

Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan

June 28, 2025, 3:15 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:00 am ET on June 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on June 28 that the SBU conducted a drone strike that destroyed a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system and three combat helicopters — Mi-8, Mi-26, and Mi-28 — at the Kirovsk Air Base in occupied Crimea on the night of June 27 and 28.[1] The SBU noted that the strike also caused a secondary explosion at the airfield. A local Crimean source reported on June 28 that the strike caused five to six explosions and likely damaged an ammunition depot, warehouses, and air defense facilities, and set at least one combat helicopter on fire.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 27 that Ukrainian Special Forces and the SBU struck the Marinovka Air Base in Volgograd Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27 and damaged four Su-34 aircraft and a technical maintenance facility.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff is conducting ongoing battle damage assessments (BDA). An unspecified intelligence source told Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* on June 28 that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted several drone strikes targeting facilities linked to the 120th arsenal of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) in Bryansk Oblast and that Ukrainian authorities are conducting BDA.[4] An unspecified intelligence source reported on June 26 that the GUR conducted a drone strike against a fuel and lubricants depot located at the GRU's 1061st MTZ Center in Bryansk Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27.[5] Residents reported heavy gunfire and a series of explosions and noted that the oil depot was on fire.[6]

Russia's deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on June 28 that Ukrainian air defenses downed a Russian Grom-1 hybrid missile-bomb on the outskirts of Dnipro City.[7] A local Ukrainian air defender in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast told Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* on June 28 that Russian forces may have deployed an experimental KAB guided glide bomb as part of ongoing efforts to increase the range of KAB bombs.[8] The local source stated that Russia has long used jet engines on the bomb to increase its range and likely used a bomb with a lighter warhead against Dnipro City to decrease the weight and increase the range of the bomb. The source also stated that Russian forces may have launched the bomb from a plane as close to Dnipro City as possible. Ukrainian political scientist and design engineer at satellite and rocket design enterprise Pivdenne Design Office Oleksandr Kochetkov told *Suspilne* on June 28 that Russia created the Grom-1 as part of an effort to

increase the range and accuracy of KAB bombs in order to preserve Russian aircraft that launch the bombs.[9] Kochetkov stated that Grom-1 is a hybrid of a glide bomb and the Kh-38 air-to-air missile and uses the Kh-38 missile's engine, which gives the bomb a range of 100 to 150 kilometers. Kochetkov noted that Russian forces used the Grom-1 possibly for the first time in August 2024 during a strike against Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast, and that Russia is not yet mass producing Grom-1 missile-bombs.

Ukrainian outlet *New Voice* assessed on June 27 that satellite imagery from early October 2024 and June 2025 shows that Russia is expanding its Shahed factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) near Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan.[10] The imagery shows that Russia has built four new sites at the Alabuga SEZ spanning about 163 hectares between October 2024 and June 2025, and that another 30-hectare site is currently under construction. *New Voice* reported that the new construction includes dormitories for factory workers and that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) previously assessed in June 2025 that laborers are Russia's main need to increase its drone production. *New Voice* noted that the GUR reported on June 21 that Russia produces up to 170 Shahed and decoy drones daily and that production rates may increase to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025. Japanese outlet *NHK* reported on June 19, citing unspecified Western and Russian diplomatic sources, that North Korea is "considering" sending 25,000 workers to drone production facilities at the Alabuga SEZ, and dormitory construction may be related to this possible influx of workers in the future.[11]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28.**
- **Russia's deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage.**
- **Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka.**

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 28.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified parts of Kursk Oblast on June 27 and 28.[12] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Novyi Put (southeast of Glushkovo) and in the Tetkino (west of Novyi Put) and Glushkovo directions.[13]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 28 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced in Yunakivka over the last week and have seized over half of Yunakivka (north of Sumy City) and that Russian forces have pushed Ukrainian forces back 14 kilometers from the international border.[14]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakiva and Sadky on June 27 and 28.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Khrapivshchyna, Pysarivka, and Khotin.[16]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that Russian forces are attempting to send reinforcements to attack in Sumy Oblast, but that Russian personnel are refusing to conduct assaults.[17]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Pysarivka and Khotin.[18] Elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Yablunivka and Khrapivshchyna.[19] Elements of the 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[20]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction June 28, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on June 28 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kharkiv City in Vovchansk.[21]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vochanski Khutory on June 27 and 28.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vovchansk.[23]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Anvar" Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[24]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 28 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer near Kolisnykivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[25]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, north of Kupyansk toward Petro-Ivanivka and Putnykove, northeast of Kupyansk near Holubivka, east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pischane on June 27 and 28.[26]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on June 28 that Russian forces intensified their assaults in June 2025 and that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attacking near Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[27] The commander stated that Russian forces recently attacked with lightly armored vehicles, tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), but noted that this behavior is abnormal. The commander stated that Russian forces are also attempting to advance toward the Oskil riverbank to establish platoon crossings.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova toward Bohuslavka; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai and Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove and Hrekivka and toward Shyikivka, Novoserhiivka, and Olhivka on June 27 and 28.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Svatove (Borova) direction.[29]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.


Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage posted on June 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in northern Torske (east of Lyman).[30]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Hlushchenkove (north of Lyman).[31]


Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Hlushchenkove and Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Novyi Myr; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 27 and 28.[32]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are reportedly operating near Ridkodub.[33]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction June 28, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast June 28, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 27 and 28.[34]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast June 28, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kalinina (northeast of Chasiv Yar) and toward Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).[35]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northwest of Chasiv Yar near Maiske, north of Chasiv Yar near Markove and Novomarkove, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Kalinina, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and toward Bila Hora on June 27 and 28.[36]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 299th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[37]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne, and toward Pleshchiivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, and Poltavka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly attacking in the direction of Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[39] Drone operators of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Donetsk Directorate are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[40] Drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne, Malynivka, and toward Koptieve, Novotoretske, and Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and toward Novopidhorodne and Molodetske; and northwest of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on June 27 and 28.[42]

An intelligence officer of a Ukrainian detachment operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are attacking during rainy weather when it is more difficult for Ukrainian forces to operate drones and are taking advantage of foliage for cover and concealment from Ukrainian drones.[43] The intelligence officer stated that Russian personnel who conduct motorcycle assaults are better equipped than infantrymen and that Russian forces are attacking on motorcycles in the early morning but not at night.[44] The commander of a Ukrainian mortar battery operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces attack in fireteams of no more than three soldiers and often attack in one area for five to 10 days.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Typhoon" Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[46]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 28 indicates that elements of the Russian 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) advanced into northern Zirka (southwest of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement.[47] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed that Russian forces seized Zirka.[48]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces crossed the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary and seized positions in Biliakivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[49] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized Dachne (south of Novopavlivka, just across the administrative boundary).[50] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces are gradually advanced in the fields southeast of Novopavlivka between Bohdanivka and Oleksiivka.[51]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Troitske; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Oleksiivka; and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Zaporizhzhia, Yalta, Fedorivka, Perebudova, and Komar and toward Myrne and Voskresenka on June 27 and 28.[52]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD), and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are reportedly operating near Myrne.[53]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction June 28, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 28 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Shevchenko and toward Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[54]

Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Maliivka on June 27 and 28.[55]

Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on June 28 that Russia is transferring troops from training camps near occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, and Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast to the Pokrovsk direction.[56]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on June 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Separate 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vysoke (east of Hulyaipole).[58]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed Claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the E-105 Vasylivka-Kamyanske highway in central Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[59]

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on June 27 and 28.[60]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[61]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction June 28, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on June 28 but did not make confirmed advances.[62]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction June 28, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 23 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[63] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 21 drones and that one drone was "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Odesa Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian and residential infrastructure facilities in Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts and that a Russian missile struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast.[64]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[1] <https://t.me/SBUkr/15181>

[2] <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/82050>

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[4] <https://suspilne dot media/1053839-droni-gur-urazili-arsenal-minoboroni-rf-u-bransku-dzerelo/>

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[10] <https://nv dot ua/ukr/ukraine/events/rosiya-buduye-novi-maydanchiki-dlya-virobnictva-shahediv-z-yavilis-suputnikovi-znimki-50525607.html>

- [11] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-26-2025>
- [12] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26020>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25984>;
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- [13] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30521>; https://t.me/dva_majors/74309;
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- [27] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/28/suyiczdalnyj-geroyizm-rosijskyh-shturmovykh-vorog-peretynaye-richku-oskil-na-plotah-chovnah-i-vbrid/>
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- [29] https://t.me/notes_veterans/24063

[30] https://t.me/operationall_space/4833;
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[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31916

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[33] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/37869>

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