Africa File, January 24, 2025: Russia Continues Pivot to Libya and Mali; SAF Advances in Khartoum; M23 Marches on Goma; IS Somalia Down but Not Out; AES Joint Force

Africa File, January 24, 2025: Russia Continues Pivot to Libya and Mali; SAF Advances in Khartoum; M23 Marches on Goma; IS Somalia Down but Not Out; AES Joint Force

Authors: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson

Contributor: Yale Ford

Data Cutoff: January 24, 2025, at 10 a.m.

Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

Russia. Russia has continued to strengthen and expand its military presence in Libya and Mali as it withdraws assets from Syria. The Kremlin’s equipment buildup in Mali is likely unrelated to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and instead part of the Kremlin’s plans to continue to consolidate control of the Russian military presence in Mali under the Ministry of Defense–controlled Africa Corps. The Kremlin’s decision to send armored vehicles to Mali, particularly T72 tanks, is significant in light of Russia’s significant vehicle losses in Ukraine.

Sudan. The SAF continued to advance in northern Khartoum to relieve besieged SAF troops and dislodge the Rapid Support Forces from the capital. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) broke the siege on the SAF Headquarters in Khartoum on January 24 for the first time since the war began in April 2023. The recapture of Khartoum is a strategic objective for the SAF that supports its grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan.

DRC. Rwandan-backed M23 rebels are advancing towards Goma, a provincial capital in eastern DRC, and say that they intend to capture the town, which is a major escalation in the group’s publicly stated aims and would exacerbate the already dire humanitarian situation in eastern DRC. M23’s advances increase the risk of clashes between M23 and allied Rwandan forces and UN and SADC forces that are supporting the FARDC. Such engagements would increase the diplomatic and military costs for M23 and Rwanda to capture Goma. M23 advances into South Kivu province are also setting conditions to significantly expand the conflict in eastern DRC. M23’s advances will strengthen the group’s control over critical mineral resources and supply lines to Rwanda. The timing of the Rwandan-backed M23 offensive indicates an effort to maximize its position in currently paused negotiations after peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda collapsed in December 2024.

Somalia. Somali security forces in Puntland, northern Somalia, have degraded the ISS with a counterinsurgency offensive but have not set conditions to weaken or defeat ISS permanently in the long term. The Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) will be able to reconstitute itself if the Puntland offensive does not significantly degrade the group’s revenue streams and set conditions to maintain pressure on ISS’s porous support zones. ISS has sought to defend its support zones and deter security forces from interfering in its support zones without engaging in decisive battles that would draw additional pressure from security forces. These tactics support ISS’s long-term strategic goal of acting as an administrative node for the IS global network.

Sahel. The Alliance of Sahel States created a joint force of 5,000 troops that will deploy in the coming weeks. Increased ground operations will be necessary to degrade the very large and strong insurgent support zones along the borders of the Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

Assessments:

Russia

Russia has continued to expand its military presence in Libya as it relocates more assets from Syria. A Russian An-124 made two round-trip flights from Syria to the al Khadim airbase near Benghazi, Libya, between December 26 and 28, and an Il-76 made at least nine round-trip flights between Syria and al Khadim between January 1 and 20.[1] The Russian cargo ships Sparta and Sparta II entered the Port of Tartus, Syria, on January 21, after a weeks-long voyage from Russia that began in December.[2] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate reported in early January that Russia intended to use the Sparta II to transport equipment from Syria to Libya.[3]

Figure 1. Africa Corps Network in Libya

 

Source: Liam Karr.

The Italian outlet Agenzia Nova reported that Russia has redeployed assets from Syria to rebuild the Matan al Sarra airbase in the southern Libyan desert near the border with Chad and Sudan.[4] Agenzia Nova said that Russia transferred military equipment and Syrian officers to the base in December 2024.[5] Satellite imagery shows that the alleged Russian forces are actively repaving the runway and renovating storage areas at the base. Agenzia Nova reports that the base still needs new facilities, including housing, warehouses, control towers, and security fences.[6] The son of Libyan warlord and Russian ally Khalifa Haftar, Saddam Haftar, deployed Libyan National Army forces to help secure the base, and Russia has forged a relationship with the local tribes in the area to eliminate any local threats to the position.[7]

Figures 2–3. Matan al Sarra Air Base: June 2024

 

 

Source: Maxar Technologies.

