



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, Grace Mappes, and Karolina Hird

July 16, 2025, 8:15pm ET


Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on July 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin is recycling several longstanding informational narratives, including nuclear threats, in a renewed effort to break the United States away from Ukraine and the NATO alliance. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reaffirmed on July 16 that all provisions of Russia's nuclear doctrine, including the responsibility of nuclear countries to not "incite" non-nuclear states, remain in effect and that nuclear states must "answer" for "inciting" non-nuclear states.[1] Russia updated its nuclear doctrine in Fall 2024 to include a clause stipulating that Russia will consider aggression against it by a non-nuclear state with the support or participation of a nuclear power as a joint attack on Russia, likely in an effort to deter Western support for Ukraine during critical Western policy discussions in late 2024.[2] Peskov claimed that "Europeans maintain a rabid militaristic attitude towards Moscow" in response to a question regarding the US President Donald Trump-led effort to provide increased military aid to Ukraine via NATO member states.[3] Peskov also called on the international community to pressure Ukraine into bilateral negotiations with Russia — a reversal of Western calls to pressure Russia into meaningful bilateral negotiations to end the war — likely to falsely portray Russia as willing to negotiate while undermining Ukraine's credibility.[4] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on July 15 that Russia's war in Ukraine is aimed at eliminating "the threats that NATO has created" on Russia's borders.[5] The Kremlin is employing the same rhetorical lines that it has continuously used throughout the war to deter Western support for Ukraine, but has shifted its objective from *preventing* new support for Ukraine to *reversing* recent support and breaking the United States away from its transatlantic allies, likely in response to President Trump's recent demonstration of the United States' reinvigorated commitment to arming Ukraine and supporting NATO. Trump reaffirmed in late June 2025 that the United States will uphold NATO's Article 5 collective defense clause and recently demanded that Russia agree to a ceasefire agreement by September 2 or risk stringent US secondary tariffs.[6] The Kremlin is prioritizing informational campaigns aimed at undermining NATO unity and stoking discontent between the United States and its European allies in order to degrade Ukraine's defense capabilities and achieve its longstanding war aims that amount to Ukraine's capitulation.

Western officials provided additional details about the new US-led effort to arm Ukraine. US President Donald Trump responded on July 15 to a question about when the first Patriot air defense systems will arrive in Ukraine as part of this effort.[7] Trump stated that the US Patriot

missile systems are “already being shipped” to Ukraine from Germany and that NATO member states will pay for “everything,” referring to future US military deliveries to Ukraine. Unspecified US officials told the *New York Times* (NYT) on July 15 that nearly all weapons that NATO member states are expected to purchase for Ukraine from the United States — including Patriot air defense systems, unspecified missiles, and ammunition — are “immediately available” to send to Ukraine.[8] An unnamed NATO representative told Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* that the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) fund will coordinate NATO purchases of US weapons for Ukraine.[9] The representative also stated that Germany, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Finland have confirmed participation in this US-led effort, in addition to these states' existing commitments to the NSATU fund, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format), and various bilateral and multilateral agreements with Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 15 to 16, heavily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 400 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea on the night of July 15 and 16.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 198 Shahed-type drones and that 145 decoy drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian strike package largely targeted Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Kharkiv Oblast; and Vinnytsia City, Vinnytsia Oblast, and Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes also damaged civilian, industrial, and energy infrastructure in Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes mainly damaged energy infrastructure and that authorities were working to restore power to Kryvyi Rih.[12] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast officials and Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile each against both Kryvyi Rih and Odesa Oblast.[13] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces only launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile overnight, and Odesa Oblast officials did not report a ballistic missile strike in the oblast, so it is unclear whether Russian forces launched two ballistic missiles overnight.[14] Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Russian forces continue targeting Ukrainian cities with large drone swarms.[15]




The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) accepted the resignation of Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal on July 16, dissolving the current Ukrainian government. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Oleksiy Honcharenko reported that the Verkhovna Rada will vote on the composition of the new government on July 17.[16] Zelensky announced that he nominated Shmyhal to be the new Ukrainian defense minister and subordinated the Ministry of Strategic Industries to the Ministry of Defense (MoD).[17]

Key Takeaways:

- **The Kremlin is recycling several longstanding informational narratives, including nuclear threats, in a renewed effort to break the United States away from Ukraine and the NATO alliance.**
- **Western officials provided additional details about the new US-led effort to arm Ukraine.**
- **Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 15 to 16, heavily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure.**
- **The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) accepted the resignation of Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal on July 16, dissolving the current Ukrainian government.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Borova, Lyman, and Novopavlivka.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War July 16, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation


Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 16.

