



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on August 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used an English-language interview with a US outlet to reiterate the Kremlin's explicit rejection of US-proposed initiatives for peace in Ukraine. Lavrov stated in an interview with NBC that Russian officials have explained Russia's war goals during meetings with Trump and other US officials and have also explained them publicly, signaling that public Russian statements about the war convey the same points that Russian officials aim to convey in private meetings.[1] Lavrov reiterated that Russia views NATO expansion and the alleged "violation of Russian security interests" as one of the "root causes" of the war.[2] Lavrov claimed that Russia will achieve its war aims, which he listed as the removal of security threats to Russia "coming from the Ukrainian territory," the protection of the rights of the "ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking people who believe they belong to the Russian culture and Russian history," and Ukrainian neutrality. Lavrov claimed that Ukraine has the right to exist but only as long as it "lets go" of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers who "decided that they belong to Russian culture." [3] Lavrov claimed that Russia has a "duty" to support and protect those who share the values of the Russian language and the "Russian World" ("Russkiy Mir"). [4] Lavrov's statements in the NBC interview reiterate consistent Kremlin claims that the alleged "root causes" of the war are NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's discrimination against Russian speakers. [5] The Kremlin's "root causes" notably extend beyond Ukraine, and agreeing to Russia's demand that any future peace settlement "eliminate" the root causes would require substantial negotiations with NATO as well. [6] Lavrov is also promoting the narrative that Ukraine is part of the Kremlin's "Russkiy Mir" idea – an amorphous ideological and geographic conception that Russia claims includes all of the former territories of Kyivan Rus, the Kingdom of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the contemporary Russian Federation. Lavrov's continued insistence that any end to the war must address Russia's "root causes," including multiple times following the August 15 Alaska summit, continues to indicate that Russia's war aims have not changed. [7]

Lavrov continued efforts to mischaracterize Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the impediment to an enduring peace in Ukraine, in order to distract from the Kremlin's own unwillingness to compromise or engage in negotiations on US President Donald Trump's proposed timeline. Lavrov claimed that Zelensky "will not resolve the [Kremlin's] issue[s]" with Ukraine and accused Zelensky of publicly stating that "he is not going to discuss any territories," deliberately mischaracterizing Zelensky's recent public statements to the opposite. [8] Zelensky has repeatedly indicated in recent days that he is willing to discuss territorial issues in a bilateral meeting with Putin. [9] Lavrov claimed that Zelensky is going against Trump's wishes regarding NATO membership and is refusing to repeal laws relating to Russia's defined "root causes" of the war. Lavrov asked why Zelensky is "ready to meet" and implied that any Zelensky-Putin meeting would be useless, suggesting

that Putin is unwilling to meet with Zelensky unless Ukraine concedes to Russia's original war demands, which amount to Ukraine's military, political, and cultural capitulation.[10]

Lavrov also undermined Zelensky's legitimacy as part of efforts to justify Russia's refusal to engage in the peace process and to sign a peace deal with Ukraine. Lavrov responded to a question about whether he and Putin recognize Zelensky as the "legitimate leader of Ukraine" by stating that "we recognize him as the de facto head" of Ukraine.[11] Lavrov claimed that the Kremlin is willing to meet with Zelensky "in this capacity" but "when it comes to signing legal documents...[Russia] would need a very clear understanding by everyone that the person who is signing is legitimate." Lavrov falsely claimed that "Zelensky is not at the moment" the legitimate leader of Ukraine under the Ukrainian Constitution. Lavrov is continuing months-long Kremlin efforts to exploit Ukraine's legally mandated inability to hold elections during the war and to deliberately mischaracterize the Ukrainian Constitution and law. The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections when martial law is in effect, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.[12] Lavrov is likely attempting to inject these justifications for not engaging in the peace process into the American information space in an attempt to sway US policy and public opinion in Russia's favor.

