drone operators in demonstrates the abundance of drone operators. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are not conducting unguided glide bomb strikes against the dams on the Zherebets River east of Kolodyazi to avoid destroying the dams and flooding the surrounding area.[73]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating in Torske.[74] Elements of the 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, CMD) are also reportedly operating in Torske.[75] Mashovets stated that elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) and 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD) are operating near Zelena Dolyna, Lypove, Hlushchenkove (all north of Lyman), Karpivka, Ridkodub, and Shandryholove. Drone operators of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[76]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction August 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast** (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 11 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka on August 10 and 11.[77]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces east of Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[78]

### **Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within and southwest of Chasiv Yar; northwest of Stupochky; and north, northwest, and south of Predtechyne (both south of Chasiv Yar).[79]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on August 10 and 11.[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly operating in Predtechyne.[81] Armored elements of the Nevsky Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[82]

### **Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 10 indicates that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) recently advanced in eastern Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[83] Additional geolocated footage published on August 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk).[84]


Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that small Russian assault groups infiltrated east of the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka road, almost to the northern outskirts of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[85] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest and east of Katerynivka, north of Yablunivka, to the eastern outskirts of Kleban-Byk, and near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar (all northwest of Toretsk).[86]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Bila Hora; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove; and northwest of Toretsk near Katerynivka, Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka and toward Stepanivka and Pleshchiivka on August 10 and 11.[87]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to break through weak points in Ukrainian defenses, especially in areas that depend on natural barriers and limited ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[88] The milblogger claimed that Russian reconnaissance and sabotage groups regularly enter the outskirts of Rusyn Yar and that the settlement is a contested "gray zone."

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are attacking toward Oleksandro-Shulytyne (north of Toretsk) on both sides of the railway.[89] Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are operating near Yablunivka. Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (northwest of Toretsk).[90] Drone operators of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Ivanopillya (north of Toretsk).[91] Drone operators of

the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[92]



## Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

*See topline text for reports of assessed Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.*

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Troyanda (southwest of Pokrovsk).[93]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Pokrovsk near Vilne, Sukhetske, and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Mayak, Dorozhnie, Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, Novoeconomichne, Volodymyrivka, Zatyshok, Zapovidne, Krasnyi Lyman, Fedorivka, and Boikivka and toward Kucheriv



Yar; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 10 and 11.[94]

Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction are conducting both highly attritional infantry assaults with poorly trained personnel and attacks with more combat experienced and better trained personnel.[95] A Russian milblogger claimed that drone operators of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are using first-person view (FPV) drones to drop anti-tank grenades in the Pokrovsk direction.[96] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are bringing up fresh reserves in the Pokrovsk direction.[97] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted two Geran-2 drone strikes against Zoloty Kolodyaz (northeast of Pokrovsk).[98]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating in the Dobropillya direction northeast of Pokrovsk.[99] Mashovets stated that elements of the 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both 51st CAA, SMD) are attacking near Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman. Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Myrnohrad.[100]

#### **Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 11 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on August 10 and 11.[101]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 430th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 29th CAA, EMD), with reinforcements from elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), are operating near Zelenyi Hai.[102]

#### **Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 11 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) advanced roughly one kilometer south of Maliivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[103] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Piddubne (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[104]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Myrne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vilne Pole, Sichneve, Maliivka, and Shevchenko and toward Novoheorhiivka and Komyshevakh on August 10 and 11.[105]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 430th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 29th CAA, EMD), with reinforcements from elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), are operating toward Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[106] Mashovets reported that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating in the Sichneve and Oleksandrohrad directions. Drone operators of the

57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions east of Shevchenko.[107]

**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhzhia Oblast on August 11, but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces advanced south of Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole) along the O-0510 Velyka Novosilka-Hulyaipole highway.[108]

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on August 10 and 11.[109]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Covering Brigade and 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[110] Drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) and 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhzhia direction (likely referring to eastern Zaporizhzhia Oblast).[111]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on August 11 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Stepanohirsk; southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske; south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka; and southeast of Orikhiv towards Mala Tokmachka on August 10 and 11.[112] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kamyanske and Plavni.[113]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Stepanohirsk.[114]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 10 and 11, but did not advance.[115]**

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) and the 104th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[116]

**Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched 71 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[117] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 59 drones, that 12 drones struck six locations, and that drone debris hit one location.[118]

The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that a Russian airstrike damaged the External Crisis Center of the ZNPP building in Zaporizhzhia City on August 10.[119] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported

that the External Crisis Center monitors radiation levels at the ZNPP after the Russian occupation authorities stopped transmitting data on the nuclear and radiation status of the plant to Ukrainian authorities. Ukrainian officials stated on August 11 that Russian glide bombs also damaged residential buildings and medical infrastructure and injured at least 23 civilians in Zaporizhzhia City on August 10.[120]

### **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

Russia and Belarus continue to develop governmental infrastructure to increase integration within the Union State framework. Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko to also serve as Russia's Special Representative for the Agreement on Security Guarantees for the Union State.[121] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko appointed Belarusian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Sekreta to act as Belarus' special representative on July 15.[122]

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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