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July 29, 2025, 6:15 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Kremlin officials decisively rejected US President Donald Trump's new deadline for Russia to negotiate an end to its war against Ukraine and reiterated Moscow's interest in continuing the war. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account that Trump cannot dictate the timing of peace negotiations and that negotiations will end when Russia has achieved all of its war objectives — likely referring to Russia's original war aims, including regime change in Ukraine, changes to NATO's open-door policy, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that it cannot defend itself.[1] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed that Russia will continue its war against Ukraine in order to protect Russia's interests, despite Trump's July 28 announcement of the new 10- or 12-day deadline.[2] Peskov claimed that there is currently a slowdown in the process to normalize Russian-American relations, that the Kremlin remains interested in normalization, and that progress will require "impulses" from both sides.[3] Peskov claimed that the current state of Russian-American relations is hindering the process of negotiating an extension of the New START Treaty.[4] The Kremlin previously dangled the prospect of incentives that were unrelated to the war in Ukraine, such as bilateral arms control talks and economic projects, in order to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[5] Peskov's statements about the deterioration of Russian-American relations and New START are likely part of efforts to compel Trump to renounce his deadline for the sake of normalizing bilateral relations and pursuing increased cooperation. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is uninterested in negotiations to end the war and is instead trying to protract the war in Ukraine in order to make additional gains on the battlefield.[6]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against civilian targets near the frontline and in the Ukrainian rear on July 28 and 29 that resulted in high casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea and 37 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[7] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 32 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that five drones and two missiles struck in three locations and that drone debris fell in two locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on July 29 that Russian forces conducted a missile strike against Kamyanske (west of Dnipro City), striking the city hospital, including a maternity

ward.[8] Lysak reported that the strike killed four people, including a pregnant woman, and injured eight. Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov and the Ukrainian State Penitentiary Service reported that Russian forces conducted an airstrike on July 28 against the Bilenkivksa Correctional Facility in Bilenke, Zaporizhia Oblast, with four guided glide bombs.[9] The Ukrainian State Criminal Executive Service reported that the strike killed 16 prisoners and injured nearly 100 people.[10] The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) reported that the July 28 strike against the correctional facility may amount to a serious violation of international humanitarian law.[11] The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported on July 29 that Russian forces conducted a multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) strike against Novoplatonivka, Kharkiv Oblast (just north of Boroza), and struck a group of civilians awaiting humanitarian assistance.[12] The State Emergency Service reported that the strike killed five civilians and injured three.


Ukrainian forces appear to be intensifying a long-range strike campaign against Russian military industrial facilities and transport networks. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on July 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a railway station and a Russian resource base in Salsk, Rostov Oblast.[13] Kovalenko stated that Russian forces use Salsk as a logistics hub to transfer resources, fuel, ammunition, and other cargo to frontline units in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and occupied Crimea. A Ukrainian reserve officer reported on July 29 that Ukrainian forces highly likely struck a train carrying fuel at the Salsk railway station.[14] Russian sources posted footage reportedly of fires at the Salsk railway station, and Russian officials claimed that Russian forces repelled drone strikes against Rostov Oblast overnight.[15]

Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight reported that July 29 was the third day in which Ukrainian drones struck Russian railway and industrial hubs and that Ukrainian drones have inflicted a “tangible” logistical setback on a railway line linking the military industrial hubs in Volgograd, Volgograd Oblast, and Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast.[16] Frontelligence Insight reported that Ukrainian forces have recently targeted electrical substations, fuel tanks, and station buildings in Orlovsky, Rostov Oblast, and Zhutovo, Volgograd Oblast, both of which are located along a railway that connects Russian defense industrial facilities with occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[17] Ukrainian forces have previously targeted Russian defense industrial, weapons storage, and oil production facilities that support and fund Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces currently appear to be targeting the transportation lines between these hubs.[18]

Key Takeaways:

- **Kremlin officials decisively rejected US President Donald Trump's new deadline for Russia to negotiate an end to its war against Ukraine and reiterated Moscow's interest in continuing the war.**
- **Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against civilian targets near the frontline and in the Ukrainian rear on July 28 and 29 that resulted in high casualties.**
- **Ukrainian forces appear to be intensifying a long-range strike campaign against Russian military industrial facilities and transport networks.**

- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka, and in eastern Zaporizhzhia Oblast.**



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on July 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued limited attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 28 and 29.[19] A Russian source associated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked southeast of Glushkovo near Novyi Put.[20]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating near the Kursk border area.[21] Elements of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (a mobilized unit formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) are reportedly operating near Tetkino (southeast of Glushkovo).[22]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Fighting continued in northern Sumy Oblast on July 29.


