

**Angelica Evans, Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, Jennie Olmsted,
Jessica Sobieski, and George Barros**

June 24, 2025, 6:00 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on June 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO. Rutte stated on June 24 at the NATO summit at The Hague that Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to NATO, especially considering the support North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and Belarus provide Russia.[1] Rutte stated that Russia could attack NATO within three to seven years and is currently more prepared for a war than NATO. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with *Sky News* on June 24 that Russia would not be ready to attack NATO in the immediate future but could be ready for a war with NATO by 2030.[2] Zelensky stated that the war in Ukraine is currently constraining Russia's ability to train and reconstitute its forces and that any decrease in aid to Ukraine would benefit Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia is preparing its military and society for a potential future war with NATO in the medium- to long-term.[3] Any future ceasefire or long-term pause in combat in Ukraine would free up Russian forces for redeployment to Russia's eastern border with NATO and allow Russia to rearm and reconstitute, whereby Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than 2030.

The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia's Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command. The Russian State Duma ratified on June 24 a protocol that allows CSTO states to send their troops to other CSTO states' territory in the event of armed conflict, threats, crisis situations, and exercises; to respond to the consequences of emergencies; and to provide humanitarian aid.[4] The protocol now allows for the CSTO to transport troops one day after a decision from the CSTO Council — as opposed to after 30 days as the protocol stated previously. The protocol also introduces the concept of a "command of formations" that will command CSTO military forces sent to one CSTO state. This "command of formations" will likely be a Russian-dominated command. The CSTO Collective Security Council approved the protocol in November 2024.[5] ISW has long assessed that the Kremlin has been trying to subordinate the militaries of former Soviet states to the Russian Armed Forces to recreate a multinational combined army in the former Soviet space.[6] Western assessments of Russia's future combat power must take into account the forces of Russia's CSTO allies that Russia may use in future operations — not only those of Russia.

Russian forces are expanding their use of motorcycles along the frontline in Ukraine — a tactic that the Russian military may leverage in future wars beyond Ukraine, possibly

including operations against NATO states. A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade reported on June 24 that the threat of Russian motorcycle assaults is increasing along the frontline as Russian forces increasingly integrate motorcycles into assault tactics.[7] The servicemember stated that Russian motorcycle forces are no longer attacking along roads but mainly attacking through open fields and trying to bypass Ukrainian engineering barriers along the frontline. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight provided additional information on June 23 about the tactical doctrine the Russian military is establishing for motorcycle usage.[8] Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are mainly using motorcycles as a form of transport for attacking infantry to support diversion, reconnaissance, infiltration, and flanking support missions. Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian motorcyclists operate in squads of six to eight motorcycles with one or two riders on each motorcycle (between six and 16 personnel in total). Each squad reportedly has two to four portable electronic warfare (EW) systems and one device scanning for Ukrainian drones. Frontelligence Insight reported Russian forces are also leveraging motorcycles for casualty evacuation and logistics support. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported in May 2025 that Russian forces were mainly using motorcycles in tandem with armored vehicles.[9] Russian forces appear to be increasingly relying on motorcycles as a method of transport and advancement independent from tanks and armored vehicles in recent weeks, however.[10]

Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces have been training troops on motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) at ad hoc motocross tracks in Russia and occupied Ukraine as of Spring 2025.[11] Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are also conducting more advanced training programs, including for drone evasion, and that the length of these courses varies between 16 hours to over a month. Frontelligence Insight reported that Russian forces are mainly using foreign-made motorcycles, primarily those manufactured in the People's Republic of China (PRC), and that volunteer organizations in Russia provide most of the motorcycles for frontline Russian units. Frontelligence Insight reported, citing internal documents from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), that Russia intends to equip over half of its infantry forces with motorcycles, ATVs, and buggies in the future. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely increasingly depend on motorcycles and other quicker unarmored vehicles, as slower-moving vehicles have become a hazard on the more transparent battlefield of Ukraine.[12] Russian efforts to integrate tactical innovations, such as motorcycle usage, among frontline units indicates that the Russian military is learning modern ground warfare lessons that it intends to leverage beyond the war in Ukraine.[13]

NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte highlighted NATO's plans to invest more in its own defense capabilities, including by investing in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) — in line with US President Donald Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of collective security. Rutte called on NATO states to invest in Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB), which Rutte assessed has an untapped potential of about \$35 billion, in order to prevent NATO states from reducing their own stockpiles and to allow NATO states and allies to buy weapons from Ukraine in the future.[14] Rutte stated that NATO states will agree to introduce a baseline of allocating five percent of GDP toward defense spending during the NATO summit.[15] Rutte stated that NATO's new defense investment plan will include a five-fold increase in investments in NATO air defense capabilities and investments to produce "thousands" more tanks and armored vehicles and millions of artillery ammunition rounds.

Ukraine's European partners allocated military aid to Ukraine and financial support for drone production during the NATO summit on June 24. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans announced on June 24 that the Netherlands approved a new military aid package for Ukraine worth 175 million euros (about \$203.4 million), which provides 100 drone detection radars and 20 Ermine partly unmanned vehicles for casualty evacuation and includes 80 million euros (about \$93 million) toward the international drone coalition.[16] Brekelmans stated that the Netherlands also recently signed a contract worth 500 million euros (about \$5.8 million) with Ukrainian drone manufacturers to fund the production of 600,000 drones.[17] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on June 24 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Keir Starmer agreed to launch a new joint drone production initiative.[18] Umerov stated that the UK will produce Ukrainian-designed drones in the UK for three years as part of a project to support integration between the British and Ukrainian defense industries. Umerov stated that the UK and Ukraine will share the produced drones after the war in Ukraine ends and that the project will enable British defense companies to rapidly design and produce state-of-the-art drones at scale. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for Digital Development Kateryna Chernohorenko, NATO Digital Staff Deputy Director Marco Criscuolo, and NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) Director General Ludwig Descamps announced on June 24 that NATO will provide 37 million euros (about \$43 million) for Ukrainian satellite communications, including satellite radio stations, trackers, and services.[19]


Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 23 to 24 that resulted in over 100 civilian casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 97 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[20] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 63 drones and that 15 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Dnipro City and Samara, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, damaging educational and medical facilities.[21] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported that Russian forces struck a passenger train in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing at least 17 people and injuring at least 279.[22] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City and Velykyi Bobryk, Sumy Oblast.[23] **Russia's ongoing strike campaign against Ukraine in recent months has increasingly impacted civilian areas and infrastructure and Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) — underscoring the urgency of providing additional air support to Ukraine and strengthening Ukraine's air defense umbrella.**

Key Takeaways:

- **NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO.**
- **The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia's Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command.**

- **Russian forces are expanding their use of motorcycles along the frontline in Ukraine — a tactic that the Russian military may leverage in future wars beyond Ukraine, possibly including operations against NATO states.**
- **NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte highlighted NATO's plans to invest more in its own defense capabilities, including by investing in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) — in line with US President Donald Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of collective security.**
- **Ukraine's European partners allocated military aid to Ukraine and financial support for drone production during the NATO summit on June 24.**
- **Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 23 to 24 that resulted in over 100 civilian casualties.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Kherson City, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War June 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 24.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 23 and 24.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to attack toward Glushkovo, Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), Novyi Put (east of Tetkino), and Vesele (north of Novyi Put).[25]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Kursk direction.[26]

Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 24 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[27]


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Andriivka and in southern Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[28]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in unspecified areas in the Sumy direction.[30]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Andriivka is a "contested" gray zone.[31] Another milblogger claimed that personnel from the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade stated that Russian forces in the Sumy direction are using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) with attached trailers to transport supplies, ammunition, and fuel to frontline positions.[32]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th and 83rd separate VDV brigades and 76th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[33]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction June 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on June 23 and 24.[34]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated that small Russian infantry groups with drone support are attacking in the Vovchansk and Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) directions daily.[35]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Anvar" Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in border areas of Kharkiv Oblast.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west and southwest of Dovhenke (north of Kupyansk).[37]

