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August 15, 2025, 9pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on August 15, except for reports about the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15. Trump and Putin initially planned to meet one-on-one, but the talks expanded to a three-on-three format including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff, for unspecified reasons.[1] Leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev claimed that the talks went "remarkably well" following the three-on-three discussions.[2] Trump and Putin then held a joint press conference. Putin addressed the crowd first and spoke in Russian, reiterating several long-standing Kremlin information operations about the war in Ukraine, Russian history, and the US-Russia relationship.[3] Putin invoked the geographical closeness of Alaska and the Russian Federation and called back to US-Soviet military cooperation during the Second World War in order to artificially highlight bilateral US-Russia relations. Putin emphasized the importance of solving the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which the Kremlin has defined as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[4] Putin also accused European states of attempting to undermine the negotiation process. These statements are two standard narrative lines that the Kremlin employs in order to justify its illegal invasion of Ukraine and to drive a wedge between the United States, Europe, and Ukraine.[5] Trump then spoke for a shorter time than Putin and emphasized that the meeting had been "productive," but that the US and Russian delegations reached "no deal." Putin concluded by addressing Trump in English and inviting him to Moscow.[6] Trump and Putin left the press conference stage without taking any audience questions, and a luncheon planned for after the meeting was reportedly cancelled.[7]

Putin said nothing in the joint press conference to indicate that he has moderated either his war aims or his willingness to compromise on them and reiterated language he has used since 2021 to justify Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Putin again demonstrated that he has not changed his views on Ukrainian sovereignty since 2021 and remains disinterested in serious peace negotiations with Ukraine. Putin used the joint press conference following the August 15 Alaska summit to evoke the Kremlin's long-standing narrative that Russia and Ukraine share the "same roots" and that Russia considers Ukraine to be a "brotherly" nation.[8] Putin published an essay on the "Historic Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" in July 2021, in which he similarly ideologized that Ukrainians and Belarusians have always belonged to the Russian nation because of their shared

"historical and spiritual space." [9] ISW previously assessed that the essay, which Putin published less than a month after meeting with then-US President Joe Biden in Geneva in June 2021, was an ultimatum to Kyiv as it openly questioned Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Putin stated in the essay that Ukraine was a "product of the Soviet era shaped on the lands of historical Russia," and reiterated these arguments in his February 2022 declaration of war against Ukraine as a justification for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. [10] The continuity between Putin's statements at the August 15 press conference with Trump and his previous statements demonstrates that he remains committed to the view that Ukraine's existence as a state and territorial integrity depend on Ukraine's alignment with Russia.

Trump stated that the United States and Russia did not come to a firm agreement about the war in Ukraine. Trump reported that he and Putin "made great progress" and agreed on "many points" but did not agree on other points. [11] Trump did not elaborate on the specifics of what the US and Russian delegations discussed, upon what points the delegations agreed, and which points remain in contention. Trump stated that "there's no deal until there's a deal" and stated that he will inform Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and NATO states about the conversation and that an agreement on Ukraine is "ultimately up to them." [12] Trump reiterated his timeline that any bilateral economic agreements with Russia will come after the war is "over with."

Russia conducted drone and missile strikes in Ukraine in the hours before the August 15 Alaska summit, causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Voronezh and Bryansk oblasts and 97 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the direction of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast on the night of August 14 to August 15. [13] Russian forces used drones to target frontline areas of Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Chernihiv oblasts, and the missiles to target Kharkiv and Chernihiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down or suppressed 63 Shahed-type and decoy drones over northern and eastern Ukraine. [14] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the two Iskander-Ms and 34 drones struck 13 locations throughout Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that the ballistic missiles hit cars in Dniprovskiy Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and an agricultural enterprise in Koryukivka Hromada, Chernihiv Oblast, killing and wounding civilians. [15] Russian drones hit an ambulance and a civilian car in Velykapyshkarivka Hromada, Sumy Oblast, on the morning of August 15, killing one civilian. [16] Ukrainian officials and media sources reported on the evening of August 15 that a Russian drone hit the Sumy City Central Market, damaging retail outlets, an educational institution, and other buildings. [17] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces conducted drone strikes against Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts "on the eve of the [Alaska] meeting." [18] US President Donald Trump responded to the August 15 Russian strikes while en route to Alaska, noting that Russian President Vladimir Putin is "trying to set a stage" ahead of the summit. [19] Trump stated that the Russian strikes will "hurt" Putin's ability to make a deal with Trump. Russia continues to conduct drone and missile strikes that result in high civilian casualties even as Trump has repeatedly called on Russia to stop strike series that disproportionately affect civilian areas. [20] The United Nations (UN) reported on August 13 that Russian air and drone strikes in July 2025 contributed to the highest total monthly casualty toll since May 2022. [21]