Figures 4–6. Matan al Sarra Air Base: December 2024

Source: Maxar Technologies.

Operationalizing the Matan al Sarra air base would strengthen links between Russia’s Libyan and Nigerien partners and Russia’s prospective partners in Chad and strengthen the four countries’ collective influence over illicit smuggling networks that run across the sparsely populated desert borders.[8] Khalifa Haftar and the Nigerien junta sent at least four delegations to each other between February and August 2024 to discuss closer collaboration on border-control cooperation, military cooperation, and free trade zones.[9] Saddam Haftar met with the Chadian president in June 2024.[10] Agenzia Nova reported in August 2024 that Khalifa Haftar had struck a deal with Chad and Niger to clear Chadian rebels and traffickers from the Libyan border to open agreed-upon free trade zones that would allow Haftar to ship oil to Niger and Chad to ship arms to Libya in violation of the UN arms embargo on Libya.[11]

A Russian military convoy of over 100 newly arrived vehicles passed through the Malian capital on January 17, highlighting the simultaneous Russian military buildup in Mali. Open-source intelligence analysts Casus Belli and Tatarigami reported that the Russian convoy included close to 60 combat armored vehicles, most of which are used for patrol and mobile warfare.[12] These combat vehicles included BTR 82, VPK-Ural, and Tigr model mine-resistant armored personnel carriers and other armored trucks.[13] The column also included two T-72 tanks, two BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, two anti-aircraft cannons, and three artillery pieces.[14] Casus Belli and Tatarigami claimed that this composition is consistent with a Russian expeditionary battalion-tactical group, which is a grouping size that Russia used in Syria.[15]

Most of the equipment in Bamako almost certainly came from Russia, not Syria. Kremlin-linked milbloggers gave conflicting reports on whether any of the material arrived from Syria but agreed that most of the equipment came directly from Russia based on the oversized cargo designations on the equipment.[16] These designations indicate that the vehicles were recently transported on Russian railways and would not have been on equipment transported directly from Syria.[17] Flight and ship tracking data also shows numerous flights from Russia to Mali via Libya since December 2024 and Russian cargo ships that arrived in Guinea from Russia in January, either of which could have transported the equipment from reserves in Russia.[18]

The Kremlin’s equipment buildup in Mali is likely unrelated to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and instead part of the Kremlin’s plans to continue to consolidate control of the Russian military presence in Mali under the Ministry of Defense–controlled Africa Corps. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) has struggled to sideline the Wagner Group in Mali since beginning to subsume Wagner’s global operations after the Wagner mutiny in June 2023 and the subsequent death of Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023. The Malian junta has been skeptical of the switch due to Malian leaders’ relationships with Wagner commanders, and the thousands of Wagner fighters in the country were also hesitant to subordinate themselves to the MOD.[19] All parties reached a compromise in early 2024 in which the MOD gained control of 20 percent of the Wagner contract and agreed to provide heavy weaponry and ammunition to Wagner for free in exchange for the MOD choosing the Wagner commanders and having those commanders coordinate with MOD officers.[20] This settlement led to little tangible change for Russian forces in Mali, as there was no noticeable change to the group’s objectives or operations and Wagner fighters kept their uniforms and traditions as long as they signed a contract with the MOD.[21] This hybrid arrangement helped bypass Africa Corps recruitment struggles and bandwidth issues and link any setbacks in Mali with Wagner instead of the Russian MOD.[22]

The Africa Corps continued to push for greater control over the Russian military presence in the second half of 2024. The MOD intensified its efforts to convince the Malian government to replace Wagner after a deadly insurgent ambush on Malian and Wagner forces at the end of July 2024 that killed at least 84 Russian and 47 Malian soldiers.[23] Multiple prominent Russian military commentators said that the MOD would use the attack to replace Wagner.[24] The French investigative outlet Jeune Afrique reported that the attack undermined the Malian junta’s trust in Wagner and that 80 Africa Corps advisers arrived in Bamako shortly after the attack to help transition Wagner to greater Africa Corps control.[25]

