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July 14, 2025, 9:30pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on July 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump announced large-scale and rapid military aid supplies to Ukraine via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and possible future secondary tariffs against Russia. Trump stated on July 14 during a meeting with NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte that the United States will impose "severe" 100 percent secondary tariffs on Russia's trade partners if there is no peace settlement to end Russia's war in Ukraine within 50 days.^[1] Trump also announced that the United States will send "billions of dollars' worth" of military equipment and weapons to NATO, that NATO will pay for the US weapons, and that NATO will "quickly distribute" these weapons to Ukrainian forces. Rutte stated that NATO will supply Ukraine with "massive" amounts of military equipment, including air defenses, missiles, and ammunition. Trump answered a question about whether the United States was providing Patriot air defense batteries or just missiles, stating that the United States will send "everything...a full complement with the batteries." Trump stated that some Patriot systems will arrive in Ukraine "within days" as unspecified NATO states give Ukraine their own Patriot systems, after which the United States will replace those systems. Trump stated that an unspecified state has "17 Patriots ready to be shipped" and that a "big portion of the 17 will go to the war zone" in Ukraine "very quickly." It is unclear if Trump was referring to 17 Patriot launchers or batteries.

Trump is acting upon the reality that successful US efforts to bring Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table require that economic instruments be coupled with Western military support to allow Ukraine to increase pressure on Russia on the battlefield. Trump stated that the Russian economy is doing "very poorly" and that Russia is using its assets for war, not trade.^[2] Trump stated that Russia is wasting money and people on its war. Rutte stated that Russian forces have suffered 100,000 deaths since January 1, 2025. ISW continues to assess that Russia's battlefield losses are the key driver of Russia's economic woes as Russia suffers from the consequences of increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund.^[3] Increased pressure on Russian forces


on the battlefield would risk Putin's efforts to balance butter and guns and could force Putin to face hard choices sooner than he would like. Forcing Putin either to make unpopular decisions or to face a scenario in which Russia cannot continue the war at the current tempo could bring Putin to the negotiating table, ready to offer concessions to end the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine and the United States.

Trump noted that Russia has been delaying negotiations to end the war and that the recent intensification of Russia's overnight drone and missile strikes demonstrates that Russia is not interested in peace – in line with ISW's longstanding assessment of Kremlin intentions. Trump stated that he is "disappointed" in Putin and that Trump has thought that a peace settlement was close "about four times."^[4] Trump noted that Russian strikes are hitting residences in Ukrainian cities and that it will take Ukraine "years" to rebuild its damaged energy infrastructure. Trump stated that Russian strikes against Ukrainian cities show that Russia's "talk does not mean anything" and that the United States needs to see actions and results, not just "talk." Rutte added that the recent intensification of Russia's overnight drone and missile strikes is not aimed at pursuing military goals but trying to create panic in Ukraine. ISW has repeatedly assessed in recent months that the Kremlin was pursuing various methods as part of wider efforts to delay the negotiation process and prolong the war in order to secure additional territorial gains on the battlefield.^[5]

Trump said that European security benefits US interests and noted that Europe is committed to helping Ukraine defend itself. Trump stated that "having a strong Europe is a very good thing" and that Europe thinks supporting Ukraine is important.^[6] Rutte stated that Trump's July 14 announcements are building on the June 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, in which NATO decided to "keep Ukraine strong" and increase Europe's defense industrial production. The joint declaration from the NATO summit highlighted that Ukraine's security contributes to NATO's security.^[7] *Axios* on July 13 cited a source stating that Trump told French President Emmanuel Macron following the call that Putin "wants to take all of [Ukraine]."^[8] ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory in the war that results in the conquest of all of Ukraine would bring combat experienced Russian forces up to NATO's borders from the Black Sea to the Arctic Ocean such that the United States would need to move large numbers of US forces and commit a significant proportion of its fleet of stealth aircraft to Europe.^[9]


