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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on August 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Moscow on August 6, but concrete results from the meeting remain unclear.

Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that the Witkoff-Putin meeting was "useful and constructive" and that Putin and Ushakov exchanged "signals" about Ukraine.[1] Ushakov stated that the Kremlin will refrain from issuing further statements about the negotiations until Witkoff has briefed US President Donald Trump about the results. Leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev also attended the meeting with Putin and Witkoff and called the negotiations "successful." [2] Trump characterized the negotiations as "highly productive" and stated that Witkoff and Putin made "great progress," and emphasized the importance of ending Russia's war in Ukraine.[3] Neither the Kremlin nor the White House has issued formal read-outs as of the time of this writing.

Trump may meet with Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the coming weeks. White House Spokesperson Karoline Leavitt stated following the Putin-Witkoff meeting that Trump intends to meet with both Putin and Zelensky, and two people familiar with the matter told the *New York Times* (NYT) that Trump could hold a bilateral meeting with Putin followed by a trilateral meeting with Zelensky as soon as next week.[4]

Certain Russian commentators are attempting to stoke schisms within the Trump administration, likely as part of a wider effort to avoid US sanctions ahead of Trump's stated August 8 deadline for peace efforts in Ukraine. Russian state media and pro-Kremlin outlets amplified commentary from Russian State Duma deputies, largely framing Witkoff as a rational actor in US-Russia negotiations while portraying Trump as irrational. Russian State Duma Deputy Grigory Karasin stated on August 4 that he hoped that the results of Witkoff's meeting with Putin would be "specific, not emotional, like Trump's latest statements," and Russian media amplified Karasin's comment in reporting about the Witkoff-Trump meeting on August 6.[5] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 6 that Trump sent Witkoff to "smooth over tensions" following Trump's recently issued "ultimatums" that Russia end the war or face US sanctions, and claimed that this smoothing over could negatively affect the image of the Trump administration.[6] Alexander "Sasha" Kots, a Russian milblogger who also serves on the Kremlin's Human Rights Council, accused Trump of "handing out" daily ultimatums and suggested that Witkoff will bring Trump a proposal that Trump "will perceive as a small victory." [7] The Kremlin has

frequently attempted to sow divisions between Ukraine and its allies, as well as between the United States and Europe, as part of wider efforts to deter support for Ukraine.[8] The Kremlin appears to be employing similar informational tactics against the Trump administration to undermine ongoing US efforts to compel Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations to end the war. The Kremlin also likely aims to coerce unilateral concessions from the United States regarding the war, including fostering US-Russian economic deals in Russia's favor without Trump's stated preconditions of a ceasefire and negotiations for an enduring peace.

Russian officials and media continue to project an image of a strong and resilient Russian economy in anticipation of further US sanctions. *Bloomberg* reported on August 5 that Russia's oil revenue fell by approximately a third from July 2024 to July 2025 due to the global decline in crude oil prices and the appreciation of the ruble.[9] *Bloomberg* reported that the oil industries continue to account for roughly a third of Russia's budget and that the drop in oil revenues therefore increases pressure on Russia's already-strained federal budget. Russian State Duma deputies downplayed the impact of the fall in oil revenue on August 6, however. State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed in an interview with the Russian outlet *NEWS.ru* that Russia would not stop the war in Ukraine even if it were "twice as expensive to fill oil tanks" and that the Russian government structured a reserve into its budget forecasts for 2025 such that even a \$10 decrease in the price per barrel of oil would not impact the state budget.[10] State Duma Energy Committee First Deputy Chairperson Valery Selezne stated in an interview to Russian outlet *OSN* that Russia should take advantage of gas shortages in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to increase Russian exports to Central Asia to protect the Russian domestic economy from the financial burden of potential tariffs against Russia — somewhat in opposition to Zhuravlev's claim that Russia's economy is impervious to changes in oil revenues.[11] State Duma Committee on Security and Anti-Corruption member Adalbi Shkhagoshev stated in an interview to Kremlin newswire *TASS* that further US sanctions against Russia will not affect the course of the war in Ukraine, and that new sanctions would amount to economic war against Russia and its BRICS allies.[12]

