


Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Nate Trotter, Angelica Evans,  
Jessica Sobieski, and Kateryna Stepanenko

July 26, 2025, 4:15 pm ET

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 25 to 26 and appear to be increasingly integrating missiles into overnight strike packages after mainly relying on drones in Spring and early Summer 2025.** The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 26 that Russian forces launched 12 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh, Kursk, and Rostov oblasts, Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Crimea; eight Iskander-K cruise missiles from Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai and Voronezh and Rostov oblasts; and seven Kh-59/69 guided missiles from the airspace over Belgorod Oblast and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 208 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed and suppressed 183 unspecified drones and 17 unspecified missiles and that 25 drones and 10 missiles struck nine unspecified locations in Ukraine.



Graphic by Daniel Mealie, Harrison Hurwitz, and Angelica Evans  
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The Russian military has used a denser concentration of missiles in recent strikes and ISW has observed various reports indicating that the Russian defense industry is increasing its missile and drone production capabilities.[2] Russia's increasing missile and drone production will likely allow Russia to continue conducting increasingly larger strikes against Ukraine during Fall 2025, and ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to 2,000 drones in a single night by November 2025 should the current pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage continue.[3] Increasingly large Russian strike packages highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine's air defense capabilities, particularly with US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missile threats.


**Russia is increasingly targeting densely populated cities as part of a cognitive warfare effort to weaken Ukrainian resolve and to undermine Ukraine's long-term defense capacity.** Kharkiv Oblast and City officials reported on July 26 that Russia targeted the city with four guided glide bombs (KABs), two ballistic missiles, and 15 Shahed-type drones, injuring civilians and first responders.[4] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Dnipro City officials reported on July 26 that Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against Dnipro City, killing and injuring civilians and damaging multi-story residential buildings and industrial enterprises.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 26 that Russian forces launched 100 Shahed-136 (Geran-2) drones and up to 15 Iskander missiles against Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and 40 Shahed-136 (Geran-2) drones against Kharkiv City.[6] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces targeted the Dnipropetrovsk Electromechanical Plant in Yelyzavetivka (northwest of Dnipro City) and the HARTRON-ARKOS research and production enterprise in Kharkiv City, suggesting that Russian forces used over half of their 208 drones and 27 missiles to target two specific areas.

**Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide critical air defense and military assistance to Ukraine.** Lithuanian Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė announced on July 26 that Lithuania plans to allocate up to 30 million euros (roughly \$35 million) to purchase Patriot air defense systems for Ukraine.[7] Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany Oleksii Makeiev stated on July 25 that Germany is preparing to send an additional IRIS-T air defense system to Ukraine. Germany is also prepared to work with Ukrainian manufacturers to produce additional air defense systems.[8] German defense company HENSOLDT announced on July 24 that it received an order worth over 340 million euros (roughly \$399 million) to provide Ukraine with TRML-4D and SPEXER radar systems for air defense needs.[9] The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) announced on July 24 that the US State Department approved a Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of \$150 million to Ukraine to enhance Ukrainian capabilities for maintenance, repair, and overhaul of the M109 155mm self-propelled howitzer.[10]

### **Key Takeaways:**

- **Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 25 to 26 and appear to be increasingly integrating missiles into overnight strike packages after mainly relying on drones in Spring and early Summer 2025.**

- **Russia is increasingly targeting densely populated cities as part of a cognitive warfare effort to weaken Ukrainian resolve and to undermine Ukraine's long-term defense capacity.**
- **Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide critical air defense and military assistance to Ukraine.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Velykyi Burluk and Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.**



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are***

***assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

### **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

#### **Russian forces conducted limited attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 25 and 26.[11]**

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating on the international border between Kursk and Sumy oblasts.[12]

**Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a radio electronics plant in Stavropol Krai on the night of July 25 and 26.** Geolocated footage published on July 26 shows a drone striking the Signal radio plant in Stavropol, Stavropol Krai.[13] Ukrainian sources reported on July 26 that drone strikes damaged at least two factory buildings housing expensive imported equipment and production lines, and that the plant produces the SAP-518 and SAP-518SM electronic warfare (EW) systems for Su-34, Su-35S, and Su-27SM3 fixed wing aircraft; EW for air defense systems; the Redut EW system for the Tu-160 strategic bombers; active radio jamming systems, including the Khibiny jamming system for Russian fixed wing aircraft; the Bars system for the Russian Liana reconnaissance satellite; and electronics for Russian weapons’ guidance systems.[14] A Ukrainian reserve officer stated that the plant supplies cathodic protection systems for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Halileh, Iran.[15] Stavropol Krai Governor Vladimir Vladimirov claimed that Ukrainian drones struck industrial facilities and caused a small fire in Stavropol Krai.[16]

**Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)**

**Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.**


Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Ukrainian forces retook Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[17]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne, Sadky, and Yunakivka and northwest of Sumy City near Bezsativka on July 26.[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Varachyne, Sadky, and Yunakivka.[19]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[20] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and elements of the 11th VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction July 26, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 25 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke, Starytsia, and Vovchansk and toward Lyptsi and north of Kharkiv City toward Kozacha Lopan and Kudiivka on July 25 and 26.[21]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported that Russian forces are storming Ukrainian defenses in small groups and using drones in search of weak spots at different points along the frontline in Kharkiv Oblast.[22] Shamshyn reported that Russian forces shift their focus between Milove or Ambarne (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and other sectors such as Kozacha Lopan, but noted that Russian forces remain focused on seizing Vovchansk. A drone operator of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction stated that Russian forces are sending two to three personnel for reconnaissance missions and five to seven personnel for assaults on Ukrainian positions.[23] The drone operator stated that Russian forces operating near Vovchansk use fiber-optic drones to strike Ukrainian logistics routes.

Order of battle: Drone operators of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly struck Kharkiv City.[24]



### **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction.**

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove.[26]

### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

#### **Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 26 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrne; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Petro-Ivanivka, Stroivka, Krasne Pershe, Kamyanka, Dvorichna, and Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Pishchane; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on July 25 and 26.[27]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated on July 26 that Russian forces rarely use armored vehicles in the Kupyansk direction due to effective Ukrainian drone operations in the area and ongoing armored vehicle shortages.[28]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk and drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyyi (southeast of Kupyansk).[29]

#### **Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 26 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on July 25 and 26.[30]


### **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.**

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Dibrova (east of Lyman) in the Serebryanske forest area.[31]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Karpivka, and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Zelena Dolyna, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on July 25 and 26.[32]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast July 26, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)**


**Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 25 and 26th shows elements of the Russian 1234th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and the 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) raising Russian flags north and northeast of Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk) in the southern part of the Serebryanske forest area, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[33]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske and Vyimka, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on July 25 and 26.[34]


Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian motorized assault comprised of up to 80 unspecified pieces of armored and motorized vehicles near Siversk, Hryhorivka, Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk), and Vyimka.[35] A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Siversk direction reported on July 26 that the unit repelled a Russian motorized assault near Bilohorivka (east of Hryhorivka) that included infantry and both light and heavy armored vehicles.[36] The Ukrainian unit reported that drone operators destroyed two tanks, an armored tank, and a civilian vehicle. It is unclear if Russian forces recently advanced near Serebryanka as a result of either of these motorized assaults, or if Ukrainian sources are providing differing accounts of a singular assault

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Siversk Direction July 26, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST





## Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast July 26, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 26 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Predtechyne on July 25 and 26.[37]


Order of Battle: Snipers of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and drone operators of the 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Chasiv Yar direction.[38]

**Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[39]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, and Popiv Yar and toward Katerynivka and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on July 25 and 26.[40]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Oleksandro-Kalynove (northwest of Toretsk) and elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly operating near Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[41]



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 26 but did not make confirmed advances.**




Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups have advanced to Zakhysnykiv Ukrainy Street in central Pokrovsk.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 506th and 589th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating in southern Pokrovsk and that elements of the 30th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA) advanced into Troyanda (immediately south of Pokrovsk).[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced in northern Novopavlivka (immediately southeast of Pokrovsk).[44]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Novotoretske, Razine, Boikivka, Rodynske, and Novoeconomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne, and toward Molodetske and Novopidhorodne on July 25 and 26.[45]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on July 26 that Russian forces are using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in the Pokrovsk direction.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups were able to break into Pokrovsk during a recent Starlink outage along the frontline.[47]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction July 26, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




### Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) participated in the seizure of Zelenyi Hai.[49]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai, Tovske, Novokhatske, Oleksandrohrad, and Voskresenka on July 25 and 26.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near Voskresenka.[51]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksandrohrad and Sichneve (southwest of Novopavlivka).[52] A reconnaissance battalion of the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) is reportedly operating near Fedorivka.[53]



### Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and likely seized the settlement.[54] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) seized Maliivka.[55]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and toward Komyshevakh and west of Velyka Novosilka near Temyrivka on July 25 and 26.[56]

A Russian source claimed on July 26 that Russian forces destroyed a bridge and two Ukrainian positions in Velykomykhailivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), indicating that Russian forces may intend to continue pushing west from the Velyka Novosilka area into southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA) are reportedly operating near Maliivka.[58]

**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)**

**Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on July 26.**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on July 26 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the southern outskirts of Stepnohirsk and into Plavni (both west of Orikhiv).[59]


Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Novopokrovka and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Plavni, and Kamyanske on July 25 and 26.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepnohirsk and Plavni.[61]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast reported on July 24 that it repelled a reinforced platoon-size Russian mechanized assault consisting of a tank, three BMP infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and four buggies near Novopokrovka on July 23.[62]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Chechen Yug-Akhmat Battalion are reportedly operating near Robotyne (south of Orikhiv).[63] Drone operators of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kamyanske.[64] Elements of the 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[65]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction July 26, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




**Russian forces continued limited attacks in unspecified parts of the Kherson direction on July 26 but did not advance.[66]**

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) and 328th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Krynky (northeast of Kherson City).[67]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction July 26, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

*See topline text.*

**Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

Nothing significant to report.

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other**

**geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015>; [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/14467](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467);  
[https://t.me/dva\\_majors/76075](https://t.me/dva_majors/76075); <https://t.me/severnnyi/4659>
- [22] [https://suspilne dot media/1075977-u-nato-pidtverdili-peregovori-sodo-patriot-dla-ukraini-zelenskij-hoce-viroblati-do-1000-droniv-sodna-1249-den-vijni/?anchor=live\\_1753528661&utm\\_source=copylink&utm\\_medium=ps](https://suspilne dot media/1075977-u-nato-pidtverdili-peregovori-sodo-patriot-dla-ukraini-zelenskij-hoce-viroblati-do-1000-droniv-sodna-1249-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1753528661&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps)
- [23] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/26/znyshhuyut-zhduniv-piloty-vazhkyh-bomberiv-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku-ne-dayut-zhyttya-vorozhym-bpla-zasidkam/>
- [24] <https://t.me/sashakots/55137>
- [25] [https://t.me/WarArchive\\_ua/29857](https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29857); [https://t.me/army\\_3heavy/2023](https://t.me/army_3heavy/2023)
- [26] [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/76075](https://t.me/dva_majors/76075); <https://t.me/severnnyi/4659>
- [27] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017>; [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/14467](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467);  
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66193>; [https://suspilne dot media/1075977-u-nato-pidtverdili-peregovori-sodo-patriot-dla-ukraini-zelenskij-hoce-viroblati-do-1000-droniv-sodna-1249-den-vijni/?anchor=live\\_1753528661&utm\\_source=copylink&utm\\_medium=ps](https://suspilne dot media/1075977-u-nato-pidtverdili-peregovori-sodo-patriot-dla-ukraini-zelenskij-hoce-viroblati-do-1000-droniv-sodna-1249-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1753528661&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps)
- [28] [https://suspilne dot media/1075977-u-nato-pidtverdili-peregovori-sodo-patriot-dla-ukraini-zelenskij-hoce-viroblati-do-1000-droniv-sodna-1249-den-vijni/?anchor=live\\_1753528661&utm\\_source=copylink&utm\\_medium=ps](https://suspilne dot media/1075977-u-nato-pidtverdili-peregovori-sodo-patriot-dla-ukraini-zelenskij-hoce-viroblati-do-1000-droniv-sodna-1249-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1753528661&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps)
- [29] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96542>; [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/16177](https://t.me/voin_dv/16177)
- [30] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015>; [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/14467](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467)
- [31] <https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1948852422384009424>;  
[https://t.me/operationall\\_space/5391](https://t.me/operationall_space/5391)

