Africa File, February 20, 2025: M23 Advance Continues Unchallenged; SAF Grows Partnerships with Iran and Russia; RSF Creates Parallel Government in Sudan

Africa File, February 20, 2025: M23 Advance Continues Unchallenged; SAF Grows Partnerships with Iran and Russia; RSF Creates Parallel Government in Sudan

Authors: Yale Ford, Kathryn Tyson, and Liam Karr

Contributors: Nick Markiewicz, and John Reece

Data Cutoff: February 20, 2025, at 10 a.m.

Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.

Read CTP’s new daily briefing series, the Congo War Security Review, here.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

• Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwandan-backed M23 captured the South Kivu provincial capital, Bukavu, and continued to advance on several axes in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). M23’s advances have set conditions for the group to expand its campaign into the interior of the DRC by strengthening its supply lines with Rwanda and securing access to roads that connect to adjacent regions of the DRC. M23’s control of Bukavu and Lake Kivu also gives M23 and Rwanda significant economic benefits. M23 will likely continue to advance in the eastern DRC due to FARDC’s ineffectiveness as the Congolese government seeks more effective external support. The West is increasing pressure on Rwanda to withdraw from the DRC and cut its support for M23, which would decrease M23’s military effectiveness, however. Various international and domestic peace talks have stalled, and CTP continues to assess that the Congolese government will be unwilling to accede to M23’s and Rwanda’s maximalist demands. M23’s offensive has significantly restricted humanitarian operations and caused widespread population displacement.
• Sudan—International. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) agreed to several deals, including a Russian naval base, during separate diplomatic meetings with Iran and Russia in mid-February. A Russian naval base in Sudan would support Russia’s strategic objective of threatening NATO’s southern flank from Africa and the Mediterranean Sea while decreasing Russian reliance on bases in Syria after the collapse of the Bashar al Assad regime in December 2024. Iran also seeks to grow bilateral ties with the SAF to secure an Iranian Red Sea naval base. An Iranian naval base at Port Sudan would support Iran’s and its Axis of Resistance’s power projection and attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Russia could allow Iran to operate from Russia’s naval base in Port Sudan if Russia and Sudan follow through on the naval port deal.
• Sudan—Domestic. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and other RSF-aligned political and military factions will create a new government in Sudan on February 21 as the RSF seeks to portray itself as the legitimate governing power in Sudan. The RSF proposal to form a parallel government comes after the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) outlined plans for a new SAF-led government on February 8. The RSF has committed more mass atrocities against civilians and refugees in several areas in Sudan as it faces military setbacks in Khartoum. The RSF’s abuses across Sudan continue a pattern of indiscriminate violence against civilians and genocide.

Assessments:

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Rwandan-backed M23 captured the South Kivu provincial capital, Bukavu, and continued to advance on several axes in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). M23 took several towns with minimal resistance as it advanced 18 miles along the RN2 highway from the Congolese army’s (FARDC’s) stronghold at the Kavumu airport to Bukavu on February 14.[1] FARDC troops, allied militia fighters, and Burundian soldiers fled from Bukavu on February 13 due to the lack of air support from Kavumu airport and to avoid casualties.[2] M23 took control of all key points in Bukavu by February 16.[3]

Figure 1. M23 Advances in Eastern DRC

 

Source: Liam Karr; Nick Markiewicz and Yale Ford.

M23 has continued to advance in South Kivu on two separate axes after it seized Bukavu. The rebel group advanced southward from Bukavu along the RN5 highway and is about 22 miles from Uvira after it captured several towns near the tri-border area of southwestern Rwanda, northwestern Burundi, and eastern DRC on February 18.[4] Uvira is the second-most-populated city in South Kivu and a transportation hub with access to Lake Tanganyika and Burundi’s economic capital, Bujumbura, roughly 16 miles to the east.[5] French and local media reported that FARDC soldiers initially fled to Uvira on February 13 and then retreated further south from Uvira on February 19.[6]

Figure 2. M23 Advances Southward in South Kivu Province

 

Source: Liam Karr; Nick Markiewicz and Yale Ford.

M23 forces advanced southwest on the RN2 from Bukavu toward Kamituga, a gold mining hub and a gateway town to the south-central regions of the DRC.[7] M23 captured Walungu, a village about 20 miles south of Bukavu and 80 miles from Kamituga, on February 17.[8] A Congolese social media account circulated a video of M23 “general” Bernard Byamungu denouncing the DRC government during a speech in Walungu.[9]

Figure 3. M23 Advances Northward Toward Lubero

 

Source: Liam Karr; Nick Markiewicz and Yale Ford.

