Africa File, March 6, 2025: Burundi and Rwanda Truce in Eastern DRC Despite M23 Advance; SAF Targets RSF Supply Lines in Darfur; Sahelian Jihadists Tap Trans-Saharan Networks

Africa File, March 6, 2025: Burundi and Rwanda Truce in Eastern DRC Despite M23 Advance; SAF Targets RSF Supply Lines in Darfur; Sahelian Jihadists Tap Trans-Saharan Networks

Authors: Liam Karr, Kathryn Tyson, and Yale Ford

Contributors: Jean-Philip Banane and John Reece

Data Cutoff: March 6, 2025, at 10 a.m.

Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

• Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwandan-backed M23 rebels have halted their southward advance along the Burundian border in South Kivu after Burundi and Rwanda likely reached a deal to deconflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which decreases the risk of a wider regional war between Burundi and Rwanda in the immediate term. M23 has made significant advances southwest of the South Kivu provincial capital of Bukavu that create opportunities for the group to advance farther into the interior of South Kivu and neighboring Maniema province. M23’s control of Kamituga would allow the group to tax and control the production and trade of gold.
• Sudan: The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are setting conditions on multiple axes to break the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF’s) hold on western Sudan. The SAF and SAF-aligned militia groups reinforced a second front north of el Fasher, the capital city of North Darfur, which the SAF could use to support its campaign to disrupt RSF supply lines into el Fasher. SAF-RSF clashes in western Sudan will almost certainly cause significant civilian casualties due to the RSF’s pattern of retaliatory, ethnically based violence against civilians. The SAF also advanced against RSF forces in eastern Khartoum as it continued its offensive to retake the capital city and consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River.
• Sahel: Al Qaeda’s and IS’s Sahelian affiliates are increasing their influence over trans-Saharan trafficking nodes, which will likely strengthen their links into North Africa. IS Sahel Province and Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen are almost certainly collaborating with local actors as an entry point to expand their areas of operation. Greater influence over trans-Saharan networks will expand these groups’ external reach and increase the threat—particularly from IS—of external plots in North Africa and potentially Europe.

Assessments:

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Rwandan-backed M23 rebels have halted their southward advance along the Burundian border in South Kivu after Burundi and Rwanda likely reached a deal to deconflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which decreases the risk of a wider regional war between Burundi and Rwanda in the immediate term. M23 had advanced as far south as Sange—a village on the Sange River that lies 25 miles (40 kilometers) north of Uvira on the RN5—at the peak of its advance on February 19.[1] M23 forces withdrew from these areas to Kamanyola—the southernmost village on the DRC-Rwanda border that is 25 miles north of Sange--in the following days, however. Burundian forces and pro-Congolese militias advanced unopposed through Sange to Luvungi—a village nearly 20 miles north of Sange along the Burundi-DRC border—on February 23.[2] The Vatican news agency Agenzia Fides reported on March 4 that pro-Congolese government militias controlled as far north as Katogota village, which is separated from Kamanyola by the Luvini River.[3]

The control shift is likely part of a deal between Burundi and Rwanda to deconflict and control their own respective sides of the DRC border. The Burundian advance came after French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported that an unspecified Burundian official visited Kigali in mid-February and reached a verbal agreement with Rwanda.[4] The Burundian president said on February 16 that he received assurances that Rwanda would not attack Burundi.[5] The bloodless nature of the land swap further indicates that Burundi and Rwanda orchestrated the transfer of territory.

Burundi and Rwanda’s efforts to deconflict in the eastern DRC decrease the risk of a wider regional war between the two countries in the immediate term. Burundi and Rwanda are rivals in the eastern DRC, and both view their competition as potentially existential. Burundi has collaborated with the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda—a militia group in the DRC linked with the Rwandan genocide that the Rwandan government has labeled as a national security threat.[6] The Hutu-dominated Burundian government suspects that Rwanda funds Tutsi opposition groups in Burundi, the UN has accused Rwanda of backing Burundian rebels based in the eastern DRC, and regional diplomats told the International Crisis Group that Rwanda may intend to topple the Burundian government.[7] Burundi has deployed several thousand soldiers to fight alongside Congolese army (FARDC) forces to both counter Rwanda and contain the Burundian rebels based in eastern DRC.[8]

Figure 1. M23 Advances Southward in South Kivu Province

 

Source: Liam Karr; Yale Ford; Nick Markiewicz.

M23 has continued to make significant advances southwest of the South Kivu provincial capital of Bukavu. M23 advanced southwest on the RN2 after capturing Bukavu on February 16 to capture the district capital Walungu on February 17.^[9] The rebel group resumed operations against FARDC and allied Wazalendo militia fighters on this axis after a two-week pause and has advanced over 30 miles along the RN2 since March 1.

