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August 29, 2025, 8:15pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on August 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia reportedly leveraged the August 15 Alaska Summit in order to stall for a planned Fall 2025 offensive, among other things. A German source with insider knowledge told Reuters that Ukrainian officials warned German officials on August 13 that Ukrainian intelligence assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin planned to use the Alaska Summit to "play for time" ahead of a potential Russian offensive in October or November 2025.[1] This report is consistent with recent Ukrainian warnings of Russian efforts to prepare for renewed offensives in the future, though it is not yet clear where Russian forces may focus their main effort in Fall 2025. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 12 that Russia may transfer 15,000 troops to the Zaporizhia direction, 7,000 troops to the Pokrovsk direction, and 5,000 troops to the Novopavlivka direction to intensify offensive operations in these areas in the near future.[2] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in an interview published on August 12 that Russian forces planned to achieve all their objectives near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk — presumably seizing the entirety of these towns — by the end of August or start of September 2025.[3] Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces postponed their initial plan to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by August 1 to December 31, 2025, and that Russian forces increased strikes against Kherson City in accordance with plans to do so. Russian forces notably took advantage of the August 15 Alaska Summit to intensify ongoing offensive operations in certain areas of the theater, such as conducting an infiltration operation near Dobropillya, and to stockpile drones and missiles that Russian forces used to strike Kyiv and inflict heavy civilian casualties overnight on August 27 to 28.[4] Reports that Russian forces are still planning for a Fall 2025 offensive support ISW's long-term assessment and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's recent statements that the Kremlin's war aims in Ukraine have not changed.[5]

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave a major speech at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium on August 29. Belousov gave an update on the ten priority directions for the Russian MoD. Belousov also discussed Russian battlefield progress in Ukraine and exaggerated Russian gains in recent weeks. Belousov claimed on August 29 that Russian forces seized roughly 300 to 400 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory per month at the beginning of 2025 but that Russian forces are currently seizing roughly 600 to 700 square kilometers per month.[6] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized roughly 426.85 square kilometers of territory in January 2025, 310.67 square kilometers in February 2025, 193.19 square kilometers in March 2024,

173.79 square kilometers in April 2025, 499.28 kilometers in May 2025, 465.80 square kilometers in June 2025, 445.88 square kilometers in July 2025, and about 500 square kilometers thus far in August 2025. Russian advances in August 2025 are far below Belousov's claims. Belousov's statement also ignores that Russian forces are making these gains in open fields and areas with minimal fortifications, through failed infiltration operations such as those east and northeast of Dobropillya, and at heavy personnel losses.[7] Ukrainian General Staff reporting about Russian personnel casualties thus indicates that Russian forces suffered an average of 938 personnel casualties per day thus far in August 2025.[8] Belousov stated that 97 percent of wounded in action (WIA) servicemembers return to the frontlines "after being wounded," which is consistent with reports that the Russian military command continues to send injured Russian personnel on attritional, infantry-led assaults.[9]

Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD has shifted its priorities to produce light vehicles over heavy armored vehicles, reflecting Russian battlefield tactics since winter 2024–2025. Belousov claimed that the Russian MoD procured and delivered 22,725 motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and buggies to the frontlines and plans to deliver an additional 12,186 light vehicles to Russian forces along the frontlines by the end of August 2025.[10] ISW previously observed reports from unspecified Russian military sources that claimed that Russia purchased over 40,000 Chinese-made motorcycles in 2024 and intends to purchase up to 200,000 motorcycles and 60,000 other light vehicles in 2025.[11] Russian forces are increasingly fielding light vehicles including motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and buggies in lieu of heavy armored vehicles such as tanks due to their maneuverability and cheap cost relative to armored vehicles, which Ukrainian drone operations threaten.[12] Russian forces have not implemented adequate protection for armored vehicles and tanks against Ukrainian drone strikes and Russia faces declining tank and armored vehicle stockpiles.[13]

Belousov stated that Russia continues to focus on developing its Unmanned Systems Forces and drone production capacity. Belousov stated that Russian forces are focused on integrating elements of the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces units into the wider Russian forces and noted that the MoD must still augment logistics and repairs, implement faster training of drone operators, and better staff unmanned systems units.[14] The Russian MoD launched a coordinated effort in August 2024 to create a centralized separate service for unmanned systems, likely to centralize the MoD's control over informal specialized drone detachments and unmanned systems procurement.

Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD is expanding its efforts to digitalize Russian recruitment likely as part of wider efforts to augment Russia's administrative capacity to handle conscription and mobilization processes. Belousov noted that the MoD continues implementing a myriad of digital changes to streamline administrative processes for Russian personnel, including onboarding new servicemembers, receiving feedback and appeals from Russian servicemembers, and digitizing the application process and issuance of combat veteran status.[15] Belousov highlighted that the MoD completed the State System of Unified Military Registration, which is a "unified digital environment" for the MoD.[16] Russia has focused on digitizing elements of the conscription and mobilization process since the partial involuntary reserve call-up in September 2022 and has digitalized aspects of this process including issuing digital draft summons for Russian conscripts.[17] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov introduced a bill in late July 2025 that would facilitate Russia's ability to process mobilized personnel throughout

the year rather than only during the semi-annual reserve call-ups, allowing Russia to mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that complicate Russia's ability to conduct large-scale involuntary call-ups of conscripts and reservists.[18]

ISW will cover Belousov's speech in greater detail in a forthcoming Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations report

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 29 that GUR forces struck a Russian Buyan-M radar system belonging to an S-400 air defense system in an unspecified location in occupied Crimea overnight on August 28 to 29.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 29 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SOF), struck a Russian diesel fuel pumping station near Naytopovychi, Bryansk Oblast.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the station pumps diesel fuel through Russia's main oil product pipelines, including for Russian forces, and has a pumping capacity of roughly 10.5 million tons per year. Ukrainian intelligence sources told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on August 28 that unspecified actors, implied to be pro-Ukrainian, planted and remotely detonated explosives under railway fuel tanks at the Tver City railway station located between Moscow and St. Petersburg and that the explosion caused a massive fire.[21] The sources stated that the Tver railway junction is a hub that Russia uses to supply its army with fuel and lubricants, ammunition, and personnel. Geolocated footage published on August 28 and Russian opposition outlet Astra clarified that Ukrainian drones struck a crude distillation unit, a liquefied gas rack, a liquified gas pipeline, a gasoline pipeline, a diesel fuel storage tank, and other equipment at the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast during a strike on August 28.[22] Astra reported that 28 Ukrainian drones struck the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery and forced the refinery to cease operations.

Ukraine's ongoing strikes campaign against Russian oil infrastructure continues to contribute to gasoline shortages in Russia. Sources told Reuters on August 29 that damage from Ukrainian strikes on the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast overnight on August 23 to 24 will force the port's oil export terminal to operate at about half its usual capacity at around 350,000 barrels per day in September 2025.[23] Attacks against Russian rail-transported fuel shipments also may exacerbate supply problems. Russian business outlet *Kommersant* noted on August 21 that rail-transported fuel also causes supply logistics problems as fuel tanks can take two to three months to reach their destination railway station and then stand idle for several weeks before reaching their intended oil depots.[24] Ukraine's continued strikes are evidently having an impact on Russia's domestic gasoline market, exacerbating shortages and causing price spikes that will likely push over inflation upwards and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[25]

US and Ukrainian representatives met in New York City on August 29 and reaffirmed Ukraine's readiness for peace negotiations with Russia, including at the level of heads of state. Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak stated on August 29 that he and Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Serhiy Kyslytsia met with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff and emphasized Ukraine's readiness to end the war.[26] Yermak noted that Ukraine welcomes all US-proposed peace initiatives and efforts to end the war and that Ukraine is ready for direct negotiations at the level of heads of state.[27]