Ukrainian officials continue to indicate that Ukrainian counterattacks are stabilizing the situation east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk). Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces have stabilized Russian penetration near Pokrovsk and Dobropillya.[22] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces continue to destroy the Russian assault groups in the area and that Russian forces have not been able to redeploy additional troops to the area. A Ukrainian corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces cleared Pokrovsk of Russian groups and individual soldiers who had previously infiltrated the settlement.[23] A Ukrainian corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces cleared Hruzke, Rubizhne, Novovodyane, Petrivka, Vesele, and Zoloty Kolodyaz (all northeast of Dobropillya).[24] A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces have in part stabilized the situation along the Vesele-Zoloty Kolodyaz-Kucheriv Yar line (northeast of Dobropillya).[25] ISW has not observed broader reporting about Ukrainian forces clearing settlements in the Russian penetration near Dobropillya at this time. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 15 that elements of the Russian 5th, 110th, and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (all of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) initially advanced several hundred meters east of Pankivka (east of Dobropillya) but that Ukrainian counterattacks from Volodymyrivka and Shakhove (both north of Pankivka) pushed back the Russian advance.[26] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) have been attempting to hold Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya) and to repel Ukrainian counterattacks in the Ivanivka-Zapovidne direction (north to east of Dorozhnie) since August 13.[27] A Russian milblogger also acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Zoloty Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[28] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces had tactical successes near the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway.[29] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Volodymyrivka and Shakhove.[30] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claimed Russian advances, however.

The Russian military command is reportedly trying to redeploy forces and means to reinforce and exploit the penetration near Dobropillya but has so far been unsuccessful. Mashovets stated that small infantry groups of the Russian 5th, 110th, and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (all three of the 51st CAA) conducted the initial penetration, but that the total number of Russian forces that conducted the tactical breakthrough did not exceed 300 to 350 personnel.[31] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command tried to consolidate the penetration by redeploying elements of the 114th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) to near Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and Zapovidne.[32] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command asked senior commanders in the area to provide additional forces and means by redeploying up to two battalions with armored vehicles from the 8th CAA (SMD), which is largely operating in the Toretsk direction, to support the other elements of the 51st CAA that conducted the tactical breakthrough.

Ukrainian officials continue to conduct evacuations of settlements near the Russian penetration area, however, likely reflecting the increased Russian drone threat due to the Russian advance near Dobropillya. Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin announced on August 14 the mandatory evacuation of families with children from Druzhkivka (northeast of Dobropillya) and villages in Andriivka Hromada, northeast, north, and northwest of Zoloty Kolodyaz,

noting that roughly 1,800 children live in these settlements.[33] ISW continues to assess that Russia's use of drone strikes to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects in the Ukrainian rear is severely hindering Ukrainian evacuation efforts in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya area.[34]

Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 14 to 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 15 that Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) and other Ukrainian elements conducted a drone strike against the Rosneft Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast, causing explosions and fires.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Syzran Oil Refinery is one of Rosneft's largest refineries and produces a wide range of fuel products, including aviation kerosene for the Russian military. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, posted images on August 15 showing smoke over the Syzran Oil Refinery.[36] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Syzran Oil Refinery in February 2025.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 15 that the Ukrainian SSO and other Ukrainian forces also struck the Russian Olya Seaport in Astrakhan Oblast, including the Port Olya 4 vessel, which was carrying Shahed-type drone components and ammunition from Iran.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian military uses the Olya Seaport as a logistics supply point for military goods from Iran. The Ukrainian SSO Command reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed the Port Olya-4.[39] Astrakhan Oblast Governor Igor Babushkin claimed that Russian air defenses downed Ukrainian drones targeting the Olya Seaport and that drone debris damaged a ship.[40]

Russian opposition outlet Baza reported on August 15 that there was an explosion at the Elastik Gunpowder Factory in Ryazan Oblast.[41] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov confirmed that there was an "emergency situation" at a plant in the area that killed five and injured 100 others and declared a state of emergency in the municipality.[42] The Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) opened an investigation into the violation of safety procedures following the explosion.[43] Kovalenko posted footage on August 15 showing an explosion at a gunpowder plant in Ryazan Oblast, noted that there were roughly 50 workers at the plant, and stated that "something strange" occurred at the plant.[44] Ukrainian sources have not yet claimed responsibility for the strike, however, and ISW cannot confirm its causes at this time.

