

Angelica Evans, Anna Harvey, Daria Novikov, Jennie Olmsted, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 9, 2025, 6:45 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00 pm ET on August 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Trump Administration has described Russian President Vladimir Putin's reported demands for a ceasefire in Ukraine in four different ways since August 6. The exact details of Putin's position remain unclear. German outlet *BILD* reported on August 9 that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff misunderstood Putin's demand for *Ukraine* to withdraw from the remainder of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, in addition to the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, as an offer for *Russia* to withdraw from occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts during the August 6 Putin-Witkoff meeting.[1] *BILD* reported that Witkoff also misunderstood Putin's proposal for an energy infrastructure and long-range strikes ceasefire, and that Witkoff interpreted Putin's offer as a general ceasefire that would curtail frontline military activity. The *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) reported that European officials familiar with the conversation and call stated that US President Donald Trump, presumably after being briefed by Witkoff, told Ukrainian and European officials on August 6 that Putin would withdraw from occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange for Ukraine ceding unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast.[2] The officials told WSJ that Witkoff walked back Trump's statement during a call with European officials on August 7 and stated that Russia would "both withdraw and freeze" the frontline, presumably referring to Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. European officials reportedly asked Witkoff to further clarify Putin's demand during a call on August 8, and Witkoff stated that the "only offer" on the table was for Ukraine to unilaterally withdraw from Donetsk Oblast in exchange for a ceasefire. Ukrainian outlet *Kyiv Independent* reported that a source in Ukraine's Presidential Office briefed on the Putin-Witkoff meeting, presumably by Witkoff himself, stated that Putin also offered to withdraw from northeastern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts as a "sign of goodwill" in exchange for Ukraine ceding the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast.[3] The source stated that Putin reportedly told Witkoff that Putin would be willing to freeze the frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. *Bloomberg* reported on August 8 that unnamed sources stated that Putin demanded that Ukraine withdraw from the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and concede occupied Crimea to Russia in exchange for freezing the frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and beginning negotiations on a ceasefire agreement.[4] It remains unclear, based on Western reporting, if Putin ever truly offered to withdraw from occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rejected Putin's demand.[5]

The only element of Putin's reported position common to all reports is Putin's continued demand for Ukraine to withdraw from unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast — a major Ukrainian concession. Conceding to such a demand would force Ukraine to abandon its "fortress belt," the main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014 — with no guarantee that fighting

will not resume.[6] Ukraine's fortress belt stymied Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast in 2014 and 2022 and is still impeding Russia's efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast in 2025, as ISW has recently described. The fortress belt is a significant obstacle to Russia's current path of advance westward in Ukraine, and surrendering the remainder of Donetsk Oblast as the prerequisite of a ceasefire with no commitment to a final peace settlement would position Russian forces extremely well to renew their attacks on more favorable terms, having avoided a long and bloody struggle for the ground.[7]

Ukrainian and European officials reportedly presented a counterproposal to US officials on August 9 as European officials continue to issue statements of support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. WSJ reported on August 9 that Ukraine and European leaders proposed a counteroffer to Russian President Vladimir Putin's demands for Ukrainian territorial concessions as a precondition to ceasefire during a meeting with US Vice President JD Vance in the United Kingdom (UK) on August 9.[8] WSJ reported that the counteroffer stipulates that a full ceasefire in Ukraine must be implemented *prior* to territorial negotiations, in accordance with US President Donald Trump's previously articulated preferred timeline for an end to Russia's war against Ukraine.[9] WSJ reported that the counteroffer also states that territorial exchanges should be conducted in a reciprocal manner and that Ukraine must receive robust security guarantees in exchange for any Ukrainian territorial concessions to prevent future Russian aggression against Ukraine. WSJ reported that Finnish President Alexander Stubb presented the Ukrainian-European counterproposal to Trump during a phone call on August 9. European leaders, including UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron, Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys, Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braze, and Romanian Foreign Minister Toiu Oana, expressed support for Ukraine's efforts to achieve a just and lasting resolution to Russia's war on August 9.[10]