The US State Department approved three Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of aviation ammunition, Starlink services, and Patriot air defense system support to Ukraine. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on August 28 that the US State Department approved an FMS to Ukraine worth roughly \$825 million that includes up to 3,350 Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) air-launched missiles and 3,350 navigation systems equipped with modules equipped with anti-spoofing modules, weapons components and spare parts, support equipment, weapons software and support equipment, technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, and logistics and transportation support.[28] The DCSA reported that Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and US Foreign Military Funding are funding this FMS to Ukraine. The DSCA announcement confirmed an August 24 report from the *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) that the United States had approved the sale of the 3,350 ERAMs for Ukraine.[29] The DCSA announced on August 29 that the US State Department approved another FMS to Ukraine worth roughly \$150 million that includes an extension of Starlink terminal support services and a third FMS to Ukraine worth roughly \$179 million that includes Patriot air defense system spare parts, maintenance, and related equipment and technical support.[30]


Russian forces recently executed seven Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Myrolyubivka, Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on August 29 that it opened an investigation into Russian forces who brutally tortured and executed seven Ukrainian POWs in a basement near Myrolyubivka, Donetsk Oblast in August 2025, and attempted to kill an eighth Ukrainian POW who survived the execution attempt.[31] Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* detailed how the surviving Ukrainian POW crawled to safety for five days after the executions and noted that the POW had to write his account of the executions by hand because the injury Russian forces inflicted prevented him from verbally speaking.[32] There has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025, and ISW continues to assess that Russian military commanders including battlefield commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of international law.[33]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russia reportedly leveraged the August 15 Alaska Summit in order to stall for a planned Fall 2025 offensive, among other things.**
- **Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave a major speech at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium on August 29 and gave an update on the ten priority directions for the Russian MoD. Belousov also discussed Russian battlefield progress in Ukraine and exaggerated Russian gains in recent weeks.**
- **Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD has shifted its priorities to produce light vehicles over heavy armored vehicles, reflecting Russian battlefield tactics since Winter 2024–2025.**
- **Belousov stated that Russia continues to focus on developing its Unmanned Systems Forces and drone production capacity.**

- **Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD is expanding its efforts to digitalize Russian recruitment, likely as part of wider efforts to augment Russia's administrative capacity to handle conscription and mobilization processes.**
- **Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine.**
- **Ukraine's ongoing strikes campaign against Russian oil infrastructure continues to contribute to gasoline shortages in Russia.**
- **US and Ukrainian representatives met in New York City on August 29 and reaffirmed Ukraine's readiness for peace negotiations with Russia, including at the level of heads of state.**
- **The US State Department approved a \$825 million Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of aviation ammunition and related equipment to Ukraine.**
- **Russian forces recently executed seven Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Myrolyubivka, Donetsk Oblast.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Pokrovsk.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War August 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus


Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for Ukrainian strikes in Russia and occupied Ukraine.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 29 but did not advance.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction August 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka; northeast of Sumy City within Yunakivka and near Sadky; and in unspecified areas of Sumy and Kursk oblasts on August 28 and 29.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka.[35]


A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces have been bogged down in attritional fighting in Yunakivka for over a month, despite daily Russian reports of incremental gains.[36] The milblogger noted that Russian forces have repeatedly claimed the seizure of Yunakivka and that the presence of individual Russian soldiers does not indicate that Russian forces seized the settlement.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 76th and 106th airborne (VDV) divisions, 11th and 83rd VDV brigades, and the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in Sumy Oblast.[37]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.