The MOD likely plans to replace Wagner with Africa Corps personnel in some parts of Mali over the coming months. Jeune Afrique reported in January 2025 that the current contract for Russian forces in Mali expires in February and that the Africa Corps advisers in Mali have laid the groundwork for the arrival of several hundred “civilian and military operators.”[26] Prominent Kremlin-linked milblogger Rybar claimed that “it is expected” that Africa Corps will replace Wagner in some strongholds in southern Mali when discussing the January 17 Russian military convoy in Mali.[27] Russian milbloggers also said that the equipment in the convoy is for the Africa Corps, not Wagner or the Malian army.[28] Russian cargo flights to Mali have originated from Krasnodar Krai, which is an Africa Corps logistics and recruitment hub among other things.[29]

The Kremlin’s decision to send armored vehicles to Mali, particularly T-72 tanks, is significant given Russia’s significant vehicle losses in Ukraine. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) recently assessed that substantial Russian armored vehicle losses throughout 2024 may be impeding Russia’s rate of advance in Ukraine and that these losses “are likely unsustainable in the medium-term.”[30] The Wall Street Journal and ISW have reported that these losses have led Russia to turn to its Soviet-era stockpiles, but that some of these vehicles—especially tanks—may be in inoperable condition.[31] Russia used fewer armored vehicles in Ukraine in late 2024, and ISW assessed that this development may be a result of the dwindling usable Soviet-era stockpiles.[32] Russia continues to seek valuable mineral resources in Mali and may be closer to securing direct access to commercial gold mines in Mali after the Malian junta pressured the Canadian mining company Barrick Gold to suspend operations.[33] Jeune Afrique reported that the junta seized $245 million in gold from Barrick earlier in January and speculated that it could be used to pay Africa Corps for a new contract.[34]

Sudan.

The SAF continued to advance in northern Khartoum to relieve besieged SAF troops and dislodge the RSF from the capital. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) broke the siege on the SAF Headquarters in Khartoum on January 24 for the first time since the war began in April 2023 by linking up SAF units at the SAF Signal Corps and SAF Headquarters.[35] The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have held large swaths of Khartoum and parts of southern Omdurman on the west side of the Nile since 2023.[36] The recent SAF advances are part of an SAF offensive that began in September 2024 to relieve besieged SAF positions, which include the SAF Signal Corps and SAF Headquarters in Khartoum.[37] Eyewitnesses claimed on January 19 that RSF forces withdrew fighters and heavy weaponry from northern Khartoum, known as Bahri, toward eastern Khartoum.[38] Sudanese media reported on January 21 that SAF forces at the Signal Corps base launched an offensive north and northwest to link up with the advancing SAF units in Bahri and near the Halfaya Bridge.[39] Additional SAF forces are also advancing toward Khartoum from the south after they recaptured Wad Madani, an operationally significant district capital in central Sudan, from the RSF on January 11.[40]

Figure 7. SAF Seizes Bridges in Surprise Attack, September 26, 2024

 

Source: Sudan War Monitor.

Note: Signal Corps is part of the Kober Prison–SAF Headquarters complex.

Figure 8. SAF Captures Halfaya Bridge, Breaks Kadroo Siege, September 29, 2024

 

Note: Signal Corps is part of the Kober Prison–SAF Headquarters complex.

Source: Sudan War Monitor.