Economic indicators suggest that the Russian economy is weaker than Russian officials project. The Russian Central Bank reported to *TASS* on August 6 that the Russian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 1.4 percent in the first quarter of 2025, below the originally forecasted growth projection of two percent, and by 1.8 percent in the second quarter of 2025, close to the forecasted growth projection of 1.9 percent.[13] The Russian Central Bank claimed that there was a "slowdown in the growth rate of household and government consumption" in April 2025, which the bank did not forecast. UK outlet *Express* reported on August 6 that Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade data showed that the passenger car market fell by 24 percent from July 2024 to July 2025.[14] Consumer spending is a major driver of domestic economies, and a decline in purchases of a common item such as passenger vehicles suggests that consumers either face or fear economic instability that would inhibit such purchases. The Russian Central Bank is likely attempting to use reports of GDP growth as a sign of economic stability to project confidence to the domestic Russian populace who may be worried about the impact of the war and further Western sanctions on everyday life. Russian officials and the Central Bank are also likely attempting to discourage the West from levying additional sanctions against Russia or secondary sanctions against Russia's trading partners. Increased sanctions, especially against Russian oil exports, will further hinder Russia's ability to fund its war in Ukraine. The sanctions remain critical — in tandem with continued Western defense assistance to Ukraine — to constraining Russian aggression.[15]

US President Donald Trump formally imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on India's exports to the United States due to India's ongoing economic cooperation with Russia. Trump signed an executive order on August 6 that will impose an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian exports to the United States, starting on August 31, given India's continued purchases of Russian oil.[16] The executive order includes a modification provision in the event that India ceases purchases of oil from Russia or in the case of retaliation against the United States for this order. The executive order describes Russia as "an unusual and extraordinary threat" to US national security and foreign policy. India is one of the largest importers of Russian oil and has continued to purchase Russian military equipment since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[17] ISW previously assessed that European and US sanctions appeared to be degrading Russia's revenues from third-country importers of Russian oil and that sanctions that target countries that purchase Russian oil will further hinder Russia's ability to finance its war in Ukraine.[18]

Russian forces likely advanced to the western outskirts of Kupyansk and secured positions from which they can threaten Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into the town. Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Sobolivka (immediately west of Kupyansk) and likely seized Sobolivka and Myrne (immediately north of Sobolivka).[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are close to interdicting the H-26 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway (running east-west from Kupyansk and roughly one kilometer south of Sobolivka), the main Ukrainian GLOC supplying Kupyansk.[20] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces would likely leverage advances northwest of Kupyansk to support efforts to envelop Kupyansk and complicate Ukraine's ability to supply positions in the town and defend areas to the west.[21] Russian forces have at least three possible courses of action (COAs) following the potential future seizure of Kupyansk. Russian forces may continue to push west of Kupyansk toward Shevchenkove or northwest of Kupyansk toward Velykyi Burluk in order to support Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast and advance toward Kharkiv City.[22] The Russian military command may instead reprioritize the seizure of the remainder of the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in the Borova and Lyman directions to support efforts to seize the remainder of Luhansk Oblast or set conditions for a future offensive on Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the northeast, respectively. The Russian military command may alternatively redeploy manpower from the Kupyansk direction to higher priority areas such as the Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, or Novopavlivka directions to facilitate Russia's long-standing objective of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. Russian advances in Sobolivka and Myrne appear to be consistent with Russia's recently demonstrated operational pattern of partially enveloping a settlement as opposed to trying to seize it using frontal assaults.[23] Russian forces are likely to use advances in these areas to support the envelopment of Kupyansk and pursue further advances west and northwest of Kupyansk.


The US State Department approved a \$104 million Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Ukraine. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on August 5 that the US State Department approved and notified US Congress of an FMS to Ukraine worth roughly \$104 million for equipment, maintenance services, and long-term sustainment support for M777 howitzers.[24] The DSCA reported that UK defense manufacturer BAE Systems will be the principal contractor for this FMS.

A Russian servicemember recently executed a Ukrainian civilian in occupied Donetsk Oblast in clear violation of international law. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported on August 6 that it opened a case against a Russian servicemember who intentionally killed a Ukrainian man attempting to evacuate from Udachne, Donetsk Oblast, which Russian forces currently partially occupy.[25] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General published footage of the execution and reported that this is the third recorded incident of Russian forces executing civilians in occupied Donetsk Oblast thus far in 2025.[26] Russian soldiers and occupation authorities have notably committed extreme atrocities against civilians and soldiers in occupied Ukraine in Russia's pursuit to eradicate an independent Ukrainian language, culture, and identity.[27]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin met with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Moscow on August 6, but concrete results from the meeting remain unclear.**
- **Trump may meet with Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the coming weeks.**
- **Certain Russian commentators are attempting to stoke schisms within the Trump administration, likely as part of a wider effort to avoid US sanctions ahead of Trump's stated August 8 deadline for peace efforts in Ukraine.**
- **Russian officials and media continue to project an image of a strong and resilient Russian economy in anticipation of further US sanctions.**
- **US President Donald Trump formally imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on India's exports to the United States due to India's ongoing economic cooperation with Russia.**
- **Russian forces likely advanced to the western outskirts of Kupyansk and secured positions from which they can threaten Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into the town.**
- **The US State Department approved a \$104 million Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Ukraine.**
- **A Russian servicemember recently executed a Ukrainian civilian in occupied Donetsk Oblast in clear violation of international law.**
- **Ukrainian forces advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv and western Zaporizhia oblasts and near Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War August 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 5 and August 6.[28]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 6 but did not advance.


