

Iran Update



Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa, and Annika Ganzeveld

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Key Takeaways

- Iran is continuing to try to assess damage at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). CTP-ISW previously reported that imagery from June 28 and 29 showed an excavator and crane near the northern impact points and an excavator near the southern impact points at Fordow. A US weapons expert assessed on June 30 that Iran may be preparing to send cameras or personnel into the craters to conduct a downhole damage assessment.
- Satellite imagery captured on July 1 indicates that Iran has at least partially filled the three southern impact points and covered one of the northern impact points with a temporary cover. A US weapons expert suggested that Iran may seek to prevent materials and personnel from falling into the craters while Iran conducts battle damage assessments around the site. Satellite imagery captured on July 1 also shows that Iran has cleared the surroundings of a tunnel entrance near the southern impact points to enable vehicle access to the tunnel.
- The Iranian Parliament approved an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) law on June 29 that aims to close the “critical legal and operational gaps” that enabled Israel to conduct drone operations at the beginning of the Israel-Iran War. Mossad established a secret drone base in Iranian territory prior to the war that Israel used to target Iranian air defenses and missile launchers at the start of the war. The Iranian Parliament also introduced a nine-article law on June 29 that labels any intelligence, espionage, or operational cooperation with Israel, the United States, or other “hostile” actors as “corruption on earth,” which is a crime punishable by death. These security measures are consistent with CTP-ISW’s previous assessment that the Iranian regime is prioritizing regime stability following the Israel-Iran War.

Iran is continuing to try to assess damage at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 29 and 30 showed Iranian heavy equipment, including bulldozers and excavators, near two clusters of impact points at Fordow.[1] CTP-ISW previously reported that imagery from June 28 and 29 showed an excavator and crane near the northern impact points and an excavator near the southern impact points.[2] A US weapons expert assessed on June 30 that Iran may be preparing to send cameras or personnel into the craters to conduct a downhole damage assessment.[3] The expert noted that Iran will likely access the southern

cluster of impact points first because US strikes made the ground around the northern impact points "highly unstable." The expert stated that Iran is likely using a bulldozer at the southern impact points to prepare a platform for downhole access.[4] The expert added that Iran will likely lower cameras into the crater first and then personnel, depending on the site's safety.

Satellite imagery captured on July 1 indicates that Iran has at least partially filled the three southern impact points and covered one of the northern impact points with a temporary cover.[5] It is unclear why Iran would cover or fill the craters. A US weapons expert suggested that Iran may seek to prevent materials and personnel from falling into the craters while Iran conducts battle damage assessments around the site.[6] The expert noted that Iran would need to rebuild the ventilation shafts if it sought to resume operations at Fordow.[7]

Satellite imagery captured on July 1 also shows that Iran has cleared the surroundings of a tunnel entrance near the southern impact points to enable vehicle access to the tunnel.[8] It is unclear how far vehicles will be able to travel in the tunnel system.

Iranian nuclear safety regulators have reportedly stopped sharing information with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), according to two unspecified officials.[9] The IAEA's Incident and Emergency Center had maintained contact with Iranian regulators since June 13, but two unspecified officials told Bloomberg on July 1 that Iran has stopped sharing information with the IAEA. This report comes after Iran's Guardian Council approved a bill on June 26 that suspends Iran's cooperation with the IAEA and bars inspectors from accessing Iran's nuclear facilities.[10] Iran has historically restricted IAEA oversight in Iran, including by withdrawing the certifications of several inspectors in September 2023 and barring other top inspectors in November 2024.[11] The IAEA has not conducted any inspections in Iran since the Israel-Iran War began.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Western media on July 1 that Iran "will not easily back down from enrichment." [12] This statement is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iranian officials have not relaxed their negotiating position on the US demand for zero uranium enrichment.