The recapture of Khartoum is a strategic objective for the SAF that supports the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. SAF control over Khartoum would be a political victory that would boost the SAF’s claim to be Sudan’s only legitimate power. SAF Commander General Abdel Fattah al Burhan has conducted several regional and international tours since 2023 to garner international support. Burhan conducted several high-profile meetings with the leaders of Egypt, Qatar, South Sudan, and Turkey in 2023 in a bid to boost the SAF’s legitimacy in the international community.[41] Burhan has also attempted to delegitimize the RSF and called for the RSF to be designated as a terrorist group in a speech to the UN in September 2024.[42]

SAF control over Khartoum would be a military victory for the SAF that would allow the SAF to consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River and prepare for future offensives that aim to defeat the RSF militarily in its strongholds in western Sudan. The RSF would struggle to recross the Nile, as the SAF controls several key bridges on the river.[43] The Jabal Awliya Dam Bridge in southwestern Khartoum is the RSF’s last route into and out of the city.[44] Khartoum also has airports and military infrastructure that are more centrally located than the SAF’s current command and logistics hub in Port Sudan, which is over 400 miles from Khartoum on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.

DRC

Rwandan-backed M23 rebels are advancing towards Goma, a provincial capital in eastern DRC, and say that they intend to capture the town, which is a major escalation in the group’s publicly stated aims and would exacerbate the already dire humanitarian situation in eastern DRC. M23 captured Minova on January 21, a key town in South Kivu province 15 miles (23 kilometers) southwest of Goma that is operationally significant due to its economic and military importance.[45] M23 control of Minova and the nearby Kasunyu Port gives the group control over the supply lines between Goma and South Kivu province via the RN2 and Minova Bay on Lake Kivu.[46] Congolese and allied Burundian forces were also based in Minova.[47]

Figure 9. M23 Advances in Eastern DRC

 

Note: The UN reports that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops are fighting alongside M23 in eastern DRC and “de facto control” M23 operations.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

M23 captured Sake on January 23, which is the last major Congolese army (FARDC) stronghold before Goma.[48] There are conflicting reports on the current status of Sake and fighting continues around the town, however.[49] M23 had encircled Sake for most of 2024 before the FARDC launched a short-lived offensive south of Sake toward Minova on January 12 to clear the RN2.[50] Sake is a key crossroads town at the intersection of the RN2, RP529, and RP1030 roads, which all connect Goma and the rest of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). M23 extended its pre-existing control on the RP529, the main east–west supply line to Goma from the interior of the DRC, on January 4 when the group captured the district capital Masisi town.[51] M23 is also trying to pressure Goma from the north along the RN2 from the Kibumba area.[52]

Figure 10. M23 Advances Toward Goma and Masisi

 

Note: The UN reports that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops are fighting alongside M23 in eastern DRC and “de facto control” M23 operations.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

M23’s rapid advances could indicate that FARDC lines and morale in the area have collapsed, giving M23 an opportunity to capture Goma with lower costs than previously expected. Locals told the Belgian outlet La Libre Afrique on January 23 that Congolese soldiers had abandoned Sake without fighting.[53] DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and the Congolese parliamentary speaker returned to the DRC on January 23 from foreign trips ahead of schedule to assess the military situation, and the United States warned American citizens around Goma to review personal security plans in case of evacuation.[54] This strong domestic and international reaction signals fears of an imminent collapse of the FARDC around Goma.

M23 stated that it intends to capture Goma, which is a major change in the group’s publicly stated aims and would exacerbate the already dire humanitarian situation in eastern DRC. M23 released an official statement on January 24 saying that it is “advancing to liberate our compatriots in Goma.”[55] The group had previously said on multiple occasions that it did not want to capture Goma despite surrounding the town and likely possessing the capability to capture the town for more than a year.[56] M23 pressure on the supply lines to Goma has caused a “rapidly deteriorating” socioeconomic situation with overwhelmed displacement camps and food price inflation due to supply issues since the spring of 2024.[57] The UN reported that the M23’s recent advances have displaced over 178,000 people in the last two weeks and at least 237,000 total since the start of 2025.[58] These figures do not include the thousands more refugees are fleeing as M23 advances toward Goma.[59]

M23’s advances increase the risk of clashes between M23 and allied Rwandan forces and UN and SADC forces that are supporting the DRC. Such engagements would increase the diplomatic and military costs for M23 and Rwanda to capture Goma. The UN reported in December 2024 that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) fight alongside M23 and “de facto control” M23 operations.[60] The UN and United States also recently accused Rwanda of providing advanced military equipment, artillery, reinforcements, and resupply convoys to support the M23.[61]