Russian forces continued assaults in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 15 and 16.[18] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo, Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[19]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction July 16, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into western Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[20]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Ryzhivka and Bezsalivka (both northwest of Sumy City).[21]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Varachyne on July 15 and 16.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka,

Yablunivka, Sadky, and Zapsillya.[23]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) units reportedly continue to operate near Ryzhivka.[24] Artillery elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and drone operators of the 11th and 83rd VDV brigades reportedly continue to operate in northern Sumy Oblast. [25]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the Oil Extraction Plant in northern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and in a forested area northwest of Vovchansk.[26]




Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Tykhe, Vovchansk, and Prylipka on July 15 and 16.[27] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Prylipka and Vovchansk.[28]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Dehtyarne (north of Velykyi Burluk) and from Milove toward Khanty (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[29]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Milove and Dehtyarne on July 15 and 16.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[31]

Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe, Stroivka, and Synkivka and toward Bolohivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on July 15 and 16.[32]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces conduct ground assaults and glide bomb strikes at all times of day and night, including during poor weather conditions.[33] The deputy commander stated that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction conduct ground assaults in small groups and frequently send lone soldiers on to conduct assaults.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Hrektivka (southeast of Borova).[34]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Hrektivka and Novoyehorivka and toward Cherneshchyna on July 15 and 16.[35]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Karpivka (northwest of Lyman).[36]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction July 16, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer near Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman).[37]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna and toward Novyi Myr; north of Lyman near Karpivka and Hlushchenkove and toward Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebrianske forest area on July 15 and 16.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and

possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 16 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk); south of Novoselivka (east of Siversk); and west of Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk).[39]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on July 15 and 16.[40]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults near Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Stupochky on July 15 and 16.[41]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction reported on July 16 that Russian infantry are hiding from Ukrainian drones in pipes, drainage sewers, and windbreaks.[42]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are supporting Russian ground attacks near Chasiv Yar.[43]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on July 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk toward Nelipivka and Poltavka and near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, and Yablunivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Novospaske and Romanivka on July 15 and 16.[44]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian targets near Yablunivka and Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction July 16, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 15 that Russian forces seized Rodynske (northeast of Pokrovsk).[46] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Razine, southeast of Pankivka and into western Boikivka (all northeast of Pokrovsk); northeast of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk); and near Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[47]

Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Razine, and Fedorivka and toward Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on July 15


and 16.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske.[49]

A Ukrainian brigade spokesperson operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces in the brigade's area of responsibility are focusing on efforts to advance toward Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk) and conducting highly attritional infantry-led assaults.[50] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces attack in fireteams of three soldiers: one fully-armored soldier with a weapon, one soldier with no armor carrying ammunition and additional weapons, and a final soldier bringing up the rear. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces have intensified glide bomb strikes in the Pokrovsk direction.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novotroitske (southwest of Pokrovsk) and Razine.[51] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Razine.[52] Drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Sofiivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[53] Elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[54]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction July 16, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 16 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka).[55] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing Novokhatske.[56]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west and northeast of Novokhatske and toward Oleksandrohrad and Maliivka (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[57]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Dachne, and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Yalta, and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Piddubne, Myrne, Lisne, and Novokhatske on July 15 and 16.[58]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are primarily attacking in small infantry formations using four-wheelers and motorcycles, but sometimes attack using heavy equipment, including infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) or armored personnel carriers (APCs), and sometimes multi-purpose armored fighting vehicles (MTLBs) and one to two tanks.[59] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces cover these heavy armored vehicles with protective structures and electronic warfare (EW) systems and that Russian forces continue to struggle with armored vehicle shortages. A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are regrouping and transferring a significant number of forces to the Novopavlivka direction after failing to secure tactically significant advances in the Pokrovsk direction.[60]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Oleksandrohrad.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized 2.5 square kilometers of territory near southeastern Komyshuvakha (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and 1.5 square kilometers of territory near southeastern Temyrivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[62]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Maliivka and toward Komyshuvakha and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Zelene Pole and toward Temyrivka on July 15 and 16.[63]


Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[64]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 16 but did not make confirmed advances.[65]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Olhivske (northeast of Hulyaipole) and west of Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[66]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 16 but did not advance.



Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Plavni and south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka on July 16.[67]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 247th VDV Regiment, and of the 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[68]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on July 16 but did not advance.



Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky Bridge and southwest of Kherson City near Zabych and Kozulyskyi islands, on July 15 and 16.[69]

A Ukrainian deputy company commander operating in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction reported that Russian drone activity in this direction has greatly increased.[70] The deputy commander stated that Russian forces field three to four reconnaissance drones at a time and are fielding first-person view (FPV) drones with a greater range than previously observed. The deputy commander also stated that Russian forces are effectively using drones as mines by planting camouflaged drones on roads and streets and waiting for them to detonate when Ukrainian forces pass by.

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 31st Separate VDV Brigade and drone operators of the 104th Guards VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[71] Elements of the 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[72]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See *topline* *text*.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Russian Federation Council ratified a protocol on July 16 that will allow Belarusian citizens who are permanent residents of Russia to vote in local Russian government elections.[73] Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed the protocol on March 13, and the Russian State Duma (lower parliament) ratified the protocol on July 15.[74]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

POWERED BY:



BABEL STREET

[1] <https://tass dot ru/politika/24526193> ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325532

[2] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar111924>

- [3] <https://tass dot ru/politika/24526193>
- [4] <https://tass dot ru/politika/24526233>
- [5] https://t.me/MID_Russia/62677
- [6] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425> ; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025>
- [7] <https://x.com/CNBCTV18News/status/1945330411732918520>
- [8] <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/15/world/europe/ukraine-weapons-us-nato.html>
- [9] <https://suspilne dot media/1067577-evropejski-souzniki-ta-kanada-profinansuut-vijskovu-dopomogu-ukraini-cerez-novij-mehanizm-nato/>
- [10] <https://t.me/kpszsu/38567>
- [11] <https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbidom3hEvcBcMGJ3bJUUXPgRbwobDde4t5K5nNGKkpbdsRSp4gjJ12qu7LPYHdgLBMyKl> ; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/vorog-atakuvav-izmayil-udarnymy-bezpilotnykamy-poshkodzhenainfrastruktura/> ; <https://t.me/odeskaODA/10538>
- [12] <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1945381927411966087> ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15132
- [13] [https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbidom3hEvcBcMGJ3bJUUXPgRbwobDde4t5K5nNGKkpbdsRSp4gjJ12qu7LPYHdgLBMyKl?__cft__\[o\]=AZW1XMsTpxuOYPi-i-01LitpKhIxsGhp6JHo4iadrHwL8h9YfKHdiIdIK4PCKguvxFe4nIFErhqEio-_UsVLG7AtC8m4vvbRpdolQWaRfu5xzC5w_HnVMtoIN_fyyvcy9HXuHLMZVal8dkNPMRQICCuEB13lD4eJd1dlbKTrRgikHw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R](https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbidom3hEvcBcMGJ3bJUUXPgRbwobDde4t5K5nNGKkpbdsRSp4gjJ12qu7LPYHdgLBMyKl?__cft__[o]=AZW1XMsTpxuOYPi-i-01LitpKhIxsGhp6JHo4iadrHwL8h9YfKHdiIdIK4PCKguvxFe4nIFErhqEio-_UsVLG7AtC8m4vvbRpdolQWaRfu5xzC5w_HnVMtoIN_fyyvcy9HXuHLMZVal8dkNPMRQICCuEB13lD4eJd1dlbKTrRgikHw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R) ; https://www.facebook.com/PvKPivden/posts/1122519176593446?ref=embed_post ; <https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1067841-rf-atakuvala-odesinu-balisticnou-raketou-ta-dronami-castinu-povitranih-cilej-zniseno/> ; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/takogo-shhe-ne-bulo-rosiyany-atakuvaly-kryvyj-rig-balistykyoyu-ta-odrazu-28-shahedamy/> ; <https://t.me/vilkul/11706>
- [14] <https://t.me/kpszsu/38567> ; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/vorog-atakuvav-izmayil-udarnymy-bezpilotnykamy-poshkodzhenainfrastruktura/> ; <https://t.me/odeskaODA/10538>
- [15] <https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9528>
- [16] <https://kyivindependent dot com/ukraines-parliament-dismisses-government/> ; <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/16/verhovna-rada-zvilnyla-premyer-ministra-denysashmygalya-uryad-jde-u-vidstavku/> ; <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/14/pereformatuvannya-kabminu-hto-mozhe-ocholyty-uryad-i-minoborony/> ; <https://suspilne dot media/1068017-rada-vidpravila-smigala-ta-jogo-urad-u-vidstavku/> ; <https://www.youtube.com/live/r-UUVbCFewg>
- [17] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15144