Lavrov denied that Russia violated past international treaties prohibiting Russia from invading Ukraine and rejected Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine in the future. Lavrov claimed that the 1994 Budapest Memorandum guaranteed Ukraine's security just "as any other non-nuclear state" and that the legal obligation of nuclear states that give guarantees to non-nuclear states is to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.[13] Lavrov claimed that Ukraine – not Russia – violated the 1994 agreement by not respecting human rights after 2014. The Budapest Memorandum does state that Russia, the UK, and the United States are committed to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, such as Ukraine.[14] Lavrov's claims ignore, however, that the memorandum also states that Russia, the UK, and United States are committed to "respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine."

Lavrov claimed that Western states, which Lavrov alleged prepared a "coup" in Ukraine in 2014 (in reference to Ukraine's democratically organized Revolution of Dignity) and support a "Nazi" government in Kyiv (in reference to Ukraine's democratically elected government), should not be allowed to be responsible for Ukraine's post-war security – a rejection of the US- and European-backed security guarantees for Ukraine currently under discussion.[15] Lavrov claimed that he never stated that Russia must have a veto over security guarantees for Ukraine but that there should be a consensus on such guarantees and take into account Russia's interests. Lavrov repeatedly referenced the security guarantees for Ukraine laid out in the 2022 Istanbul draft treaty during the NBC interview. The 2022 draft treaty stated that Russia would be one of the states guaranteeing Ukraine's security but that the guarantor states all had to come to a consensus before assisting Ukraine in the event of an armed attack against it – essentially granting Russia veto power over the other guarantor states' abilities to help Ukraine in the event of renewed Russian aggression.[16] Lavrov and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly referenced the 2022 Istanbul draft treaty – which amounted to full Ukrainian capitulation in accordance with Russia's original war demands – as the basis for any future peace settlement.[17] ISW continues to assess that granting Russia veto power over Western security guarantees

would enable the Kremlin to weaken Ukraine's ability to resist another Russian invasion by preventing Ukraine from forming binding security agreements such as those now under discussion, increasing and modernizing its military, and receiving support from Ukraine's partners.[18] Lavrov is likely attempting to obfuscate Russia's 2014 and 2022 violations of the Budapest Memorandum in an interview for American audiences in order to push for a future security guarantee agreement listing Russia as a guarantor state.

Ukrainian forces struck Russian energy infrastructure in Leningrad and Samara oblasts on the night of August 23 to 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted a drone strike against the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast.[19] Ukrainian broadcaster *Suspilne* stated that the SBU and SOF struck the Novatek gas processing complex, which is the largest producer of liquified natural gas (LNG) in Russia that can process up to 6.9 million tons of raw material per year and is a key Russian logistics hub in the Baltic Sea for energy resource export.[20] *Suspilne* reported that the strikes damaged the cryogenic gas condensate and gas fractionation unit, which is the "heart" of the complex's technological processes.[21] Geolocated footage published on August 24 shows a fire at the Ust-Luga port.[22] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed on August 24 that drone debris caused a fire at the Novatek terminal.[23]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces, including from Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), also struck the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast on the night of August 23 to 24.[24] The Syzran Oil Refinery can refine up to 8.5 million tons of oil per year, which amounts to about 3.08 percent of the total volume of oil refining in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Syzran Oil Refinery specializes in producing gasoline, diesel fuel, aviation kerosene, and other petroleum products for the Russian military. Geolocated footage published on August 24 shows an explosion and fire near the refinery.[25] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed on August 24 that Ukrainian drones struck an unspecified "industrial enterprise" in Syzran City.[26] ISW recently observed reports from Russian business outlet *Kommersant* indicating that Ukrainian long-range strikes campaign targeting Russian oil refineries are among the factors impacting Russia's fuel reserves and threatening oil revenues.[27] The Kremlin relies on oil revenues to fund its war in Ukraine, and Ukrainian long-range strikes continue to threaten Russia's economic stability.

Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons. Two US officials told the *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) on August 24 that the United States approved the sale of 3,350 Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) air-launched missiles to Ukraine and reported that the systems will arrive in Ukraine in six weeks (about mid-October 2025).[28] The WSJ reported that the ERAMs are part of a mostly European-funded arms package for Ukraine that includes other air defense systems and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS). The Norwegian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on August 24 that Norway allocated seven billion kroner (around \$694 million) to purchase two Patriot air defense systems and other forms of air defense for Ukraine.[29] The Norwegian MoD noted that Germany is also contributing financially to purchase the air defense systems. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney stated that more than C\$1 billion (about \$722 million) of the C\$2 billion (around \$1.44 billion) worth of military aid that Canada pledged to Ukraine in June 2025 will go toward the delivery of armored vehicles, drones, and ammunition that will arrive in Ukraine as early as September 2025.[30]

Ukraine and Russia conducted another prisoner exchange that included a limited number of Ukrainian journalists and government officials on August 24. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the

Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Ukraine and Russia each exchanged 146 POWs.[31] Russia also released three civilians, two journalists, and former Kherson City Mayor Volodymyr Mykolayenko, and Ukraine also released eight Kursk Oblast residents. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported that this exchange is in accordance with agreements the parties reached in Istanbul on June 2. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.


Key Takeaways:

- Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used an English-language interview with a US outlet to reiterate the Kremlin's explicit rejection of US-proposed initiatives for peace in Ukraine.
- Lavrov continued efforts to mischaracterize Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the impediment to an enduring peace in Ukraine, in order to distract from the Kremlin's own unwillingness to compromise or engage in negotiations on US President Donald Trump's proposed timeline.
- Lavrov denied that Russia violated past international treaties prohibiting Russia from invading Ukraine and rejected Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine in the future.
- Ukrainian forces struck Russian energy infrastructure in Leningrad and Samara oblasts on the night of August 23 to 24.
- Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted another prisoner exchange that included a limited number of Ukrainian journalists and government officials on August 24.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War August 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 24.[32]

Order of Battle: reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near the Kursk Oblast border.[33]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 24 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the southern outskirts of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[34]

Russian forces continued attacks in northern Sumy Oblast, including northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on August 23 and 24.[35] The Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian forces, likely a limited sabotage and reconnaissance group, that attempted to cross the international border near Prokhody (east of Sumy City).[36]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed on August 24 that the command of the Russian 237th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) ordered elements of the regiment to conduct multiple assaults across open fields to enter eastern Yunakivka despite some objections from Russian officers.[37] The milblogger claimed that the regiment lost about 80 percent of its personnel in these assaults and is now withdrawing to rest and reconstitute as a result. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces within Bezsaliivka (northwest of Sumy City) have no logistics lines to or from the settlement and that the situation is difficult.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate within western Yunakivka.[39] Scouts of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD) reportedly continue to operate in northern Sumy Oblast.[40]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction August 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[41]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Zelene, Vovchansk, and Synelnykove on August 23 and 24.[42]

Footage published on August 19 shows a Ukrainian drone striking a bridge that Russian forces had reportedly mined near Krasnyi Khutor (north of Kharkiv City just across the international border).[43]




Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction August 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and Khatnie on August 23 and 24, but did not advance.[44]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast August 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Synkivka; and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on August 23 and 24.[45]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are unable to move equipment or motorcycles across the Oskil River to conduct operations northeast of Kupyansk due to Ukrainian strikes and that Russian forces must cross the river in groups of 10 to 20 personnel on makeshift boats.[46]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[47] Elements of the Russian 344th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly operating between Stroivka and Kamyanka (both northeast of Kupyansk near the international border).[48] Elements of the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly participated in the claimed seizure of Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk) on August 14.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Hlushchenkove and toward Olhivka on August 24 and 25.[50]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 24 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: The Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces reported on August 24 that Ukrainian forces liberated Novomykhailivka (north of Lyman), indicating that Russian forces likely held some or all of the settlement at a prior date.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Dibrova (east of Lyman) toward Dronivka (southeast of Lyman).[52]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Karpivka, Serednie, and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne and toward Stavky; and southeast of Lyman near the Serebrianske forest and toward Dronivka on August 23 and 24.[53]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[54]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast August 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Fedorivka and Pereizne on August 23 and 24.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; northwest of Chasiv Yar toward Markove; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne on August 23 and 24.[56]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on August 24 that Russian forces conducted a large air strike on Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar) with 37 glide bombs on August 22.[57] Zaporozhets stated that 90 percent of the affected areas were civilian.

