



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Jennie Olmsted, Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Grace Mappes, and Karolina Hird

July 17, 2025, 7:15 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russia's Central Bank continues efforts to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia's economic instability. Bloomberg reported on July 17, citing the Russian Central Bank's June 2025 monthly report, that Russia's seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of inflation decreased to four percent in June 2025, in line with Russia's four percent target inflation rate.[1] Bloomberg assessed the decrease in the SAAR of inflation as the first indicator that the Central Bank's efforts to lower the inflation rate have been successful. The Russian Central Bank report cautioned that the official annual inflation rate remains at nine percent, but assessed that if the current trajectory continues, the inflation rate could hit the target of four percent sometime in 2026. The SAAR is a short-term measurement, however, and its decrease is unlikely to positively impact the Russian economy in the long term. The Russian Central Bank reported that the cost of interest-bearing instruments — financial assets that generate interest — significantly decreased in June 2025, and that investors expect an average key interest rate below 18 percent between August 2025 and October 2025. The Russian Central Bank's report claimed that a strong Russian ruble significantly contributed to the SAAR decrease. A strong ruble increases Russia's purchasing power on the global market, which in turn decreases the ruble cost of imported goods such as machinery and technology, lowering input costs (expenses to produce goods or services) and inflationary pressure (that increases the price of goods and services over time) on firms that rely on imported components. A strengthened ruble softens the blow of Western sanctions as it makes parallel imports cheaper and keeps substitutes affordable. **ISW assesses that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues and cheaper imports using the strengthened ruble, both of which are essential for the Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine.** The Russian Central Bank reported two potential complicating factors in lowering the interest rate: the eventual waning of effects from earlier

bouts of ruble strengthening that helped slow price growth in June 2025, and the ongoing rise in the cost of services, despite a stabilization of the exchange rate and cost of goods sensitive to credit.

Russia's unsustainably high payments to soldiers and the impacts of the resulting domestic labor shortage will likely further destabilize the Russian economy, regardless of the Kremlin's claims of economic stability. Russia's strategy of incentivizing volunteer recruitment by offering large one-time payments to recruits and simultaneous efforts to rapidly expand its defense industrial base (DIB) since 2022 has required Russia to significantly increase payments to both sustain military recruitment and to augment the DIB's labor force.[2] Russia has had to significantly increase the federal and regional one-time bonuses to incentivize Russians to sign military contracts rather than take other jobs, given high Russian casualty rates.[3] Competition between Russia's DIB and civilian enterprises is raising the average salary for these positions and is raising prices in service industries writ large. These factors, coupled with labor shortages in the civilian and defense sectors, are likely contributing to the divergence between the cost of goods and services in the Central Bank's report by limiting Russian economic growth, force generation efforts, and defense industrial production. ISW continues to assess that Russia cannot indefinitely replace its forces at the current casualty rate without an involuntary reserve mobilization, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown great reluctance to order, nor can it sustain increasingly high payments to recruits, which the Russian economy cannot afford.[4] Russia is effectively burning the candle at both ends by simultaneously loosening monetary policy to stimulate short-term growth, while expanding fiscal expenditure to feed the military effort. This strategy will likely adversely affect the Russian economy by weakening consumer purchasing power, devaluing the ruble in the medium- to long-term, and creating deeper macroeconomic instability.

Russian bankers are reportedly privately expressing concerns over a growing number of non-performing (late and unpaid) loans despite the Russian Central Bank's claims of economic stability. Bloomberg reported on July 17 that unspecified top executives at "some of Russia's largest banks" have privately discussed seeking a state-funded bailout if the level of non-performing loans on their books continues to grow through 2025.[5] Bloomberg reported that it reviewed documents that indicate that three of Russia's systemically important lenders (financial institutions whose potential failure could disrupt the broader financial system and economy) may need to recover funds lost from the non-performing loans. Bloomberg reported that non-performing loans issued by Russian banks have grown by 1.2 percent in 2025 and could rise to six or seven percent from their current rate of four percent by 2026. ISW is unable to independently verify Bloomberg's report about these unspecified large Russian banks and lenders, but has observed indications that Russian officials are growing concerned about economic stability in the wake of Russian Central Bank policy changes. Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina previously downplayed the risk of systemic economic crisis, claiming that the Russian banking system has capital reserves of eight trillion rubles (about \$102.5 billion).[6] Bloomberg reported that the Russian Central Bank has advised lenders to focus on restructuring credit with the borrowers and absorbing the bad loans, reflective of Russia's risky and contradictory economic policies, rather than recognizing the full extent of sourcing loans.[7] The Russian Central Bank is therefore likely disinterested in bailing out Russian major banks - an action that could cause liquidity problems and, in the worst case, cause bank failure. Any failure of a major Russian bank would undercut Russian President Vladimir Putin's long-standing narrative that neither the war in Ukraine nor Western sanctions are hurting the Russian economy.[8]