M23 simultaneously restarted an offensive 265 miles north of Bukavu in North Kivu province along the RN2 toward the district capital of Lubero, which is the last FARDC stronghold before the commercial hub Butembo. M23 captured Mambasa, which is where the FARDC halted M23’s previous advance in late December, and advanced another nine miles to Kitsombiro village on February 18 and 19.[10] M23 has since attempted to flank Congolese defensive positions north of Kitsombiro, with Congolese media reporting that some FARDC elements have already fled toward Lubero town.[11]

M23’s advances have set conditions for the group to expand its campaign into the interior of the DRC by strengthening its supply lines with Rwanda and securing access to roads that connect to adjacent regions of the DRC. M23 captured Masisi town on January 4 and several other key crossroads towns before it took control of the North Kivu provincial capital of Goma in late January.[12] M23’s control of the DRC-Rwanda border will boost M23’s and Rwanda’s ability to resupply and reinforce forces from Rwanda. The UN and United States have accused Rwanda of deploying an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 troops to support M23 and providing the group with training and military equipment.[13] Bukavu is situated along major highways that run hundreds of miles northwest to Kisangani and south and southwest to the mineral-rich areas of Lubumbashi and Kasai. Lubumbashi and Kinsangani are the second and fourth most populous cities in the DRC, respectively.[14]

M23’s control of Bukavu and Lake Kivu also gives M23 and Rwanda significant economic benefits. The rebel group will benefit from controlling the local economic activity between Goma and Bukavu, the two main logistic and commercial hubs along the DRC-Rwanda border and Lake Kivu.[15] Both cities are major mineral processing and transit points for gold and raw tin, tantalum, and tungsten exports from nearby areas.[16] M23 control of the Bukavu area will allow M23 to tax mining activity and exports as the group has in North Kivu. The UN reported in December 2024 that M23 generated nearly $800 million from these taxes between April and December 2024.[17]

M23’s advances give the group control over the water resources of the Lake Kivu and Rusizi River Basin. M23 controls the Congolese ports on Lake Kivu, which will provide opportunities for M23 to tax the local fishing economy and control the movement of goods and people on Lake Kivu.[18] Rwanda already extracts methane from Lake Kivu, which generates nearly a third of Rwanda’s domestic electricity production, and carries out oil and gas exploration operations near Lake Kivu.[19] Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda share several hydroelectric dams on the Rusizi River that are located along M23-controlled territory.[20] The Rusizi River flows south from Lake Kivu at Bukavu to Lake Tanganyika near Uvira.

M23 will likely continue to advance in the eastern DRC due to FARDC’s ineffectiveness as the Congolese government seeks more effective external support. FARDC has faced issues of widespread corruption, divided loyalties, informal chains of command, and a lack of military equipment that has limited its effectiveness since its formation in 2003.[21] FARDC units around Lake Kivu have been combat ineffective against M23’s advances since January and have abandoned their positions repeatedly without a fight.[22] These failures undermined FARDC’s alliance with local militia fighters that are trying to stop M23. Security sources in South Kivu reported that FARDC soldiers clashed with pro-government militias along the RN5 after FARDC tried to withdraw from Bukavu without a fight.[23] Reuters quoted an FARDC general who criticized Wazalendo fighters and questioned DRC President Félix Tshisekedi’s decision to recruit and arm the “poorly trained” fighters.[24]

The Congolese government has sought assistance from Chad as Burundi and the South African Development Community (SADC) have decreased their military support for the Congolese government. An unspecified number of Burundian soldiers withdrew from the eastern DRC across the DRC-Burundi border after Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye said that Rwandan officials assured him that Rwanda would not attack Burundi.[25] Burundian troops suffered heavy losses against M23 forces in Masisi district in North Kivu and Minova town north of Bukavu in 2025.[26] Burundian troops have been present in the eastern DRC since late 2022 to contain Rwanda’s growing influence and recently numbered seven battalions and more than 10,000 troops.[27] The SADC has confined its forces to their bases and has not sent reinforcements since SADC troops suffered casualties in the fighting around Goma late January, and several SADC troop-contributing countries have called to withdraw the SADC force altogether.[28]

Chadian and South African troops may reinforce Congolese positions outside of North and South Kivu to prevent M23 from advancing across the DRC. French media reported that Tshisekedi requested troops and military equipment from Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby to counter M23.[29] South Africa deployed 700 additional troops to Lubumbashi, which is over 600 miles south of Bukavu near the Zambian border.[30]

The West is increasing pressure on Rwanda to withdraw its forces from the DRC and cut its support for M23, which would decrease M23’s military effectiveness, however. The United States sanctioned retired Rwandan General James Kabarebe and M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka Kingston on February 20.[31] Kabarebe played a key role in previous Rwandan military support for Congolese insurgents during the First and Second Congo War and is again playing a “central” role in Rwandan support for M23. The United States said that Kabarebe is a liaison to M23, orchestrates Rwandan military support for the group, and manages M23 mineral revenue from his official position as Rwanda’s Minister of State for Regional Integration.[32] The United States also sanctioned two businesses affiliated with Kanyuka.[33]

