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**July 15, 2025, 6:15 pm ET**

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on July 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**Kremlin officials dismissed US President Donald Trump's demand that Russia agree to a ceasefire agreement in Ukraine within 50 days while promoting claims that Russia can withstand economic pressure and remains committed to achieving its war aims.** Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Kremlin newswire TASS on July 15 that Russia views any attempt to make demands of Russia, "especially ultimatums," as "unacceptable." [1] Ryabkov noted that Russia is ready to negotiate and prefers a diplomatic solution to its war in Ukraine, but will continue to pursue its war aims militarily if the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) do not take Russia's demands seriously. Ryabkov stated that Russia's position is "unshakable." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov echoed Ryabkov's statements, claiming that Russia is ready to participate in a third round of Ukraine-Russia bilateral negotiations but blamed Ukraine for the lack of progress towards the next round of talks. [2] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev posted on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account, claiming that "Russia didn't care" about Trump's "ultimatum." [3] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed confidence that Russia will be able to cope with US tariffs, as Russia is already "coping" with prior sanctions. [4] A Just Russia Party Leader and Duma Deputy, Sergei Mironov, claimed that potential tariffs will not affect the course or goals of Russia's war in Ukraine. [5] Russian President Vladimir Putin has yet to officially respond to Trump and is likely attempting to identify which narratives could convince Trump not to follow through with secondary tariffs in early September 2025.

**Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory continues to drive his unwillingness to compromise on his pre-war demand for Ukraine's capitulation.** *Reuters*, citing three unspecified sources close to the Kremlin, reported on July 15 that Putin intends to continue the war in Ukraine until the West concedes to his demands, is unfazed by US President Donald Trump's threats of secondary tariffs, and may expand his territorial demands as Russian forces continue their advances on the battlefield. [6] *Reuters'* sources noted that Putin is resolved to continue his war, as he believes Russia can endure any further economic hardship that the West imposes. One source told *Reuters* that Putin believes that none of Russia's diplomatic engagements thus far have included detailed discussions on a peace plan for Ukraine, so Putin "will continue until he gets what he wants." The sources told *Reuters* that Putin's demands for a potential settlement are the same as his demands from 2021 and at the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022 - demands that the Kremlin has repeatedly cited throughout

over three years of war.[7] ISW continues to assess that Putin holds a theory of victory that posits that Russia can achieve its war aims by continuing to make creeping gains on the battlefield indefinitely and outlasting Western support for Ukraine and Ukraine's ability to defend itself.[8] Western economic pressure, combined with sustained Western military support to Ukraine, is necessary to enable Ukrainian forces to inflict battlefield losses on Russia to force Putin to reassess his calculation and engage substantively in peace negotiations to end the war.[9]

**Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced new appointments within the Ukrainian government.** On July 14, Zelensky announced that he nominated current Economic Minister Yulia Svyrydenko as prime minister and noted that Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal's robust experience would be well suited for the role of defense minister.[10] Shmyhal later resigned from his position as prime minister on July 15.[11] Zelensky has yet to formalize these reassignments with an official decree as of this writing.

#### **Key Takeaways:**

- **Kremlin officials dismissed US President Donald Trump's demand that Russia agree to a ceasefire agreement in Ukraine within 50 days while promoting claims that Russia can withstand economic pressure and remains committed to achieving its war aims.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory continues to drive his unwillingness to compromise on his pre-war demand for Ukraine's capitulation.**
- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced new appointments within the Ukrainian government.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, and Toretsk.**

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War July 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

### **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

#### **Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 15.**

Russian forces continued assaults in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 14 and 15.[12] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and near Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[13]

#### **Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a defense industrial enterprise in Lipetsk Oblast.**

Russian opposition outlet *Astra* reported on July 15 that unspecified sources stated that at least four Ukrainian drones struck the Energiya chemical and weapons component plant in Yelets, Lipetsk Oblast, and damaged buildings at the plant.[14] *Astra* posted footage of fires near the plant.[15] Ukrainian forces reportedly last struck the Energiya plant on May 23.[16]

#### **Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)**

#### **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.**

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[17]


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing near Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City) and that elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and unspecified airborne (VDV) units advanced near Ryzhivka (southwest of Bezsalivka).[18]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of northern Sumy Oblast on July 14 and 15.[19] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Andriivka (southeast of Kindrativka) and that elements of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade are attacking near Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[20]



The spokesperson of a Ukrainian border guard detachment operating in northern Sumy Oblast stated that Russian forces in July 2025 are currently mainly attacking on foot after having used many motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and buggies in June 2025.[21]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 382nd Separate Naval Infantry Battalion of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[22] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar Volunteer Detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions northwest of Sumy City along the international border near Seredyna-Buda, Bachivsk, and Chyhyn.[23] Elements of the 11th VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[24]



## **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**


**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

**Russian forces conducted offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 15 but did not advance.**

Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Kharkiv City near Zelene and Vovchansk on July 14 and 15.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked west of Vovchansk.[26]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar Volunteer Detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions northwest of Kharkiv City along the international border near Veterynarne.[27]

