The leaders of all four members of the Adversary Entente have convened in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for a series of multilateral meetings and memorial events. PRC President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian arrived in Tianjin, PRC, on August 31 to participate in the 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit.[1] North Korean leader Kim Jong Un arrived in Beijing on September 2 to attend a military parade commemorating Japan’s formal surrender in World War II.[2] Xi, Putin, and Kim will likely hold a series of bilateral and trilateral meetings while in Beijing. This series of meetings and commemorative events is the first time that the leaders of all four members of the Adversary Entente have been present in the same place at the same time, highlighting the historical convergence between these four states.[3] The interactions between Xi, Putin, Pezeshkian, and Kim serve as strong indicators of the ways in which the Adversary Entente is cooperating politically, economically, and militarily in order to challenge the United States and its partners across the globe.

Presidents Putin and Xi have used the SCO to challenge Western-led international organizations and platform their envisioned alternative Eurasian security architecture. Putin gave a speech at the SCO Heads of State Council meeting in Tianjin on September 1 and lauded the SCO for uniting “like-minded people,” who are committed to building a “fair, multipolar world order.” Putin similarly characterized the SCO as laying the foundation to create a new system intended to replace the “obsolete Eurocentric and Euro-Atlantic models” of security, stability, and peaceful development in Eurasia.[4] SCO member states, including Russia, the PRC, and Iran signed the Tianjin Declaration on September 1, which defines the SCO as a basis for the formation of a security architecture in Eurasia.[5] The Tianjin Declaration also provides for cooperation in several security spheres, including counter-terrorism and counter-extremism, law enforcement, and border security—all functions that the SCO has historically performed. PRC President Xi advocated for a multipolar global system during his SCO address, and PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi said that the SCO agreed on a 10-year development plan that will advance the aim of making a multipolar world order.[6] Xi said at a bilateral meeting with Putin in Beijing on September 2 that the PRC and Russia have a “great responsibility” as the “main countries that won the Second World War and permanent members of the UN Security Council,” portraying the PRC and Russia as contemporary peers that are superior to Western states and who are in charge of constructing this alternative world order.[7] Putin has been promoting a vaguely defined Eurasian security architecture since Spring 2024 with the aim of creating a Russia-led bloc to further his goal of weakening NATO and the West and is using the SCO and other Adversary Entente members, such as the PRC, as a base for this alternative security architecture.[8] Putin, Xi, and other leaders of Adversary Entente states will likely attempt to use multilateral events, such as the SCO summit, to further challenge the West, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s visit to the PRC and various bilateral and trilateral meetings with Xi and Putin in close proximity to the SCO summit serve as yet another Adversary Entente challenge to the West.

The Adversary Entente is using Iran’s participation in the SCO to undermine current European efforts to penalize Iran for refusing to adhere to its nuclear obligations. Iran is currently facing the imminent re-imposition of international mechanisms that would further politically isolate it on the world stage. The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28, initiating the process to reinstate UN snapback sanctions on Iran if Iran does not show progress within 30 days addressing its “significant noncompliance” with the JCPOA.[9] All UN member states are expected to enforce UN sanctions on Iran, which mostly target Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and would represent a significant diplomatic blow to Iran.

Iran, Russia, and the PRC seek to undermine the E3’s attempts to sanction Iran, including through alternative frameworks, such as the SCO. Putin and Xi welcomed Pezeshkian during bilateral meetings on September 1 and 2.ⁱⁱ Both reiterated their support for Iran’s nuclear program and commitment to continuing economic relations with Iran, though neither leader specifically referenced the looming imposition of sanctions or how they might adapt to sanctions as Iran’s primary political and economic partners.[10] Diplomatic engagements between Adversary Entente leaders in the context of the SCO likely aim to diminish the diplomatic and economic isolation that snapback sanctions are designed to impose on Iran.

SCO engagement is not the sole diplomatic channel through which Russia and the PRC are politically coalescing around Iran prior to the imposition of sanctions. Iran, Russia, and the PRC sent a joint letter to the UNSC on September 1, condemning the E3 activation of the snapback mechanism.[11] It is unlikely that such an effort would halt or slow the progress if Iran does not make the necessary progress toward adhering to its nuclear commitments by September 27, however.