M23’s advances have set conditions for the group to advance toward key district capitals and commercial centers in the interior of South Kivu. M23 seized areas near Bwahungu and Muzinzi villages in Walungu district on March 1. Bwahungu is connected to the RP503 road that leads to Shabunda, which lies nearly 165 miles west of Bwahungu and is the westernmost district capital in South Kivu.^[10] Shabunda is also a gateway town to Kindu, which is 145 miles west of Shabunda and is the administrative and commercial capital of Maniema province.^[11] M23 advanced a further 19 miles southwest from the Walungu district into central South Kivu’s Mwenga district on March 3 and reached Kalama town, located 22 miles north of the Mwenga district capital.^[12] Congolese media reported that Wazalendo militias “halted” M23’s advance toward Mwenga town on March 5.[13] Kalama is roughly 50 miles from the mineral-rich Kamituga town in Mwenga district on the RN2.

M23’s control of Kamituga would allow the group to tax and control the production and trade of gold. Kamituga has a population of 300,000 people and is an important gold-mining town in the area.^[14] Kamituga produced 12 to 17 percent of South Kivu’s total gold output according to the most recent figures from 2013.^[15] The town is situated on a regional economic corridor via the RN2 that links to Bukavu, where “big traders” from Kamituga go to sell gold.^[16]

M23 would benefit from taxing gold revenues and controlling transport networks in the Kamituga area. M23 has set up sophisticated, “state-like” administration in key areas it controls in North Kivu, including in mineral-rich areas where the group has established mining ministries that award permits, enforce taxes, and pay salaries to traders and miners.^[17] M23 militants also patrol towns to ensure compliance with the administration’s rules on selling minerals exclusively to M23.^[18] M23’s presence in Kamituga would affect Chinese mining companies, which have a heavy presence in the area.^[19]

Sudan

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are setting conditions on multiple axes to break the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF’s) hold on western Sudan. The SAF and SAF-aligned militias reinforced a second front north of el Fasher—the capital city of North Darfur. Sudanese media reported a “large buildup” of SAF and SAF-aligned forces approximately 130 miles (210 kilometers) north of el Fasher on March 2.^[20] Sudanese media also noted that pro-SAF rebels are recruiting fighters in al Tina along the Sudan-Chad border and northwest of el Fasher, according to Sudanese media on February 27.^[21]

The SAF has advanced west toward RSF strongholds in Darfur since January 2025.^[22] The SAF on February 20 captured el Obeid—a state capital in south-central Sudan located on a major east-west highway that leads toward Darfur.^[23] The SAF has made no further westward advances since February 25, when it advanced west from el Obeid toward al Nahud.^[24] CTP previously assessed that these SAF advances create conditions for an offensive against the RSF’s center of gravity in Darfur.^[25]  The SAF seeks to merge with SAF elements in al Fasher, where ongoing fighting in the town has killed over 700 civilians since the RSF began besieging the SAF there in April 2024.^[26]

Figure 2. RSF Supply Lines into Darfur from Neighboring Countries

 

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

The SAF could use a reinforced northern front to support its campaign to disrupt RSF supply lines into el Fasher.  The RSF has several key supply lines from neighboring countries into western Sudan.^[27] Nations.^[28] The RSF has also frequently attacked and looted aid trucks traveling between the Adre border crossing in eastern Chad and el Fasher.^[29]

The SAF and SAF-aligned groups have attacked RSF forces north and south of el Fasher and near the Chad-Sudan border since 2023 to disrupt RSF logistics and supply lines.^[30] The Sudanese Joint Forces—an umbrella group comprised of Darfuri rebel militias that allied with the SAF in November 2023—said that it intercepted a significant amount of RSF military supplies, including missiles and artillery shells, southeast of el Fasher on February 27.^[31] The SAF tried to disrupt RSF reinforcements and supply convoys south of el Fasher in at least two other instances in February 2025.^[32] The new SAF reinforcements north of el Fasher could support this effort to disrupt RSF supply lines to el Fasher.

SAF-RSF clashes in western Sudan will almost certainly cause significant civilian casualties due to the RSF’s pattern of retaliatory, ethnically based violence against civilians. The RSF launched widespread retaliatory attacks against civilians southeast of el Fasher after the Sudanese Joint Forces’ attacks on February 27.^[33] The RSF targeted dozens of villages in the Dar al Salam district on March 1 and looted livestock, burned homes, and killed and displaced civilians.^[34] The International Organization for Migration said on March 3 that over 3,400 civilians fled to other areas in the state and to the Zamzam camp refugee camp following the RSF attacks.^[35] The RSF has intentionally targeted civilians in the Zamzam camp, which hosts approximately 500,000 internally displaced persons.^[36] Doctors Without Borders suspended operations in the camp on February 24 due to the escalating violence around the camp.^[37]