Reports that Ukrainian forces targeted Moscow City and St. Petersburg overnight on July 16 and 17 are likely overreacting to standard Russian statements about Ukraine's longstanding deep strike campaign aimed at degrading Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed two Ukrainian long-range Neptune missiles and 308 aircraft-type drones overnight on July 16 to 17 over Bryansk, Orlov, Belgorod, Lipetsk, Oryol, Kursk, Smolensk, Voronezh, Moscow, Kaluga, Leningrad, and Tula oblasts.[9] Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyenin claimed that Russian forces downed three drones flying toward Moscow City, and Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems downed two drones over Kirovsky Raion.[10]

Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian DIB assets in areas around Moscow and St. Petersburg, including Smolensk and Tula oblasts, may be mischaracterized as targeting St. Petersburg and Moscow Oblast, respectively, due to their geographical proximity and the direction of flight. Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that Russian forces downed seven drones over Tula Oblast.[11] Russian opposition outlet *Astra* and Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Shchekinoazot United Chemical Plant in Pervomaysky, Tula Oblast, suspended operations after at least four drones struck the facility and caused a fire.[12] Kovalenko noted that the chemical plant manufactures industrial chemical products, including ammonia, methanol, and urea, that support the production of explosives, solid rocket fuel, and synthetic materials.[13] Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin claimed on July 17 that Russian forces downed 14 drones in Smolensk Oblast.[14] *Astra* reported on July 17 that a drone may have struck Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec's 720th Flight Support Equipment Repair Plant in Roslavl, Smolensk Oblast.[15] It is unlikely that Ukrainian drones struck targets in either Moscow or Leningrad oblasts, given the lack of footage and Russian and Ukrainian official reporting that ISW typically observes accompanying successful strikes against Russian DIB assets, particularly those in or near major cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg. Ukrainian drone strikes in the direction of or against Moscow and Leningrad oblasts do not represent an inflection in Ukraine's long-range strike campaign, as Ukrainian forces regularly conduct strikes against legitimate military and DIB targets in these oblasts and oblasts between the Ukrainian border and Moscow and St. Petersburg cities. Ukraine's strike campaign differs from Russia's in that Ukrainian forces chiefly target legitimate military targets and avoid incurring disproportionate civilian casualties, whereas Russian strike packages are designed to maximize damage to civilian areas. The Kremlin previously employed an informational campaign that leveraged unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian strikes to discredit Ukraine during temporary ceasefire periods and may recycle this campaign in an attempt to influence Western policy discussions regarding support for Ukraine.[16]

Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on July 17, in accordance with agreements reached during negotiations in Istanbul on June 2. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported that Russia released the bodies of 1,000 deceased Ukrainian soldiers and that Ukrainian authorities will examine and identify the bodies.[17] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky stated that Ukraine released the bodies of 19 deceased Russian soldiers.[18] Kremlin newswires TASS and RIA Novosti claimed that a source close to the Russian negotiation team reported that Russia

is prepared to exchange the bodies of 3,000 deceased Ukrainian soldiers in accordance with Russian President Vladimir Putin's previous statement and that the July 17 exchange is the first exchange involving these 3,000 bodies.[19] ISW has previously observed Ukrainian reports that Russian authorities included the bodies of Russian soldiers KIA in previous KIA exchanges, likely to artificially inflate the number of bodies Russia claims to return to Ukraine and undermine the efficacy of this confidence-building measure.[20]


The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada approved the appointment of former Ukrainian Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko as Ukraine's new prime minister, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Justice Minister Olha Stefanishyna as a special representative to the United States. The Rada supported Svyrydenko's new Cabinet of Ministers on July 17, including former Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal as defense minister; former Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov as first deputy prime minister; former Deputy Minister of Economics Tara Kachka as the deputy prime minister for European integration; former Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko as the justice minister; former Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Minister Svitlana Hrynychuk as the energy minister, and former First Deputy Minister of Economy Oleksiy Sobolev as the minister of economy.[21] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha and Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko remain in their positions. Zelensky appointed Stefanishyna as the Ukrainian presidential special representative for the development of cooperation with the United States.[22]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russia's Central Bank continues to posture Russian economic stability and growth to maintain the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia's economic instability.**
- **Russia's unsustainably high payments to soldiers and impacts of the resulting domestic labor shortage will likely further destabilize the Russian economy, regardless of the Kremlin's efforts to posture stability.**
- **Russian bankers are reportedly privately expressing concerns over a growing number of non-performing loans despite the Russian Central Bank's claims of economic stability.**
- **Reports that Ukrainian forces targeted Moscow City and St. Petersburg overnight on July 16 and 17 are likely overreacting to standard Russian statements about Ukraine's longstanding deep strike campaign aimed at degrading Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).**
- **Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on July 17, in accordance with agreements reached during negotiations in Istanbul on June 2.**
- **The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada approved the appointment of former Ukrainian Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko as Ukraine's new prime minister, and**

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Justice Minister Olha Stefanishyna as a special representative to the United States.

- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Borova.**



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population, and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian

violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 17.

Russian forces continued ground attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 16 and 17.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and near Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[24]


Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 17 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces likely maintain positions in most of Kindrativka and have partially encircled Russian forces near Oleksiivka (both north of Sumy City).[25]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Sumy City near Ryzhivka and Bezsalivka; north of Sumy City near Varachyne; and northeast of Sumy City near Myropillya.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Sadky and Yablunivka.[27]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that an unspecified battalion of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD), and the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD) are operating in the Kindrativka-Oleksiiivka area and are no longer combat effective due to heavy casualties.[28] Mashovets reported that elements of the 11th and 83rd separate airborne (VDV) brigades, with the reinforcement of one battalion from the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, are operating in the Yablunivka-Varachyne area. Mashovets stated that elements of the 104th, 234th, and 237th VDV regiments (all part of the 76th VDV Division) are operating northeast of Sumy City, including near Yunakivka. Drone operators of the Russian 106th VDV Division reportedly continue striking Ukrainian forces in northern Sumy Oblast.[29]



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and crossed the Vovcha River into southern (left bank) Vovchansk.[30]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kharkiv City toward Kudiivka and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Zelene on July 16 and 17.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[32]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating in Vovchansk.[33] Elements of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion are reportedly operating near Vovchansk.[34]


Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Dehtyarne (north of Velykyi Burluk along the international border).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west and southwest of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[36] Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced 200 meters toward Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[37]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and toward Ambarne and Khatne on July 16 and 17.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Milove.[39]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 45th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are attacking toward Ambarne.[40]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction July 17, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 17, but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Kindrashivka and from Dvorichna toward Kutkivka (all north of Kupyansk).[41]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Stroivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Novoyehorivka and toward Pishchane on July 16 and 17.[42]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Radkivka (northwest of Kupyansk) is a contested "gray zone" and refuted claims that Russian forces reached Myrove (northwest of Kupyansk).[43]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army ([GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[44]


Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[45]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kolisnykivka (northeast of Borova).[46]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Zelenyi Hai; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka on July 16 and 17.[47]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction July 17, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on July 16 and 17.[48]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast July 17, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces advanced south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[49]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on July 16 and 17.[50] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryhorivka.[51]

Mashovets refuted Russian claims that Russian forces seized Hryhorivka and stated that Russian forces have still not established control over Verkhokamyanske (east of Siversk).[52] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Verkhokamyanske as of October 9, 2024.[53]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 127th Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly of the 3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Hryhorivka.[54] Elements of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Vyimka.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and south of Chasiv Yar.[56]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Predtechyne, and Stupochky on July 16 and 17.[57]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces occasionally conduct mechanized assaults in this area and have sustained 5,000 casualties in the Chasiv Yar direction in the past year.[58] The commander also stated that the Russian military command is constantly replenishing elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division operating in Chasiv Yar with poorly-trained penal colony recruits or personnel who have signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for the financial incentives, resulting in the fact that the division is no longer an "elite" formation. This is consistent with ISW's longstanding assessment that Russian assault tactics in Ukraine have degraded the reputation and functionality of many units that were considered "elite" prior to the full-scale invasion.[59]

Kramatorsk City Military Administration Head Oleksandr Honcharenko stated on July 17 that Russian forces struck Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar) with six guided glide bombs, three Geran-2 long-range strike drones, and two KUB-2 reconnaissance and strike drones.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division, including its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 1065th Separate Artillery Regiment, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[61] Drone operators of the BARS-27 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction, but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on July 17 that Russian forces seized Popiv Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and west of Popiv Yar, east of Poltavka (northwest of Toretsk), and near Novospaske (west of Toretsk).[64]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Poltavka, and Yablunivka, and toward Nelipivka and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske on July 16 and 17.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Popiv Yar.[66]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russia's guided glide bomb strikes in the Toretsk direction are supporting Russian ground advances.[67] The milblogger claimed that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) are fielding a new guided glide bomb modification with increased noise immunity (a weapon system's ability to function correctly despite electronic interference) and accuracy.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) and artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Shcherbynivka.[68] Drone elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) and artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Rusyn Yar.[69]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southeastern Novoekonomichne (east of Pokrovsk).[70]