The US sanctions come amid growing pressure on Rwanda from Europe. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States pushed for a strong UN Security Council resolution condemning M23 and Rwanda on February 19. The draft resolution reportedly condemns M23 and demands that the group halt its advance, calls upon Rwanda to cease support for M23 and withdraw from the DRC, and warns of future targeted sanctions against M23 leadership and M23 “external supporters.”[34] The United Kingdom and France directly called on Rwanda to withdraw from M23-held areas and cease its support for the group after M23 took Bukavu.[35] The EU Parliament passed a resolution on February 13 demanding that the EU halt direct humanitarian and military aid to Rwanda and suspend the EU’s agreement on mineral supply chains with Rwanda.[36]

The loss of Rwandan support would severely undermine M23’s military capability and capacity. The UN reports that advanced Rwandan military equipment and the thousands of Rwandan troops in the eastern DRC are key to M23’s “superior combat strength.”[37] Rwanda cut its support for M23 and let the group collapse under pressure from UN and FARDC forces in 2012 and 2013 after the international community suspended $240 million in aid to Rwanda as part of widespread sanctions.[38] At least a third of Rwanda’s budget comes from foreign aid, and World Bank figures from 2021 show that the $1.25 billion that Rwanda received in official development assistance was equal to 74 percent of central government spending that year.[39] Rwandan President Paul Kagame warned on February 12, 2025, that Rwanda would not be “intimidated” by sanctions.[40]

Various international and domestic peace talks have stalled, and CTP continues to assess that the Congolese government will be unwilling to accede to M23’s and Rwanda’s maximalist demands. Member countries from the East African Community (EAC) and SADC have yet to implement several recommendations from the joint bloc’s summit in mid-February. The DRC and Rwanda signed a communiqué that called for the merging of the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes and directed EAC and SADC defense ministers to develop a plan to implement a ceasefire agreement by February 13.[41] An African Union (AU) summit delayed the EAC-SADC defense ministers meeting, however, and the AU has yet to appoint “additional facilitators” to help consolidate the various peace initiatives.[42] The AU Peace and Security Council met to discuss the security situation in the eastern DRC on February 14 but only reaffirmed the EAC-SADC summit’s recommendations.[43]

M23 and its Rwandan backers likely aim to secure an agreement that legitimizes M23’s control of Goma, Bukavu, and parts of the eastern DRC. M23 has demanded that the DRC implement the 2013 Nairobi peace deal, which stipulated that M23 would demilitarize and become a political party and that the Congolese government would facilitate the return of refugees, release prisoners, reintegrate former rebels, and launch a national reconciliation and justice initiative as well as social security and economic reforms.[44] M23 almost certainly aims to consolidate control over the areas that it has captured and possibly expand its influence in the DRC as a legitimate political party as part of any such agreement. Corneille Nangaa, the head of M23’s political branch Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), said that the AFC-M23 is “here to stay” and “open to dialogue” with the DRC after the rebel coalition captured Goma.[45] The group’s systematic effort to set up “state-like” administrative systems in the parts of eastern DRC that it controls indicates that M23 intends to govern these areas in the long term.[46]

Tshisekedi agreed to negotiate with M23 after the EAC-SADC summit in mid-February but is unlikely to follow through on a deal that meets M23’s and Rwanda’s demands. The DRC and Rwanda explicitly agreed during the EAC-SADC summit to resume bilateral peace talks and direct negotiations “with all state and nonstate parties (military and non-military) including the M23.”[47] Tshisekedi is unlikely to follow through on a deal that legitimizes M23’s control of eastern DRC, however, because such an agreement would severely undermine his legitimacy and power base in Kinshasa. Congolese government officials have sought to mobilize the population against Rwanda in sometimes violent anti-Rwandan and anti-Western protests since January 2025, and Tshisekedi’s political party released a statement on February 11 that rejected the call for direct dialogue with M23 and called M23 a “terrorist group in service to Rwanda.”[48]

M23’s offensive has significantly restricted humanitarian operations and caused widespread population displacement. M23’s seizure of Goma in late January severely limited access to electricity and water and halted humanitarian operations in the broader Lake Kivu region due to Goma’s importance as a logistic hub.[49] M23 has refused to open the Goma airport and claimed that the airport remains inoperable due to the fighting around Goma.[50] The airport in Goma is key for medical evacuations and the delivery of medical supplies and humanitarian personnel.[51]

The capture of Bukavu has hampered the response capacity of humanitarian organizations.[52] The UN said that M23’s presence along Lake Kivu and its control of the Goma-Bukavu corridor has “cut off” nearly all humanitarian aid routes.[53] M23’s capture of the second major airport in the Lake Kivu region, the Kavumu airport north of Bukavu, has further restricted regional humanitarian flights.[54]

M23’s advance in the Kivu provinces has led to a mass influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and an increase in human rights abuses. M23 dismantled refugee camps and has forced at least 70,000 IDPs around Goma to disperse from the city and return to their villages in Masisi, Nyiragongo, and Rutshuru territories in North Kivu.[55] The UN said that recent clashes in South Kivu have displaced more than 150,000 civilians.[56] The crisis has caused 10,000 to 35,000 civilians to flee to the DRC-Burundi border since M23 captured Bukavu.[57] The UN has accused M23 of committing human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings and sexual violence.[58]

Read CTP’s new weekday briefing series, the Congo War Security Review, for daily updates on and maps of the fighting in the eastern DRC between M23 and its Rwandan backers and pro-Congolese government forces: https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review.