Senior Iranian officials and state media have continued emphasizing the need to expand cooperation, especially militarily, with the PRC. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei posted on X (Twitter) on August 31 that Iran and China should “operationalize” all aspects of their strategic agreement.[12] Iran and the PRC signed the agreement to expand political, economic, and military ties in 2021.[13] Not all details of the agreement have been made public, including details about military cooperation. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled outlet Defa Press praised the PRC in a September 1 article and highlighted the PRC as a “reliable [military] partner” for states seeking to strengthen their capabilities due to the PRC’s “affordable prices” and “deep and lasting cooperation.”[14] The article did not directly call for Iran and the PRC to deepen military ties but emphasized the PRC’s sale of fighter jets, submarines, drones, and advanced air defense systems to numerous other states, including Pakistan.

Khamenei’s and Defa Press’s comments are consistent with ISW-CTP’s observation that Iran may be seeking closer military cooperation with the PRC in the aftermath of the June 2025 Israel-Iran war. Iranian and Arab media suggested immediately after the war that Iranian officials sought to purchase the PRC’s Chengdu J-10C multirole combat aircraft or PRC air defense systems to replace damaged or destroyed equipment and systems, for example.[15] Iranian officials may also seek for the PRC to fulfill previous agreements that it has made with Iran, particularly regarding dual-use technologies to help Iran rebuild after the war. Western media reported in June 2025 that Iran ordered “thousands of tons” of ammonium perchlorate from the PRC that could fuel “hundreds” of ballistic missiles.[16] The shipment was expected to reach Iran within a few months, but it is unclear if the shipment ever arrived or even left the PRC. Iranian officials may seek to ”operationalize” agreements with the PRC before the imposition of snapback sanctions, particularly given that UN sanctions could hinder Iranian efforts to rebuild its missile program.

It is unclear if the PRC views expanding military ties with Iran as in its own interests, as Iranian officials clearly do. Beijing has not directly sold weapons to Iran since 2005 and has limited itself to selling dual-use equipment and materials, such as drone parts and components of missile fuel.[17] Xi and Pezeshkian’s meeting during the SCO summit did not result in any concrete agreements between the two countries, in contrast to Russia and the PRC’s gas pipeline agreement and series of energy deals. Xi emphasized that Iran is central to the PRC’s political interests in the Middle East, according to Iranian readouts of the meeting.[18] The readouts did not detail whether the two leaders discussed deepening military or military technical cooperation, but neither Iran nor the PRC is likely to acknowledge growing military cooperation outright. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei told PRC state media on September 1 that the implementation of the strategic agreement has entered an “advanced stage,” though he did not elaborate by which metrics or mechanisms.[19] Israeli sources have alleged in recent weeks that the PRC has helped Iran rebuild its ballistic missile arsenal since the Israel-Iran war.[20]

Iranian officials and state media have pushed for greater Sino-Iranian defense cooperation amid recent Iranian frustration over Russia’s unreliability as a defense partner. Defa Press’s characterization of the PRC as a “reliable” defense partner contrasts with how Iranian officials have described recent frustrations with Russia for its refusal to provide meaningful military support to Iran. Iranian Expediency Discernment Council member Mohammad Sadr publicly criticized Tehran’s strategic alliance with Moscow as “meaningless” on August 24, complaining that Russia contributed diplomatic overtures rather than military support to Iran during the Israel-Iran war.[21] The Kremlin has attempted to push back against perceived growing fissures between Iran and Russia. The Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry criticized Iranian media on August 29 for allegedly spreading ”misinformation” that Russia is not a ”reliable partner” and has been unable to provide it with ”proper support” during the war.[22] Putin also reiterated that relations between Iran and Russia remain ”friendly” during his meeting with Pezeshkian in Tianjin on September 1.^xv Iranian officials are unlikely to be reassured by these remarks, however, as reflected by Iranian officials’ growing public interest in deepening ties with the PRC.

Russia and the PRC used the SCO summit to announce several energy deals, including those that will facilitate sanctions evasion efforts. Russian state energy company Gazprom President Alexey Miller announced on September 2 that Russia, the PRC, and Mongolia signed a “legally-binding” memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the construction of the Power of Siberia-2 (PS-2) natural gas pipeline and its Soyuz-Vostok extension pipeline between Russia and the PRC through Mongolia.[23] Miller claimed that these construction projects will allow Russia to sell up to 50 billion cubic meters of natural gas to the PRC per year. Miller added that Russia and the PRC also reached agreements to increase natural gas flows through the existing Power of Siberia pipeline from 38 billion cubic meters to 44 billion cubic meters per year. Miller said that Russia and the PRC will conclude gas purchases half in rubles and half in yuan but indicated that prices for these gas flows to the PRC remain undecided. The Kremlin announced that Russia and the PRC concluded additional bilateral energy deals as part of a 22-deal package, including between Gazprom and the PRC National Petroleum Cooperation as well as between the Russian state atomic energy corporation Rosatom and the PRC state Atomic Energy Agency.[24]