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within eastern Udachne, near Zvirove (both southwest of Pokrovsk), and in Chunyshyne (south of Pokrovsk).[71]

Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk toward Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne, and toward Molodetske on July 16 and 17.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Kotlyne.[73]

Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, stated that Russian forces struck a shopping mall in Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) with a guided glide bomb, killing four people.[74]

Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) with the recent seizure of Mykolaivka.[75] Elements of the Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[76] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bilozerske (northwest of Pokrovsk).[77]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction July 17, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated on July 17 that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) advanced 3.5 kilometers near Piddubne (southwest of Novopavlivka) in the past day and that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) advanced at least 2.5 kilometers west of Myrne (southwest of Novopavlivka).[78] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka), north of Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka), and northeast and west of Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka).[79]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Novoukrainka, Oleksiivka, and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Piddubne, Voskresenka, Myrne, and Zelenyi Hai on July 16 and 17.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), Muravka, Dachne, and Horikhove.[81]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Novokhatske.[82]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 17, but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets reported on July 17 that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) advanced 1.5 kilometers in the area north of Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) in the past day.[83]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko and toward Komyshevakh, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and toward Temyrivka on July 16 and 17.[84]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are operating north of Zelene Pole.[85] Drone operators of the 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Yanvarske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[86]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast July 17, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on July 17.

Russian forces continued ground assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv) and credited elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 108th and 247th VDV regiments, with the claimed seizure.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed Russian forces advanced south of Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[88]


Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Kamyanske.[89]



Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on July 17, but did not advance.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued attacks on unspecified islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[90]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 104th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast.[91]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 64 strike and decoy drones, of which 59 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[92] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 36

drones and that five decoy drones were lost or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts.[93]

The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that Russian forces conducted a "double tap" strike using first-person view (FPV) drones against civilians and emergency workers in Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, on the evening of July 16.[94]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

POWERED BY:



BABELSTREET

[1] <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-17/russia-notches-long-awaited-win-in-fight-against-inflation> ; https://www dot cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/57021/bulletin_25-05.pdf

[2] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage>

[3] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-15-2025> ; <https://isw.pub/ForceGen060625> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2024> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024>

[4] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage>

[5] <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-17/russian-banks-have-discussed-seeking-bailouts-within-next-year>

[6] <https://ria dot ru/20250703/dolya-2026931910.html?ysclid=md7vogh10604045280>

[7] <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-17/russian-banks-have-discussed-seeking-bailouts-within-next-year>

- [8] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925>
- [9] https://t.me/tass_agency/325714 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54759 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54742 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54741 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54737 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54736 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325653 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325624 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325622
- [10] https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/7589 ; https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/7590 ; https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/15933 ; https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/15934
- [11] <https://t.me/dmilyaev/6156> ; <https://t.me/dmilyaev/6143>
- [12] <https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9532> ; <https://t.me/astrapress/86820>
- [13] <https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9532>
- [14] <https://t.me/anohin67/7259>
- [15] <https://t.me/astrapress/86775>
- [16] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050725> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050325> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925>
- [17] https://t.me/Koord_shtab/13806
- [18] https://t.me/vr_medinskiy/2667
- [19] <https://ria dot ru/20250717/peredacha-2029649659.html>; <https://tass dot ru/politika/24537929>
- [20] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925>
- [21] <https://suspilne dot media/1068649-novij-starij-urad-hto-vidteper-ocolue-ministerstva-ukraini/>
- [22] <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1945791717363617962>
- [23] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739>
- [24] https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31399>
- [25] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2866>
- [26] https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; <https://t.me/wargonzo/27880>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31399>;
- [27] https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172690; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31399>;
- [28] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2866>
- [29] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/9554; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172715; https://t.me/mod_russia/54758

- [30] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65985>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95946>;
https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13625
- [31] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903
- [32] <https://t.me/wargonzo/27880>
- [33] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2867>
- [34] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5842
- [35] https://t.me/mod_russia/54753;
- [36] <https://t.me/wargonzo/27880>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65985>
- [37] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2867>
- [38] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65985>; https://t.me/dva_majors/75544;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95971>
- [39] Warning: graphic content
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172672
- [40] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2867>
- [41] <https://t.me/rybar/72216>
- [42] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903
- [43] <https://t.me/rybar/72216>
- [44] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172711
- [45] <https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1945884101497745548> ; https://t.me/rubaka_77/137
- [46] <https://t.me/rybar/72216>
- [47] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903
- [48] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903
- [49] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2868>
- [50] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903
- [51] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2868>