Sudan—International.

Russia and the internationally recognized SAF government reaffirmed their commitment to a naval port deal as Russia seeks to boost its power projection in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef said on February 12 that the Sudanese and Russian governments were in “complete agreement” to establish the port at the end of Youssef’s three-day visit to Moscow.[59] Youssef added that both sides must still ratify the deal, however, and did not publicly state a timeline for the ratification.[60] SAF officials said in May 2024 that Sudan and Russia would soon finalize the deal, but negotiations stalled until Youssef’s visit.[61] Youssef met with other Russian officials during his trip, including Russian Minister of Natural Resources Alexander Kozlov and Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs Leonid Slutsky.

The Kremlin has sought for years to implement a naval agreement that it signed in 2017 with former Sudanese dictator Omar al Bashir. The original 2017 agreement allowed Russia to establish a base with four ships and up to 300 personnel.[62] Sudan’s former transitional government and the Russian government signed a draft agreement in 2020 based on the 2017 deal to establish a navy base in Sudan for at least 25 years, but the Sudanese government did not implement the agreement due to disagreements over its terms.[63] The Kremlin has provided “unrestricted military aid” to Sudan since April 2024 in exchange for the implementation of the 2017 deal.[64]

A Russian naval base in Sudan would support Russia’s strategic objective of threatening NATO’s southern flank from Africa and the Mediterranean Sea while decreasing Russian reliance on its bases in Syria after the collapse of the Bashar al Assad regime in December 2024. CTP and the Institute for the Study of War assessed on February 17 that Russia appears to be nearing a deal with the Syrian interim government to maintain a reduced military presence at the Port of Tartus and other locations in Syria.[65] Russia has used its base in Tartus as a logistics hub for military deployments to Africa and to project power into the Mediterranean.[66] Russian media reported before the fall of the Assad regime that a base in Sudan would allow the Kremlin to transform Tartus into a multipurpose naval base.[67] Russia had previously outlined upgrading its facilities at Tartus as a key element of its effort to bolster its Mediterranean power projection.[68]

Sudan signed several political and economic deals with Iran in mid-February as Iran seeks to grow bilateral ties with the SAF and secure an Iranian Red Sea naval base. The Sudanese and Iranian governments signed two memoranda of understanding in Tehran on February 17.[69] The memoranda included visa exceptions for diplomatic and political passport holders and the establishment of a joint political committee. Sudanese and Iranian officials also held meetings in Port Sudan on February 13 and agreed to increase economic cooperation.[70] Iran and Sudan reestablished diplomatic ties in October 2023, and Iran has sent military support to the SAF since December 2023 to try and secure an Iranian naval base in the Red Sea.[71]

An Iranian naval base at Port Sudan would support Iran’s and its Axis of Resistance’s power projection and attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. An Iranian Red Sea naval base would improve Iran’s surveillance capabilities that the Yemeni-based Houthis have used to attack Israel, US ships, and commercial shipping in the Red Sea.[72] Iran has used its vessels in the Red Sea, including Iranian spy ships, to provide radar and electronic intelligence to the Houthis in 2024.[73] The Iranian government requested Sudanese permission to establish a permanent naval base on the Red Sea coast in March 2024, but the SAF rejected the request.[74] An SAF official said that Iran wanted the base to gather intelligence on maritime traffic around the Suez Canal and Israel and to station warships at the base.[75]

Figure 4. Iran and Russia Seek Red Sea Naval Bases in Sudan

 

Source: Liam Karr.

Russia could allow Iran to operate from Russia’s naval base in Port Sudan if Russia and Sudan follow through on the naval port deal. Iran and Russia demonstrated a willingness in Syria to work together to jointly base their forces and improve their interoperability to achieve shared objectives during the Syrian Civil War.[76] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported in February 2024 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and an Iranian proxy trained Russian drone operators at the Shayrat air base in Syria, for example.[77]

A Russian naval base in Sudan would provide another possible platform for military cooperation between Russia and Iran. Both countries are mutually interested in challenging the US-led world order. Russia has also provided diplomatic cover for Iran and its proxies in the Middle East and even considered transferring military equipment to the Houthis.[78]

Sudan—Domestic.

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and other RSF-aligned political and military factions will create a new government in Sudan on February 21 as the RSF seeks to portray itself as the legitimate governing power in Sudan.[79] The RSF has assembled allied politicians and armed group leaders in Nairobi, Kenya, to sign a political charter that would create a “Government of Peace and Unity” to govern the territories that the RSF controls.[80]

Figure 5. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War

 

Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas van Linge; UNICEF; UNDP.