Russian forces conducted assaults northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; north of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Dvorichna and toward Kurkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on June 23 and 24.[38]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated on June 24 that Russian forces are trying to expand their bridgehead near Dvorichna.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove, and Hrekivka and toward Druzhelyubivka, Olhivka, and Cherneschyna on June 23 and 24.[40]

Ukrainian Borova City Military Administration Head Oleksandr Tertyshnyi reported that Russian forces conducted a glide bomb strike against Borova.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 24 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[42]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman near Karpivka, Novyi Myr, Zelena Dolyna, and Ridkodub and toward Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 23 and 24.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked from Novyi Myr toward Ridkodub and Shandryholove.[44]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kolodyazi.[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast June 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) marginally advanced to the eastern outskirts of Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced north of Verknokamyanske (east of Siversk).[47]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on June 23 and 24.[48]

A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces are changing as their capabilities fluctuate by conducting several mechanized assaults until they lose too much equipment and manpower and then switching to attacking in small infantry groups.[49]


Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Chasiv Yar.[50]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar toward Bondarne; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove and toward Pryvillya; southeast of Chasiv Yar toward Mykolaivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Bila Hora on June 23 and 24.[51]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment, and 299th VDV Regiment (all of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[52]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Chasiv Yar Direction June 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.


Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).[53]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) seized Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[54] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may maintain positions on the northern outskirts of Dyliivka, however.[55] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to enter Oleksandro-Kalynove (west of Toretsk) and that claims that Russian forces already seized the settlement are exaggerated.[56]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar and toward Poltavka and Pleshchiivka; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, Yablunivka, Novospaske, and Rusyn Yar and toward Stepanivka; and south of Toretsk near Nelipivka on June 23 and 24.[57]

An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces are using a significant number of drones to disrupt Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and to strike Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[58] The officer reported that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables in “ambush tactics,” using Mavic drones to strike Ukrainian infantry, and using other FPV drones to target Ukrainian military equipment. The officer added that Russian forces also use Molniya drones to strike in the Kostyantynivka direction because the drones are cheap and have a decent payload. A Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov previously reported that Molniya drone can carry several FPV drones but is not a full-fledged drone mothership.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are slowly advancing in Yablunivka house-by-house.[60]

Assessed Control of Terrain Southwest of Toretsk June 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 24 shows a Ukrainian drone striking a Russian servicemember in western Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[61]


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[62]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka; northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Myrne and toward Razine, Koptieve, Novoekonomichne, Volodymyrivka, and Shakhove; east of Pokrovsk near Pomin, Myrolubivka and Novotoretske and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk

near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Zvirove and toward Molodetske and Chuhuyeve on June 23 and 24.[63]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian artillery battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on June 24 reported that Russian infantry are using light vehicles, such as scooters and motorcycles, to attack in groups of one or two and that Russian forces are not using heavy equipment.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are launching Shahed drones against Ukrainian forces near Shakhove.[65]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[66]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 24 shows Russian forces raising a flag in central Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[67]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and northeast of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), west of Fedorivka, west of Vesele, and southwest of Komar (all south of Novopavlivka).[68]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka and Horikhove; and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Vesele, Komar, Perebudova, and Bahatyr on June 23 and 24.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar, Yalta, and Voskresenka (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[70]

Order of Battle: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Perebudova.[71] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in northern Yalta.[72] Elements of the 30th Separate Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA) are reportedly operating near Voskresenka.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 24 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces only occupy northern Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and that Ukrainian drones are preventing Russian forces from seizing the settlement.[74]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on June 23 and 24.[75]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[76]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)


Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on June 24.

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces reported on June 24 that Russian forces are accumulating personnel, replenishing forces, and increasing logistical support in the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv directions in order to prepare for future offensive operations.[77]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on June 24.[78]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 100th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA), including the "Nemets" group of the division's 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[79]




Ukrainian forces recently advanced during a likely raid in the Kherson direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Oleshky (southeast of Kherson City on the east [left] bank of the Dniro River) near the Antonivsky Road Bridge, likely during a raid.[80]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 23 and 24.[81]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) and 127th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (22nd Army Corps [AC], Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[82]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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