Additional US military aid to Ukrainian forces will arrive at a dynamic, not static, frontline characterized by ongoing Russian offensive operations aimed at achieving slow maneuver and by Ukrainian counterattacks in key frontline areas. Russian forces intensified offensive operations throughout the theater in February and March 2025 and have maintained pressure along the entire frontline over the last six months. Russian forces have established or are actively establishing at least eight salients that Russian forces could leverage in mutually reinforcing tactical-

and operational-level envelopments along the frontline. Recent Russian attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction indicate that the Russian military command intends to create a salient from which Russian forces can threaten Ukrainian forces in the rear of the Vovchansk and northern Kupyansk directions.^[10] Russian forces have also developed salients aimed at forcing Ukrainian troops to withdraw from frontline towns and settlements under threat of envelopment in the Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, Siversk, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions over the last year. ISW assessed in late January 2025 that Russian forces were developing and disseminating a doctrinal method of advance throughout the theater that aims to conduct slow envelopments of frontline settlements at a scale that is reasonable for Russian forces to conclude before culminating, and Russian patterns of advance over the last six months are consistent with this assessment.^[11] The Russian military command's apparent decision to bypass the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast and attempts at a multi-year operation to envelop the southern half of the fortress belt further underscores Russia's commitment to this new doctrinal method.^[12]




Russian forces' ability to advance deep enough into Ukraine's defenses to establish these salients indicates that the Russian military command has improved its ability to seize on opportunities to advance, but the rate of Russian advances has not increased beyond foot pace. The Russian military command appears to have improved its ability and increased its willingness to plan and conduct multi-year operational-level efforts. Russian forces have been pursuing the envelopment of Kupyansk since at least January 2024, although Russian forces did not make notable advances towards this goal until July 2024.^[13] Russian forces have thus been pursuing the envelopment of Kupyansk for at least 18 months and have advanced roughly 454 square kilometers since July 1, 2024 (roughly 1.2 square kilometers per day over the last year). Russian forces have also aimed to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in the Borova and Lyman directions since late 2023 or early 2024 and only began making significant advances north of Lyman in early January 2025.^[14] Russian forces have advanced roughly 15 to 17 kilometers west of the Zherebets River over the last six months as part of efforts to establish the Russian salient north of Lyman. Russian forces renewed offensive operations in the Toretsk area in mid-June 2024 and have focused on expanding their salient south and southwest of Kostyantynivka over the last nine months. Russian efforts south and southwest of Kostyantynivka also reinforce and have coincided with the ongoing Russian effort to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Russian forces have advanced roughly 617 square kilometers in the Kostyantynivka direction and roughly 1,394 square kilometers in the Pokrovsk direction since November 1, 2024 - an average of 2.4 square kilometers and 5.5 square kilometers per day for the last nine months, respectively. The renewed Russian offensive in Toretsk in June 2024 also coincided with intensified Russian mechanized activity and armor usage throughout western Donetsk Oblast in summer and fall 2024. Russian forces have since leveraged several envelopments to seize Vuhledar, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka and are currently establishing the southern and eastern flanks of a future Russian effort to envelop Novopavlivka. Russian forces have advanced roughly 1,057 square kilometers in western Donetsk Oblast since January 2, 2025, or an average of 5.5 square kilometers per day for the last seven months.

Assessed Russian Advances in Northern Donetsk Oblast January 2, 2025 to July 14, 2025




ISW previously assessed that Russian forces have advanced at a rate of roughly 14 to 15 square kilometers per day over the past six months, indicating that Russian gains are spread across the frontline and not concentrated in a single frontline area.^[15] Russian forces have largely relied on infantry to advance in Ukraine since Russia's initial push at the start of its full-scale invasion, and Russian forces have failed to restore their ability to conduct the kind of mechanized maneuver that would enable more rapid Russian gains. Three and a half years of war have only further degraded Russia's ability to conduct armored assaults, due in part to significant Russian armored vehicle losses in 2023 and early 2024 and the loss of the more elite, well-trained servicemembers that comprised Russia's pre-war professional military cadre. Russian forces have thus far been able to offset the personnel losses they incur during these advances, although high Russian casualty rates are perpetuating a cycle of loss that further incentivizes Russia to rely on poorly trained and equipped infantry to make advances. This cycle, in turn, is limiting Russia's rate of advance in Ukraine.