The attacks follow a pattern of RSF violence against civilians with perceived links to the SAF or other anti-RSF forces when faced with battlefield setbacks. The RSF conducted retaliatory, ethnically based violence in Gezira state, south of Khartoum, in October 2024, following the defection of a senior RSF commander.^[38] Sudanese media reported that the RSF targeted members of the commander’s ethnic group and attacked villages and towns in Gezira seen as loyal to the commander.^[39] The RSF has similarly justified its attacks on civilians at the Zamzam camp by accusing the Sudanese Joint Forces of using the camp as a base and the refugees as human shields.^[40]

The SAF advanced against the RSF in eastern Khartoum as it continued its offensive to retake the capital city. The SAF has surrounded RSF forces in the East Nile district, east of central Khartoum.^[41] The SAF captured the eastern side of the Manshiya Bridge on March 3, leading RSF fighters to retreat to their last remaining positions in central Khartoum.^[42] Online footage geolocated by CTP shows RSF fighters attempting to flee across the bridge, which connects RSF territory in central Khartoum to RSF positions east of Khartoum.^[43]

Figure 3. Area of SAF and RSF Operations in Khartoum

 

Source: Kathryn Tyson; John Reece; Thomas van Linge.  

The SAF may be attempting to degrade an RSF supply line between el Obeid and RSF-controlled areas in Khartoum to support its offensive on the capital. The RSF reportedly repelled an SAF attack against el Bara, 36 miles (58 kilometers) north of al Obeid, on February 28.^[44] The SAF launched a drone strike targeting RSF fighters in el Bara on March 1.^[45] The town lies along a north-south highway connecting al Obeid to Omdurman that the RSF has used as a supply route to support operations in Khartoum. SAF attacks along this highway would degrade the RSF’s ability to supply its remaining forces in Khartoum and prevent RSF forces from retreating from Khartoum along the highway. The flat, open terrain along this highway already makes RSF supply lines there vulnerable to SAF airstrikes.^[46]

SAF control over Khartoum would allow the SAF to consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River and support SAF offensives into western Sudan. The RSF would struggle to recross the Nile River given SAF control of key bridges on the river.^[47] Drone footage from early February 2025 shows lines of RSF military vehicles trying to flee from southwestern Khartoum to western Sudan across the Jebel Awliya Bridge, which is the RSF’s last remaining link to the city.^[48] Khartoum also has airports and military infrastructure that are better positioned to support future offensives in western Sudan than the SAF’s current command and logistics hub in Port Sudan, which is over 400 miles northeast of Khartoum on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.

Sahel.

Al Qaeda’s and the Islamic State’s local affiliates are increasing their influence over the Sahelian end of trans-Saharan trafficking networks, which will likely expand their links into North Africa. Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM)—the AQ affiliate in the Sahel—killed at least 11 Nigerien soldiers in an attack on a security post in the Agadez region in northern Niger on February 28.[49] JNIM claimed to kill 15 soldiers and take another five soldiers prisoner.[50] JNIM claimed its first attack in far northern Niger in October 2024, when it killed six soldiers in an attack on a checkpoint in Assamaka, which is less than 10 miles from the Algerian border.[51] An anonymous security source told Wamaps—a local conflict monitoring network—that the February 28 JNIM attack aimed to prevent Nigerien forces from disrupting trafficking networks in the area.[52] The departure of US and French forces—particularly the US drone base in Agadez—has undermined intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support covering these remote areas.[53]

IS Sahel Province (ISSP) launched a kidnapping campaign targeting foreign nationals in West Africa in 2025 that has included two kidnappings along the southern edge of the Sahara in Algeria and Niger. Local bandits abducted an Austrian national in Agadez, northern Niger, and a Spanish national in southern Algeria, near the Algeria-Mali border, in January 2025.[54] Regional expert and France24 journalist Wassim Nasr reported that ISSP called for the attacks and offered $150,000 to $400,000 (100 to 250 million CFA francs) per foreign hostage.[55] 

Figure 4. Sahelian Salafi-Jihadi Area of Operations on Trans-Saharan Smuggling Networks

 

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

JNIM and ISSP are almost certainly collaborating with local actors as an entry point to expand their areas of operation. Wamaps reported that JNIM is working with “local traffickers” to support attacks against Nigerien security forces at key nodes along smuggling routes.[56] This alleged collaboration between JNIM and local bandits may be contributing to a slight increase in unidentified armed group attacks on Nigerien security forces in far northern Niger. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data recorded three attacks by “unidentified armed groups” against Nigerien security forces in the Agadez region and northernmost district in the Tahoua region in the nearly six months since JNIM claimed its first attack in October 2024 compared to just two such attacks over the previous year.[57]

