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August 25, 2025, 8:15 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on August 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continue to pressure the Russian penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 25 that Ukrainian forces seized Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya and the western bound of the base of the Russian penetration).[1] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces pushed out Russian forces from positions near the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway and south of Vesele (northeast of Dobropillya). Mashovets added that Ukrainian forces have almost completely cleared Kucheriv Yar (east of Dobropillya). Mashovets' August 25 report follows reports from Ukrainian military officials since August 15 that Ukrainian forces continue to clear settlements at both the northern extent of the Russian penetration and along the base of the penetration.[2] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on August 24 that Ukrainian forces had seized Volodymyrivka, (southeast of Dobropillya and the eastern bound of the base of the Russian penetration), and Ukrainian advances along the western and eastern bases of the penetration indicate that Russian forces are failing to expand the width of the penetration to the extent necessary to sustain the depth of the penetration.[3] Mashovets reported on August 25 that these Ukrainian counterattacks threatened to encircle elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army ([CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) operating within the penetration north of the Zapovidne-Mayak-Volodymyrivka line.[4] Mashovets reported that the command of the 51st CAA created an assault group that aimed to break through Ukrainian forces and reach the Russian forces within the penetration. Mashovets added that elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) had regrouped and attempted to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks at the western part of the base near Zapovidne. Mashovets had reported on August 18 that elements of the Russian 8th CAA (SMD) had been attempting to outflank and threaten Ukrainian forces counterattacking at the eastern

part of the base near Volodymyrivka.[5] These various recent reports of Ukrainian advances in the area, coupled with the lack of reporting about Russian advances or successful reinforcement missions within the penetration, indicate that the efforts of both the 51st CAA and 8th CAA to defend the base of the penetration may have failed at this time.

The Russian military command has reportedly given up efforts to exploit the penetration toward Dobropillya, after Russia's infiltration tactics appear to have been unsuccessful in establishing enduring positions within this penetration. Mashovets stated on August 25 that the command of the 51st CAA is now preparing for assaults directly against Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), indicating that the 51st CAA has reverted back to its original plan following a brief shift in focus on exploiting the penetration northeast of Dobropillya.[6] Mashovets' report and the recent Ukrainian advances within the penetration indicate that Russian forces likely have not established enduring positions within the salient. Russian milbloggers' reporting about the penetration near Dobropillya has also significantly decreased in recent days and shifted back to focusing on activity north, east, and southwest of Pokrovsk instead — further suggesting that Russian forces have been unsuccessful in consolidating and exploiting the penetration and are shifting their focus back on Pokrovsk directly. Russian milbloggers have warned in the past week that the penetration near Dobropillya was too narrow relative to its depth, creating vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks and interdiction.[7] Russian milbloggers also previously warned that Russian forces had to widen the penetration's flanks to sustain the penetration, which Russian forces have failed to do so far.[8] ISW previously assessed that Russian infiltration tactics and a low manpower density along the front in the Pokrovsk direction seemed to have allowed Russian forces to temporarily restore limited, tactical maneuver east and southeast of Dobropillya, but Russia's inability to establish logistics to support and reinforce the forward units operating within the penetration have degraded Russia's ability to widen and exploit the penetration.[9]

Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov is likely to become the Chairperson of the Russian Supreme Court, reportedly after Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairperson Alexander Bastrykin refused the Kremlin's offer to assume this position. The Russian Higher Qualification Collegium of Judges (which oversees the selection of candidates for judicial positions) announced on August 25 that it completed accepting applications for the vacant position of Chairperson of the Supreme Court and that Krasnov was the sole candidate who submitted an application.[10] Moscow-based business newspaper *Vedomosti* reported on August 21 that the Higher Qualification Collegium of Judges cancelled the required qualification examination for the position due to a lack of candidates and reported on August 22 that Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded Krasnov the title Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, exempting Krasnov from the qualification examination.[11] A Russian insider source claimed on August 25 that Bastrykin, whom *Vedomosti* previously reported was a candidate for the Supreme Court vacancy, recently refused the position for unknown reasons during a closed-door meeting with Putin.[12] Bastrykin reportedly asked to remain in his position at the Russian Investigative Committee for another year before moving to become the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian President in the Northwestern Federal Okrug. Putin previously allowed Bastrykin to remain in office past the age of 70 in September 2024, and ISW assessed on August 20 that the Kremlin may have attempted to appoint Bastrykin to serve as Chairperson of the Supreme Court to open the Sledkom chairperson position to a younger official without firing or retiring Bastrykin.[13] The Russian insider source claimed that the current plenipotentiary representative, Alexander Gutsan, will succeed Krasnov as Prosecutor General and that current Minister of Justice Konstantin Chuychenko will replace Bastrykin as Investigative Committee chairperson.[14] Krasnov has held his position as Prosecutor General since 2020 and is notably 49 years old; and Chuychenko is 60 years old — significantly younger than the nearly-72-year-old Bastrykin, reflecting the Kremlin's introduction of younger officials to senior positions.[15]