UN and South African Development Community (SADC) forces deployed tanks to the west of Sake on January 23 to support pro-government forces and said they were tightening collaboration with FARDC to defend Goma and Sake.[62] The DRC has repeatedly the criticized UN forces for not adequately intervening against M23, however.[63] M23 warned on January 23 that although it was not hostile to UN and SADC forces that it would “defend itself” from any UN or SADC attacks and reiterated a warning that the UN and SADC should “refrain from intervening in the war…” on January 24.[64] FARDC forces rapidly collapsed the last time that M23 seized Goma in 2012 after UN forces stood down.[65]

M23 advances into South Kivu province are also setting conditions to significantly expand the conflict in eastern DRC. The EU warned that M23 could use its control over the RN2 and northern Kivu Lake following the capture of Minova to advance toward Kavumu, which is 37 miles (60 kilometers) south of Minova.[66] The UN identified Kavumu as a major military objective for a potential M23 offensive to seize Bukavu, the provincial capital of South Kivu, due to FARDC’s use of the airport near Kavumu.[67] M23 threatened to capture Bukavu during their last major insurgency in 2012.[68]

M23’s advances will strengthen the group’s control over critical mineral resources and supply lines to Rwanda. M23 recaptured Ngungu in North Kivu as well as Numbi and several other towns in South Kivu province on between January 16 and 21, which marks an expansion of M23 advances into South Kivu and solidifies its hold over mineral-rich areas along the North Kivu and South Kivu provincial border.[69] Ngungu is a key node on a series of side roads that serve as a link between the lucrative coltan mines around Rubaya and mineral-rich areas around Numbi.[70] These M23 advances along with the capture of Minova and Masisi-centre cut FARDC lines of communication to the area.

Figure 11. M23 Activity in Mineral-Rich Areas of the Eastern DRC

 

Source: Liam Karr; International Peace Information Service.

The UN reported in December 2024 that M23 had generated nearly $800 million in taxes on the production, trade, and transport related to the coltan mines around Rubaya since April 2024.[71] M23’s advances toward Masisi town and South Kivu in January extends the group’s presence into areas containing additional coltan and cassiterite, which are tantalum and tin ores, as well as gold.[72] The United States designates tantalum and tin as critical minerals due to their use in electronics, and US-based tech company Apple told its suppliers to stop purchasing minerals—including gold, tantalum, and tin—from the DRC and Rwanda on December 17 after a criminal complaint by the Congolese government that accused Apple of using conflict minerals.[73] M23 and Rwanda already controlled supply lines around Goma to Rwanda, and the capture of Minova opens more transportation corridors for minerals and military logistics via Lake Kivu.[74] M23 will also be able to tax the 40 tons of goods that move through Minova Bay on a daily basis.[75]

The timing of the Rwandan-backed M23 offensive indicates an effort to maximize its position in currently paused negotiations after peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda collapsed in December 2024. All parties called off a summit planned for December 15 with Tshisekedi, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, and Angolan President João Lourenço after lower-level officials failed to agree on fundamental aspects of negotiations. Talks reached after Rwanda insisted that the DRC “hold a direct dialogue with the M23.”[76] Kagame reiterated this demand on January 9, less than a week after M23 captured Masisi town.[77] Congolese officials have called the Rwandan-backed M23 “terrorists” repeatedly, refused to negotiate directly with its representatives, and claimed that Rwanda supports M23 to expropriate the eastern DRC’s mineral resources.[78] An anonymous European ambassador told La Libre Afrique that they “do not see how Tshisekedi and Kagame will be able to sit down at the same table again.”[79]