Key Takeaways:


- **US President Donald Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15.**
- **Putin said nothing in the joint press conference to indicate that he has moderated either his war aims or his willingness to compromise on them and reiterated language he has used since 2021 to justify Russia's aggression against Ukraine.**
- **Trump stated that the United States and Russia did not come to a firm agreement about the war in Ukraine.**
- **Russia conducted drone and missile strikes in Ukraine in the hours before the August 15 Alaska summit, causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure.**

- **Ukrainian officials continue to indicate that Ukrainian counterattacks are stabilizing the situation east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk).**
- **The Russian military command is reportedly trying to redeploy forces and means to reinforce and exploit the penetration near Dobropillya but has so far been unsuccessful.**
- **Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 14 to 15.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka.**

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War August 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Limited fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 15.[45]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked southwest of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) along the Seim River shore.[46]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger, citing unnamed Ukrainian military analysts, claimed that Russian forces advanced into Novokostyantynivka (near the international border north of Sumy City) and that the settlement is a contested "gray zone." [47]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Novokostyantynivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and toward Sadky on August 14 and 15. [48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novokostyantynivka, Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City), Bezsaliivka (northwest of Sumy City), and Sadky. [49]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) continue to face the threat of encirclement in an unspecified forest area, likely referring to previous reports of the Russian military command abandoning elements of the regiment near Sadky on August 12. [50] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced on two flanks and from the rear, forcing Russian forces to hastily retreat to unprepared positions. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling with logistics and are unable to resolve supply problems with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in forested environments. The milblogger added that Ukrainian forces are actively targeting elements of the regiment with drones.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are working with elements of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) in the Sumy direction. [51]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction August 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Hlyboke, Synelnykove, and on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River on August 14 and 15.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove.[53]


The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated that Russian forces operating in the Vovchansk direction mostly leverage small infantry groups for assaults because Ukrainian strikes against Russian armored equipment have forced the Russian military command to pull Russian materiel, such as tanks and artillery systems, back to Russia.[54]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on August 15 but did not advance.[55]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated on August 15 that the intensity of Russian military activity in the brigade's area of responsibility (AOR) decreased compared to the first half of July 2025, particularly near Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burlyk).[56]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast August 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka and Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on August 14 and 15.[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Borova itself; northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; and southeast of Borova near Hrektivka and Olhivka on August 14 and 15.[59]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Ivan Group of the 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions southwest of Lozova (northeast of Borova).[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Stavky (north of Lyman) and into western Zarichne (east of Lyman).[61]


Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman near Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 14 and 15.[62]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on August 15 that Russian forces in this direction are attempting to set conditions for a mechanized assault by using engineering detachments to build river crossings, including across the Chornyi Zhrebets (Zhrebets) River.[63] The officer added that Russian forces in the Lyman direction are conducting motorcycle assaults in small fireteams of four to eight infantrymen. The officer noted that Russian forces are using anti-heat vision cloaks and tents to evade detection and constantly reinforcing elements of the Russian 3rd (Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th (MMD) combined arms armies (CAAs) operating in the Ukrainian unit's area of responsibility (AOR) with drone detachments. The officer added that Russian forces operating near Lyman are increasing air strikes with guided glide bombs and other munitions and drone strikes, suggesting that Russian forces are intensifying their offensive tempo. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on August 15 that Russian forces in the Lyman direction are leveraging small infantry groups in day and night assaults, expecting that some of the groups will reach assigned rally points in the Ukrainian rear.[64]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 11th Tank Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Serebryanske forest area.[65] Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[66]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast August 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka, and Vasyukivka on August 14 and 15.[67]

The Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces reported on August 15 that Russian forces in the Siversk direction increased their use of guided glide bomb strikes from eight to 22 in the past three days (since August 12).[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces advanced in Mykolaivka (just west of Chasiv Yar).[69]

Russian forces attacked north of Chasiv Yar near Minkivka and Orikhovo-Vasylivka and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on August 14 and 15.[70]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1065th Artillery Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mykolaivka.[71]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[72]