Russia may have made significant concessions to conclude the PS-2 MOU with the PRC, though the contours of the deal remain unclear. Russia has historically been more motivated to conclude such a deal than the PRC, especially following Western sanctions in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The PRC remains interested in diversifying its energy suppliers and obtaining great deals on energy imports, and Russia has historically been more dependent on the PRC as an energy buyer than the PRC has been dependent upon Russia as an energy seller.[25] Russia faces the prospect of increased Western primary and secondary sanctions against its energy imports and increased energy shortages domestically, which threaten the energy revenues upon which Russia’s war effort in Ukraine is dependent. Russia and the PRC reportedly disagreed about the price and amount of natural gas flows through the PS-2 in Spring 2024, which delayed a deal to finish constructing the pipeline.[26] The PRC reportedly regained interest in the PS-2 pipeline following the June 2025 Iran-Israel war due to concerns about another war disrupting natural gas imports from the Middle East.[27] ISW previously assessed that the PRC’s increased willingness to import additional Russian energy is a near-term impact of the June 2025 Israel-Iran war on Russian-PRC bilateral relations and will likely generate disproportionate benefits for Russia’s war in Ukraine.[28] The PRC increasing its purchases of natural gas transported by land will also make it easier for Russia and the PRC to avoid Western sanctions that would hinder natural gas imported by sea or other means.

The PRC, Russia, and other SCO members are using the SCO to insulate themselves from Western sanctions as they promote their alternative model of global governance. The SCO agreed to establish an SCO Development Bank, an initiative that the PRC has promoted for over a decade.[29] Xi said that he hoped the SCO could provide collective protection from unilateral “bullying,” including through economic cooperation. A regional SCO bank could reduce SCO member states’ reliance on US dollars for trade.[30] The scheme would benefit heavily sanctioned SCO members, such as Russia and Iran, but could also appeal to India, which the United States recently subjected to high tariffs due to its continued purchase of oil and weapons from Russia. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has recently tried to improve relations with the PRC and held hands with Putin at the SCO summit in a possible show of resistance to US pressure.[31]

The PRC and Russia have aligned their historical narratives about World War II to present themselves as the true inheritors of the postwar international order and challenge the United States and its allies. The Tianjin Declaration included a call “to remember the heroic deeds of the peoples of all countries and the historical lessons of World War II.”[32] PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi characterized this point of the declaration as a call “to learn from history, uphold a correct view of World War II history, and safeguard the international system with the United Nations at its core.”[33] The PRC and Russia have been trying to reshape the global narrative around World War II to frame themselves as decisive victors and to challenge and overturn “Western-centric” narratives. PRC scholar Liu Bensen wrote on August 29 in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Party School newspaper Study Times that Western narratives have “downplay[ed] the strategic value of the Eastern theatre, exaggerate[d] Western contributions, and reconstruct[ed] historical evaluation standards based on present-day political needs.”[34] Liu and other PRC scholars called for a “truthful, fair and pluralistic” shared memory that acknowledges the PRC, India, Russia, and Southeast Asian nations as important contributors to the war effort.[35] Russia has likewise consistently portrayed itself as the main contributor to the Allied victory in World War II, albeit primarily in the European theater.[36]

The PRC is hosting leaders of 26 countries for its Victory over Japan (V-J) Day military parade on September 3 and has emphasized both Putin and Kim as its most important guests.[37] Xi and Putin met in Beijing on September 2 and commemorated China and the Soviet Union’s “solidarity and cooperation” during World War II and their emergence as founders and defenders of the postwar order, especially as permanent members of the UN Security Council. They had made similar comments when Xi attended Russia’s Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9.[38] PRC assistant foreign minister Hong Lei said on August 28 that China and the Soviet Union were the “backbone of the fight against militarism and fascism” in World War II and fought side by side to make “a decisive contribution” to victory in the war.[39] PRC Executive Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu likewise commended China and Russia’s “tremendous sacrifices” and “historic contributions” to the postwar international order but did not reference US or European contributions, even though he discussed the US-PRC and EU-PRC relationships in the same statement.[40] Hong Lei similarly said that the people of China and North Korea “supported each other and jointly resisted Japanese aggression, making important contributions to the victory,” when asked about Kim’s attendance at the parade.[41]