The RSF is creating a parallel government to legitimize itself as a governing power. The new government aims to “restore the legitimate government that was overthrown by remnants and militias of the Islamic movement.”[81] The RSF frequently refers to the SAF as “Islamists” affiliated with the former regime of Sudanese dictator Omar al Bashir. The RSF has long sought to play a broader role in the Sudanese government and has advanced this effort during the current civil war.[82] The RSF established local governments and civil administrations in Darfur and southwestern Sudan since the war began to institutionalize and legitimize its control.[83] The officials behind the charter said that the new government would “reinstate the democratic path through a national consensus that includes all political, civil, and social forces.”[84] The RSF does not have nationwide support, however, given that the factions backing the RSF government are mostly from the group’s traditional support base in western Sudan’s Darfur region.

The RSF also seeks to gain international support and legitimacy through the parallel government. The planned signing of the charter in Nairobi implicitly signals Kenya’s support for the plan. A key RSF-aligned official said on February 16 that the new parallel government would seek to acquire weapons and warplanes under a new “defense ministry.”[85] The purchase of weapons from foreign countries through a front government could help to circumvent sanctions on the RSF and bolster international ties. The RSF has long attempted to gain regional and international clout. RSF leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, released a competing address to the UN in 2024 after Burhan’s September speech and said that the RSF is “fully prepared” for a ceasefire.[86] Hemedti conducted a regional diplomatic tour and met with leaders in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda in January 2024.[87]

The RSF proposal to form a parallel government comes after the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) outlined plans for a new SAF-led government on February 8.[88] SAF leaders are seeking to legitimize the SAF as the sole governing power in Sudan as the SAF prepares to capture the Sudanese capital, Khartoum.[89] The SAF has made rapid breakthroughs in Khartoum since January 2025.[90] The SAF regained control of the northern Khartoum district, also known as Bahri, on February 17 and has surrounded RSF forces on at least three axes in central Khartoum.[91] Control of Khartoum would be militarily and symbolically significant for the SAF as the SAF wants to solidify its legitimacy and consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River. The RSF in January 2025 dismissed claims that the SAF had advanced in Khartoum as “propaganda” and said on February 7 that Khartoum remains under RSF control.[92]

Figure 6. Area of SAF and RSF Operations in Khartoum

 

Source: Kathryn Tyson and John Reece; Thomas van Linge.

The RSF has committed more mass atrocities against civilians and refugees in several areas in Sudan as it faces setbacks in Khartoum. The RSF killed at least 200 unarmed civilians in White Nile state in villages approximately 48 miles (77 kilometers) south of Khartoum between February 15 and 18.[93] The RSF attacks in White Nile are the deadliest since the RSF killed over 120 civilians in Gezira state, central Sudan, in October 2024.[94] The RSF has repeatedly shelled the Zamzam refugee camp in al Fasher, Darfur, and disrupted the delivery of humanitarian aid over the past week.[95] International humanitarian organizations have expressed concern over the possibility of mass violence against internally displaced persons at Zamzam refugee camp as the RSF has blocked an exit route from the camp.[96] A UN spokesperson said that the reports of mass killings in White Nile state are “horrifying” and warned that refugees in the Zamzam camp faced “grave threats.”[97]

The RSF’s abuses across Sudan continue a pattern of indiscriminate violence against civilians and genocide. The US government said in January 2025 that the RSF had committed genocide in Sudan and sanctioned the RSF leader.[98] The announcement came about two decades after the United States said that the Janjaweed, which later morphed into the RSF, had committed genocide in Darfur in 2004.[99] A UN report from January 2025 called for further investigation into RSF war crimes.[100] The UN also urged the international community to broaden the existing arms embargo on Sudan and extend the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction to cover all of Sudan, not just Darfur. [101]

[1] https://actualite dot cd/2025/02/12/rdc-presence-de-combattants-de-lafcm23-kalehe-centre-et-ihusi-le-gouvernement-denonce; https://actualite dot cd/2025/02/14/rdc-kabamba-et-katana-des-entites-du-territoire-de-kabare-conquises-par-les-rebelles-de; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1658499/politique/guerre-dans-lest-de-la-rdc-le-m23-sempare-de-laeroport-de-kavumu-et-se-rapproche-de-bukavu; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-rebel-leader-nangaa-says-rebels-have-entered-bukavu-city-2025-02-14; https://x.com/afrikarabia/status/1890502992962453822

[2] https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2025/02/14/rdc-apres-goma-bukavu-tombe-dans-l-escarcelle-des-rebelles-du-m23_6547076_3210.html; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/02/14/republique-democratique-du-congo-l-aeroport-de-bukavu-aux-mains-du-m23-allie-a-des-troupes-rwandaises_6546691_3212.html

[3] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250216-rdc-le-m23-et-les-soldats-rwandais-d%C3%A9sormais-%C3%A0-bukavu; https://www.voanews.com/a/m23-rebels-tighten-their-grip-on-second-major-city-in-eastern-drc/7978719.html