Somalia

Somali security forces in Puntland, northern Somalia, have degraded ISS with a counterinsurgency offensive but have not set conditions to weaken or defeat ISS permanently in the long term. The semi-autonomous Puntland state government said on December 26 that it launched an offensive to dislodge Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) militants from their hideouts and degrade the group’s support zones in the Cal Miskaad mountains.[80] Somali media reported on January 16 that the Puntland Security Forces (PSF) is now in its “final and most decisive phase” of operations.[81] The PSF said that it has destroyed numerous ISS outposts, training areas, weapons manufacturing facilities, and a court to adjudicate internal issues.[82] The PSF has also seized ISS weapons, including armed commercial quadcopter drones, and destroyed wells and food supplies.[83] The PSF and Puntland government officials have held several meetings with local leaders in the Bari region to gain local support for the PSF operations and counter a potential ISS resurgence.[84]

ISS will be able to reconstitute itself if the Puntland offensive does not significantly degrade the group’s revenue streams or set conditions to maintain pressure on ISS’s porous support zones. Puntland has not targeted ISS racketeering networks or attack cells in the port capital Bosaso, where ISS generates hundreds of thousands of dollars per month for regional IS financing efforts by coercing local businesses.[85] ISS has also taken advantage of the ungoverned and difficult terrain of the Cal Miskaad mountains to retreat and regroup across the mountain chain. The PSF discovered several abandoned ISS outposts in caves during its operations, suggesting that ISS fled elsewhere in the mountains in anticipation of PSF operations.[86] The PSF has claimed to kill “dozens” of ISS fighters and capture even fewer, figures that are far from the UN-estimated 600 to 700 total ISS fighters.[87]

Figure 12. Puntland Security Forces Launch Counterterrorism Offensive Against ISS

 

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

ISS has sought to defend its support zones and deter security forces from interfering in its support zones without engaging in decisive battles that would draw additional pressure from security forces. These tactics support ISS’s long-term strategic goal of acting as an administrative node for the IS global network. ISS planted improvised explosive devices (IED) that killed six PSF soldiers as the soldiers cleared the IEDs in the Cal Miskaad mountains between January 19 and 20.[88] A PSF spokesperson said that the PSF and ISS fighters also engaged in small-arms fire and that the PSF killed seven ISS fighters during the same period.[89] ISS carried out its most complex attack in Somalia yet on December 31 to preempt the planned Puntland offensive, but CTP assessed that ISS will likely prioritize its role as a key logistics node for the Islamic State over conducting further high-profile attacks.[90]

ISS has limited the frequency of high-profile, complex attacks against the PSF as the group primarily operates under the radar as a command-and-control node for IS in Africa.[91] ISS hosts the regional East Africa IS office, al Karrar, which oversees financing, training, and other support for the group’s personnel in East and South Africa and the global IS network.[92] ISS acts as a logistic node and disperses funds and trainers around the world, including to IS affiliates in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, and Yemen.[93]ISS money transfers to IS Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan is particularly dangerous given ISKP’s prominent role in external attack plots against the West.[94]

Figure 13. The Islamic State Somalia Province’s Financing Networks

 

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

Sahel

The Alliance of Sahel States created a joint force of 5,000 troops that will deploy in the coming weeks. Nigerien Defense Minister Salifou Modi said on January 21 that the force will operate in all three AES countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—and have its own personnel, coordination system, as well as air, land, and intelligence resources.[95] The Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des États du Sahel, AES) has planned to increase joint counterinsurgency operations since March 2024 and agreed to set up a unified security force and joint plan for military actions in July 2024.[96]

The AES has regularly coordinated drone strikes across the borders of its member states’ territories since the inception of the AES but has struggled to organize more impactful ground operations. The AES countries conducted only two joint ground operations in 2024. The first was a series of joint Burkinabe-Nigerien patrols to secure a key road in northern Burkina Faso over a week in July.[97] The second operation was a combined air and ground offensive against insurgent bases in northeastern Mali on December 18.[98] Defense Minister Modi was presumably alluding to this December operation and a joint airstrike against a Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen commander on December 26 when he said that some joint operations had already taken place.[99]

