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June 30, 2025, 5:30 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on June 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

High-ranking Kremlin statements, including from Russian President Vladimir Putin, continue to demonstrate Russia's wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting on June 30 on the socioeconomic development of occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts during which he frequently referred to occupied Ukraine as "Donbas and Novorossiia." [1] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on June 30 to a June 27 statement by Odesa City Mayor Gennadiy Trukhanov that Odesa City is not a "Russian" city and has its own history, claiming that the history of Odesa City is "inextricably linked" with Russia. [2] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed on June 30 that Russians and Ukrainians are "one people" with a "historical homeland" and referenced the "ancient Russian lands on both sides of the Dnipro (River), Novorossiia, and Crimea." [3]

Putin's, Peskov's, and Medinsky's June 30 statements are only the latest statements from high-ranking Kremlin officials indicating the extent of Russia's territorial ambitions. Putin reiterated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 that he considers the Russian and Ukrainian people to be "one people in reality" and that "Ukraine is [Russia's]." [4] Kremlin officials have routinely labelled Odesa City as a "Russian" city, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov most recently on June 9. [5] Kremlin officials have also repeatedly referenced "Novorossiia," which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine. [6] Medinsky's reference to the "ancient Russian" lands on "both sides of the Dnipro" also coheres with Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's April 2025 call for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. [7] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated in early June 2025 that Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa Oblast by the end of 2026. [8] Putin and other Kremlin officials have consistently indicated that they do not believe that Ukraine is an independent state with its own history, identity, and culture separate from Russia. [9] Russian officials' ongoing commitment to these narratives demonstrates the Kremlin's continued objective of destroying the Ukrainian state and subjugating the Ukrainian people.

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its December 2024-May 2025 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited

Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs. The UN OHCHR reported that 968 Ukrainian civilians died and 4,807 sustained injuries from conflict-related violence from December 1, 2024, to May 31, 2025 — a 37 percent increase compared to the same time period last year.[10] The UN OHCHR assessed that the vast majority of these civilian casualties resulted from Russian military operations to seize territory along the front, the use of explosives in urban areas, and the increased use of short-range combat drones. The UN OHCHR reported that it had recorded credible allegations of the execution of 106 Ukrainian POWs by Russian forces between late August 2024 and May 2025, with 35 of these executions likely occurring between December 2024 and May 2025. The report stated that most of these executions occurred in areas where Russian forces were advancing in Donetsk and Kursk oblasts. The UN OHCHR reported that interviews with Ukrainian POWs released from Russian captivity confirmed Russia's "widespread and systematic" practices of torture. The report states that the UN verified the execution of one Russian soldier rendered *hors de combat* by a Ukrainian soldier in late 2024. The UN OHCHR stated that it has verified the execution of 26 persons *hors de combat*, including Russian POWs, by Ukrainian forces since February 2022, but that all but one of these executions occurred in 2022 or early 2023. The UN OHCHR stated that interviewed POWs held in Ukrainian captivity reported torture and ill-treatment, but noted that most of these acts occurred in transit places before arrival at official internment locations. Russian state media largely misrepresented the UN OHCHR report by ignoring assessments about Russia's widespread execution and systemic mistreatment of Ukrainian POWs and reporting only on the assessments about Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs.[11] Russian state media similarly misrepresented the UN OHCHR's previous reports.[12]

The Kremlin is poised to launch a new "national messenger" application affiliated with Kremlin-controlled social media site VKontakte (VK) as part of ongoing efforts to censor Russian citizens and isolate them from the global internet. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on June 24 approving the creation of a national messenger application that will allow Russian citizens to virtually access government services and documents.[13] The decree orders that the application combine the functions of a social media messenger application with government services and documents and that it be available by Fall 2025. Russian citizens would not be able to have an anonymous social media presence on this national messenger application. VK announced its "Max" digital platform and messenger application in March 2025, and Russian officials have acknowledged that Max could serve as the basis for the new "national messenger" application.[14] The Kremlin has reportedly been planning to partner with VK to launch a national messenger since at least Fall 2024.[15] A source familiar with VK's plans told Russian news organization *Vedomosti* in March 2025 that Max could become an analogue to the Chinese WeChat application.[16] A Max representative told *Vedomosti* on June 30 that one million users have registered with the beta-version of Max over the last "several weeks." [17] Russian State Duma Information Technology (IT) Committee First Deputy Chairperson Anton Gorelkin claimed on June 5 that Russia will not ban Telegram in connection with the launch of Max, although the Kremlin may attempt to ban Telegram and other social media connected to the Western world in the medium- to long-term if the roll out of the new national messenger application is successful.[18]