Russian officials welcomed the announcement that US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in Alaska on August 15 and referenced Russian narratives about Russia's historical claims to Alaska. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that Alaska is a logical meeting place due to the fact that the United States and Russia are close neighbors across the Bering Strait and share economic interests in Alaska and the Arctic region.[11] Leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev, who attended the August 6 meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff, described Alaska on August 9 as "a Russian-born American" and claimed that Alaska reflects the ties between the United States and Russia.[12] Dmitriev also noted Alaska's historic ties to the Russian Orthodox Church and Russia's past military and economic presence in Alaska.[13] Russian officials and state media have previously claimed that the United States should return Alaska to Russia. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed in January 2024 that Russia has been waiting for the United States to return Alaska "any day" in response to a US Department of State statement to the contrary.[14] Russian TV hosts and propagandists Vladimir Solovyov and Olga Skabeyeva repeatedly claimed in 2024 that the United States should return Alaska to Russia.[15] Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin claimed in July 2022 that Russia would claim Alaska as its own if the United States froze foreign-based Russian assets.[16] Russian state media outlet *RT* claimed in October 2018 that Russia should demand

Alaska back from the United States after the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.[17]


Ukraine continues its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on August 9 that it conducted a drone strike against a Russian Shahed drone warehouse in Kzyl Yul, Republic of Tatarstan and that the drone strike started a fire at the warehouse.[18] The SBU stated that Russia stored Shahed drones and related foreign-sourced components at the facility. Kzyl Yul is located roughly 43 kilometers from the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) near Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, where Russia has based a large-scale Shahed drone production facility.[19] Ukrainian outlets *Suspilne* and *Militarnyi* reported that sources within Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that GUR conducted a sabotage operation in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai on August 8, causing two explosions near a checkpoint on the Russian 90th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade's (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) base.[20]

Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) replaced Northern Grouping of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on August 8 that the Russian military command appointed Nikiforov as the new commander of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, replacing Lapin, who has held the position since Fall 2024.[21] Russian milbloggers have been highly critical of Lapin for Russia's failure to establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[22] Nikiforov has reportedly been overseeing Russia's response to the August 2025 Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and subsequent Russian offensive into northern Sumy Oblast alongside Lapin since mid-August 2024.[23] A Kremlin insider source claimed that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov is a close ally of Nikiforov and likely had a role in Nikiforov's appointment.[24] Neither Russian state media nor the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has yet confirmed Nikiforov's appointment, and Lapin's next assignment remains unclear.

Key Takeaways:

- **The Trump Administration has described Russian President Vladimir Putin's reported demands for a ceasefire in Ukraine in four different ways since August 6. The exact details of Putin's position remain unclear.**
- **The only element of Putin's reported position common to all reports is Putin's continued demand for Ukraine to withdraw from unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast - a major Ukrainian concession.**
- **Ukrainian and European officials reportedly presented a counterproposal to US officials on August 9 as European officials continue to issue statements of support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.**
- **Russian officials welcomed the announcement that US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in Alaska on August 15 and referenced Russian narratives about Russia's historical claims to Alaska.**

- **Ukraine continues its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities.**
- **Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) replaced Northern Grouping of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.**
- **Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk.**



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of

these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 8 and 9, but there were no advances.[25]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to cross the border near Malev, Bryansk Oblast (southwest of Bryansk City) on August 9.[26]

Russian sources claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino and near Novyi Put (both southwest of Glushkovo) and near Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[27]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)


Fighting continued in northern Sumy Oblast on August 9.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces crossed into Kursk Oblast near Novokostyantynivka (north of Sumy City) and that Russian forces retreated from Stepne (northwest of Sumy City) and Novokostyantynivka.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[29]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka and toward Novokostyantynivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka,

on August 8 and 9.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Yunakivka.[31]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[32] Elements of the Russian 11th Separate VDV Brigade and 234th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) reportedly relieved the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade in the Sumy direction.[33] Additional elements of the 76th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Yunakivka.[34] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[35] Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[36] Drone operators of the pro-Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction.[37]



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on August 9 that Russian forces advanced in Vovchansk and near Vovchansky Khutoryi, Ohirtseve, and Hatyshche (all northeast of Kharkiv City) and near Lypsti (north of Kharkiv City).[38]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on August 8 and 9.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 8 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City).[40]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed on August 9 that Russian forces are struggling to maintain positions and advance near Vovchansk, and that Russian forces recently retreated in some areas.[41]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 9.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction August 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook and advanced southwest of Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[42]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized a railway station northeast of Kupyansk.[43]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove and toward Kovalivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; and northeast of Kupyansk toward Kolodyazne, Petro-Ivanivka, and Novovasylivka on August 8 and 9.[44]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka (southwest of Kupyansk).[45] Drone operators of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk with fiber optic Groza Leska drones.[46]




Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova toward Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on August 8 and 9 but did not advance.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within southern Karpivka (north of Lyman) and up to the northern outskirts of Serednie (northwest of Lyman).[48]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka and Ridkodub and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Zarichne, Dibrova, and Torske; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 8 and 9.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Torske.[50]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced from Dibrova (northeast of Siversk) toward Serebryanka (south of Dibrova).[51]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and southwest of Siversk near Pereizne and Fedorivka on August 8 and 9.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself on August 8 and 9 but did not advance.[53]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets refuted claims that Russian forces seized Chasiv Yar and stated that Ukrainian forces still maintain positions in a majority of the settlement.[54] Zaporozhets stated that Ukrainian shelling is preventing Russian forces from attacking toward Kostyantynivka from the Chasiv Yar direction.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk), and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) with seizing the settlement.[55] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also seized Shcherbynivka.[56] Another milblogger, however, claimed that while elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) advanced in northern Shcherbynivka, other milbloggers' claims that Russian forces seized the settlement are premature.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) advanced into southern Oleksandro-Shulyne (north of Toretsk).[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups advanced to the Kleban Byk reservoir (northwest of Toretsk), although the milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions east of the reservoir.[59]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Bila Hora, Oleskandro-Shulyne, and Dyliivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Poltavka, Rusyn Yar, Pleshchiivka, and Katerynivka and toward Stepanivka on August 8 and 9.[60]

The chief of staff of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces changed their tactics in the battalion's area of responsibility (AOR) after suffering massive armored vehicle losses, presumably referring to Russian armored vehicle losses in 2024.[61] The chief of staff reported that Russian forces currently primarily use armored vehicles as a disposable way to transport infantry to the frontline and typically do not expect the vehicles to return. The chief of staff reported that Russian forces attack in small fire teams and are using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs).

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating near the Kleban Byk reservoir.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating near Dobropillya (north of Pokrovsk).[63]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Nove Shakhove, Dorozhne, Sukhetske, Zatyshok, Boikivka, Volodymyrivka, Chervonyi Lyman, Novoekonomichne, and Myrolyubivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne, and Molodetske on August 8 and 9.[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from the Tsentralna Mine in central Myrnohrad and near Chunyshyne and Novopavlivka (both immediately south of Pokrovsk).[65] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Chunyshyne is a contested "gray zone." [66]

Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on August 9 that Russian forces have a manpower advantage in the Pokrovsk direction.[67] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction noted that units of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are disrupting Ukrainian logistics in the area.[68] The spokesperson stated that Rubikon units are training and improving other drone units in the area and forming new tactical drone groups near Pokrovsk. The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces have intensified attacks near Pokrovsk.[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Zelenyi Kut; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Zelenyi Hai, and Tovste on August 8 and 9.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Dachne.[71]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Novopavlivka.[72] Elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk (Novopavlivka) direction.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer toward Komyshevukha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[74]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka toward Andriivka-Klevtsove, east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka, and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka, Sichneve, Vilne Pole, and Komyshuvakha on August 8 and 9.[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Andriivka-Klevtsove.[76]



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[77]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Temyrivka, Olhivske, Novopil, and Novoukrainka and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on August 8 and 9.[78]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Olhivske, Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole), and Zelenyi Hai (east of Hulyaipole).[79] Drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Zaporizhia Oblast.[80]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[81]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka and west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and Stepnohirsk and toward Novoandriivka on August 8 and 9.[82] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kamyanske and Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[83]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions toward Orikhiv.[84] Drone operators of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Stepnohirsk.[85]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction August 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued attacks in the Kherson direction on August 9 but did not advance.[86]

Ukrainian officials reported on August 9 that a Russian drone struck a civilian bus near Kherson City, killing two civilians.[87]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction August 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched 47 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones and two Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[88] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces targeted frontline areas in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Donetsk oblasts with drones and Dnipro City with cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 16 drones and one Iskander-K cruise missile and that 31 Russian drones struck 15 locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast. Zolochiv City Military Administration Head Viktor Kovalenko told Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* on August 9 that at least

three Russian jet-engine drones, likely Geran-3s, struck a former hospital building in Zolochiv (northwest of Kharkiv City).[89]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

POWERED BY:



BABELSTREET

[1] <https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland-und-internationales/friedlicher-rueckzug-hat-trumps-mann-putin-falsch-verstanden-6895de301174f91cbo81eb54>

[2] https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-and-europe-counter-putins-cease-fire-proposal-6a16133c?st=XtqGt5&reflink=article_copyURL_share

[3] <https://kyivindependent.com/exclusive-putin-to-demand-ukraine-cede-new-territory-in-alaska-peace-plan-us-likely-to-agree-kyiv-to-reject/>

[4] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025>

[5] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15575 ; <https://suspilne.media/1086707-zelenskij-vikluciv-bud-aki-teritorialni-postupki-rosii/>; <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/vidpovid-na-ukrayinske-teritorialne-pitannya-ye-vzhe-v-konst-99445>

[6] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025>

[7] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025>

[8] https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-and-europe-counter-putins-cease-fire-proposal-6a16133c?st=XtqGt5&reflink=article_copyURL_share

[9] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925>

[10] <https://x.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/1954201798484381980>;
<https://x.com/Tsahkna/status/1954088534106616063> ;
https://x.com/Braze_Baiba/status/1954103784453349728 ;

<https://x.com/BudrysKestutis/status/1954111017673216350>;
https://x.com/oana_toiu/status/1954255014169563570;
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-call-with-president-zelenskyy-of-ukraine-9-august-2025>
 [11] https://t.me/tass_agency/330036 ; http://kremlin_dot_ru/events/president/news/77745;
https://t.me/news_kremlin/6121; https://t.me/tass_agency/330038
 [12] https://t.me/tass_agency/330048 ; <https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1953940768952893899>
 [13] <https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1953940768952893899>;
<https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1954177766267420898> ;
<https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1954148333406019993>
 [14] <https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1749520810933404072>
 [15] <https://www.newsweek.com/vladimir-solovyov-calls-alaskas-return-russia-2006979> ;
<https://www.newsweek.com/russian-state-tv-us-threat-alaska-1931298>
 [16] <https://alaskapublic.org/news/2022-07-06/putins-aide-threatens-to-claim-back-alaska-in-response-to-us-sanctions>
 [17] https://www.rt_dot_com/russia/442754-us-russia-inf-alaska/
 [18] https://ssu.gov_dot_ua/novyny/bezpilotnyky-sbu-vrazyly-terminal-zberihannia-shakhediv-u-tatarstani; <https://t.me/SBUkr/1552>
 [19] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar122724>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar062825>
 [20] https://suspilne_dot_media/1086555-gur-atakuvalo-zenitno-raketnu-brigadu-rf-u-krasnodarskomu-krai-dzerela/; https://military_dot_com/en/news/diu-attacked-russian-anti-aircraft-missile-brigade-in-krasnodar-territory/
 [21] https://t.me/pograni4nik_iz_ada/11777 ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66550> ;
<https://t.me/milinfo/154390> <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2024> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97363>
 [22] <https://t.me/akashevarova/8124> ; <https://t.me/severnnyi/4772> ;
<https://t.me/severnnyi/4773> <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025>
 [23] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2024>
 [24] <https://t.me/arat/2133>
 [25] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599>
 [26] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97392>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66567>;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32261>; https://t.me/dva_majors/77104 ;
<https://t.me/yurasumy/24281>

- [27] https://t.me/tass_agency/330035; <https://t.me/severnnyi/4774> ;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/40264>
- [28] <https://t.me/severnnyi/4777> ; <https://t.me/severnnyi/4774>
- [29] <https://t.me/wargonzo/28362>
- [30] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32256>;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/28362>; <https://t.me/severnnyi/4774>;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32256>
- [31] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40253>
- [32] <https://t.me/severnnyi/4774>
- [33] <https://t.me/severnnyi/4774>
- [34] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40253>
- [35] <https://t.me/severnnyi/4774>
- [36] <https://t.me/severnnyi/4774>
- [37] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5894
- [38] <https://t.me/wargonzo/28362>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40293> ;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32235>
- [39] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308;
https://t.me/tass_agency/330045
- [40] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32235>
- [41] <https://t.me/severnnyi/4774>
- [42] <https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1953931316077932656>; <https://t.me/mangustzzzz/983>
- [43] <https://t.me/wargonzo/28362>
- [44] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/28362>
- [45] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40301>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40247>
- [46] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97387>
- [47] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599>;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308
- [48] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40246>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66546>