Assessed Russian Advances in Western Donetsk Oblast January 2, 2025 to July 14, 2025



Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast near Hulyaipole – the first tactically significant activity in this area of the frontline since the Summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive. Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates that elements of the Russian 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both subordinated to the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) recently seized Malynivka (west of Hulyaipole).[16] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and a Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) also participated in the seizure.[17] Russian forces intensified activity in the Hulyaipole direction in early May 2025 and advanced into Malynivka in late June.[18]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Hulyaipole Direction July 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



The Russian military command likely intends to seize on recent advances in western Donetsk Oblast in order to advance westward into Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian forces made a series of tactically significant advances along the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway in mid-June 2025, especially southeast of Novopavlivka near Bahatyr and Odradne and south of Novopavlivka near Komar.[19] Russian forces have gradually advanced further west from Bahatyr and north from Komar over the last month and advanced roughly 20 kilometers from Bahatyr to Novokhatske (southwest of Novopavlivka) between June 14 and July 14, or about 670 meters a day on average in the past month.[20] Geolocated evidence indicates that Russian forces have made marginal advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in the direction of Novopavlivka, but Russian

forces have mainly concentrated their advances westward toward Velykomykhailivka and Havrylivka (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[21] The Russian military command also recently redeployed elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies from the Kursk direction to western Donetsk Oblast, indicating that the Russian military command is taking some steps to reinforce the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces, possibly ahead of a future push into southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[22] The Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces currently oversees the frontline from the Novopavlivka through the eastern Zaporizhia direction and would likely command the forces involved in a Russian offensive into southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian forces may leverage advances in western Donetsk Oblast to launch an offensive operation toward Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in pursuit of Russia's long-standing desire to seize Zaporizhzhia City. Russian forces have established a wide and mostly level frontline in the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia oblast border area that spans from Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole) to Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka) from which Russian forces could attack toward Hulyaipole, Velykomykhailivka, and Havrylivka. The Russian military command may intend to attack westward through Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts if Russian commanders assess that most of Ukraine's frontline defensive fortifications are oriented east to west against attacks from the south, rather than north to south against attacks from the east. Russian forces may attempt to leverage the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway to make rapid advances and establish convenient supply routes from occupied Donetsk City. Russian forces advancing westward from Zelenyi Hai will have to ford several rivers, including the Haichur, Solona, Verkhnya Tersa, and Vovcha rivers.[23] Russian forces will also need to cross the T-0408 Preobrazhenka-Novomykolaivka and T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highways and seize several towns whose pre-war populations are comparable to that of Chasiv Yar, which Russian forces have still yet to seize despite ongoing offensive efforts since May 2024.[24] Russian forces are extremely unlikely to advance rapidly across the roughly 150 kilometers from their current positions in Novokhatske to Zaporizhzhia City given the current rate of Russian advances, and Russian forces would likely have to engage in a multi-year-long offensive effort to advance to Zaporizhzhia City from the west. Russian forces will likely also attempt to advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City from Kamyanske (roughly 35 kilometers south of Zaporizhzhia City) but will likely face significant Ukrainian defenses. Russian forces will also likely struggle to seize Zaporizhzhia City due to the city's size and near certainty that Ukrainian forces will seriously defend the regional capital. Russian forces have not taken a city this size since the initial push at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in early 2022. This assessment provides one possible avenue the Russian military command may take to achieve its reported objective to seize significant areas of southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and the remainder of Zaporizhia Oblast in 2026.[25]

Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in key areas of the front to slow Russian advances and are inflicting significant costs on the Russian military, however. Ukrainian forces

conducted a series of limited counterattacks into advancing Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions in February and March 2025, which forced Russian units to regroup and slowed Russian advances in these areas.[26] Ongoing successful Ukrainian counterattacks and defensive operations in the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions appear to have forced the Russian military command to reevaluate its plan for attacking Kostyantynivka, prompting the recent prioritizing of Russian advances that bypass the Ukrainian fortress belt from the southwest. Ukrainian forces are also successfully counterattacking in the Kupyansk, Lyman, and Siversk directions and have retaken limited positions in these directions in recent days.[27] Ukrainian forces reportedly enveloped some Russian positions in northern Sumy Oblast because of recent counterattacks.[28]