Azerbaijani authorities raided the offices of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet *Sputnik* in Baku as Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated recently after a raid against ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia. Azerbaijani outlet *Qafqazinfo* reported on June 30, citing the Azerbaijani Ministry of Internal Affairs, that local police raided the office of *Sputnik* in Baku.[19]

Local Azerbaijani outlets claimed that Azerbaijani authorities detained two Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) agents during the raid on *Sputnik*'s Baku office.[20] The Azerbaijani Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that *Sputnik* had continued working in Azerbaijan via "illegal financing" despite the revocation of its official accreditation in February 2025.[21] The raid on the *Sputnik* office in Baku comes after a recent raid by Russian security forces in Yekaterinburg that resulted in the detention of nine Azerbaijani citizens accused of contract killings in the early 2000s and left two Azerbaijanis dead.[22] The Azerbaijani Ministry of Culture cancelled all cultural events that Russia organized in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijani officials cancelled planned trips to Moscow in response to the Yekaterinburg raid.[23] Continued Azerbaijani restraints on Russian state media or cultural events in Azerbaijan would likely further deteriorate bilateral relations and undermine Russia's influence in the south Caucasus, particularly as the Kremlin uses its media presence and cultural soft power abroad to further its objectives in the former Soviet space.[24]

Key Takeaways:

- **High-ranking Kremlin statements, including from Russian President Vladimir Putin, continue to demonstrate Russia's wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed.**
- **The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its December 2024-May 2025 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs.**
- **The Kremlin is poised to launch a new "national messenger" application affiliated with Kremlin-controlled social media site VKontakte (VK) as part of ongoing efforts to censor Russian citizens and isolate them from the global internet.**
- **Azerbaijani authorities raided the offices of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet *Sputnik* in Baku as Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated recently after a raid against ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War June 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 30.

Russian forces conducted attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 29 and 30.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in the Tetkino (southeast of Glushkovo) and Glushkovo directions.[26]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are operating near Tetkino.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Sumy Oblast, including northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on June 29 and 30.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yablunivka, Oleksiivka, Andriivka (all north of Sumy City), Sadky (northeast of Sumy City), and Yunakivka.[29]


Ukraine's Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated that the number of Russian attacks in the Sumy direction has decreased.[30] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Sumy direction stated that Russian forces are exclusively attacking with small groups of infantry and are not using any types of vehicles.[31] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have a significant manpower advantage in the area. The commander of a Ukrainian special forces unit told the *Wall Street Journal* in an article published on June 29 that Russian forces in Sumy Oblast are bringing in reserves to replenish their roughly 300 to 400 daily losses.[32]

A source in Ukrainian law enforcement told Ukrainian outlet *Ukrainska Pravda* that Russian forces conducted a tube artillery strike against Pishchane (just north of Sumy City) on June 22 to 23 and that Russian forces likely launched the artillery strike from either near Kulbaki (north of the international Ukrainian-Russian border roughly 25 kilometers north of Pishchane) or from near Gornal (just north

of the border roughly 28 kilometers northeast of Pishchane) or Guyevo (northeast of Gornal roughly 32 kilometers northeast of Pishchane).[33]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, LMD), and 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD) are trying to advance across the O-191505 Khotin-Yelizavetovka highway and near Oleksiivka.[34] Mashovets stated that elements of the 11th and 83rd separate airborne (VDV) brigades are attacking along the Novomykolaivka-Yablunivka line (north of Sumy City) and that the Russian military command reinforced this area with elements of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th AC, LMD) in the past week. Mashovets stated that elements of the 104th, 234th, and 237th VDV regiments (all part of the 76th VDV Division) are attacking near Yunakivka. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 106th VDV Division from Sumy Oblast to another unspecified sector of the front but that elements of the 106th VDV Division's 51st and 137th VDV regiments continue to attack in the Sumy Oblast border area. Elements of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) and Andriivka.[35]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction June 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Vovchansk and toward Vovchanski Khutory (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[36]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on June 29 and 30.[37]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Anvar" Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west and northwest of Ivanivka (east of Kupyansk).[39]

Russian forces continued assaults near Kupyansk itself, north of Kupyansk near Petro-Ivanivka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk toward Pishchane on June 29 and 30.[40]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on June 30 that elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are attacking in Kindrashivka and Holubivka and trying to seize Radkivka (all immediately north of Kupyansk).[41] Elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[42]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kupyansk Direction June 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued assaults in the Borova direction on June 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Nadiya and Kopanky and southeast of Borova near Novovodyane and Hrekivka and toward Olhivka and Novoserhiivka on June 29 and 30.[43]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are unsuccessfully attacking toward Druzhelyubivka (southeast of Borova).[44]


