

Christina Harward, Jessica Sobieski, Angelica Evans, Jennie Olmsted, and Karolina Hird with Nate Trotter

July 22, 2025, 7:15 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on July 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups reportedly recently advanced into southern Pokrovsk as Russian forces continue to pursue their operational objective of enveloping the town. Geolocated footage published on July 21 reportedly shows Russian forces engaging Ukrainian forces driving along the E50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway in southern Pokrovsk.[1] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on July 21 that Russian sabotage groups of unspecified size advanced into Pokrovsk through Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk) "a couple days ago" and that Ukrainian forces are still searching for and destroying these Russian groups.[2] Ukrainian outlet *Ukrainska Pravda* reported on July 22 that Ukrainian military personnel operating in Pokrovsk confirmed that Russian sabotage elements entered the town on July 17 and that Ukrainian forces are conducting clearing operations.[3] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group trying to penetrate Pokrovsk.[4] Geolocated evidence indicates that Russian forces are advancing close to Pokrovsk from the southwest. Geolocated footage published on July 21 indicates that Russian forces also recently marginally advanced east of Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk) after recently intensifying assaults south of Pokrovsk.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further northeast of Zvirove.[6] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Zvirove is a contested "gray zone." [7]

Ukrainian reports of Russian redeployments to the area and Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups entering Pokrovsk suggest that the Russian military is preparing to intensify assaults against the town in the near future. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 21 that the Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the Russian 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) to reinforce the Russian force grouping attacking north and northeast of Pokrovsk.[8] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command intends to leverage these units to intensify efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and that elements of the 2nd CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) have simultaneously intensified assaults south of Pokrovsk. ISW continues to assess that Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (just east of Pokrovsk) by interdicting the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway and complicating Ukrainian egress routes from Pokrovsk.[9] Russian forces have largely struggled to

advance southeast, south, and southwest of Pokrovsk due to Ukrainian drone operations since late 2024. Russian forces reportedly advanced into the outskirts of Myrnohrad in late August 2024 for a short time, but Ukrainian forces later pushed them from the town.[10] Russian forces may continue efforts to advance northeast of Pokrovsk while intensifying attacks against the town from the south and southwest in an effort to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw under threat of envelopment.

Ukrainian and Russian delegations will meet on July 23 in Istanbul for the third round of bilateral negotiations, but Kremlin officials are already dismissing and undermining the upcoming talks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on July 21 that Russian and Ukrainian representatives will meet in Istanbul for the next round of peace negotiations on July 23.[11] Zelensky stated that Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov will again lead the Ukrainian delegation, which will also include representatives from Ukrainian intelligence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Office of the President.[12] Zelensky noted that the Ukrainian delegation will focus on returning prisoners of war (POW) and deported Ukrainian children and announced that Russian and Ukrainian representatives have already begun discussing additional POW exchanges.[13] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that "there is no reason to count on any breakthroughs" in the upcoming talks and that emphasized that Russia intends to ensure its interests and fulfill the tasks that the Kremlin has set from the start of the war - likely referring to Russia's original war aims, such as regime change in Ukraine, changes to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) open-door policy, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that it cannot defend itself.[14] Peskov stated that the Ukrainian and Russian delegations will need to discuss the draft memoranda that they exchanged during the second round of talks on June 2. Russia's delay in exchanging its memorandum until the June 2 meeting and Peskov's July 22 statements continue to indicate that Russia is deliberately trying to delay the negotiation process in order to protract the war and make additional gains on the battlefield.[15]

Russia's reported long-term rearmament plans further indicate that the Kremlin is preparing for a potential future conflict with NATO. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on July 22 that Russia plans to spend \$1.1 trillion on rearmament by 2036 (or roughly \$110 billion per year over the next ten years).[16] Budanov stated that Russia is further mobilizing its society and economy in preparation for a future large-scale war. Budanov noted that Russia's restoration of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD/LMD) and ongoing efforts to form new divisions based on existing units and formations are indicative of Russia's long-term plans. ISW has long assessed that Russia's restoration of the MMD and LMD and ongoing efforts to restructure and expand the Russian Armed Forces are in preparation for a future large-scale conventional war against NATO.[17] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently claimed that Russia's 2025 military budget is 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly \$172 billion) and that Russia plans to steadily decrease defense spending beginning in 2026.[18] It is unclear exactly how much Russia spends on military and defense industrial procurement, however, given ongoing Kremlin efforts to obscure its national budget from domestic and foreign audiences. It remains unclear exactly how Russia will spend and allocate this reported rearmament fund, and the Kremlin may view Russia's rearmament as a separate budget line from Russia's yearly military budget for Ukraine.