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Poltavka, south of Rusyn Yar, and toward Sofiivka (all northwest of Toretsk).[73]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Katerynivka, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka and toward Stepanivka and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 14 and 15.[74]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces have been fighting for Toretsk for more than one year and that the brigade has killed or wounded more than 50,000 Russian forces in that time – roughly five divisions' worth.[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka and the Kleban Byk reservoir.[76] Drone operators of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in the Kostyantynivka direction.[77]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kostyantynivka Direction August 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for reports of activity east and northeast of Dobropillya.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novoeconomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[78] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces likely withdrew from Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[79] Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call-up), with support from elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), advanced from Udachne toward Zvirove (east of Udachne).[80]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Fedorivka, Novoekonomichne, Zapovidne, Mayak, Shakhove, Krasnyi Lyman, Zaytshok, and Vesele; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske, Sukhetske, Zoloty Kolodyaz, and Rubizhne; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Mykolaivka and toward Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne and toward Molodetske on August 14 and 15.[81]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are attacking during both the day and night and continue to use tactics to accumulate small groups of one to two personnel for further attacks.[82] The commander of a drone crew operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to conduct repeated highly attritional, infantry-led assaults to attack the same positions.[83] An aerial reconnaissance officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to attack in groups of two to six personnel.[84] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Ukrainian forces are using "Hiyena" unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) that can carry 26 kilograms of explosives to attack Russian fortified positions or infantry in buildings.[85]


Mashovets reported that the area of responsibility (AoR) of the 2nd CAA (CMD) extends approximately from the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk to Myrolyubivka.[86] Mashovets stated that the AoR of the 41st CAA (CMD) extends approximately from Kotlyne to north of Oleksiivka (southeast of Novopavlivka) and that the AoR of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD), which includes personnel from occupied Ukraine, is approximately from Myrolyubivka to Popiv Yar (northeast of Pokrovsk and northwest of Toretsk).

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are fighting in the Surove-Bilytske direction (north of Pokrovsk) and that elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are fighting near Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[87] Mashovets stated that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are fighting in southern Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk).[88] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk and Rodynske.[89]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction August 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Control of Terrain North of Pokrovsk August 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northwest of Andriivka-Klevtsove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[90]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai, Tovste, Zirka, Andriivka-Klevtsove, and Ivanivka on August 14 and 15.[91]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 15 shows elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising a flag in western Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka), indicating that Russian forces recently seized Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka (southeast of Oleksandrohrad).[92]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Vorone (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and advanced west of Oleksandrohrad to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk Oblast border area.[93]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Myrne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka, and toward Novoselivka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka and Zelene Pole, and toward Zaporizke, Komyshevakh, and Novoheorhiivka on August 14 and 15.[94]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Vorone, Sichneve (southeast of Velykomykhailivka), and Sosnivka (south of Velykomykhailivka).[95] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly conducting unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in Novoselivka.[96]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velykomykhailivka Direction August 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger posted a map on August 15 that claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[97]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske, Novodarivka, and Temyrivka on August 14 and 15.[98]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[99]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces are advancing from the southeastern side of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) in order to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Orikhiv and Zaporizhzhia City.[100] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing on the southeastern side of Mala Tokmachka.[101]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and toward Prymorske on August 15.[102] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Stepnohirsk.[103]

Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian forces struck a highway near Orikhiv with a first-person view (FPV) drone, injuring one civilian.[104]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[105] Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka.[106]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction August 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson City direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky road bridge and southeast of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on August 14 and 15.[107]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating on unspecified islands of the Dnipro River Delta.[108] Drone operators of an unspecified Russian VDV artillery brigade, likely the 52nd VDV Artillery Brigade, are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River with Lancet loitering munitions.[109]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction August 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for today's report on Russian air, missile, and drone campaign,

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

US President Donald Trump called Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on August 15 ahead of the Alaska summit and thanked Lukashenko for releasing 16 prisoners.[110] Trump stated that the United States and Belarus discussed the release of 1,300 additional prisoners, the Alaska summit, and plans for a future Trump-Lukashenko meeting. Belarusian state news agency Belta claimed that Lukashenko invited Trump and his family to visit Belarus and that Trump agreed.[111] Belta added that

Trump and Lukashenko discussed bilateral relations, regional affairs, and war in Ukraine. Lukashenko recently met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg on June 21 and requested an interview with *Time Magazine* published on August 8.[112]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



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