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July 8, 2025, 5:15 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.


US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that the United States would resume weapons deliveries to Ukraine as discussions about provisions of additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly ongoing. Trump stated on July 7 that the United States will send more weapons to Ukraine to help Ukraine defend itself.[1] Trump stated that the United States is "going to see if [it] can make some [Patriot interceptors] available." *Politico* reported that two sources stated that shipments of US military aid to Ukraine could resume over the "coming weeks." [2] Chief Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell stated on July 7 that Trump directed the US Department of Defense (DoD) to send additional defensive weapons to Ukraine to ensure that Ukraine can defend itself while the United States works to secure a "lasting peace." [3] *Axios* reported on July 8 that sources stated that Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he wants to help Ukraine's air defenses and promised to immediately send 10 Patriot interceptors and help to find other means of supply. [4] *Axios'* sources reportedly stated that Trump suggested that Germany should sell one of its Patriot batteries to Ukraine and that the United States and Europe would split the costs of the purchase. *Axios* reported that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has identified Patriot batteries in Germany and Greece that the US could finance and send to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that US-provided Patriot systems and interceptors are critical for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian long-range overnight strikes, particularly against Russian ballistic missiles. [5]

The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine support for US military aid to Ukraine, likely as part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational effort. Medvedev responded on July 8 on his Russian- and English-language channels to US President Donald Trump's statements about resuming weapons supplies to Ukraine, claiming that Russia should continue "business as usual." [6] Medvedev claimed that Russia will "push forward" to achieve its war goals and "reclaim [its] land." Medvedev's July 8 statements aim to present Western military aid to Ukraine as futile in the face of an alleged inevitable Russian victory. The West should not disregard all of Medvedev's statements as hyperbole or fringe, however. Russian President Vladimir Putin often leverages Medvedev to amplify inflammatory rhetoric designed to stoke panic and fear among Western decision-makers and discourage aid to Ukraine. [7] Medvedev's statements are part of a wider Kremlin reflexive control campaign against the West. Medvedev's provocative and at times threatening statements are very likely part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational strategy. Putin would be able to censor

Medvedev's statements should Putin choose to do so, especially considering the coordination within the Kremlin on official statements and the Kremlin's overall grip on the Russian information space, internet, and media. Medvedev's continued use of his platform to make aggressive statements that specifically target the United States and Europe suggests that the Kremlin is approving and encouraging this effort. Medvedev's aggressive statements serve a specific purpose for Putin, as they push the West to see Putin's statements as more moderate and rational by comparison and open space for Putin to make greater demands or larger threats.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a series of ongoing counterattacks. Geolocated footage published on July 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern and northeastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[8] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces advanced between Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka (north of Kindrativka) and east of Oleksiivka (east of Kindrativka) and entered Novomykolaivka (northeast of Oleksiivka).[9] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 8 that Ukrainian forces entered Kindrativka from the northwest and Oleksiivka from the northeast.[10] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized central and northern Kindrativka and have cut off Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along the C-191502 Novomykolaivka-Volodymyrivka road. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command deployed elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to Kindrativka to support Russian personnel retreating from the settlement. The milblogger claimed that the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) is fighting to establish a foothold south of Oleksiivka, but that recent Ukrainian advances are complicating this effort.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction July 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian advances in northern Sumy Oblast slowed between late May and early June 2025, and Ukrainian forces began counterattacking and regaining territory in mid-June. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 14 that Ukrainian forces retook Andriivka (southeast of Kindrativka), and Ukrainian forces advanced in other areas of northern Sumy Oblast throughout late June 2025.^[11] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July 8 that fighting remains intense in the North Slobozhansk (Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts) direction and that Ukrainian forces are restoring positions in this direction and maintaining positions in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts.^[12] The Russian military command redeployed some drone and elite naval infantry units from the Kursk and Sumy directions to other higher-priority sectors of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast in May and June 2025, and the command may further deprioritize the offensive in northern

Sumy Oblast if Ukrainian forces continue to complicate further Russian advances.[13] Russia could also reinforce its frontline units in northern Sumy Oblast in the near future in order to continue advancing toward Sumy City, however.