Russian forces continued assaults in the Lyman direction on June 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub and toward Shandryholove, Serednye, and Novyi Myr, and east of Lyman near Torske and in the Serebryanske forest area on June 29 and 30.[45] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Ridkodub and trying to push Russian forces from the settlement.[46]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on June 30 that Russian forces are accumulating between the Oskil and Zherebets rivers in the Lyman direction, but that it is unclear where Russian forces intend to concentrate their assaults in the future.[47]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) and 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA) are attacking toward Karpivka (northwest of Lyman) and in Ridkodub.[48] Mashovets stated that elements of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, with support from the 164th and 169th separate motorized rifle brigades (all of the 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), are attacking near Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman) and Torske.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast June 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, and southwest of Siversk near Vyimka on June 29 and 30.[49]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[50]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast June 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).[51]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechnye and Stupochky and toward Bila Hora on June 29 and 30.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky and in Chasiv Yar.[53]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Bila Hora.[54] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 331st VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[56]

Russian forces continued ground assaults near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northeast of Toretsk near Dachne; and northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka and Rusyn Yar on June 29 and 30.[57]

Order of Battle: Engineering-sapper elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly mining areas near Pleshchiivka (north of Toretsk).[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 30 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk) and advanced southwest of Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk), northwest and west of Hrodivka, northeast and west of Mykolaivka (both southeast of Pokrovsk), northeast of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk), and northeast of Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk).[59]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Myrne and toward Razine, Novotoretske, and Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne on June 29 and 30.[60]

Ukrainian Khortytisia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction are focusing their attacks near the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway.[61] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that the Russian military command has likely redeployed a large part of the personnel in the battalion's area of responsibility (AoR) to another direction where Russian forces are attacking with equipment and that Russian forces in the area are primarily conducting reconnaissance of Ukrainian positions.[62] The commander reported that Russian forces are more intensely remote-mining Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Pokrovsk direction and that Russian forces are using drones with tear gas. The commander reported that Russian forces are accumulating near Kurakhove and Selydove (both in the Russian near rear south of Pokrovsk). The commander of a Ukrainian drone crew operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are using drones to destroy Ukrainian communications and logistics to prevent Ukrainian forces from being able to move equipment or supplies to frontline positions or evacuate wounded.[63] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian platoon operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are conducting guided glide bomb strikes against Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad to block Ukrainian logistics.[64]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Typhoon" Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[65]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction June 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 30 shows elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) raising a flag in Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[66]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka), west and south of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka), near Hrushivske, and toward Pidubne, south of Zirka, west and northwest of Komar, west of Fedorivka, and south of Zirka (all south of Novopavlivka), and southeast of Voskresenka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[67]

Russian forces continued ground assaults toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near

Horikhove, Oleksiivka, and Bahatyry; south of Novopavlivka near, Piddubne, Zaporizhzhia, Fedorivka, Perebudova, Vesele, and Myrne on June 29 and 30.[68]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko and Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces do not occupy any territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast but that fighting is ongoing near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[69]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Myrne.[70] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Novomykolaivka.[71]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 60th and 57th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) advanced northwest of Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[72]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko, west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil on June 29 and 30.[73]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 30 that Russian forces trained with motorcycles and anti-drone ponchos ahead of the seizure of Shevchenko.[74]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[75]

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 29 and 30.[76]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on June 30 that positions are constantly changing hands but that Russian forces have not seized Malynivka.[77]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[78]


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), in northern Kamyanske, and west of Stepove (east of Kamyanske).[79]

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on June 29 and 30.[80] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kamyanske.[81]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on June 30 that Russian forces cannot conduct motorcycle assaults near Kamyanske as the settlement is on a dominant height and the terrain is marshy, so Russian forces are conducting infantry attacks.[82]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 108th and 247th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kamyanske.[83] Elements of the 629th Separate Engineer and Sapper Battalion (reportedly of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[84] Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Mala Tokmachka.[85] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mala Tokmachka.[86]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction June 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 29 and 30 but did not advance.[87]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction June 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 107 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[88] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 64 drones and that 10 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian strikes primarily targeted Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes hit civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts.[89]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[1] <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77329>

[2] <https://t.me/xydessa/54561> ; <https://tass dot ru/politika/24390329>

[3] <https://tass dot ru/politika/24387329>

[4] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025>

[5] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025>; <https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/14/12/2023/657acd6a9a79477cbd43f7d5>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2025>

[6] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar060825>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225>

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