- [52] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2868>
- [53] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024>
- [54] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2868>
- [55] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2868>
- [56] <https://t.me/wargonzo/27880>
- [57] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903
- [58] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSSoBoyo> ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/07/17/transformuyetsya-i-degraduye-yak-vtraty-v-chasovomu-yari-motyvyut-rosiyan-zdavatsya/>
- [59] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2024> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024> <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-30-2025>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2023>
- [60] <https://suspilne.media/donbas/1068521-vnoci-vijska-rf-zavdali-sim-udariv-pokramatorsku/>; <https://www.facebook.com/alexander.vasilyevich.goncharenko>
- [61] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31376>;
<https://www.facebook.com/24th.brigade/posts/pfbid02PLq1sETKbvugD6WPT3mhuLQP2SsbsvkwujovZaYGRiEBW1mE1WKkyUZBkpsanWmgl> ; <https://suspilne.media/donbas/1068325-uchasovomu-arui-vijskovi-24-brigadi-vzali-v-polon-desantnikov-98-i-divizii-rf/> ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/07/16/elitu-rosijskoyi-armiyi-popovnyly-zekamy-u-chasovomu-yaru-vzyaly-v-polon-desantnykiv-z-kryminalnym-mynulym/>;
; https://x.com/24th_brigade/status/1945513659498922041;
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSSoBoyo> ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/07/17/transformuyetsya-i-degraduye-yak-vtraty-v-chasovomu-yari-motyvyut-rosiyan-zdavatsya/>
- [62] https://t.me/mod_russia/54758
- [63] https://t.me/mod_russia/54753
- [64] https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; <https://t.me/rybar/72208>

[65] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903; https://t.me/dva_majors/75544; <https://t.me/wargonzo/27880>

[66] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65993>

[67] <https://t.me/rybar/72223>

[68] <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1945601870237471055> ; <https://t.co/qfCRrrR782> ; <https://t.co/sRnfcv4Yrm>; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14055

[69] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14056

[70] <https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1945644258343453017> <https://t.me/icpbtribicon/319>

[71] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65977>; https://x.com/clement_molin/status/1945598718704558323

[72] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65977>; <https://t.me/rybar/72208>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/38994>

[73] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65983>

[74] <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1945550959003811874>; <https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/9690> ; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/aviaudar-po-tcz-u-dobropilli-rosiyany-skynuly-kab-500-ye-zagybli-j-poraneni/> ; <https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/9700> ; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/udar-po-dobropillyu-odna-lyudyna-zagynula-kilkist-poranenyh-zrosla-do-21/>; <https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/9708> ; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/16/novi-dani-pislya-udaru-po-tcz-v-dobropilli-dvoye-zagyblyh-i-26-poranenyh/>; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/46272 ; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/17/dsns-zavershyly-avarijno-ryatuvalni-ta-poshukovi-roboty-na-misczi-udaru-v-dobropilli-shho-vidomo/> ;

[75] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95944>

[76] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/38994>

[77] <https://t.me/milinfoolive/153060>

[78] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2869>

[79] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32053; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/172739

[80] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/95941>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65983>; https://t.me/voin_dv/16033

[81] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65983>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65977>

[82] <https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1068713-rosijski-vijska-kontroluut-novohatske-boi-trivaut-poblizu-bagatira-osuv-hortica/>

- [83] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2869>
- [84] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26763>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26741>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26739>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/13903
- [85] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2869>
- [86] https://t.me/voin_dv/16028
- [87] https://t.me/mod_russia/54753 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54757 ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96007> ; <https://t.me/sashakots/54969> ; https://t.me/tass_agency/325713
- [88] <https://t.me/wargonzo/27880>
- [89] <https://t.me/wargonzo/27880>
- [90] https://t.me/dva_majors/75544
- [91] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31376>
- [92] <https://t.me/kpszsus/38621>
- [93] <https://suspilne.media/dnipro/1068719-armia-rf-zavdala-dronovih-udariv-po-krivomu-rogu-poraneno-ludinu-vinikla-pozeza/>; <https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22950>; <https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22943> ; <https://suspilne.media/dnipro/1068509-vijska-rf-vdarili-po-dnpru-ta-trom-rajonam-oblasti-poraneni-10-ludej-stalisa-pozezi/>; <https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22970>; <https://t.me/syngubov/15841>; https://t.me/Suomy_news_ODA/37159 ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/07/17/armiya-rf-zavdala-masovanogo-udaru-po-shostkynshhyni/>
- [94] https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/52057