[4] https://x.com/afrikarabia/status/1891797687218885061; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1659807/politique/est-de-la-rdc-a-bukavu-sous-le-controle-du-m23-cest-un-nouveau-monde/?utm_term=link&utm_source=Twitter&utm_campaign=Twitter&utm_medium=Social%20media; https://actualite dot cd/2025/02/18/rdc-les-rebelles-du-m23-semparent-de-kamanyola; https://x.com/afrikarabia/status/1891995669604294681; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250219-est-de-la-rdc-les-combattants-de-l-afc-m23-continuent-d-avancer-dans-le-sud-kivu-sc%C3%A8nes-de-pillages-%C3%A0-uvira?utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=x&utm_source=shorty&utm_slink=rfi.my%2FBQSd; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/1892268703145722267

[5] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250219-est-de-la-rdc-les-combattants-de-l-afc-m23-continuent-d-avancer-dans-le-sud-kivu-sc%C3%A8nes-de-pillages-%C3%A0-uvira?utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=x&utm_source=shorty&utm_slink=rfi.my%2FBQSd; https://www.mindat.org/feature-205413.html; https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/south_kivu_factsheet._eng.pdf; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rebel-advance-causes-panic-congolese-border-town-uvira-2025-02-19

[6] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/podcasts/revue-de-presse-afrique/20250217-%C3%A0-la-une-apr%C3%A8s-goma-le-m23-s-empare-de-bukavu; https://actualite dot cd/2025/02/19/affrontements-fardc-wazalendo-uvira-une-dizaine-de-morts-signales-la-ville-plongee-dans;

https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/1892178593003806974

[7] https://apnews.com/article/mpox-new-strain-outbreak-kamituga-eastern-congo-f9affb7a7d73c8c30daf296c51c920c7

[8] https://x.com/RDC_Times/status/1891542245490163804; https://x.com/officialrnintel/status/1891893183589613659; https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/1892210549443682677

[9] https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/1892210549443682677

[10] https://actualite dot cd/index.php/2024/12/28/nord-kivu-les-fardc-ont-repris-linitiative-et-stoppe-la-progression-du-m23rdf-vers-le; https://actualite dot cd/index.php/2024/12/22/rdc-m23-larmee-congolaise-recupere-mambasa-et-progresse-alimbongo; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/12/24/actualite/securite/lubero-les-fardc-et-le-m23-saffrontent-pour-le-controle-de-mambasa; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2024/12/23/actualite/securite/les-fardc-et-le-m23-saffrontent-autour-de-mambasa-lubero; https://actualite dot cd/2025/02/18/rdc-lubero-des-rebelles-du-m23-signales-ndoluma-les-combats-en-cours-en-direction-de

https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/02/18/actualite/securite/reprise-des-combats-entre-fardc-et-m23-apres-plusieurs-jours-daccalmie; https://x.com/afcongo/status/1892177732894613758; https://actualite dot cd/2025/02/19/rdc-situee-au-moins-30-km-de-lubero-centre-la-localite-de-kitsombiro-passe-sous-controle

[11] https://actualite dot cd/2025/02/18/rdc-lubero-des-rebelles-du-m23-signales-ndoluma-les-combats-en-cours-en-direction-de; https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/1892206786691608892; https://actualite.cd/2025/02/20/rdc-lubero-apres-une-accalmie-volatile-ce-jeudi-les-rebelles-du-m23-tentent-de-deborder; https://x.com/betordc/status/1892517183944614216

[12] https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/01/04/en-republique-democratique-du-congo-les-rebelles-du-m23-s-emparent-d-une-nouvelle-ville-cle-dans-l-est_6481748_3212.html; https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-conflict-intensification-and-m23-advances-north-south-kivu-dg-echo-un-ocha-echo-daily-flash-22-january-2025; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/26/congo-rwanda-m23-rebels-peacekeepers/1fed6c20-dbd0-11ef-8889-d5c3924edafd_story.html

[13] https://docs.un.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=s%2F2022%2F967&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False

[14] https://worldpopulationreview.com/cities/dr-congo

[15] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/16/world/africa/rebels-congo-bukavu.html

[16] https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19197.8?seq=4; https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-true-cost-of-mineral-smuggling-in-the-drc; https://thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/GoldenLaundromat_Sentry_Oct2018-final.pdf

[17] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

[18] https://www.dw.com/en/drc-traffic-resumes-on-lake-kivu/video-71675555;

[19] https://www.rmb dot gov.rw/oilandgas; https://www.rmb dot gov.rw/index.php?eID=dumpFile&t=f&f=115823&token=ba42e8820cb147cbf29dc4ef8de830efd5c0b770; https://time.com/4338310/rwanda-kivuwatt-methane-lake-kivu

[20] https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/environmental-science/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2022.892591/full; https://www.voanews.com/a/plastic-waste-chokes-congo-dam-causing-widespread-power-cuts/7867505.html

[21] https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1nwbr0n

[22] https://x.com/albcontact/status/1890452847914799613; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-army-retreat-bukavu-leads-clashes-with-allied-militias-2025-02-18

