Nils Peterson on the People's Republic of China's theory of hybrid warfare.

Fred Kagan writes about why the positional war in Ukraine is not a stable stalemate and how the current balance could readily be tipped in either direction by decisions made in the West.

ISW and AEI’s Critical Threats Project have launched a high-fidelity interactive map of Israeli ground operations in the Israel-Hamas War.

By Mason Clark and Karolina Hird

The first installment of ISW's series on the structure and capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces.

Nataliya Bugayova, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan explain why Putin invaded Ukraine and how the war must end.
October 1, 2023

Latest from ISW

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 12, 2023

US intelligence reportedly assessed that Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in fall 2023 and through the upcoming winter aim to weaken Western support for Ukraine instead of achieving any immediate operational objectives. The US intelligence community reportedly shared a declassified intelligence assessment with Congress on December 12 wherein US intelligence assessed that Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine aim to weaken Western support for Ukraine but have only resulted in heavy Russian losses and no operationally significant Russian battlefield gains. This assessment of high Russian losses and lack of operationally significant Russian gains is consistent with ISW’s assessment. US National Security Council Spokesperson Andrienne Watson reportedly stated that Russian forces have suffered more than 13,000 casualties and lost 220 combat vehicles along the Avdiivka-Novopavlivka axis (Avdiivka direction through western Donetsk Oblast) since launching offensive operations in October 2023. Watson added that Russia appears to believe that a military “deadlock” through the winter will drain Western support for Ukraine and give Russian forces the advantage despite high Russian losses and persistent Russian shortages of trained personnel, munitions, and equipment. ISW has assessed that Russian forces have been trying to regain the theater-level initiative in Ukraine since at least mid-November 2023 and have now likely committed to offensive operations in multiple sectors of the front during a period of the most challenging weather of the fall-winter season in an effort to seize and retain the initiative.[4]

Iran Update, December 12, 2023

Palestinian militias are attempting to resist Israeli advances north and east of Khan Younis. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed that it detonated multiple claymore-type, anti-personnel mines targeting ten Israeli soldiers east of Khan Younis. The militia also claimed that it inflicted five casualties during a small arms clash with Israeli forces along the Israeli forward line of advance in al Qarara, north of Khan Younis . The al Qassem Brigades separately mortared Israeli soldiers advancing north and east of Khan Younis. The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed that it conducted four mortar and rocket attacks on Israeli forces advancing into Khan Younis. Al Quds Brigades fighters fired tandem-charge rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at an Israeli armored personnel carrier east of Khan Younis. The National Resistance Brigade—the militant wing of Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—used mortars against Israeli forces advancing east of Khan Younis. Residents published footage of audible small arms fire east of Khan Younis on December 12. The BBC reported on December 11 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had captured most of the four main towns east of Khan Younis.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 11, 2023

The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) announced on December 11 that Russia will conduct voting for the 2024 presidential election in occupied Ukraine, likely in an attempt to legitimize the Russian occupation and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rule. The CEC reported that it made the decision to hold the election in occupied territories – all of which except Crimea are under martial law – in consultations with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Federal Security Service (FSB), and occupation authorities. Russian law notably requires the CEC to consult with these agencies when considering holding elections in areas under martial law, including occupied Ukraine. Russia will likely use the March 2024 presidential election to further establish a veneer of legitimacy for its occupation of Ukraine as it has done during the illegal 2022 annexation referenda and the 2023 regional elections. Russian CEC Chairperson Ella Pamfilova stated on December 7 that elections in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts “will differ somewhat” in procedure from elections in Russia and occupied Crimea. The CEC will likely use these differing procedures to falsify votes in Putin’s favor and claim a high voter turnout while falsely portraying occupied Ukraine’s participation in the election as legitimate to the international community.

Iran Update, December 11, 2023

Israeli forces are degrading Hamas’ battalions in Shujaiya and Jabalia. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on December 11 that Hamas’ Jabalia and Shujaiya Battalions are “on the verge of being dismantled.” CTP-ISW defines “degrade” as a temporary effect whereby a unit’s losses seriously impede its ability to continue executing assigned missions while the unit remains able to operate. Israeli forces captured Hamas military infrastructure in Jabalia, including explosives manufacturing facilities, training facilities, and weapons caches. The loss of these facilities will temporarily negatively affect Hamas’ Jabalia al Balad Battalion’s ability to execute its assigned missions, which include using improvised explosive devices and rocket-propelled grenades to resist Israeli advances.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 10, 2023

Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova emphasized that Russia's maximalist objectives in Ukraine have not changed, repeating the Kremlin’s demand for full Ukrainian political capitulation and Kyiv’s acceptance of Russia’s military and territorial demands rather than suggesting any willingness to negotiate seriously. In a written interview with AFP on December 9, Zakharova claimed that a "comprehensive, sustainable, and fair resolution" in Ukraine can only happen if the West stops "pumping up the Armed Forces of Ukraine with weapons" and that Ukraine surrenders Russia’s claimed Ukrainian territory and "withdraws its troops," presumably from Ukrainian territory Russia claims to have annexed. Zakharova emphasized the Kremlin's longstanding claim that Russia invaded Ukraine for "de-militarization," "denazification," and to "ensure the rights of Russian-speaking citizens" in Ukraine. The Kremlin has consistently used the term “denazification” as code for the removal of the elected government of Ukraine and its replacement by some government the Kremlin regards as acceptable—i.e., regime change.

Iran Update, December 10, 2023

Palestinian militias continued to attack Israeli forces on the Israeli forward line of advance in Khan Younis on December 10. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued targeting Palestinian militia sites in Khan Younis, Jabalia, Shujaiya, and Beit Hanoun. Israeli forces attacked underground tunnels in Khan Younis and conducted airstrikes to support ground maneuvers. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed that its fighters detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting Israeli forces northeast of Khan Younis. The militia claimed to kill 13 Israeli soldiers in the EFP attack and two more soldiers with small arms afterward the initial explosion. EFPs are particularly lethal improvised explosive devices designed to penetrate armored vehicles, such as main battle tanks. This attack is consistent with the shift of Hamas and other Palestinian militias using increasingly sophisticated tactics since the humanitarian pause expired on December 1.