Increased ground operations will be necessary to degrade the very large and strong insurgent support zones along the borders of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. ISSP has established a significant control hub along the Mali-Niger border that extends into northeastern Mali and northwestern Niger.[100] The group has implemented various governance and shari’a measures in this area and has inflicted severe costs on security forces that attempt to enter the area.[101] ISSP is also threatening vital supply lines for Niger with a campaign to expand the group’s support zones along the Burkina Faso-Niger border by controlling the RN23 road that connects the district capitals Dori and Tera in Burkina Faso and Niger, respectively.[102] JNIM has expanded its support zones along the border of central Mali and northwest Burkina Faso since 2023 due to a general lack of counterterrorism activity in this border area.[103] JNIM regularly controls the lives of civilians in the area through taxation, school closures, and evictions, and is using these support zones to target key transportation corridors that connect southern Mali and Burkina Faso.[104]

Figure 14. ISSP and JNIM Areas of Operation in the Tri-Border Region

 

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Figure 15. JNIM Area of Operations Along the Mali-Burkina Faso Border

 

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

[1] Available by subscription at https://www.flightradar24.com

[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-21-2025

[3] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5151; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/iz-syrii-v-liviiu-rosiiany-planuiut-perekynuty-chastynu-viiskovoi-tekhniky-v-afryku.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2024

[4] https://www.agenzianova.com/news/libia-fonti-nova-la-russia-riattiva-una-base-al-confine-con-ciad-e-sudan

[5] https://www.agenzianova.com/news/libia-fonti-nova-la-russia-riattiva-una-base-al-confine-con-ciad-e-sudan

[6] https://www.agenzianova.com/news/libia-fonti-nova-la-russia-riattiva-una-base-al-confine-con-ciad-e-sudan

[7] https://www.agenzianova.com/news/libia-fonti-nova-la-russia-riattiva-una-base-al-confine-con-ciad-e-sudan; https://x.com/MTailamun/status/1882210004394233950

[8] https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/libia-ciad-in-corso-combattimenti-fra-enl-e-gruppi-armati-vicino-a-miniere-doro-al-confine; https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/human-smuggling-and-trafficking-in-the-sahel-2024

[9] https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/libia-dabaiba-cerca-di-strappare-il-niger-ad-haftar; https://www.africaintelligence.com/north-africa/2024/02/01/khalifa-haftar-cosies-up-to-nigerien-junta-with-putin-s-blessing,110154752-eve; https://libyaobserver dot ly/news/saleh-meets-nigerien-military-officials-benghazi-amid-growing-haftar-niger-ties; https://fr-africanews-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/fr.africanews dot com/amp/2024/08/22/le-rapprochement-entre-le-niger-et-les-autorites-de-lest-de-la-libye-continue

[10] https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/07/16/le-clan-du-marechal-haftar-qui-controle-l-est-de-la-libye-avance-ses-pions-au-sahel_6250988_3212.html

[11] https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/libia-ciad-in-corso-combattimenti-fra-enl-e-gruppi-armati-vicino-a-miniere-doro-al-confine; https://fr-africanews-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/fr.africanews dot com/amp/2024/08/22/le-rapprochement-entre-le-niger-et-les-autorites-de-lest-de-la-libye-continue

[12] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1880684647904108548; https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/special-report-a-convoy-of-over-one

[13] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1880684647904108548; https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/special-report-a-convoy-of-over-one

[14] https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/special-report-a-convoy-of-over-one

[15] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1880684669014028495; https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1880684673745219890

[16] https://t.me/directorate4/21807; https://t.me/milinfolive/140052

[17] https://t.me/milinfolive/140052

[18] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-december-19-2024-russia-reinforces-libya-amid-syria-withdrawal-drc-rwanda-talks-collapse-ethiopias-counter-fano-campaign-issp-strangles-roadways-in-niger-ankara-declaration#Russia; available by subscription at https://www.flightradar24.com; https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1882406837204496522

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[20] https://therussiaprogram.org/wagners_future

[21] https://www.pism.pl/webroot/upload/files/Raport/PISM%20Report%20Africa%20Corps_.pdf; https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso

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[25] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1649876/politique/de-wagner-a-africa-corps-au-mali-les-putschistes-jouent-a-la-roulette-russe

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[27] https://t.me/rybar/67262

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