Russian authorities recently detained Acting Kursk Oblast Vice Governor Vladimir Bazarov, likely as part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to scapegoat local officials for Russian border security failures. Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein told Kremlin newswire TASS on August 25 that Russian law enforcement detained Bazarov as part of a larger criminal case investigating the embezzlement of funds that Russian authorities previously allocated for the construction of defensive fortifications in the Belgorod Oblast border areas during Bazarov's tenure in the Belgorod Oblast administration.[16] Khinshtein claimed that Bazarov embezzled one billion rubles (roughly \$12.4 million) of these funds.[17] Russian authorities previously detained former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, former Bryansk Oblast Vice Governor Nikolai Simonenko, and former Belgorod Oblast Vice Governor Rustem Zainullin on similar embezzlement charges.[18] Russian President Vladimir Putin also notably dismissed Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit on July 7, just prior to Starovoit's reported suicide on July 7.[19] ISW continues to assess that these arrests and personnel changes are part of a concerted Kremlin effort to use border oblast officials as scapegoats for Russia's failure to repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[20] The Kremlin is likely also trying to scapegoat local officials for Russia's failure to repel Ukrainian cross-border raids into Belgorod Oblast in 2023 and 2024.[21]

Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons and joint production ventures. German Vice Chancellor and Minister of Finance Lars Klingbeil announced on August 25 that Germany will allocate nine billion euros (roughly \$10 billion) to Ukraine annually for the next two years.[22] NATO announced on August 24 that Canada will finance a \$500 million aid package to purchase US military equipment for Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative.[23] Ukrainian Minister of Defense Denys Shmyhal announced on August 24 that Ukraine and Canada signed a joint defense production agreement that will simplify the establishment of Ukrainian defense industrial companies in Canada, facilitate technology exchanges, and help provide Ukrainian forces with modern weapons and military equipment in the long term.[24] Shmyhal and Lithuanian Defense Minister Laurynas Kasciunas similarly signed a letter of intent on August 25 on the joint production of defense products in both countries, with an emphasis on the joint production of long-range drones.[25]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian forces continue to pressure the Russian penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya.**
- **The Russian military command has reportedly given up efforts to exploit the penetration toward Dobropillya, after Russia's infiltration tactics appear to have been unsuccessful in establishing enduring positions within this penetration.**
- **Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov is likely to become the Chairperson of the Russian Supreme Court, reportedly after Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairperson Alexander Bastrykin refused the Kremlin's offer to assume this position.**
- **Russian authorities recently detained Acting Kursk Oblast Vice Governor Vladimir Bazarov, likely as part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to scapegoat local officials for Russian border security failures.**
- **Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons and joint production ventures.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War August 25, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus


Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Group of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike on the Russian 186th Motorized Rifle Regiment’s (Eastern Military District [EMD]) command and drone operations control post in Dubrava, Kursk Oblast (northwest of Kursk City).[26]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction August 25, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City).[27]

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on August 25 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and advanced toward the Zolotarivskyy Reserve (northwest of Andriivka).[28] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Group of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) advanced toward Stepne (northwest of Sumy City near the international border).[29]

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast and in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 24 and 25.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bezsalivka and in the Andriivka-Oleksiiivka direction (north of Sumy City).[31]