A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) in occupied Soledar (northeast of Chasiv Yar) on an unspecified date and reportedly killed the commander of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade and five other Russian officers.[58]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[59]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on August 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[60]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Toretsk near Bila Hora; northwest of Toretsk near Kleban Byk, Katerynivka, Pleshchiivka, Poltavka, and Popiv Yar; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 23 and 24.[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating within Oleksandro-Shulytne, and elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Katerynivka.[62] Elements of the 150th and 20th motorized rifle divisions (both 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Rusyn Yar.[63] Drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) and elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[64]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently seized Mykhailivka (east of Pokrovsk) and advanced south of Myrne (northeast of Mykhailivka) and in northern Myrolyubivka (just south of Mykhailivka).[65] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on August 24 that Ukrainian forces seized Mykhailivka after conducting successful counterattacks.[66] One milblogger denied reports that Ukrainian forces advanced toward Malynivka (just east of Myrne).[67]

Unconfirmed claims: Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces seized Volodymyrivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces entered Myrne.[69] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces were able to enter Myrne because Russian forces do not control positions in Novoeconomichne (west of Myrne) as Russian forces had claimed.[70] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within

and west of Udachne and near Leontovychi (both southwest of Pokrovsk); north of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk); and east of Sofiivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[71]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske and Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok, Zapovidne, Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, Novoekonomichne, Krasnyi Lyman, Mayak, Volodymyrivka, Myrne and Sofiivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Mykolaivka, and Pomin and toward Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Leontovychi, Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on August 23 and 24.

[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zoloty Kolodyaz, Kucheriv Yar (both northeast of Pokrovsk), Volodymyrivka, and Mykhailivka.[73]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Krasnyi Lyman, south of Myrnohrad, and on the northern outskirts of Udachne.[74]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) and drone operators of the AirNomads Group are reportedly operating near Malynivka and Myrne.[75] Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Myrnohrad.[76] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[77]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction August 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into Filiya from the west after crossing the Vovcha River.[79]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; southeast of Novopavlivka near Novoukrainka and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and toward Ivanivka on August 23 and 24.[80] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Filiya.[81]

Syrskyi and Ukraine's Dnipro Grouping of Forces reported that Ukrainian forces seized Zelenyi Hai, which ISW assessed Ukrainian forces had seized as of August 22.[82] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling to advance across the open terrain along the Kotlyariivka–Dachne line (northeast to southeast of Novopavlivka).[83]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Ivanivka.[84]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Zaporizke, Novoheorhiivka, Maliivka, Shevchenko, Komyshuvakha, and Vilne Pole and toward Novomykolaivka on August 23 and 24.[85]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (VKS and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Ternove (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[86] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka).[87] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[88]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Temyrivka, Zelene Pole, Olhivske, and toward Novoivanivka, and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on August 23 and 24.[89]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[90]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 24 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are fighting in central Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) and made advances on the outskirts of the settlement.[91]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Plavni, and Kamyanske on August 23 and 24.[92]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 108th and 247th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly fighting near Stepnohirsk.[93] Drone operators of the Russian BARS–Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS–Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to the Russian VDV Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Stepnohirsk.[94] Drone operators of the Russian Nemets Group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[95]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction August 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on August 23 and 24, but did not advance.[96]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly of the 40th Army Corps [AC], 18th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Korsunka (northeast of Kherson City).[97]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction August 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 23 and 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Taganrog Oblast and 72 Shahed-like and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[98] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 48 drones over northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and that 24 drones struck ten unspecified locations in Ukraine. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on August 24 that a Russian missile struck an unspecified area in Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, causing a fire.[99]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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