Ukraine's drone-based defense remains a key feature of Ukraine's ability to constrain Russian advances. Ukrainian drone operators have created a 15-to-20 kilometer kill zone along the frontline that is currently helping prevent rapid Russian advances and inflicting significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia. *The Economist* recently assessed that Russia has suffered between 900,000 and 1.3 million personnel casualties since February 24, 2022, including between 190,000 and 350,000 killed-in-action (KIA), and Ukrainian drone operators have inflicted a significant number of these losses.[29] Russian adaptations aimed at countering Ukrainian drones, including intensified usage of motorcycles, are likely also contributing to increased KIA to wounded-in-action (WIA) ratios in Russian units, as Russian forces attacking on motorcycles are poorly protected from drones.[30] Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operators have thus far succeeded in keeping Russian advances to a slow crawl, although the Kremlin thus far appears willing to accept these high costs for further gains.

Forcing Putin to abandon his current theory of victory and agree to end the war on reasonable terms requires Ukrainian forces to stop Russian advances and begin to retake operationally significant areas. Western aid provided in support of this effort is essential to hastening an end to the war. Ukrainian forces have been successful in holding Russian advances along the frontline to a foot pace while inflicting significant casualties on Russian forces. Putin has demonstrated throughout the past year, however, that he believes in a theory of victory that posits that indefinite Russian gains – no matter how slow or how costly – will allow Russia to achieve his goals in Ukraine.[31] Putin's theory assumes that the Russia can outlast and overcome Western military assistance to Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any significant territory that Russian forces seize. Putin is operating under the assumption that Ukraine will not be able to acquire and sustain the manpower and materiel required to prevent creeping but indefinite Russian advances or to contest the initiative and conduct counteroffensive operations at some scale to liberate territory. Western military aid to Ukraine's ground forces is required to enable Ukrainian forces to stop Russian advances and then push Russian forces back in critical areas. Such successes will invalidate Putin's assumptions that Russian forces can continue gradual advances indefinitely and that Russian forces will be able to hold any territory they seize. Only significant Ukrainian battlefield gains will prompt changes in his calculus and force Putin to discard his efforts to prolong the war, come to the negotiating

table, and agree to a peace settlement on acceptable terms to bring about Trump's desired just and lasting end to the war.

Timely and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine coupled with increased economic pressure is necessary to bring about an end of the war on terms satisfactory for the United States, Europe, and Ukraine. Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces have previously demonstrated their ability to prevent Russian forces from making even marginal gains and to retake significant territory despite Russian manpower and materiel advantages.[32] Western military aid to Ukraine will enable Ukrainian forces to maintain, if not increase, their ability to inflict the significant materiel and personnel losses on the battlefield that are straining Russia's economy. Western provisions of air defense systems to Ukraine will protect Ukraine's people and enable Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) to flourish and increasingly meet Ukraine's long-term national security needs. Ukraine's DIB has proven critical for maintaining Ukraine's drone-based defenses that are limiting Russian forces to creeping advances at high costs, and the West will continue to benefit from Ukrainian innovations and industrial capacity in the long-term. Economic pressure, in the form of both Western sanctions and enduring labor shortages and demographic issues brought on by losses in Ukraine, will further strain the Russian economy and reduce the funds available to Moscow for its protracted war effort.


Putin remains committed to his original war aims over 1,200 days into his full-scale invasion and is trying to avoid making concessions at any cost, including those that would risk the long-term security of the Russian state and the stability of Putin's regime.[33] Putin is deliberately protracting the war in Ukraine, believing that time is on Russia's side. Putin has chosen not to enact socially unpopular policies that would boost Russia's war effort in a sustainable way and continues to bet that the West will abandon Ukraine long before he must. The Trump administration has set the stage to seize on this critical moment, via both military aid to Ukraine and expanded economic pressure on Russia, to exploit Russia's weaknesses and negotiate a deal that maximizes US, European, and Ukrainian interests.