The Iranian government has imposed security measures on Iranians to counter Israeli drone warfare, but these measures are unlikely to achieve the objectives they are meant to achieve. The Iranian Parliament approved an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) law on June 29 that aims to close the "critical legal and operational gaps" that enabled Israel to conduct drone operations at the beginning of the Israel-Iran War.[13] Mossad established a secret drone base in Iranian territory prior to the war that Israel used to target Iranian air defenses and missile launchers at the start of the war.[14] Iranian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Brigadier General Reza Talaei Nik stated that Israel took extensive advantage of the "lack of effective oversight and guidance in Iran." [15] The new law prohibits foreign nationals from being involved in the production, import, export, and operation of UAVs. The law also mandates that drone owners have proper registration, permits, tracking systems, and insurance.[16] It is unlikely that Iran will be able to successfully counter drone operations in the near term, despite the new regulatory measures, because Iran still lacks an effective counter-UAV interception network and has limited experience in detecting low-signature, small quadcopters operating in its territory. Battlefield trends in Ukraine suggest that without mobile fire groups, Iran—like Russia—will likely struggle to protect critical assets from small, low-cost drones.[17]

The Iranian regime has also imposed security measures to counter infiltration and domestic political dissent, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's previous assessment that the Iranian regime is prioritizing regime stability following the Israel-Iran War. The Iranian Parliament introduced a nine-article law on June 29 that labels any intelligence, espionage, or operational cooperation with Israel, the United States, or other “hostile” actors as “corruption on earth,” which is a crime punishable by death.[18] The Iranian regime defines corruption on earth as “acts that seriously disrupt public order, threaten national security, or inflict widespread harm on individuals or infrastructure.”[19] The law also bans Starlink devices, which can help Iranians bypass censorship, and imposes prison terms for anyone who possesses, uses, or distributes these devices. The law also punishes individuals who engage in unauthorized drone activity or cyber sabotage.[20]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on July 1 that Iranian security forces arrested over 50 individuals “linked to Israel” and killed two others over the past two weeks in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[21] The IRGC announced that it arrested “mercenary terrorist elements.”[22] Some of the detainees could include Jaish al Adl fighters operating in southeastern Iran. Jaish al Adl is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. The Iranian regime has previously accused Israel of supporting Jaish al Adl.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile before it crossed into Israeli territory on July 1.[23] The Houthis have not claimed the attack at the time of this writing. The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic blockade on Israel in November 2023.[24]



[1] <https://x.com/DAVIDHALBRIGHT1/status/1939758564681150876>

[2] <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-special-report-june-29-2025>

[3] <https://x.com/DAVIDHALBRIGHT1/status/1939758564681150876>

[4] <https://x.com/DAVIDHALBRIGHT1/status/1939758564681150876>

[5] <https://x.com/DAVIDHALBRIGHT1/status/1940151936944370134/photo/3>

[6] <https://x.com/DAVIDHALBRIGHT1/status/1940151936944370134/photo/2>

[7] <https://x.com/davidhalbright1/status/1940151936944370134?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q>

[8] <https://x.com/davidhalbright1/status/1940151936944370134?s=46&t=EGYcIyXosW6lVJmixq2r5Q>

- [9] <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-01/iran-shuts-out-nuclear-monitors-in-wake-of-israel-and-us-attacks>
- [10] https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1938173802958995930;
<https://x.com/PressTV/status/1938204404081156141>
- [11] <https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/iran-withdraws-further-iaea-inspector-designations>
- [12] <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-foreign-minister-interview-nuclear-talks/>
- [13] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/10/3346361/> ;
<https://www.yjc dot ir/fa/news/8969912/>
- [14] <https://www.israelhayom dot com/2025/06/13/revealed-mossads-secret-base-of-explosive-drones-inside-iran/> ;
https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/mossad-set-up-a-drone-base-in-iran-uavs-were-activated-overnight-to-strike-surface-to-surface-missile-launchers-aimed-at-israel/
- [15] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/10/3346361/> ;
<https://www.yjc dot ir/fa/news/8969912/>
- [16] <https://www.yjc dot ir/fa/news/8969912/>
- [17] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2024> ;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025> ;
- [18] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/08/3344834>
- [19] <https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/09/10/last-holdouts/ending-juvenile-death-penalty-iran-saudi-arabia-sudan-pakistan-and> ;
<https://journalismisnotacrime.com/en/features/1368/>
- [20] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/08/3344834>
- [21] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/10/3346493>
- [22] <https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/10/3346493>
- [23] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1940100958077202915>
- [24] <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/12/briefing-on-developments-related-to-houthi-attacks-on-israel.php> ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-houthis-have-launched-40-missiles-320-drones-at-israel-since-start-of-war/