- [18] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoSVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUl> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700>
- [19] https://t.me/dva_majors/75472 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75491 ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31352>
- [20] <https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1945363736719712298>; https://t.me/morpex_V/5281
- [21] https://t.me/dva_majors/75472
- [22] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoSVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUl> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700> ; <https://t.me/rybar/72181> ; <https://t.me/rybar/72178> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/27862> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75472
- [23] <https://t.me/rybar/72181> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95861> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75472 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75490
- [24] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31352>
- [25] https://t.me/mod_russia/54708 ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31329> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31329> ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172557
- [26] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9610; <https://t.me/murchiki57/46> ; <https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1945432387422179371>
- [27] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoSVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUl>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843; <https://t.me/rybar/72194>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/27862>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31340>
- [28] <https://t.me/rybar/72194>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31340>; https://t.me/tass_agency/325443
- [29] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31319>; <https://t.me/rybar/72194>
- [30] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31319>; https://t.me/dva_majors/75472
- [31] https://t.me/tass_agency/325476
- [32] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoSVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUl>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843
- [33] https://armyinform_dot_com.ua/2025/07/16/diye-vnochi-vden-siryj-chas-poblyzu-kupyanska-rosiyany-v-ataky-jdut-poodynczi-ale-postijno/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iZRs_wcxLMM
- [34] <https://x.com/blinzka/status/1945097683753980096>; https://t.me/Ci4team_4mb/399
- [35] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700>

- [36] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9608; <https://t.me/ombr66/1861>
- [37] https://t.me/tass_agency/325480
- [38] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoSVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUI>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843
- [39] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32039
- [40] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoSVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUI>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843
- [41] <https://t.me/wargonzo/27862>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoSVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUI>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843
- [42] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/07/16/lizut-v-truby-j-gynut-nashi-drony-zalitayut-u-shovanky-okupantiv-i-nyshhat-yih-zseredyny/>; <https://t.me/fifthbrUA/1037>
- [43] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31329>
- [44] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoSVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUI>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843; <https://t.me/rybar/72181>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/27862>
- [45] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14040;
- [46] <https://t.me/wargonzo/27849>
- [47] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95899> ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32033; https://t.me/z_arhiv/3202 ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31363>
- [48] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoSVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDUI> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/75472
- [49] <https://t.me/wargonzo/27862>
- [50] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/07/16/vony-nazyvayut-yih-sobakamy-poblyzu-pokrovskaozni-okupanty-zhenut-vmyraty-inshyh/>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSSoBoyo>
- [51] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14041
- [52] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14040; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172595
- [53] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172540
- [54] https://t.me/mod_russia/54708

- [55] <https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1945403480744817055> https://t.me/voin_dv/16011; <https://t.me/osintpen/1442>
- [56] https://t.me/mod_russia/54727 ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95921> ; <https://t.me/sashakots/54944> ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16011
- [57] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95921>
- [58] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SVyUs6QS53PnDj5KyenYro1u9BnLj9kVVXAB5qZw6NrsywzyA8JZYp8KNNFGenDU1> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843
- [59] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/07/16/bagato-myasa-i-vono-bizhyt-u-nash-bik-nanovopavlivskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-try-varianty-shturmiv/>; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iZR_s_wcxLMM
- [60] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/07/16/za-rahunok-pihoty-yaku-zhenut-na-ubij-nanovopavlivskomu-napryamku-posylyvsya-tysk-zhyvoyu-syloyu/>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk>
- [61] https://t.me/voin_dv/16008
- [62] https://t.me/voin_dv/16001
- [63] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843
- [64] https://t.me/voin_dv/16015
- [65] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702> ; <https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbidom3hEvcBcMGJ3bJUUXPgRbwobDde4t5K5nNGKkpbdRS4gjJ12qu7LPYHdgLBMyKl>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13843
- [66] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31337>
- [67] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702> ; <https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbidom3hEvcBcMGJ3bJUUXPgRbwobDde4t5K5nNGKkpbdRS4gjJ12qu7LPYHdgLBMyKl> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/27862>
- [68] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31334>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31329> ; <https://t.me/milinfo/152962>
- [69] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26702> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26700>
- [70] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/07/16/osoblyvo-doshkulyayut-korychnevogo-koloru-naprydniprovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-narostyly-dronovyj-terror-z-povitrya/>; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iZR_s_wcxLMM
- [71] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31333> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31329> ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54724

[72] https://t.me/mod_russia/54728

[73] https://t.me/tass_agency/325527; [https://belta dot by/society/view/parlament-rf-zavershil-ratifikatsiju-protokola-dajuscheho-pravo-belorusam-uchastvovat-v-mestnyh-726677-2025/](https://belta.by/society/view/parlament-rf-zavershil-ratifikatsiju-protokola-dajuscheho-pravo-belorusam-uchastvovat-v-mestnyh-726677-2025/)

[74] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2025>