Key Takeaways:

- **US President Donald Trump announced largescale and rapid military aid supplies to Ukraine via NATO and possible future secondary tariffs against Russia.**
- **Trump is acting upon the reality that successful US efforts to bring Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table require that economic instruments be coupled with Western military support to allow Ukraine to increase pressure on Russia on the battlefield.**
- **Trump noted that Russia has been delaying negotiations to end the war and that the recent intensification of Russia's overnight drone and missile strikes demonstrates that Russia is not interested in peace – in line with ISW's longstanding assessment of Kremlin intentions.**

- **Trump said that European security benefits US interests and noted that Europe is committed to helping Ukraine defend itself.**
- **Additional US military aid to Ukrainian forces will arrive at a dynamic, not static, frontline characterized by ongoing Russian offensive operations aimed at achieving slow maneuver and by Ukrainian counterattacks in key frontline areas.**
- **Russian forces' ability to advance deep enough into Ukraine's defenses to establish these salients indicates that the Russian military command has improved its ability to seize on opportunities to advance, but the rate of Russian advances has not increased beyond foot pace.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast near Hulyaipole – the first tactically significant activity in this area of the frontline since the Summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.**
- **The Russian military command likely intends to seize on recent advances in western Donetsk Oblast in order to advance westward into Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.**
- **Russian forces may leverage advances in western Donetsk Oblast to launch an offensive operation toward Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in pursuit of Russia's long-standing desire to seize Zaporizhzhia City.**
- **Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in key areas of the front to slow Russian advances and are inflicting significant costs on the Russian military, however.**
- **Forcing Putin to abandon his current theory of victory and agree to end the war on reasonable terms requires Ukrainian forces to stop Russian advances and begin to retake operationally significant areas. Western aid provided in support of this effort is essential to hastening an end to the war.**
- **Timely and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine coupled with increased economic pressure is necessary to bring about an end of the war on terms satisfactory for the United States, Europe, and Ukraine.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Zaporizhia oblasts and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War July 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus


Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 13 and 14 but did not advance.[34]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction July 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).^[35]

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces bypassed Russian positions near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) from the east and northeast and broke through to Novomykolaivka (northeast of Oleksiivka).^[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division seized Yunakivka.^[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) and Ryzhivka and near Beszalivka (both northwest of Sumy City near the international border).^[38]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Beszalivka and Ryzhivka; north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Kindrativka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on July 13 and 14.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Andriivka.[40]

Mashovets stated on July 14 that the Russian military command introduced reserves into battle in the Bilovody and Vodolahy directions (north of Sumy City) in an attempt prevent Ukrainian forces from encircling Russian forces in Oleksiivka.[41]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) and 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are operating near Loknya (northeast of Sumy City).[42] Mashovets stated that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating near Kindrativka.[43] Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[44] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar Volunteer Detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Esman, Katerynivka, Novovasylivka, and Prohres (all northwest of Sumy City near the international border).[45]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within fields west of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[46]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Zelene on July 13 and 14.[47]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on July 14 that Russian forces are more active in Vovchansk.[48] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction stated that Russian forces operating in the Vovchansk direction conduct up to 10 assaults and lose on average 100 personnel per day.[49] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using motorcycles and buggies more frequently due to favorable summer weather conditions and are leveraging first-person-view (FPV) drones, including those with fiber optic cables, more than during Winter 2024-2025. The spokesperson stated that the largest "kill zone" in the area is five kilometers deep. The spokesperson also stated that Russian forces are unsuccessfully trying to build crossings over the Vovcha River and cross the river in watercraft.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating in Vovchansk.[50] Mashovets

stated that elements of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th AC, LMD) are operating near Hlyboke and Zelene (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[51]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west and south of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[52]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove on July 13 and 14.[53]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian attacks near Dehtyarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) are aimed at creating a "buffer zone" and stretching Ukrainian reserve[54][55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Holubivka, and Radkivka; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove; northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, Kamyanka, and Stroivka; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on July 13 and 14.^[56]

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on July 13 that reports of serious Russian advances toward Kupyansk and Russian attacks against the settlement are premature and that the complex Russian logistics measures required to accumulate Russian forces on the Oskil River's west (right) bank, terrain,

and Ukrainian drone operations will complicate Russian attempts to seize the settlement.[57] Another Russian milblogger claimed that there is no evidence supporting claims that Russian forces entered Myrove or Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk) and complained about the Russian military command's continued exaggeration of Russian advances.[58] The milblogger claimed that reports that Russian forces have almost encircled Kupyansk by seizing Myrove and Sobolivka are premature.[59]