Russian forces continued ground attacks in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City toward Khotin and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on August 5 and 6.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) and Yunakivka.[30]

Ukrainian State Border Guard Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Demchenko stated on August 6 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance activity in the Sumy direction has recently decreased but not completely stopped.[31] The Ukrainian National Police warned on August 5 that Russian forces in Sumy Oblast are equipping strike drones with PTM-3 anti-tank mines, landing the drones in fields to wait for passing Ukrainian equipment, then activating the drones again to strike passing vehicles.[32] This technique essentially amounts to drone-based remote mining.

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces criticized the Russian Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin for Russia's failure to make operationally significant advances in northern Sumy Oblast despite the area's sparse population.[33] The milblogger claimed Lapin must "know something" about Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov that is protecting Lapin from being fired and suggested that the situation for Russian forces is bad enough that bringing North Korean forces into combat in northern Sumy Oblast would not generate a strategic effect in Russia's favor. The milblogger

also claimed that elements of the 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) that are fighting near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City) are taking heavy losses and that the quality of reinforcements is very poor.[34]

Order of Battle: A company of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) reportedly relieved a company of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) near Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[35] Elements of the 382nd Separate Naval Infantry Battalion (810th Naval Infantry Brigade) are reportedly transferring from Guyevo, Kursk Oblast to Kostyantynivka to reinforce the elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade currently operating in Kostyantynivka.[36] Elements of the Chechen Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) reportedly continue to operate in northern Sumy Oblast.[37]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant in northern Vovchansk.[38] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of northern Vovchansk, including all of the Aggregate Plant, as of August 5 after over a year of fighting.[39] ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces have seized the southern part of the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant as of August 6.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to Hoptivka (north of Kharkiv City); 200 meters west of Vovchansk on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River; and one kilometer in the Synelnykove forest area (just southwest of Vovchansk).[40]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and toward Hoptivka and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and toward Synelnykove on August 5 and 6.[41]

The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces reported in August that Ukrainian forces repelled an attempt by Russian infantry clad in anti-drone thermal imaging ponchos to seize the Hoptivka Border Checkpoint on the morning of August 4 and posted footage of the event.[42] The Kharkiv Group of Forces stated that Russian forces have been attempting to seize the checkpoint since roughly July 29 and that Russian forces likely incorrectly assessed that poor weather conditions on August 4 would prevent Ukrainian forces from fielding drones to repel the attack.

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in western and southern Vovchansk.[43] Elements of the 68th and 69th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly operating on the flanks of the Russian salient in Vovchansk.[44]



Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 6.


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

See topline text for information about advances in the Kupyansk direction.

Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Putnykove, Tyshchenkivka, Holubivka, and Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Kurylivka on August 5 and 6.[45]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction using fiber-optic Groza Leska first-person view (FPV) drones.[46]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyna and Olhivka on August 5 and 6.[47]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th and 3rd motorized rifle divisions (both of the 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka and Hrekivka (both southeast of Borova)[48][49]


Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced northeast of Serednie (northwest of Lyman).[50]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[51]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Karpivka and toward Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Hlushchenkove, Ridkodub, and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 5 and 6.[52]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction August 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



The spokesperson of a Ukrainian Army Corps (AC) operating in the Lyman direction stated on August 5 that the Russian military command is deploying untrained personnel in highly attritional infantry-led frontal assaults in the Lyman direction in order to identify weak points in Ukrainian defenses.[53]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating within and south of Kolodyazi.[54] Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Lyman direction.[55] Artillery elements of the 79th Guards Rocket Artillery Brigade (MMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kreminna (northeast of Lyman).[56]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast August 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on July 30 and geolocated on August 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced southeast of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[58]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 2.5 kilometers east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske and Novoselivka.[59] [60]

Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, Serebryanka, and the Serebryanske forest area; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne on August 5 and 6.[61]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are concentrating on the seizure of Serebryanka and advancing towards Dronivka (northwest of Siversk) in order to establish pincer-shaped salients aimed at enveloping Siversk from the north and east.[62]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 6th, 7th, and 123rd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in and around Serebryanka.[63]




Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Chasiv Yar.[64]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove on August 5 and 6.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Chasiv Yar.[66]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[67] Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[68]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[69]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Toretsk itself; near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk); northwest of Toretsk near Kleban-Byk, Poltavka, Rusyn Yar, and along the H-20 Avdiivka-Yablunivka highway northeast of Yablunivka; 2.5 kilometers northeast of Bila Hora (north of Toretsk); and toward Nelipivka (south of Toretsk). [70]A milblogger also claimed that Russian forces seized Poltavka.[71] Another milblogger denied previous milblogger claims that Russian forces advanced in northern Shcherbynivka.[72]

Russian forces attacked in Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, Yablunivka, Katerynivka, and toward Ivanopillya; north of Toretsk near Bila Hora, Oleksandro-Shulytne, and Dyliivka; south of Toretsk near Nelipivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 5 and 6.[73]

A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence claimed that Russian forces are attacking from multiple directions near Toretsk and Shcherbynivka in order to interdict Ukrainian logistics.[74] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have reached the Kleban Byk reservoir (northwest of Toretsk), and established fire control over Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying Ukrainian forces in the area, allowing Russian forces to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs and partially encircle Ukrainian forces defending Katerynivka, Shcherbynivka, and Kleban-Byk (south of the Kleban Byk reservoir).[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Poltavka.[76] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Poltavka with glide bombs.[77] Drone operators of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Shcherbynivka.[78] Drone operators of the Berkut Group of the 238th Artillery Brigade and reconnaissance elements of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (both of the 8th CAA) are reportedly conducting strikes against Ukrainian forces near Berestok (northwest of Toretsk).[79] Drone operators of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bila Hora (north of Toretsk).[80]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0509 Fedorivka-Novoeconomichne highway in northeastern Fedorivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[81] Additional geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Chunyshyne (south of Pokrovsk).[82]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and to Troyanda (south of Pokrovsk).[83]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Boykivka, Novoeconomichne, Zatyshok, Nykanorivka, Sukhetske, Krasnyi Lyman, and Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and toward Promin and Myrnohrad;


south of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on August 5 and 6.[84]

The Ukrainian General Staff denied claims on August 5 that Russian forces have encircled the Ukrainian units in Pokrovsk. [85]


A drone crew commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are constantly attacking with no objective other than to advance anywhere near Pokrovsk and that Russian infantry often do not even know the names of the settlements they are assaulting.[86] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction claimed that Russian forces launch constant, "limitless" infantry assaults on Pokrovsk and that Russian military command transferred drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to support Russian forces' efforts to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that supply Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk.[87]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and reconnaissance elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly coordinating strikes on Ukrainian positions in Pokrovsk.[88] Drone operators of the AIRNOMAD Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[89]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction August 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast August 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 6 but did not advance.


Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Tovste and toward Ivanivka on August 5 and 6.[90]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk (Novopavlivka) direction.[91]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne and toward Andriivka-Kletsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka; southeast of Velyomykhailivka near Shevchenko, Zelene Pole, Temyrivka, Sichneve, and Maliivka; and south of Novomykhailivka toward Novoivanivka on August 5 and 6.[92]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sichneve, Novoselivka (west of Velykomyhailivka), and Vorone (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[93]



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Zelene Pole, Novodarivka, Novopil, Temyrivka and toward Novoivanivka and east of Hulyaipole near Zelenyi Hai and Malynivka on August 5 and 6 but did not advance.[94]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 35th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological, and Chemical Defense Regiment (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hulyaipole, Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole), and Chervone (east of Hulyaipole).[95] Drone operators of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast.[96]


Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Stepanohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[97]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka; and west of Orikhiv near Stepove and Plavni on August 5 and 6.[98] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Kamyanske.[99]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including of its 108th and 247th VDV regiments, are reportedly operating near Plavni and Kamyanske.[100]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction August 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 5 and 6 but did not advance.[101]

Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov reported that Russian forces used a fiber optic drone to strike a Ukrainian mobile communications center in Mykolaiv Oblast across from positions on the Kinburn Peninsula, unwinding 12 kilometers of fiber optic cable across the Black Sea.[102]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 31st Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[103]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction August 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched 45 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[104] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 36 strike and decoy drones and that nine Russian drones struck three unspecified locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged gas infrastructure in Novosilske, Odesa Oblast; struck a recreation center in Zaporizhzhia Raion, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, injuring at least 12 and killing at least two; and struck a residential area in Kharkiv City.[105]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that the first contingent of Russian troops and military equipment arrived in Belarus on August 6 ahead of the Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercise in September 2025.[106] Belarusian officials previously claimed that at least 13,000 total military personnel would participate in Zapad-2025.[107] ISW previously assessed that Russia and Belarus likely had to downsize the joint exercise, as most of Russia's forces that participated in the previous Zapad-2021 joint exercise are fighting in Ukraine.[108]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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