Russian authorities recently detained Bryansk Oblast Vice Governor Nikolai Simonenko and former Belgorod Oblast Vice Governor Rustem Zainullin, likely as part of the

Kremlin's continued efforts to scapegoat local officials for larger Russian border security failures following Ukraine's August 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion. Russian law enforcement officials told Kremlin newswire *TASS* on July 22 that Russian authorities detained Simonenko on abuse of power charges and searched Simonenko's home and workplace as part of a larger criminal case investigating the embezzlement of funds allocated for the construction of defensive fortifications in Bryansk Oblast border areas.[19] Russian authorities similarly detained Zainullin for fraud on June 21 on suspicion of embezzling 32 million rubles (roughly \$408,000) in funds allocated to constructing defensive fortifications in the Belgorod Oblast border area.[20] Russian authorities previously detained former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov on similar embezzlement charges in what ISW assessed to be a concerted Kremlin effort to use Kursk Oblast officials as scapegoats for Russia's failure to repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[21] Russian President Vladimir Putin also notably dismissed Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit on July 7 just prior to Starovoit's reported suicide.[22]

Russian authorities targeted a Telegram channel that revealed Russia's role in the late December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane as part of a wider campaign to censor Telegram channels that are critical of the Kremlin. Russian authorities conducted a raid on July 22 against the offices of *Baza*, a Telegram channel reportedly affiliated with Russian law enforcement, as part of an abuse of power investigation against Russian police officers who allegedly disclosed sensitive information to *Baza*. [23] Russian authorities reportedly held *Baza* editor-in-chief Gleb Trifonov and other *Baza* journalists for questioning, and the Russian Investigative Committee claimed that it detained Trifonov and a colleague on suspicions of bribery.[24] In January 2025, *Baza* published a transcript of a conversation between the pilots and ground controllers during the December 2024 downing of the Azerbaijan Airlines plane, disclosing that Russian authorities did not allow the plane to land in Russia even after the plane's crew requested an emergency landing.[25] The Kremlin's raid on *Baza* offices occurred after several smaller-scale incidents in recent weeks, including an Azerbaijani raid on the offices of Russian state-owned *Sputnik* propaganda outlet in Baku, which have inflamed Azerbaijani-Russian relations after Russian President Vladimir Putin refused to take responsibility for Russia's role in downing the plane.[26] Russian officials have been engaged in efforts throughout the war to censor critical Telegram channels and are likely using the investigation into police misconduct as a means of censoring and punishing *Baza* for its role in increasing tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia.

Russian forces recently executed a civilian in the Lyman direction. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction posted footage on July 22 showing several men dressed in Russian military uniforms assaulting and shooting a civilian riding a bicycle on a street near Torske (east of Lyman).[27] The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) states that "intentionally direct attacks against the civilian population or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities" constitutes a serious violation of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict within the established framework of international law.[28] This incident is indicative of the brutality with which Russia treats the Ukrainians living under Russian occupation.

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups reportedly recently advanced into southern Pokrovsk as Russian forces continue to pursue their operational objective of enveloping the town.**
- **Ukrainian and Russian delegations will meet on July 23 in Istanbul for the third round of bilateral negotiations, but Kremlin officials are already dismissing and undermining the upcoming talks.**
- **Russia's reported long-term rearmament plans further indicate that the Kremlin is preparing for a potential future conflict with NATO.**
- **Russian authorities recently detained Bryansk Oblast Vice Governor Nikolai Simonenko and former Belgorod Oblast Vice Governor Rustem Zainullin, likely as part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to scapegoat local officials for larger Russian border security failures following Ukraine's August 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion.**
- **Russian authorities targeted a Telegram channel that revealed Russia's role in the late December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane as part of a wider campaign to censor Telegram channels that are critical of the Kremlin.**
- **Russian forces recently executed a civilian in the Lyman direction.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Zaporizhia oblasts and near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War July 22, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 22.

Russian forces continued assaults in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 21 and 22.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces renewed assaults toward Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[30]

A Russian milblogger claimed on July 22 that Russian forces advanced south of Demidovka and west of Grafovka (both northwest of Belgorod City), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[31]


The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300 air defense system and a Nebo-M radar system in unspecified areas of Belgorod Oblast.[32]

Ukrainian forces likely struck a Russian defense industrial enterprise in Samara Oblast. Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, implied on July 22 that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuybyshevsk Petrochemical Company in Novokuybyshevsk, Samara Oblast.[33] Kovalenko reported that the company is one of Russia's largest gas processing and petrochemical companies and is part of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). Kovalenko reported that the company produces raw materials for explosives, including benzene, phenol, acetone, alpha-methylstyrene, synthetic ethyl alcohol, and para-tert-butylphenol. The company reportedly produces one million tons of raw material per year.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction July 22, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City) and likely seized the settlement.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade seized Varachyne.[35] Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have only seized part of the settlement and that reports that Russian forces seized all of Varachyne are premature, however.[36]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) and advanced in eastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City), southwest of Kindrativka, and north of Prokhody (west of Sumy City along the international border with Belgorod Oblast).[37]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Sumy direction, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on July 21 and 22.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Kindrativka and that Russian forces are either encircled in or retreating from the settlement.[39] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Yunakivka is a contested “gray zone.”[40]

The Sumy Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on July 22 that Russian forces conducted a “double tap” drone strike against a gas station in Putvil (northwest of Sumy City).[41]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[42] Elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Andriivka and Oleksiivka, and elements of the 76th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Yunakivka.[43] Elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly conducted an unsuccessful attack near Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City).[44] Drone operators of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Khotin and Pysarivka (both north of Sumy City).[45]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in Vovchansk and near Strytsya (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[46]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on July 21 and 22.[47]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 500 meters southwest of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[48]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove on July 21 and 22.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast July 22, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 22 but did not advance.


Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Stroikva and Kamyanka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka, Kutkivka, and Zapadne; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on July 21 and 22.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced into Zelenyi Hai (east of Borova).[51]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and toward Bohuslavka; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on July 21 and 22.[52]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 22 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Lypove (north of Lyman) and advanced southwest of Lypove and into eastern Torske (east of Lyman).[53]


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Karpivka (north of Lyman).[54]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove and Serednie; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Zelena Dolyna, and Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Myrne, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on July 21 and 22.[55]

A Ukrainian brigade spokesperson operating in the Lyman direction reported that Ukrainian forces recently repelled two Russian tanks attacking in an unspecified area of the Lyman direction.[56] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces rarely use armored vehicles in this direction. The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are constantly attacking in highly attritional, infantry-led assaults and that Ukrainian forces have suffered only one loss for every 66 Russian losses in recent months. A Russian source claimed that Russian forces built new fortifications and observation posts near Dibrova (east of Lyman).[57]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast July 22, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske; and south of Siversk near Pereizne on July 21 and 22.[58]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[59]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 22 shows likely elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) raising a flag in southwestern Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment seized the settlement on July 21.[61]

Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Predtechyne on July 21 and 22.[62]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Nevsky Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[63] Elements of the 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[64]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction July 22, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Dylivka (immediately north of Toretsk).[65]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Toretsk.[66] Additional geolocated footage published on July 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Popiv Yar (northwest of Toretsk) and into southern Poltavka (north of Popiv Yar), suggesting that Russian forces seized Popiv Yar.[67]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east and west of Poltavka, south of Rusyn Yar (northwest of Pokrovsk), and northwest of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[68]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliikva; northwest of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Rusyn Yar, Romanivka, Poltavka, Popiv Yar, Yablunivka, and toward Katerynivka and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Novospaske and Shcherbynivka on July 21 and 22.[69]




The chief of staff of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Toretsk direction stated that Russian forces are attacking in small groups with drone and unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) support.[70] The chief of staff stated that Russian forces almost exclusively operate in daylight.

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Katerynivka.[71] Drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka, and

drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Dachne (north of Toretsk).[72] Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) and 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are reportedly operating in Shcherbynivka.[73]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.



See topline text for reports of Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups entering Pokrovsk and assessed Russian advances in the area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 21 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces in Razine (northeast of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently reseeded the settlement.[74]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 22 that Russian forces seized Novotoretske (northeast of Pokrovsk).[75] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Fedorivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced south of Pomin (east of Pokrovsk), west of Mykolaivka, and southwest of Mayak (both northeast of Pokrovsk).[76] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating near Nove Shakhove (north of Pokrovsk) and entered Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[77]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Fedorivka, Boikivka, Krasnyi Lyman, Novoekonomichne, Volodymyrivka, Mykolaivka, and toward Mayak; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Pomin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Sukhyi Yar, and Chuyshyne; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Zvirove, and Udachne on July 21 and 22.[78]

An intelligence officer of a Ukrainian special forces unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that attacking Russian forces in this direction have varying equipment levels, with some lacking weapons, helmets, plate carriers, and bulletproof vests.[79] The officer stated that the number and quality of Russian first-person view (FPV) drones have increased significantly in the area.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces crossed the Vovcha River near Yalta (south of Novopavlivka) toward Filiya (north of Yalta) and advanced toward Yanvarske and south and east of Zelenyi Hai (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[81]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Oleksiivka, and Zelenyi Kut; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Voskresenka, Myrne, Novokhatske, Piddubne, Zirka, and Zelenyi Hai, and toward Oleksandrohrad on July 21 and 22.[82]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksandrohrad.[83]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 22 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Temyrivka (west of Velyka Novosilka) and made marginal gains toward Maliivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[84]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Maliivka and west of Velyka Novosilka toward Temyrivka on July 22.[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Komyshevukha (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[86]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)


Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast.



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[87]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv) and towards Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[88]


Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on July 21 and 22.[89]



A Russian milblogger claimed on July 21 that Russian forces conducted a platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of three tanks towards the brick factory in Mala Tokmachka, and another Russian milblogger claimed on July 22 that Russian forces seized the brick factory.[90]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Orikhiv direction.[91]

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction on July 21 and 22 but did not advance.[92]



Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[93]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 42 Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones from the directions of Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea.[94] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 26 drones and

that 7 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts.[95]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

POWERED BY:



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[1] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1947345550518501667; <https://t.co/5t87p2V4sT>; <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22205>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96296>

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