The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office stated on July 14 that Russian forces launched a Geran-2 type drone against Hrushivka (southwest of Kupyansk).[60]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st Tank Regiment and 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating in the Kupyansk direction.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Kolisnykivka and toward Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Hrekiivka and toward Cherneshchyna and Novoserhiivka on July 13 and 14.[62]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated on July 14 that elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are operating in the Hrekiivka-Druzhelyubivka direction (southeast of Borova).[63]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Novyi Myr; and east of Lyman near Torske on July 13 and 14.[64] Mashovets stated on July 14 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Ridkodub and Katerynivka (north of Lyman).[65]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on July 14 that Russian forces are increasing the tempo of their assaults.[66] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces attack in groups of five to 10 people, sometimes on motorcycles.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st and 15th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA, MMD) and 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are operating near Karpivka and Zelena Dolyna.[67] Mashovets stated that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating in Torske.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)




Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage posted on July 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in the Serebrianske forest area northeast of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).^[68]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka on July 13 and 14.^[69]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are operating near Serebryanka.^[70] Elements of the 14th Separate Tank Battalion (possibly a reconstituted

Soviet unit) (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Serebryanske forest area.[71]




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Stupochky, and Predtechyne on July 13 and 14.[72]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated published on July 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Dachne (north of Toretsk).^[73] Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Novospaske (just west of Toretsk).^[74] Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Leninska Street in central Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).^[75]




Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further northwest of Dachne, southeast of Katerynivka, east of Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk), and north of Yablunivka.^[76]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, Yablunivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Poltavka and toward Stepanivka and Pleshchiivka on July 13 and 14.^[77] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Oleksandro-Kalynove.^[78]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating west of Dyliivka.^[79] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Stepanivka.^[80] Drone operators of the Kaira Detachment of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sofiivka (northwest of Toretsk).^[81]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Fedorivka, southwest of Razine (both northeast of Pokrovsk), and in northeastern Novoeconomichne (east of Pokrovsk).^[82]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Fedorivka and Mayak (northeast of Pokrovsk).^[83] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Fedorivka, toward Volodymyrivka, in central Boykivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk), west of Razine, and west of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).^[84]

Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Razine, Novotoretske, Novoeconomichne, Myrne, Fedorivka, and Myrolyubivka and


toward Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Mykolaivka and Pomin and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Vidrozhennya and Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove 13 and 14.^[85]

The Russian MoD reported on July 14 that the Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov inspected the Central Grouping of Forces in the Pokrovsk direction.^[86]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking west of Razine toward Rodynske in order to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya road.^[87]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoekonomichne.^[88]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.



Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Tovste and in western Piddubne (both southwest of Novopavlivka).^[89]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad and west of Shevchenko (all southwest of Novopavlivka).^[90]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Kut and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia, Myrne, Dachne, and Komar and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Novokhatske, Zelenyi Hai, Piddubne, and Voskresenka on July 13 and 14.^[91]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet), 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA), and 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA) are reportedly operating near Voskresenka.[92] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Yalta (south of Novopavlivka).[93]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko and toward Komyshevakh, west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and toward Temyrivka, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil on July 13 and 14.[94]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area.[95]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)


See topline text for reports of assessed Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction.

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction July 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[\[96\]](#)



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Molodizhna Street in northern Kamyanske.[97]


Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Plavni, southwest of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky and Kamyanske, and southeast of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka on July 13 and 14.[98]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Zaporizhia direction stated on July 14 that Russian forces are increasing the intensity of their strikes with fiber optic drones, guided glide bombs, and artillery.[99]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[100]

Drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Airborne Forces) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[101]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on July 13 and 14 but did not advance.[102]



Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[103]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 136 strike and decoy drones, up to 90 of which were Shahed-type drones, and four S-300/400 air defense missiles from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk Oblast.[104] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 61 Shahed-type drones and that 47 decoy drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 28 Russian drones hit 10 locations in Ukraine and that downed drone debris fell in four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged industrial infrastructure in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts.[105]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko appointed Colonel Pavel Shebeko as Deputy Commander of the Belarussian Northwestern Operational Command on July 14.[106]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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