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Yunakivka and Varachyne (both northeast of Sumy City).[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Myropillya, Andriivka, Yunakivka, and east of Oleksandriia (all northeast of Sumy City).[24]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Novomykolaivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Varachyne on July 29.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka toward Oleksiivka.[26]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 29 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian temporary deployment point in Zvinovo (northwest of Sumy City) using a Geran-2 drone.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that the commander of the Russian 5th Battalion (51st Airborne [VDV] Regiment, 106th VDV Division), reportedly operating near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City), lacks initiative and cannot respond adequately to critical situations, such as the intense Ukrainian mining of Sadky that is hindering Russian advances.[28] The milblogger also claimed that the 5th Battalion regularly exchanges friendly fire with elements of the 106th VDV Division's 1182nd Artillery Regiment and the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), which are also operating near Sadky.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction.[29] Elements of the Storm Detachment of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[30] Elements of the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (a mobilized unit reportedly operating under the operational command of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Varachyne.[31]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction July 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within and west of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), and toward Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City).[32]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Zelene, Synelnykove, and Vovchansk on July 28 and 29.[33]

Kharkiv Oblast Police Head Petro Tokar stated on July 29 that tests of debris from a May 31 Russian strike against Vasysheve (southeast of Kharkiv City) indicate that Russian forces likely struck Vasysheve with a new UMPB-5 munition.[34] Tokar stated that the UMBP-5 is presumed to be able to reach speeds of up to 400 kilometers per hour.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and the 28th Motorized Rifle Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Tokarivka (north of Kharkiv City).[35] Drone operators of the Izya Detachment of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove on July 28 and 29.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to counterattack southwest of Chuhunivka and near Zarubynka (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are advancing into Kupyansk and that Kupyansk is becoming a contested “gray” zone.[39] Kupyansk Raion Military Administration Head Andriy Kanashevich stated on July 29 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating immediately north and northeast of Kupyansk near Radkivka and Myrove, respectively, but have yet to advance into Kupyansk itself.[40]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and toward Novovasylivka, north of Kupyansk near Radkivka and Kindrashivka, northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove, and east of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on July 28 and 29.[41]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces attack in pairs or sometimes with individual soldiers in the area.[42]


Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Lozova and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka on July 28 and 29, but did not advance.[43]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into northern Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[44]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Ridkodub (north of Lyman) and southwest of Dibrova (east of Lyman).[45]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and Zelena Dolyna and toward Hlushchenkove; northwest of Lyman near Karpivka and toward Serednie and Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Dibrova and Torske; and southwest of Lyman in the Serebrianske forest area and toward Yampil and Dronivka on July 28 and 29.[46]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 29 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Serebryanka (north of Siversk).[47]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Siversk itself; north of Siversk near Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Fedorivka on July 28 and 29.[48]


The senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russia's recent large-scale mechanized and motorized assaults in the area used diversionary attacks, showing that Russian forces are learning lessons and adapting tactics.[49] A Russian milblogger described the area east of Siversk as a contested "gray zone." [50]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[51]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction July 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast July 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern and central Chasiv Yar.[52]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Bila Hora on July 28 and 29.[53]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling to advance in Shevchenko Microraion (southwestern Chasiv Yar) due to weather conditions.[54]

Order of Battle: Sapper elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Novyi Microraion (southeastern Chasiv Yar).[55]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Chasiv Yar Direction July 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into northeastern Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).[56]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 29 that Russian forces advanced west of Novospaske (west of Toretsk).[57]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Popiv Yar, and Rusyn Yar, and toward Pleshchiivka on July 28 and 29.[58]

CNN reported on July 29 that a Ukrainian commander operating near Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) stated that new drone teams from Russia's Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are well-trained and professional and are conducting counter-drone measures, such as flying a drone with an attached thread designed to entangle the rotors on Ukrainian drones.[59] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated that Russian forces have been fighting for Toretsk for over a year and have sustained roughly 51,000 casualties, including over 20,000 personnel killed in action (KIA), and reported that the Russian military command is replenishing these losses with poorly trained soldiers.[60]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Volodymyrivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[61]


Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk).[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) from Novoekonomichne (just east of Myrnohrad).[63]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Mayak, Razine, Volodymyrivka, Novoekonomichne, and Mykolaivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Novopidhorodne on July 28 and 29.[64]

A Ukrainian officer operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian divers are attempting to penetrate into the Ukrainian rear via small rivers.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novopoltavka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[66] Drone operators of the Russian AirNomads group are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[67]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction July 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields northwest of Oleksiivka (southeast of Novopavlivka), indicating that Russian forces likely recently seized Oleksiivka.[68]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Zelenyi Kut, and Dachne, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on July 28 and 29.[69]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction July 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




[NOTE: ISW is reorganizing its tactical axes to reflect shifting Russian operational objectives. ISW is reorienting Russian activity along the southwestern Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border area around Velykomykhailivka given ISW's recent forecast that Russian forces may push west from the Velyka Novosilka area into southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[70]]

Russian forces attacked in the Velykomykhailivka direction on July 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Vorone and Komyshevukha (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[71]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and toward Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Shevchenko and toward Komyshevivka on July 28 and 29.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksandrohrad and Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[73]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka direction (likely referring to the Velykomykhailivka direction in this instance).[74]



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

[NOTE: ISW is reorganizing its tactical axes to reflect shifting Russian operational objectives. ISW is orienting Russian advances in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast around Hulyaipole, given that Russian forces are now attacking into eastern Zaporizhia Oblast from the western portions of Donetsk Oblast and that Russian forces must seize Hulyaipole in pursuit of their wider objective of seizing the entirety of Zaporizhia Oblast.]

Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 29 shows Russian forces raising a flag in Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces likely seized Temyrivka.[75] The Russian MoD credited the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing Temyrivka.[76] Russian milbloggers claimed that the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) advanced over five square kilometers and participated in seizing Temyrivka.[77]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Zelene Pole and Temyrivka on July 28 and 29.[78]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka direction (likely referring to the Hulyaipole area in this instance).[79]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, Plavni, and Stepnohirsk on July 28 and 29.[80]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported on July 29 that Russian forces are attacking intensely in this direction but recently sustained significant losses when Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon against Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[81] A Ukrainian brigade operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast previously reported on July 24 that it repelled a reinforced platoon-size Russian mechanized assault consisting of a tank, three BMP infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and four buggies near Novopokrovka on July 23. [82]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Shaman Detachment of the 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv and Mala Tokmachka.[83]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction July 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued limited assaults in unspecified areas of the Kherson direction on July 28 and 29 but did not advance.[84]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on July 29 that Russian forces recently changed their assault tactics in southern Ukraine, especially along the Dnipro River, and are now attempting to infiltrate the Ukrainian rear rather than conducting assaults in small infantry groups.[85] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces send experienced personnel with modern equipment, such as anti-drone thermal imaging ponchos, to attempt to penetrate Ukrainian defensive lines, wait for reinforcements, and then attempt to seize logistical routes when small infantry assault groups fail to advance. Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are also leveraging this tactic near the Antonivsky bridge but noted that Russian forces have not yet achieved tactical successes using this tactic.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction July 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports about Russian strikes against Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense reported on July 29 that Belarusian air defenses intercepted an unspecified unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over Minsk overnight.[86] The MoD claimed that Belarusian air defense downed the drone with electronic warfare (EW) systems and that the drone crashed into a residential building in Minsk. The Belarusian Investigative Committee claimed to the Belarusian state news agency *BELTA* on July 29 that the UAV was equipped with TNT and metallic ball

shrapnel.[87] The Investigative Committee published footage on July 29 allegedly showing UAV wreckage with inscriptions in Ukrainian, but did not report the model of the UAV or speculate on its origin.[88]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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BABEL STREET

[1] <https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1949950319510561275>

[2] <https://www.kp dot ru/online/news/6493908/>

[3] <https://ria dot ru/20250729/peskov-2032109153.html>; <https://ria dot ru/20250729/peskov-2032109153.html>; <https://tass dot ru/politika/24655309>

[4] <https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1038573>

[5] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925>

[6] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041425>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2025>

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