## Assessed Control of Terrain along the Oskil River July 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 15 but did not advance.**

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked north of Velykyi Burluk near Dehtyarne and northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove.[28]

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

**Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Krasne Pershe (northeast of Kupyansk).[29]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Krasne Pershe, west of Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk), south of Dovhenke (north of Kupyansk), and west of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[30]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Stroivka and Kamyanka, east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Novoyehorivka and toward Pishchane on July 14 and 15.[31]


### **Russia recently advanced in the Borova direction.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Hrekivka (southeast of Borova).[32]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Kolisnykivka, Zahyrzove, and Zelenyi Hai and toward Nova Kruhlyakivka and Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Novoserhiivka and Cherneshchyna on July 14 and 15.[33]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction July 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 15 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove and Serednie; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Novomykhailivka, Hlushchenkove, Novyi Myr, Ridkodub, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske on July 14 and 15.[34]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[35]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast July 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast** (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)


**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 15 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhonokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka on July 14 and 15.[36]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 14th Separate Tank Battalion (possibly a reconstituted Soviet unit) (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Hryhorivka.[37]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast July 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 15 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked in Chasiv Yar itself and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on July 14 and 15.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including drone operators of its 331st VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[39]

**Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 15 shows Russian forces raising a flag in northwestern Novospaske (west of Toretsk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the

settlement.[40] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 1465th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) seized Novospaske.[41] A Russian milblogger acknowledged on July 15 that Russian forces raised a flag in Novospaske but claimed that fighting continues for the settlement.[42] Additional geolocated footage published on July 7 and 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Yablunivka and southeast of Rusyn Yar (both northwest of Toretsk).[43]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south and northwest of Novospaske; in eastern Rusyn Yar; northwest, south, and east of Yablunivka; north of Shevchenko Pershe (northwest of Toretsk); and southwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[44]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Shevchenko Pershe, Poltavka, Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Katerynivka and Stepanivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske on July 14 and 15.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Popiv Yar and Poltavka.[46]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Toretsk is a contested "gray zone." [47]

The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces conducted a Geran-2 drone strike against Ukrainian forces near Raiske (northwest of Toretsk).[48]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Rusyn Yar.[49] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka, and drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Dovha Balka (northwest of Toretsk).[50] Drone operators of the Typhoon Detachment (Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[51] Drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Sofiivka (northwest of Toretsk).[52]

## Assessed Control of Terrain Southwest of Toretsk July 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 15 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novotoretske (northeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced southeast of Mayak, west of Razine (both northeast of Pokrovsk), and west of Novoekonomichne (east of Pokrovsk).[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman (both northeast of Pokrovsk).[54]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Razine and Novotoretske and toward Rodynske, Krasnyi Lyman, Volodymyrivka, Boykivka, and Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Mykolaivka and



toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Chunyshyne; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Zvirove, and Udachne on July 14 and 15.[55]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone detachment operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are focusing on the eastern flank in the Pokrovsk direction.[56] The commander stated that the Russian military command sends poorly trained infantry to probe Ukrainian defenses and sends more professional, better equipped, and better trained personnel to attack Ukrainian weak points.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[57]



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 15 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Voskresenka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[58] A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA) also participated in the reported seizure.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Hrushkivske (southwest of Novopavlivka) and advanced northeast of Tovste and northwest of Myrne (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[60]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Komar, Fedorivka, Yalta, and Perebudova; and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Piddubne, Myrne, Novokhatske, Voskresenka, and Hrushkivske and toward Lysne, Novoselivka, and Oleksandrohrad on July 14 and 15.[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Novopavlivka direction.[62]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 15 but did not advance.**

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha and Maliivka, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novosilka and toward Temyrivka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on July 14 and 15.[63]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velyka Novosilka Direction July 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)**

**Russian forces continued assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on July 15 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[64]


Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[65]



## Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and west of Orikhiv near Plavni on July 14 and 15.[66]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction, and drone operators of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[67]



## Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on July 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including northeast of Kherson City near the Antonivsky Bridge and southwest of Kherson City near Zabych and Kozulyskyi islands, on July 14 and 15.[68]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Hispaniola Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue operating near the coast of occupied Crimea.[69]



## **Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 14 and 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 267 strike and decoy drones, roughly 200 of which were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Millerovo,



Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk Oblast.[70] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 178 drones and that 66 decoy drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 23 drones hit seven unspecified locations and that downed drone debris fell in nine locations. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian forces struck Kharkiv Oblast.[71]

### **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

Russia continues efforts to formalize Russian-Belarusian governmental integration. The Russian State Duma ratified a protocol on July 15 allowing Russian citizens permanently living in Belarus and Belarusian citizens permanently living in Russia the right to vote and run for local elections in their country of permanent residence.[72] Putin and Lukashenko signed the protocol on March 13, 2025, and Vladimir Putin submitted the bill to the Duma to ratify on July 1.[73]

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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[5] <https://t.me/mironovonline/12673>

[6] <https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/putin-unfazed-by-trump-will-fight-could-take-more-ukraine-2025-07-15/> ; <https://archive.ph/f87Ww>

[7] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051425> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar070323>

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