Russia continues to expand its domestic drone production capacity amid the ever-growing role of tactical drones in frontline combat operations and Russia's increasingly large nightly long-range strike packages against Ukraine. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin claimed on July 8 that Russia has already more than tripled its planned overall drone production volumes for 2025.[14] Mishustin credited this increase to state financial support for drone producers and innovators, including civilian companies. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight stated on July 8 that Russian forces have launched 28,743 total Shahed variant drones (Shahed-136/131 and Geran 2) since the beginning of the full-scale invasion and that Russian forces launched 10 percent of this total (2,736 drones) in June 2025 alone.[15] Frontelligence Insight assessed that Russia produced an average of 60.5 Geran drones per day, or roughly 1,850 drones per month, between February and April 2025. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on July 8 that Russian forces launched 1.6 times more missiles and drones against Ukraine in June 2025 than in May 2025.[16] Increased Russian long-range drone production is enabling Russia's increasingly large nightly strikes against Ukraine and has also enabled Russian forces to integrate Gerans into strikes against frontline Ukrainian positions.[17] Russian forces are continuing to integrate drones into frontline combat operations to strike frontline and near rear Ukrainian positions and to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in tandem with Russian MLRS and artillery systems.

Ongoing Russian cooperation with Chinese companies is facilitating Russia's increasing domestic drone production. Documents analyzed by *Bloomberg*, including memos from Russian drone manufacturer Aero-HIT and unspecified Russian officials between late 2022 and June 2025, indicate that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) has cooperated with Chinese companies to increase Russia's drone manufacturing capacity and subvert Western sanctions for drone components since the start of Russia's war against Ukraine in February 2022.[18] *Bloomberg* reported that a Russian delegation visiting China in May 2023 established a joint venture with a Chinese university to form the Aero-HIT drone production facility in Khabarovsk, Khabarovsk Krai. *Bloomberg* reported that Aero-HIT submitted a 7.1-billion-ruble (roughly \$90 million) funding request to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in June 2025, which stated that Aero-HIT has partnered with Chinese engineers since early 2023. Aero-HIT memos reviewed by *Bloomberg* state that Aero-HIT's plant can produce up to 10,000 drones per month in 2025 and plans for further production increases. *Bloomberg* reported that Aero-HIT's relationship with Chinese engineers is crucial to Aero-HIT's ability to manufacture at scale its "Veles" first-person view (FPV) drone, which Russian forces have used significantly in Kherson Oblast.[19] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov stated on July 7 that Ukrainian forces recently observed a new type of Chinese wi-fi router on Chinese radio modems installed on Russian "Gerber" drones.[20] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported to *Radio Svoboda* on July 7 that 60 to 65 percent of the components in Russian-produced Geran-type drones (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed drone) are of Chinese origin.[21] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on July 4 that Ukrainian investigators discovered components manufactured at the Chinese Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing Company in Russian Geran-type drones recovered in Kyiv City.[22]


Russian milblogger complaints suggest that the Russian military command is struggling to supply frontline units with drones despite increased drone production, possibly indicating how Russia's centralization and bureaucracy are degrading the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slowing the Russian innovation cycle. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on July 8 that the Russian military command is prioritizing drone supplies to several specialized drone units and that the standards for equipping regular drone units are far below the units' actual needs.[23] Another Russian milblogger complained that the Russian military command is creating a small number of specialized drone units with unlimited support instead of creating drone units in all regiments and brigades.[24] The milblogger claimed that the specialized drone units produce results, but that the other units are left severely under resourced. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command supplies only 20 drones per month to non-specialized units and that these units have to instead rely on volunteer drone supplies.[25] Another milblogger complained that the Russian military has warehouses full of drones but that only "elite" units receive these supplies.[26] Russia's Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, to which the Russian MoD reportedly prioritizes supplies and staffing, appears to be Russia's effort to selectively reorganize and centralize unmanned systems detachments and assets.[27] ISW continues to assess that the Russian MoD is attempting to replicate Ukraine's drone programs via Russia's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and Rubikon Center, but that Russia's tendency towards centralization and bureaucratic ineptitude is leading to obstacles in this process.[28]

Key Takeaways:

- **US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that the United States would resume weapons deliveries to Ukraine as discussions about provisions of additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly ongoing.**
- **The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine support for US military aid to Ukraine, likely as part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational effort.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a series of ongoing counterattacks.**
- **Russia continues to expand its domestic drone production capacity amid the ever-growing role of tactical drones in frontline combat operations and Russia's increasingly large nightly long-range strike packages against Ukraine.**
- **Ongoing Russian cooperation with Chinese companies is facilitating Russia's increasing domestic drone production.**
- **Russian milblogger complaints suggest that the Russian military command is struggling to supply frontline units with drones despite increased drone**

production, possibly indicating how Russia's centralization and bureaucracy are degrading the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slowing the Russian innovation cycle.

- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian

violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 8.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 7 and 8.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked from Ryzhivka (near the international border in Ukraine) toward Tetkino.[30]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions along the international border near Tetkino.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

See topline text for reported of assessed Ukrainian advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 8 that Russian forces retook Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City).[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south and

east of Bezsalivka and northwest of Mala Korchakivka (north of Sumy City).[33]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of northern Sumy Oblast on July 7 and 8.[34]

Order of Battle: Elements of the "Granita" Detachment of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[35] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[36]

Russian	Main	Effort	–	Eastern	Ukraine
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 8 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi, northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Zelene, and further northeast of Kharkiv City along the international border toward Dehtyarne on July 7 and 8.[38]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on July 8 that Russian forces increased the frequency of their assaults in northern Kharkiv Oblast, conducting 19 assaults on July 7 and 24 assaults on July 6 as compared to a daily average of five to seven assaults in June 2025.[39] Shamshyn stated that Ukrainian drone operators are repelling ongoing Russian attempts to seize positions in the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant on the north (right) bank of the Vovcha River, including nightly Russian infantry attacks of one to two personnel in anti-thermal imaging ponchos.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Holubivka, along the P-79 Kupyansk-Velykyi Burluk highway near Radkivka (both north of Kupyansk), and north and east of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).^[40]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka and toward Novovasylivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and toward Kutkivka and Ambarne (along the international border); northwest of Kupyansk toward Lozova Druha; west of Kupyansk near Myrne and

Sobolivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Hlushkivka on July 7 and 8.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kolisnykivka and Tabayevka (southeast of Kupyansk).[42]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated on July 8 that Russian forces have intensified their attacks near Milove (north of Kupyansk near the international border) since July 7 and are crossing the international border and leveraging artillery and drone support to strike Ukrainian positions.[43] Shamshyn also stated that Ukrainian forces recently stopped Russian advances toward Ambarne (south of Milove) and Hatne (southeast of Ambarne). An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces have begun leveraging unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for remote mining, logistical operations, and evacuations and are continuing to attack in contested “gray” areas in groups of one to two personnel.[44]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 8 but did not advance.


Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova toward Olhivka on July 7 and 8.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hlushchenkove (north of Lyman).[47]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Ridkodub, Hlushchenkove, Zelena Dolyna, and Novyi Myr; and east of Lyman near Torske and in the Serebryanske forest area on July 7 and 8.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ridkodub.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on July 7 and 8.^[50]


Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).^[51]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar toward Markove; west of Chasiv Yar toward Mykolaivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Bila Hora, and Predtechyne on July 7 and 8.^[52]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups, occasionally on motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).^[53] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are increasingly using drones in order to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) and that Russian forces are constantly conducting guided glide bomb strikes against Chasiv Yar, Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar), Druzhkivka (west of Chasiv Yar), and Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar). A Russian milblogger said that claims about Russian advances in Mykolaivka are premature.^[54]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kostyantynivka Direction 8 July 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 7 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Dylivka (north of Toretsk).^[55]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Yablunivka and southwest of Popiv Yar (both northwest of Toretsk).^[56]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Poltavka, and Popiv Yar and toward Katerynivka and Pleshchiivka on July 7 and 8.[57]