The PRC and Russian regimes both derive legitimacy from their narratives of victory in World War II and have each invoked that legacy to justify present-day foreign policies. Beijing has frequently used the legacy of World War II to criticize Japan’s modern-day military development, threatening Japan to abandon “militarism” and acknowledge its imperialist history.[42] Japan is a US ally and possible partner in defending Taiwan from a PRC invasion, which is likely why the PRC has intensified anti-Japan rhetoric. The PRC also derives its claim to Taiwan in large part from the terms of Japanese surrender, in which Japan agreed to return to the Republic of China (ROC) all Chinese territories that it had seized, including Taiwan.[43] The PRC claims to be the sole successor regime to the ROC since the CCP overthrew the ROC in 1949, even though the remnant of the ROC still governs Taiwan today. Russia has similarly invoked World War II in its ongoing invasion of Ukraine by falsely claiming that Ukraine is under a “neo-Nazi” regime and frequently attempts to weaponize the mythos of World War II to further its informational and reflexive control agenda.[44] North Korea has echoed this Russian rhetoric in justifying its military support for Russia over the past year.[45]

The PRC used the absence of Western leaders at the SCO summit and V-J Day parade to portray Western powers as increasingly irrelevant to the post-World War II world order and present its own vision for reforming global governance. No Western countries are members of the SCO and most Western leaders chose to skip Beijing’s V-J Day parade partly due to Putin’s presence.[46] Xi announced a new “Global Governance Initiative” (GGI) at the SCO summit on September 1 to promote “a more just and equitable global governance system,” one that would better align with the PRC’s interests. He laid out five principles of the GGI as “sovereign equality”, including giving a greater voice to developing countries; equally applied international rule of law; multilateralism; a “people-centered approach,” and a focus on “taking real actions.”[47] Xi cited “the Cold War mentality, hegemonism, and protectionism” as enduring problems that justify the GGI, referencing common PRC criticisms of the United States. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a concept paper for the GGI that identified three main problems with the existing global governance mechanisms: the Global South is “severely unrepresented,” UN authority is being eroded as countries impose unilateral sanctions and resist UN resolutions, and global governance organizations are not effective enough at addressing global issues, such as sustainable development and climate change.[48] Several PRC- and Russian-aligned world leaders immediately endorsed the GGI, including Putin, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.[49] PRC officials continued to stress the centrality of the United Nations, however, such as during PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi’s meeting with UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres on the sidelines of the SCO summit.[50]

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s attendance at the PRC’s V-J Day military parade signals greatly improved PRC-North Korea relations and an attempt by Russia and the PRC to legitimize North Korea’s entry into the international community. Kim arrived in Beijing by train on September 2, marking his first trip to the PRC since 2019 and his first multilateral event since he assumed leadership of North Korea.[51] PRC officials made special announcements about Kim’s visit, as they did for Vladimir Putin’s, giving those two leaders special distinction above all other world leaders attending the parade.[52] The PRC-North Korean relationship appeared to deteriorate significantly in 2024 despite the year being designated a PRC-North Korean “Year of Friendship,” with the two countries holding only one significant diplomatic exchange in April to commemorate the 75th anniversary of their diplomatic relations.[53] PRC Ambassador to North Korea Wang Yajun appeared for the first time that year to skip North Korea’s July 27 “Victory Day” festivities that commemorate the end of the Korean War, a war that North Korea survived because of PRC intervention. PRC-North Korean relations may have soured over North Korea’s missile tests and increased belligerence toward South Korea in 2024; the PRC’s opposition to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program; North Korea’s mutual defense agreement with Russia, which likely reduced Beijing’s leverage over Pyongyang; and North Korea’s military intervention in Russia’s war in Ukraine, which risked damaging the PRC’s reputation by association. Ambassador Wang Yajun attended North Korea’s Victory Day celebrations in July 2025, however, and Kim’s visit to Beijing shows that the relationship has recovered.[54]

The PRC and Russia appear to be laying the groundwork to facilitate North Korea’s participation in their vision of a multilateral order. PRC officials emphasized North Korea’s contributions in the war against Japan, thus including North Korea in their historic narrative alignment efforts with Russia. Beijing’s and Moscow’s calls at the SCO summit to collectively resist “bullying” by Western powers and build economic resilience against sanctions would clearly appeal to North Korea, one of the world’s most heavily sanctioned and economically isolated countries. Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang may also feel that North Korea’s image is less politically toxic now that North Korea has declared victory in combat operations in Russia’s Kursk Oblast and committed additional troops to rebuilding Kursk, rather than further combat.[55] Kim’s public participation in a multilateralevent alongside many world leaders, particularly from the Global South, may be an opportunity to legitimize North Korea’s presence on the international stage.