[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-army-retreat-bukavu-leads-clashes-with-allied-militias-2025-02-18; https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-democratic-republic-congo-sudan-occupied-palestinian-territory; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-147492_guerre_a_l_est_affrontements_violents_a_uvira_entre_les_fardc_et_les_wazalendo.html

[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-army-retreat-bukavu-leads-clashes-with-allied-militias-2025-02-18/

[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burundis-army-is-withdrawing-dr-congo-four-sources-say-2025-02-18; https://afrikarabia dot com/wordpress/le-m23-entre-a-bukavu-tshisekedi-plus-fragilise-que-jamais

[26] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1654280/politique/est-de-la-rdc-le-burundi-craint-une-guerre-regionale; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/m23-rebels-face-burundian-forces-eastern-congo-heightening-war-fears-2025-01-31; https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/02/06/ndayishimiye-prepares-for-potential-m23-advance-in-south-kivu,110372396-gra

[27] https://insecurityinsight.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/The-Deployment-of-East-African-Community-Forces-in-Eastern-DR-Congo-February-2023.pdf; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congos-army-burundian-allies-slow-m23-rebels-southern-march-2025-01-31; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1654280/politique/est-de-la-rdc-le-burundi-craint-une-guerre-regionale

[28] https://www.congo-press dot om/provinces/est-de-la-rdc-felix-tshisekedi-plaide-pour-le-renforcement-de-la-mission-militaire-de-la-sadc-et-le-retrait-des-troupes-rwandaises; https://lepotentiel dot cd/2025/01/31/tensions-securitaires-a-goma-la-sadc-en-quete-de-solutions-avec-la-rdc; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/malawi-orders-troops-prepare-withdrawal-eastern-congo-2025-02-05; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/02/03/l-afrique-du-sud-ne-relachera-pas-son-soutien-a-la-rdc-annonce-cyril-ramaphosa_6529563_3212.html; https://x.com/newslivesa/status/1886371053879869582

[29] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1660088/politique/guerre-dans-lest-de-la-rdc-le-tchad-de-mahamat-idriss-deby-itno-aidera-t-il-felix-tshisekedi/; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250219-rdc-dans-un-message-f%C3%A9lix-tshisekedi-demande-une-aide-militaire-%C3%A0-ndjamena

[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africas-military-reinforces-beleaguered-congo-mission-2025-02-10

[31] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0022

[32] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0022

[33] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0022

[34] https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/02/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-briefing-4.php

[35] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/podcasts/revue-de-presse-afrique/20250218-%C3%A0-la-une-la-diplomatie-paralys%C3%A9e-face-%C3%A0-la-guerre-dans-l-est-de-la-rdc; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/02/16/actualite/securite/entree-des-m23-et-rdf-bukavu-le-royaume-uni-appelle-une-cessation

[36] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20250206IPR26752/meps-want-to-suspend-eu-rwanda-deal-on-critical-raw-materials

[37] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

[38] https://files.ebuteli.org/assets/9152943b-ca84-455d-8c00-a0f3e020cb1a; https://www.ft.com/content/8bae4ecd-9fd8-48c6-824c-41b929b640d7

[39] https://www.ft.com/content/8bae4ecd-9fd8-48c6-824c-41b929b640d7; https://files.ebuteli.org/assets/9152943b-ca84-455d-8c00-a0f3e020cb1a

[40] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1657080/politique/paul-kagame-personne-ne-mintimidera-avec-des-menaces-de-sanctions

[41] https://www.eac.int/communique/3302-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-joint-eac-sadc-summit-of-heads-of-state-and-government

[42] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1658852/politique/comment-le-conflit-entre-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda-a-dynamite-le-sommet-de-lua

[43] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1658852/politique/comment-le-conflit-entre-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda-a-dynamite-le-sommet-de-lua

[44] https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2013/12/17/making-sense-drc-declarations-m23

[45] https://x.com/ktpressrwanda/status/1884988117934850286; https://www.voanews.com/a/rwanda-backed-rebels-in-eastern-congo-say-they-plan-to-take-their-fight-to-the-capital/7957962.html

[46] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

[47] https://www.eac.int/communique/3302-communiqu%C3%A9-of-the-joint-eac-sadc-summit-of-heads-of-state-and-government

[48] https://x.com/udps_tshisekedi/status/1889315730555891718/photo/2

[49] https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-intensification-violence-north-kivu-and-south-kivu-provinces-situation-report-2-11-february-2025

[50] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1658852/politique/comment-le-conflit-entre-la-rdc-et-le-rwanda-a-dynamite-le-sommet-de-lua

[51] https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-intensification-violence-north-kivu-and-south-kivu-provinces-situation-report-2-11-february-2025

[52] https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160261

[53] https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160111

[54] https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160261

[55] https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/02/13/dr-congo-m23-drives-displaced-people-goma-camps; https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160136; https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-democratic-republic-congo-occupied-palestinian-territory-ukraine-myanmar; https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-intensification-violence-north-kivu-and-south-kivu-provinces-situation-report-2-11-february-2025; https://apnews.com/article/congo-m23-goma-displaced-people-d21884a2a6f5f6ed2b23b2e7294eea94; https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160261