[32] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015>; [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/14467](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467)

[33] [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/9663](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9663); <https://t.me/osintpen/1500>;  
[https://t.me/operationall\\_space/5405](https://t.me/operationall_space/5405); <https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1948948891644166465>;  
[https://t.me/sanya\\_florida/26799](https://t.me/sanya_florida/26799)

[34] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015>

[35] [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/14467](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467)

[36] <https://t.me/feniksdpsu/962> ; [https://armyinform.com\\_dot\\_ua/2025/07/26/vtekty-ne-vdalosya-nikommu-prykordonnyky-vidbyly-kombinovanyj-shturm-pid-bilogorivkoyu/](https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2025/07/26/vtekty-ne-vdalosya-nikommu-prykordonnyky-vidbyly-kombinovanyj-shturm-pid-bilogorivkoyu/);  
<https://t.me/DPSUkr/27800>

[37] [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/14467](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467) ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050>

[38] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31687>

[39] <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1949132259564360041>; <https://t.me/bbc44ombr/79>

[40] [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/14467](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467) ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050> ;  
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66190> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66190>

[41] [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/76075](https://t.me/dva_majors/76075) ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66190>

[42] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66188>

[43] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/39593>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/39596> ;  
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/39598> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/39620> ;  
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/39621> ; [https://t.me/notes\\_veterans/24401](https://t.me/notes_veterans/24401)

[44] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/39598>

[45] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015> ; [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/14467](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467) ;  
<https://t.me/wargonzo/28073> ; [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/173693](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173693) ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/24107>

[46] [https://armyinform.com\\_dot\\_ua/2025/07/26/buly-vypadky-koly-znyshhuvaly-do-50-motocykliv-za-den-na-pokrovskommu-napryamku-okupanty-lyublyat-pokataty/](https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2025/07/26/buly-vypadky-koly-znyshhuvaly-do-50-motocykliv-za-den-na-pokrovskommu-napryamku-okupanty-lyublyat-pokataty/)

[47] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/173693](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173693)

[48] [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/9665](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9665); <https://t.me/osintpen/1501>; [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/16170](https://t.me/voin_dv/16170);  
<https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1949018440691503321>

[49] [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/16170](https://t.me/voin_dv/16170) ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/76098](https://t.me/dva_majors/76098) ;  
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96598> ; [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/16170](https://t.me/voin_dv/16170) ; <https://t.me/rybar/72423>

[50] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015> ; [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/14467](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467)

[51] [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/16166](https://t.me/voin_dv/16166)

[52] [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/16176](https://t.me/voin_dv/16176)

[53] [https://t.me/nm\\_dnr/14112](https://t.me/nm_dnr/14112)

[54] [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/9667](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9667); <https://t.me/osintpen/1502>; [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/16172](https://t.me/voin_dv/16172)

[55] [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/16172](https://t.me/voin_dv/16172) ; [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/55007](https://t.me/mod_russia/55007) ;  
[https://t.me/dva\\_majors/76098](https://t.me/dva_majors/76098) ; <https://t.me/rybar/72423> ; [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/16172](https://t.me/voin_dv/16172) ;  
[https://t.me/voin\\_dv/16175](https://t.me/voin_dv/16175)

[56] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015> ; [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/14467](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14467)

[57] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/327546](https://t.me/tass_agency/327546)

[58] [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/16169](https://t.me/voin_dv/16169)

[59] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66192>

[60] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96533>;  
[https://t.me/dva\\_majors/76075](https://t.me/dva_majors/76075); <https://t.me/wargonzo/28073>; <https://t.me/ButusovPlus/21602>;  
<https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1CFQUohbY6/>

[61] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66192>

[62] <https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1CFQUohbY6/>; <https://t.me/ButusovPlus/21602>

[63] [https://t.me/RKadyrov\\_95/5864](https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5864)

[64] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31687>

[65] <https://t.me/vrogov/21282>

[66] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27050>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27017>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27015>

[67] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31690>