- [49] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/40246>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66546>;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32234>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/28362>;
https://t.me/tass_agency/330057
- [50] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66546>
- [51] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66544>
- [52] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308 ;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66544>
- [53] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308
- [54] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0>; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/08/09/chasiv-yar-perebuvaeye-pid-povnym-vognevym-kontrolem-syl-oborony/> dot
- [55] https://t.me/tass_agency/330124 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/55393 ;
https://t.me/mod_russia/55397
- [56] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66556>
- [57] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40295> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40296> ;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/40269>
- [58] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40285>
- [59] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40277> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40297>
- [60] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308 ;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/40286>
- [61] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFO62_O-gpw ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/08/09/odnorazove-bronetaksi-vorog-pislya-velykyh-vtrat-zminyiv-taktyku-zastosuvannya-tehniky/> dot
- [62] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40247> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40301>
- [63] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66543>
- [64] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308 ;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66539> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66543> ;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/28362>
- [65] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66539> ; https://t.me/rusich_army/25116

- [66] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32231>
- [67] [https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/09/evolyucziya-navpaky-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-vidmovylysyia-vid-pryamohodinnya/](https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/08/09/evolyucziya-navpaky-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-vidmovylysyia-vid-pryamohodinnya/)
- [68] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA> ; [https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/08/bagato-fantastychnyh-vkydiv-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-bye-po-logistyczii-psyhologiyi/](https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/08/08/bagato-fantastychnyh-vkydiv-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-bye-po-logistyczii-psyhologiyi/)
- [69] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFO62_O-gpw ; [https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/09/yakshho-pide-na-shturm-50-50-yakshho-ni-100-dvohsotyj-boyecz-pro-vybir-yakyj-stoyit-pered-okupantom/](https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/08/09/yakshho-pide-na-shturm-50-50-yakshho-ni-100-dvohsotyj-boyecz-pro-vybir-yakyj-stoyit-pered-okupantom/)
- [70] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308 ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602>
- [71] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40249>
- [72] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14162
- [73] https://t.me/dva_majors/77087
- [74] https://t.me/voin_dv/16389
- [75] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308 ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/28362>
- [76] https://t.me/voin_dv/16389
- [77] <https://t.me/wargonzo/28362>
- [78] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15308
- [79] https://t.me/voin_dv/16386
- [80] https://t.me/voin_dv/16394
- [81] https://t.me/rusich_army/25112 ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40280> ; <https://t.me/vrogov/21426> ; <https://ria dot ru/20250808/rogov-2034177081.html>
- [82] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599> ; [https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbido2TmNnZbA3NGqWPFdh8DkNtTy1FSgWjoo2iKmR5v5cBtvpV2RLqdsoGPKXLXgpeDyTl?__cft__\[o\]=AZW3jpOB5rQOvE9y3UxiDOHdU3m7ZRL-zNT1XcVknC9I5jeyuKeEmI8t-MceMyUjHT1uxvDMxcEFygTMor3o1JlcC3vAZai3AUopo7PMtG_NOk5qniBCQpDl3KHG51WnDt8oE4dJSaZyzlrXpPsMVFA_fo71Y36yxHAOmsmI3MwFVW8M-G-hYa4z2egmEPca-bQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R](https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbido2TmNnZbA3NGqWPFdh8DkNtTy1FSgWjoo2iKmR5v5cBtvpV2RLqdsoGPKXLXgpeDyTl?__cft__[o]=AZW3jpOB5rQOvE9y3UxiDOHdU3m7ZRL-zNT1XcVknC9I5jeyuKeEmI8t-MceMyUjHT1uxvDMxcEFygTMor3o1JlcC3vAZai3AUopo7PMtG_NOk5qniBCQpDl3KHG51WnDt8oE4dJSaZyzlrXpPsMVFA_fo71Y36yxHAOmsmI3MwFVW8M-G-hYa4z2egmEPca-bQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R) ;

[83] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40280>

[84] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97411>

[85] https://t.me/russian_airborne/11039; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/40289>

[86] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27625>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27602>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27599>; <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19vrJbPojC/>

[87] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12824; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12824

[88] <https://t.me/kpszsus/40130>

[89] <https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1086691-reaktivni-gerani-vdarili-u-kolisnu-likarnu-v-zolocevi-de-planuvali-zrobiti-reabilitacijnij-centr-kerivnik-sva/>