A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces have not been able to seize Toretsk despite fighting for the settlement for almost a year.[58] The servicemember stated that the summer 2025 Russian offensive is focusing on seizing Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk and that Russian forces are trying to envelop the settlements to avoid costly frontal assaults.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[59]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Pokrovsk direction on July 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction July 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Novoeconomichne (east of Pokrovsk) and west of Razine (northeast of Pokrovsk).^[60] Another Russian milblogger denied previous Russian claims that Russian forces seized Koptieve (northeast of Pokrovsk).^[61]

Russian forces continued assaults near Pokrovsk; northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne, Malynivka, and Razine; east of Pokrovsk near Novoeconomichne and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Novoukrainka, and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne on July 7 and 8.^[62]

A Ukrainian intelligence officer of a special forces unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 8 that Russian forces are equipping well-trained infantry with increasingly advanced anti-drone camouflage technology, including thermal cloaks that Ukrainian infrared imaging has a difficult time detecting.[63] The officer also reported that Russian forces have increased their use of drones in the Pokrovsk direction in order to interrupt Ukrainian logistics and that Russian forces are setting drone ambushes against Ukrainian vehicles along GLOCs.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and the "Typhoon" Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[64]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Novopavlivka direction on July 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are advancing toward Andriivka-Klevtsove (formerly Iskra, southwest of Novopavlivka) and that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are advancing toward and into northeastern Myrne (southeast of Andriivka-Klevtsove).[65] Additional Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating south of Novopavlivka also advanced southwest of Tovste, west and northwest of Piddubne, and west of Komar.[66]

Russian forces continued assaults toward Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Horikhove; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka and Zelenyi Kut; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Piddubne, Yalta, Komar, and Fedorivka; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Myrne, Andriivka-Klevtsove, and Vozkresenka on July 7 and 8.[67]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, Zelene Pole, and Novopil on July 7 and 8.[68]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)


Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Hulyaipole direction on July 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 7 and 8.[69]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast on July 8 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction July 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 108th and 247th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) advanced in western, eastern, and central Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv) and raised a flag in the settlement.^[71] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement.^[72]


Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv toward Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Kamyanske on July 7 and 8.^[73]

A deputy commander for a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on July 7 that Russian forces are attacking in groups of three to four soldiers, usually without equipment but sometimes with motorcycles and buggies.[74] The deputy commander stated that the intensity of Russian assaults is currently the highest since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and that Russian forces will conduct assaults throughout the summer in order to reach the Mariupol highway and seize Orikhiv, Kamyanske, and then Komyshevakha.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Nemets” group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[75]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 8.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction July 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



The “Atesh” Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on July 8 that the Russian Navy has moved practically all Russian Navy vessels out of Streletskaia Bay in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea and that the remaining Russian Navy vessels in the bay are either moving or in hiding.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-33 “Vasily Margelov” volunteer detachment are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[77]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 7 and 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four S-300/400 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast and 54 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[78] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 26 drones and that 8 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts and caused civilian casualties.[79]

Ukraine’s Ground Forces Spokesperson Vitaly Sarantsev reported on July 8 that Russian strikes may cause Ukrainian military recruitment centers to change to a remote format or disperse in order to protect the lives of staff and visitors.[80] The Vinnytsia Oblast Military Recruitment Center reported on July 7 that Ukrainian military recruitment centers in the oblast are suspending in-office services due to Russia’s targeted strikes against the centers but that ongoing force generation efforts will continue.[81]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov stated on July 7 that Belarus intends to become a full member of BRICS after taking part as a partner for the first time at the BRICS summit on July 6 and 7 in Rio de Janeiro.[82]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

POWERED BY:



BABELSTREET

[1] <https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/07/ukraine-aid-weapons-shipments-00441828> ; <https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-told-zelensky-he-wasnt-responsible-for-weapons-holdup-f684444b> ; <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-says-us-will-send-more->

[weapons-ukraine-2025-07-08/](#); <https://suspilne dot media/1061033-tramp-zaaviv-so-ssa-nadislut-ukraini-bilse-zbroi/>

[2] <https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/07/ukraine-aid-weapons-shipments-00441828>

[3] <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4236261/statement-by-chief-pentagon-spokesman-sean-parnell-on-ukraine-military-aid/>

[4] <https://www.axios.com/2025/07/08/trump-patriot-missiles-ukraine-germany>

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