Assessed Ukrainian advances: Derhachi City Military Administration Head Vyacheslav Zadorenko stated on August 29 that Ukrainian forces did not observe any enduring Russian advances east of Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City).[38] ISW previously observed geolocated footage posted on August 28 that indicated that Russian forces had advanced in the area and had recoded previous Russian advances in the area as Ukrainian-controlled territory.[39]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on August 28 and 29.[40] Kharkiv Oblast occupation governor Vitaly Ganchev claimed on August 28 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the Vovchansk direction.[41]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kanada Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kozacha Lopan.[42] Elements of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion, the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) forces, and the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[43] Drone operators of the 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC) reportedly continue to operate in Kharkiv Oblast.[44]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on August 28 and 29 that Russian forces advanced within and near Kupyansk.[45]


Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka, Zapadne, and toward Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Fyholivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka; and west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka on August 28 and 29.[46]

The commander of a Ukrainian company operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on August 29 that Russian forces are primarily attacking at night using infantry with thermal-imagery devices and anti-thermal cloaks to find gaps and penetrate deep into Ukrainian positions to direct drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and logistics.[47] The Ukrainian commander stated that Russian forces are relying more on infantry in the Kupyansk direction, as Russian forces continue to struggle to transport heavy equipment across the Oskil River, and are remotely mining roads and leveraging sleeper drones. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are using small groups, occasionally consisting of a single soldier, in an attempt to gain a foothold near Ukrainian positions and conduct semi-sabotage operations.[48]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk.[49]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction August 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Hreivka (southeast of Borova).[50]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[51]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Hreivka and toward Druzhelyubivka on August 28 and 29.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 29 but did not make confirmed advances

Unconfirmed claims: A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Russian forces recently advanced near Shandryholove.[53]


Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Hlushchenkove, Novyi Myr, Karpivka, Ridkodub, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 28 and 29.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Ridkodub.[55]

Geolocated footage published on August 29 shows elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) striking a company-sized Ukrainian mechanized assault including unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) near Shandryholove.[56] Ukrainian forces first reported conducting a fully robotic operation in December 2024.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Lyman and drone operators of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[58]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast August 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on August 28 and 29.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Serebryanka.[60]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage purportedly showing Russian forces striking a Ukrainian crossing near Dronivka.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on August 28 and 29.[62]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian forces are attempting to advance through destroyed Chasiv Yar in small infantry groups that follow different routes and try to assemble near Ukrainian positions for assaults.[63] The spokesperson noted that it is difficult for Ukrainian forces to determine the intensity of Russian assaults as Russian units are better able to hide amongst the rubble.

Kramatorsk City Military Administration Head Oleksandr Honcharenko reported that Russian forces struck a supermarket and a post office in Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar) with a V2U autonomous drone equipped with artificial intelligence (AI), killing one civilian and injuring another.[64] The *Financial Times* reported on August 28 that Russian forces are regularly conducting drone strikes against Druzhivka (directly south of Kramatorsk).[65] ISW recently observed reports that Russian forces conducted a large-scale glide bomb strike against Kramatorsk and that 90 percent of the affected areas were civilian.[66]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian supply lines near Markove (northwest of Chasiv Yar).[67] Snipers of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on August 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk).[69]


Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Shulytne; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Kleban-Byk, Katerynivka, Pleshiivka, Nelipivka, and Poltavka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 28 and 29.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kleban-Byk.[71]

A humanitarian worker in Kostyantynivka told the *Financial Times* in an article published on August 28 that the situation in Kostyantynivka has become much more dangerous in recent weeks due to the threat of Russian drone strikes.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 29 that Russian forces struck a large warehouse storing humanitarian aid in Kostyantynivka.[73]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Medusa crew (a 152mm artillery gun crew) of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kleban-Byk.[74]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction August 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Control of Terrain near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad August 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 28 shows two Russian soldiers raising a flag in northeastern Leontovychi, indicating that Russian forces recently seized (southwest of Pokrovsk) the settlement.[75] Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) participated in seizing Leontovychi.[76] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement by assaulting Ukrainian fire points and strongholds in small groups under artillery and drone cover.[77]

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on August 29 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[78]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Novoekonomichne, Sukhetske, Shakhove, Mayak, and Zapovidne; east of

Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Sukhyi Yar, Mykolaivka, and Dachenske and toward Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Troyanda, Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne on August 28 and 29.[79] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk) and between Rubizhne and Nove Shakhove and near Zapovidne, Malynivka, and Myrne (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[80]

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces interdicted the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway, which Ukraine uses as a ground line of communication (GLOC).[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to fight in the Dobropillya salient northeast of Pokrovsk and are sometimes able to advance.[82] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces gained footholds north of Zoloty Kolodyaz and in southern Petrivka behind the T-0514 highway (both northeast of Pokrovsk). The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are pushing Russian forces back in Vesele, western Zoloty Kolodyaz, and toward Kucheriv Yar (all northeast of Pokrovsk) and that Ukrainian forces are holding positions west of Vesele and Kucheriv Yar. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are fighting in northern Volodymyrivka and trying to seize Shakhove and advancing toward Sofiivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) from the east.

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on August 29 that Russian forces are trying to occupy the suburbs around Pokrovsk in order to create lines from which they can begin an assault on the city and that fighting continues on the approaches to the town.[83] The milblogger claimed that Russian reconnaissance units are operating in Pokrovsk.[84]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces launched a series of Shahed and combined strikes against Ukrainian near rear targets in the Pokrovsk direction, including against Ukrainian positions near Dobropillya, Vesna, and Novostepanivka (all northwest of Pokrovsk), damaging energy and industrial infrastructure and a Ukrainian command post.[85]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Novoukrainka, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste and Zelenyi Hai on August 28 and 29.[86] Mashovets stated on August 29 that Russian forces continue to attack on both sides of the Zaporizhia-Donetsk H-15 highway, including in the Ivanivka-Andriivka-Klevtsove area (southwest of Novopavlivka) and that Ukrainian forces recently counterattacked near Andriivka-Klevtsove-Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka).[87]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Ivanivka.[88]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velykomykhailivka Direction August 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka) and advanced south of Ternove, south of Vorone, toward Komyshevukha, near Maliivka, and into central Khoroshe (all southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[89] Mashovets stated on August 29 that elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, EMD), and 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) advanced toward Komyshevukha from the east, south, and southeast.[90]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne, Oleksandrohrad, and Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Novoselivka and Voskresenka; southeast of

Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve, Maliivka, Novoheorhiivka, and Zaporizke; and south of Velykomykhailivka near Novomykolaivka and Berezove on August 28 and 29.[91] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces recently counterattacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad-Myrne and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka-Vorone (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[92]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 29th CAA, EMD) and the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 5th Tank Brigade (both of the 36th CAA, EMD), and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are operating in the Myrne-Oleksandrohrad, Voskresenka-Sichneve, and Voskresenka-Maliivka directions.[93] Mashovets reported that elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are operating toward Novoheorhiivka.[94] Mashovets added that the Russian military command redeployed the majority of the 35th CAA, including the 69th Cover Brigade, to the 5th CAA area of responsibility (AOR), which extends approximately from Andriivka-Klevtsove to Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), to reinforce the southern part of the AOR of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces, which likely represents a reprioritization of this area.[95]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 69th Cover Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Komyshevukha.[96] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) and the 5th Tank Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novoselivka.[97] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are conducting unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in Sosnivka.[98]


Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 29

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[99] Drone operators of the 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Vremivka direction (northeast of Hulyaipole).[100]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 29 but did not advance.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction August 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces attacked near Orikhiv itself; southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka and Stepove and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirska and Plavni on August 28 and 29.[101] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirska and Stepove and southwest of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky.[102] Geolocated footage published on August 29 shows Ukrainian forces repelling an at least reduced company-sized Russian mechanized assault southeast of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) in which Russian forces lost two T-72 tanks and four BMP-1 and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles.[103]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched an unspecified large number of drones against occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and amplified footage purportedly showing elements of the Russian BARS-


Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Airborne [VDV] Forces) attempting to repel a drone strike in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[104]

Russian milbloggers claimed on August 29 that Russian forces launched an Iskander missile at a Ukrainian Neptune missile system near Lyubyske (northeast of Orikhiv).[105]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and elements of the 7th VDV Division, including its 247th and 108th VDV regiments, are attacking toward Plavni (west of Orikhiv) and Stepanohirsk.[106] Drone operators of the Chechen Vostok-Akhmat Battalion are reportedly conducting aerial reconnaissance in northwestern Robotyne (south of Orikhiv).[107] Elements of the 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka.[108] Drone operators of the Russian Nemets group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[109]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on August 29 but did not advance.[110]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction August 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 29 that unspecified Russian VDV and naval infantry elements and likely elements of the 18th CAA (SMD) are regularly attacking the Dniro River Delta and trying to create a tactical bridgehead on the east (right) bank of the Dniro River.[111]

Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported that the Russian strike on the Ukrainian Navy reconnaissance *Simferopol* ship on August 28 killed two crew members.[112] This is the first publicly documented instance of a Russian naval sea drone striking a Ukrainian naval vessel.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly of the 40th Army Corps [AC], 18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Tiahynka (northeast of Kherson City) and drone operators of the 104th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novotiahynka and Lvove (both northeast of Kherson City).[113]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 28 and 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 68 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[114] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 46 drones over the north and east of Ukraine and that 22 drones struck nine locations in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on August 29 that Russian forces launched a drone strike against Dnipropetrovsk Oblast overnight that killed two civilians and injured three others.[115]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[77] <https://t.me/sashakots/55906>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98689>;

[78] <https://t.me/rybar/73174>

[79] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377>; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16625; <https://t.me/rybar/73184> ;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/28845> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/78404

[80] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67076>; <https://t.me/rybar/73184>

[81] https://t.me/tass_agency/334242

[82] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67076>

[83] <https://t.me/rybar/73184>; <https://t.me/rybar/73174>

[84] <https://t.me/rybar/73184>

[85] https://t.me/don_partizan/9211

[86] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377> ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16625 ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/78404

[87] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2948>

[88] https://t.me/voin_dv/16660

[89] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98687>; https://t.me/dva_majors/78404;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33155>

[90] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2948>

[91] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377>; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/16625;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/28845>; <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2948>

[92] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2948>

[93] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2948>

[94] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2948>

[95] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2949>

[96] https://t.me/voin_dv/16655

[97] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177655

[98] https://t.me/voin_dv/16657; https://t.me/voin_dv/16662;
<https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1961405623901577255>

[99] https://t.me/voin_dv/16658 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16664

[100] https://t.me/voin_dv/16665

[101] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380> ;
https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12894; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377>;
https://t.me/dva_majors/78451; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33152>;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33152>; <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2950>

[102] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33152>; https://t.me/dva_majors/78451

[103] <https://x.com/moklasen/status/1961452084433170521>; https://t.me/dumky_frontovyka/2694

[104] https://t.me/dva_majors/78411; https://t.me/rogozin_do/7517

[105] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98696>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/177682

[106] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2950>

[107] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5955

[108] https://t.me/dva_majors/78451

[109] <https://t.me/wargonzo/28854>

[110] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28407>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28380> ;
https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12894; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28377>

[111] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2950>

[112] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk> ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/08/29/urazhennya-korablya-vms-zsu-zrosla-kilkist-zagyblyh-tryvayut-poshukovo-ryatuvalni-roboty/>

[113] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28632; https://t.me/rusich_army/25435

[114] <https://t.me/kpszsu/41227>

[115] <https://t.me/dnipropetrovskODA/23951> ; <https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1101864-vijskarf-atakuvali-dnipro-ta-tri-rajoni-oblasti-dronami-dvoe-ludej-zaginuli-se-troe-poraneni/>