Mashovets stated on August 25 that the Russian military command recently rotated and regrouped several units and detachments to the Sumy direction.[32] Mashovets stated that Russian command rotated in elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) and 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade to replace elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) that suffered significant losses in the western parts of the Russian penetration. ISW previously observed elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment operate in the Toretsk direction in April 2025.[33] Mashovets stated that Russian military command deployed elements of the 106th VDV Division to replace most or all of the 76th VDV Division, which had been attempting to advance in the eastern part of the penetration, especially near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[34]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are operating near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City), and elements of the 11th and 83rd VDV brigades are operating in Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[35] Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Andriivka.[36] Drone operators of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[37]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Russian forces advanced west of Synelnykove and near Tykhe (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[38]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on August 24 and 25.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the southern (left) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk.[40]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Russian forces advanced toward Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[41]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and Khatnie on August 24 and 25.[42]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kanada Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Ambarne.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)



Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within northern Kupyansk.[44]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and Holubivka and toward Kutkivka and Kolodyazne; and northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Kamyanka and toward Dvorichanske on August 24 and 25.[45]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Kolisnykivka; northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka, Vyshneve, and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrektivka.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hrektivka.[48]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army (CAA), Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating near Hrektivka.[49]

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 25 shows Ukrainian soldiers raising a flag in eastern Novomykhailivka (north of Lyman), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely liberated the settlement.[50] Footage published on August 24 and geolocated on August 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely liberated Novyi Myr (northwest of Novomykhailivka).[51]


Assessed Russian advances: Mashovets reported on August 25 that Russian forces recently seized Torske (east of Lyman).[52]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Torske and in the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[53]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and Serednie and toward Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, Novyi Myr, and Novomykhailivka; northeast of Lyman near Ivanivka and Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novomykhalivka.[55]


Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 164th and 169th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 25th CAA, CMD) are operating in the Serebryanske forest area; elements of the 37th and 31st Motorized Rifle Regiments (both of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, CMD) are operating in central Zarichne (east of Lyman); elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating near Zarichne; and other elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division and attached elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], MMD) are operating near Kolodyazi and south of Karpivka.[56] Drone operators of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[57]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction August 25, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast August 25, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced roughly 2.3 kilometers south of Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk).[58]

Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka and Pereizne on August 24 and 25.[59]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces in the Siversk direction are using small infantry groups to infiltrate into the Ukrainian rear.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 25 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Russian forces advanced east of Virolyubivka (northwest of Chasiv Yar).[61]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; northwest of Chasiv Yar near Maiske; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on August 24 and 25.[62]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in Chasiv Yar.[63]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kostyantynivka Direction August 25, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Bila Hora (northeast of Toretsk) and in southern Oleksandro-Shulytne (just west of Bila Hora).[64]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Bila Hora.[65]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Shulytne; north of Toretsk near Dyllivka; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 24 and 25.[66]


Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that dozens of Russian assault elements, possibly from 102nd or 103rd motorized rifle regiments (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA],

Southern Military District [SMD]), are operating in northern Shcherbynivka.[67] Mashovets added that Ukrainian forces have not been able to repel Russian infiltration into northern Schcherbynivka for around a week. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are fighting on the outskirts of Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) and entered the town.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that there are no confirmed reports that Russian forces have entered the town, however.[69]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are attacking near Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk) and that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division are attacking near Shcherbynivka and Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[70] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[71]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction August 25, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Pokrovsk, on the northern outskirts of Leontovychi (southwest of Pokrovsk), and northeast of Leontovychi.[72] ISW assesses that Russian forces are not currently operating within Pokrovsk, given the lack of Russian milblogger claims of Russian forces operating in the town. Mashovets stated that small infantry and sabotage and reconnaissance groups of the Russian 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (comprised of Russian mobilization reserve) and unspecified elements of the 2nd CAA (CMD) infiltrated Pokrovsk through Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[73] Mashovets stated that these Russian forces have not been able to accumulate forces and means for further advances, however.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[74] Mashovets stated that Russian forces have not seized Udachne, however.[75]


Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zapovidne, Mayak, Zatyshok, Nove Shakhove, Shakhove, Sukhetske, and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Novoekonomichne, Hrodivka, and Mykolaivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne, Troyanda, Shevchenko, and Leontovychi; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 24 and 25.[76]

