Authors: Eloise Herdegen, Veronica Iredale, Andrew Raynus, Zachary Yacht, and Karolina Hird
Data cut off: 12 pm ET, August 4
ISW’s Russian Occupation Update tracks the activities that occur in the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. This product line replaces the section of the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment covering activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.
To read ISW’s assessment of how Russian activities in occupied areas of Ukraine are part of a coerced Russification and ethnic cleansing campaign, click here.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin on August 4 to discuss the ongoing Russian-created and Russian-propagated water crisis that is severely impacting parts of occupied Donetsk Oblast. The water crisis seems to be worsening despite mounting appeals to Russian leadership and Russian efforts to claim officials are effectively and efficiently responding.
- Russia is preparing to broadly impose the Kremlin-controlled MAX messaging platform on occupied Ukraine in order to gain greater control over the information space.
- Russia continues to passportize occupied Ukraine using administrative levers and coercive tools.
- Russia’s majority state-owned Sberbank is spreading its influence in occupied Ukraine as a means of integrating occupied areas into the Russian financial system.
Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin on August 4 to discuss the ongoing Russian-created and Russian-propagated water crisis that is severely impacting parts of occupied Donetsk Oblast. Putin questioned Pushilin over the implementation of reconstruction and infrastructure projects throughout the occupied oblast, to which Pushilin responded by claiming that his administration has made significant progress on the restoration of buildings, roads, and hospitals.[1] Pushilin then admitted that the “most difficult and serious challenge” in occupied Donetsk Oblast is the issue of water supply, accusing Ukraine of causing the issue in the first place. Pushilin claimed that the occupation administration is trying to increase the flow of water to settlements by cleaning riverbeds and clearing blockages in water infrastructure, but noted that water losses in occupied Donetsk Oblast sometimes reach 60 percent due to irregular water supply schedules and degradation of water infrastructure.[2] Major settlements in occupied Donetsk Oblast, such as Donetsk City, Makiivka, Yenakiyeve, and Mariupol, reportedly receive water for a few hours a day every few days.[3] Yenakiyeve, for example, only receives water for a few hours every four days.
The Pushilin-Putin meeting occurred against the backdrop of an increasingly severe water crisis that is causing a deepening humanitarian crisis in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Social media footage published on August 4 shows residents of occupied Donetsk Oblast using plastic buckets to collect water from rainfall, puddles, and leaking pipes.[4] Residents of occupied Donetsk Oblast also posted a video appeal to Putin in late July, wherein young children begged Putin to restore the water supply so that they can “simply wash ourselves, drink, and live.”[5] Sanitation issues are increasingly rife as residents lack clean drinking water, flushable toilets, or access to water with which to bathe.[6] The water crisis seems to be worsening despite mounting appeals to Russian leadership and Russian efforts to claim officials are effectively and efficiently responding. Pushilin reported on August 4 that he is reducing the payment for water to 7 rubles 47 kopecks (around $0.09)—likely an effort to combat rising water prices, but one that does not address the origin of water supply issues.[7] Pushilin and other Russian officials have continued to blame Ukraine for “blocking” water supplies to occupied Donetsk Oblast, but as ISW and others have reported, Russian military activities have damaged water infrastructure throughout occupied Ukraine, and Russia has used critical infrastructure to facilitate military operations.[8] Ukrainian sources have also reported that Russian officials are providing sufficient water to Russian forces, occupation officials, and loyalists, while ignoring the needs of the civilian population.[9] International law requires Russia, as a belligerent occupying power, to provide the population it occupies with the basic services required to sustain life—an obligation that Russia is clearly abrogating despite efforts to posture otherwise.[10]
Russia is preparing to broadly impose the Kremlin-controlled MAX messaging platform on occupied Ukraine in order to gain greater control over the information space. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on July 31 that employees of the Kherson Oblast occupation administration must transfer work communications to MAX by August 7.[11] Saldo claimed that this change is so that all correspondence is reliably protected from the “pressure” that Russia faces “on all sides.” Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky stated in a July 31 Telegram post that all Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration employees are also required to transfer to MAX within the week to protect official information.[12] Russian news organization Vedomosti reported on July 30 that the Kremlin advised some Russian regional officials, likely including occupation officials, to create MAX accounts by August 1, and others before the end of summer.[13] MAX is a personal messaging application associated with the Kremlin-controlled social media site VKontakte (VK). ISW previously reported that MAX allows Russian citizens to access government services and documents virtually and prevents users from maintaining an anonymous online presence.[14] A Ukrainian partisan group reported on July 5 that Russian officials use MAX as “spyware” by collecting personal information from its users, which is then transferred to Russian security services through VK servers.[15] The transition of occupation administration employees to MAX will likely set conditions for the Kremlin to more broadly impose MAX on all residents of occupied Ukraine in the near future. MAX will allow Russian officials greater control over the information space in occupied Ukraine and will further sever occupied regions from access to the rest of the world.