[56] https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160231

[57] https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160231; https://x.com/michombero/status/1892266747807359344

[58] https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160231; https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160101;

[59] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c30del8dz51o

[60] https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-sudan-agree-red-sea-naval-base-sudanese-foreign-minister-says-2025-02-12/

[61] https://sudantribune.com/article286105; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-26/sudan-s-army-deepens-ties-with-russia-iran-as-civil-war-rages

[62] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/13/russia-plans-naval-base-in-sudan

[63] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/13/sudan-first-russian-naval-base-in-africa-go-ahead; https://apnews.com/article/international-news-sudan-moscow-africa-russia-0e1932a384bba427e13e590a4ac7a1f8

[64] https://sudantribune.com/article285164; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-may-31-2024-russian-red-sea-logistics-center-sudan

[65] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-17-2025-67b3cf9c9dbc6

[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-may-31-2024-russian-red-sea-logistics-center-sudan

[67] https://www.mk dot ru/politics/2020/11/12/poyavlenie-rossiyskoy-voennoy-bazy-v-sudane-obyasnil-ekspert.html; https://tass dot com/defense/1222673

[68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-special-edition-syria%E2%80%99s-potential-impact-russia%E2%80%99s-africa-and-mediterranean

[69] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/213207

[70] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-13/iran-forges-deeper-ties-with-sudan-in-boost-to-wider-influence; https://suna-sd dot net/posts/sudan-affirms-keenness-to-develop-economic-cooperation-relations-with-iran

[71] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/15/sudan-war-weapons-uae-iran/; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/drones-over-sudan-foreign-powers-in-sudans-civil-war; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-4-2024; https://www.reuters.com/world/sudan-says-it-will-resume-diplomatic-relations-with-iran-2023-10-09/

[72] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-draw-is-a-win-the-houthis-after-one-year-of-war/

[73] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/us-conducted-cyberattack-suspected-iranian-spy-ship-rcna138638; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-draw-is-a-win-the-houthis-after-one-year-of-war/

[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-4-2024

[75] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-tried-to-persuade-sudan-to-allow-naval-base-on-its-red-sea-coast-77ca3922?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos3

[76] https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-780016; https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2024

[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2024

[78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-iran-coalition-deepens

[79] https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1891855927814377776

[80] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/18/world/africa/sudan-rsf-government.html

[81] https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1890302765936591240

[82] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan; https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/whats-behind-fighting-sudan

[83] https://www.radiotamazuj dot org/en/news/article/new-government-under-rsf-formed-in-south-darfur; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rsf-establish-civil-administration

[84] https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1890302765936591240

[85] https://sudantribune.com/article297503/

[86] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-rapid-support-forces-fully-ready-ceasefire-political-talks-hemedti-2023-09-21/

[87] https://adf-magazine.com/2024/01/hemedti-makes-diplomatic-tour-of-east-africa-while-rsf-fighters-gain-ground/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-paramilitary-leader-hemedti-meets-civilian-leaders-tour-2024-01-01/

[88] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c9830566073o

[89] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-13-2025-saf-announces-government-plan-and-russian-naval-base-drc-concedes-to-direct-talks-with-m23-turkeys-growing-defense-partnerships-in-africa#Sudan

[90] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-january-30-2025-rwandan-backed-m23-captures-goma-saf-breakthroughs-in-khartoum-is-sahel-linked-to-angola-plot-targeting-biden-visit-is-calls-for-jihad-in-sudan-somalia-agrees-with-e#Sudan

[91] https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1891504259503460826

[92] https://t.me/RSFSudan/7443

[93] https://apnews.com/article/sudan-white-nile-rapid-support-forces-rsf-c3a38f43f9cdeb114d94e230fc43ab65

[94] https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-impact-armed-violence-aj-jazirah-flash-update-no-01-28-october-2024; https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241026-activists-say-50-killed-in-sudan-paramilitary-attack

[95] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/16/rsf-steps-up-attacks-on-sudans-famine-striken-zamzam-refugee-camp; https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/sudan-zamzam-camp-under-shelling-violence-escalates-north-darfur; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-famine-hit-zamzam-camp-comes-under-fire-say-residents-msf-2024-12-03/

[96] https://medicine.yale.edu/lab/khoshnood/news-article/humanitarian-research-lab-special-report-decisive-assault-launched-on-el-fasher-in-sudan/

[97] https://sudantribune.com/article297628/

[98] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/07/world/africa/sudan-rsf-genocide-us-sanctions.html

[99] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/07/world/africa/sudan-rsf-genocide-us-sanctions.html

[100] https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/29?_gl=1*1arptbi*_ga*MTE1OTY1OTA2My4xNzM4ODc1NTg2*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*MTczOTk3ODEzMS4yLjAuMTczOTk3ODEzMS4wLjAuMA..*_ga_S5EKZKSB78*MTczOTk3ODEzMS4yLjAuMTczOTk3ODEzMi41OS4wLjA.