Mashovets reported that Russian forces have not seized Novoekonomichne or Myrolyubivka (southeast of Novoekonomichne) despite reports from Russian troops to their commanders about seizing both settlements.[77] A Russian milblogger similarly claimed that Russian forces submitted false reports about the seizure of Novoekonomichne to their superiors, allowing Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups to enter the settlement and advance to Malynivka (just east of Novoekonomichne).[78] Mashovets stated that Russian forces gained a foothold on the dam south of Myrolyubivka and that Russian assault groups sometimes enter the settlement but have failed to gain a foothold. Mashovets reported that small Russian groups are operating in Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman but cannot consolidate their positions.[79] Mashovets denied Ukrainian reports that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of the area north of Rodynske along the railway. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to use small infantry group attack tactics but are changing their supply tactics by using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs).[80]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 1st and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) and of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are attacking Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman.[81] Mashovets stated that elements of the 5th and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) are attacking near Novoekonomichne and Myrolyubivka.[82] Mashovets stated that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade, with support from elements of the 137th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) and of the 72nd Spetsnaz Battalion (reportedly of the 3rd AC), attacked along the Hrodivka-Promin (east of Pokrovsk)[83][84] Mashovets stated that elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are fighting near Udachne. Drone operators of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade are also reportedly operating near Novoekonomichne[84][85]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction August 25, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 24 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Yalta and advanced to central Filiya (both south of Novopavlivka).[86]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 24 that Russian forces have not seized Filiya, refuting the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claim that Russian forces seized the settlement.[87]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Novoukrainka, and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta and Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Novokhatske and Zelenyi Hai on August 24 and 25.[88]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating within Filiya.[89]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within central Vorone and seized Zaporizke (both southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[90]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and Oleksandrohrad; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Shevchenko, Komyshevakh, Vilne Pole, Maliivka, Novoheorhiivka, and toward Novomykolaivka on August 24 and 25.[91]

Order of Battle: The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) with seizing Zaporizke.[92] Drone operators of the 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pidhavrylivka (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[93] Drone operators of the 30th Spetsnaz Company and of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[94] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Dnipropetrovsk (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[95]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Zelene Pole, Temyrivka, and Olhivske and west of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne on August 24 and 25.[96]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Konstantyn Mashovets reported that the Russian military command likely redeployed the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division in Hulyaipole direction sometime around August 11.[97] Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast with Molniya-2 drones.[98]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction August 25, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the Prydniprovskia Railroad south of Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv).[99]

Russian forces attacked toward Orikhiv itself; south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Stepanohirsk, Plavni, and Kamianske; and northwest of Orikhiv toward Prymorske on August 24 and 25.[100]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone group operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported that Russian forces continue to attack in small fire teams of two to 10 soldiers and have accumulated a large number of various weapons and are actively using them in the Zaporizhia direction.[101] The commander reported that Ukrainian and Russian forces have drone parity, which allows Ukrainian forces to neutralize Russian forces' advantages in

other weapons. The commander has not observed evidence of Russian forces advancing toward Zaporizhzhia City (northwest of Orikhiv).

Ukrainian and Russian milbloggers claimed on August 24 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against Zaporizhzhia City for the first time with a mothership drone carrying first-person view (FPV) drones.[102]

Order of Battle: Elements, including drone operators, of the Russian 3rd Assault Company of the Nemets group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[103]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on August 25 but did not advance.[104]

Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on August 25 that Russian forces established fire control over Karantynnyi Island (west of Kherson City).[105]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Burhunka (northeast of Kherson City).[106]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 24 and 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 104 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Kursk City; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[107] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 76 drones north and east of Ukraine and that 28 drones struck 15 unspecified locations and drone debris struck four unspecified locations. Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on August 25 that Russian forces launched one unspecified missile, one KAB guided glide bomb, 32 Shahed (Geran-2) drones, six Lancet loitering munitions, five Molniya drones, and five unidentified drones against 42 settlements in Kharkiv Oblast since August 18, causing significant damage to civilian infrastructure.[108] Ukrainian broadcaster *Suspilne* reported on August 24, citing local sources, that Russian forces launched two Shahed drones against Bilopillya, Sumy Oblast, causing power outages, and Sumy Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Hryhorov reported that Russian forces struck Kovpakivskyi Raion in Sumy City 10 times.[109]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



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