Russia continues to passportize occupied Ukraine using administrative levers and coercive tools. The Luhansk People’s Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs (LNR MVD) announced on July 29 that it is removing the 4,200 ruble ($52.50) application fee for a Russian passport for certain groups residing in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[16] Individuals who reside in former Soviet Union countries and formerly held Soviet Union citizenship, but are currently stateless because they did not apply for Russian or Ukrainian citizenship following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, can apply with the fee waived. Children without parental care and orphans can also apply for Russian citizenship without paying the administrative fee. The LNR will also waive the fee for Ukrainian citizens living in occupied areas with some sort of “temporary residence permit” connected to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s January 2024 decree articulating the rights of certain groups of individuals to apply for Russian citizenship. The application fee is very small, but its waiver is likely intended to lower the barrier for entry to Russian citizenship for two especially vulnerable population groups—the elderly who did not submit for new residence documents following the fall of the Soviet Union, and young children who do not have parental consent or a legal guardian to advocate for them. Russian occupation administrations have used similar administrative incentives to support passportization efforts in occupied Ukraine, usually by tying benefits or some sort of financial incentive to the act of obtaining a Russian passport.[17]
Russian passportization efforts can also be more overt and violent. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 30 that Russian occupation authorities in occupied Askania-Nova, Kherson Oblast, are forcing parents to apply for Russian passports to retain parental rights and legal control of their children.[18] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also noted that residents are unable to access basic social services, move freely throughout occupied territories, or avoid forced mobilization into the Russian military if they do not have Russian passports. A Ukrainian partisan group reported on July 31 that Russian occupation authorities are conducting patrols in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to check personal cars for Russian car insurance, which may only be obtained with a Russian passport.[19] ISW has observed similar instances of Russian occupation authorities using car registration to coerce passportization. The law “On Road Safety” requires residents of occupied Ukraine to apply for a Russian driver’s license by January 1, 2026, to legally retain the right to drive.[20] Applying for a Russian driver’s license requires an individual to present a Russian passport or Russian residence documents. ISW continues to assess that passportization supports Russia’s long-term strategic goals of setting multigenerational conditions for integrating occupied Ukrainian territories into Russia and eradicating Ukrainian identity, both physically and administratively.
Russia’s majority state-owned Sberbank is spreading its influence in occupied Ukraine as a means of integrating occupied areas into the Russian financial system. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration claimed on July 31 that Sbermobile, a subsidiary of Sberbank, began operating in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, becoming the first Russian federal operator to provide services in occupied Ukraine.[21] Sbermobile CEO Sergei Volkov said on July 31 that the company is expanding coverage and integrating occupied Ukraine into the all-Russian telecommunications space.[22] The Miranda-Media group owns the MirTelecom operating structure, which carries out Sbermobile communication in occupied Ukraine.[23] Miranda-Media CEO Igor Zhizhilkin said on July 31 that Sbermobile network users exceeded two million in occupied Ukraine and will likely continue to grow in the future.[24]
Sbermobile’s implementation in occupied Ukraine notably occurred on the same day as the start of a two-day business forum between representatives from the Russian development corporation VEB.RF, Russian officials, and Luhansk Oblast occupation officials. Russian Ministry of Construction Head Irek Faizullin said at the forum that VEB.RF has stimulated special economic conditions and infrastructure programs that should accelerate the integration of occupied Luhansk Oblast into the Russian economy.[25] LNR Minister of Industry and Trade Timur Samatov said at the forum on July 31 that LNR has ambitious plans for development in the oblast and relies on VEB.RF’s mechanisms to bring in investment to 20 percent of occupied Luhansk Oblast’s 152 enterprises.[26] Occupied Luhansk Oblast-based outlet Luhansk Information Center claimed on July 31 that VEB.RF will finance the development of 15 master plans, ten projects for planning territories, and four complex territorial schemes for the development of tourism in occupied Ukraine in 2025.[27] ISW assesses that Sberbank’s and VEB.RF’s involvement in occupied Ukraine is part of a wider Russian effort to absorb occupied Ukraine into Russia’s financial system. This financial integration will force occupied Ukraine to rely on Russia for financial flows and services, making it more detached from Kyiv and harder to integrate into the Ukrainian economy in the long run. Financial integration efforts also allow Russia to generate profit from the war in Ukraine, keeping Russia’s stagnating economy afloat and supporting the war effort financially.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77705
[2] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24702473
[3] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24702473
[4] https://t.me/astrapress/88682
[5] https://t.me/astrapress/88023
[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-july-24-2025; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/08/04/ukraine-donetsk-water-shortage-putin/
[7] https://dan-news dot ru/obschestvo/oplatu-za-vodu-v-dnr-snizjat-do-minimuma-za-vodootvedenie–otmenjat/
[8] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/08/04/ukraine-donetsk-water-shortage-putin/; https://t.me/andriyshTime/40470; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-july-24-2025; https://isw.pub/OccupationUpdate061225
[9] https://t.me/sprotyv_official/7448; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/08/04/ukraine-donetsk-water-shortage-putin/
[10] https://united24media.com/latest-news/russian-held-donetsk-region-plunges-into-crisis-amid-infrastructure-breakdown-10438
[11] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/8824
[12] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/5870
[13] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2025/07/31/1128185-regionam-rekomendovali-aktivnei-ispolzovat-mah
[14] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/685a9aec9a794732463a623d ; https://www.ixbt dot com/live/sw/v-rossii-poyavitsya-gosudarstvennyy-messendzher-zakon-o-cifrovoy-platforme-max-podpisan-prezidentom.html ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025
[15] https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/11624
[16] https://lug-info dot ru/documents/rekvizity-gosposhliny-za-prijom-v-grazhdanstvo-rf-izmenjatsja-v-lnr-s-1-avgusta/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf
[18] https://t.me/sprotyv_official/7430
[19] https://t.me/yellowribbon_ua/11835
[20] https://92.мвд dot рф/news/item/63582630/
[21] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/32631
[22] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/32631
[23] https://m.c-inform dot info/news/id/11084
[24] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/32631
[25] https://lug-info dot ru/news/veb.rf-i-instituty-razvitija-obsudili-v-luganske-integraciju-lnr-v-ekonomiku/
[26] https://lug-info dot ru/news/veb.rf-i-instituty-razvitija-obsudili-v-luganske-integraciju-lnr-v-ekonomiku/
[27] https://lug-info dot ru/news/veb.rf-i-instituty-razvitija-obsudili-v-luganske-integraciju-lnr-v-ekonomiku/