Wassim Nasr reported that JNIM and Tuareg rebels in northern Mali have discussed a potential alliance since December 2024.[58] The two groups had already established a nonaggression pact in April 2024, and CTP has previously assessed that the two groups were at least tacitly enabling each other to operate in shared areas and may be coordinating some attacks.[59] The historically pro-separatist rebels have significant historical ties to JNIM dating back to the 1990s.[60] The two sides have made informal ceasefire agreements in their shared support areas, maintained significant areas of operation and membership overlap, and operationally coordinated against ISSP in recent years.[61] Nasr and French state outlet Radio France Internationale reported that the two sides agree on the need for combined operations against Malian and Russian forces in northern Mali as well as some governance cooperation in shared areas but remain divided on long-term, strategic issues, such as expansion beyond northern Mali and JNIM’s transnational ties.[62] A formal alliance would strengthen JNIM’s influence in northern Mali, among the Tuareg communities in neighboring countries, and the smuggling routes that cross these communities.

Kidnappings and collaboration with local criminal groups have been entry points and precursors to insurgent infiltration in the Sahel. A 2023 GITOC report said that kidnappings are entry points for violent extremist groups and that the nascent stages of violent extremist group territorial infiltration are typically accompanied often by higher levels of criminal activities, including kidnappings.[63] The report notes that part of this expansion includes recruiting or working with criminal groups that are already active in the area.[64] Kidnap-for-ransom attacks in Burkina Faso were a precursor to JNIM’s and ISSP’s expansion into Burkina Faso in 2015, as insurgent cells sought to generate resources for their expansion.[65]

Greater influence over trans-Saharan networks will expand these Salafi-jihadi groups’ external reach and increase the threat of external plots in North Africa and potentially Europe. A strengthened presence along trans-Saharan trafficking lines will strengthen the connections between the Salafi-jihadi affiliates in the Sahel and support and facilitation networks in North Africa. Counterterrorism efforts targeting IS in North Africa have heavily eroded IS networks in Algeria and Libya. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data has not recorded an IS attack in Algeria or Libya since 2022.[66] IS continues to maintain a loose presence in southwestern Libya, however, and Libyan forces killed the governor of IS-Libya in 2024.[67]

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is still active in southwestern Libya and Algeria and primarily functions as a logistics hub and transit corridor along the trans-Saharan trafficking routes. The United Nations has reported as recently as 2024 that AQIM still uses southwestern Libya as a logistics hub to support its West African affiliates.[68] Such support has included sending fighters to northern Mali.[69] UN reports in 2024 indicate the AQIM is present along trafficking routes between Algeria, Libya, and Niger and works with Tuareg traffickers in drug, weapon, and migrant smuggling.[70] AQIM also has a network of over 100 facilitators based in the mountainous areas between Algeria and Tunisia.[71]

IS has shown a clear intent to use its trans-Saharan networks to support attack cells in North Africa and Europe and support the movement of foreign fighters. Morocco’s General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance claimed in February 2025 that ISSP is making a concerted effort to “recruit, arm, and direct sympathizers to carry out attacks in Morocco.”[72] Moroccan police foiled two separate IS attack cells with direct ties to ISSP in January and February 2025.[73] At least one of these cells used a weapons cache in a remote area of the Morocco-Algeria border in the Sahara for supplies.[74] The United Nations reported in July 2023 that IS recruiters and facilitators in the Sahel had established transit corridors between southern Europe and the Sahel and established a thwarted attack cell that operated from Morocco and Spain.[75] Moroccan security forces also disrupted three IS cells that facilitated foreign fighters’ travel to ISSP in Mali between October 2023 and February 2024.[76] The presence of foreign fighters has led to an increase in Salafi-jihadi groups’ external attack plots historically since foreign fighters are usually more hardened ideologues than local recruits and often aim to eventually return to their homeland to organize attacks.[77]

JNIM may be more focused on economic aims with its presence on trans-Saharan networks given reports that the group is considering a split from al Qaeda. Wassim Nasr interviewed JNIM second-in-command and Macina Liberation Front leader Amadou Koufa in October 2024, and Koufa avoided answering any questions related to al Qaeda central. Nasr’s local contacts said that Koufa’s silence was intentional and that it is “very possible that JNIM is at least seriously discussing and maybe preparing to break from al Qaeda.”[78] Nasr and others have noted that JNIM has broken with long-standing practices, such as referring to AQIM in its media, directing its followers to AQIM’s media outlet, using al Qaeda branding in its media publications, and issuing joint communiqué with AQIM since December 2024.[79] Two templates for this model are the Afghan Taliban and Hayat Tahrir al Sham in Syria, which both publicly distanced themselves from al Qaeda to help gain domestic and international legitimacy in their pursuit for power.[80] JNIM would likely retain human network and business ties to AQIM-linked facilitators, however, as both sides continue to benefit economically from direct participation in smuggling or taxing third-party traffickers.[81]

 

[1] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250219-est-de-la-rdc-les-combattants-de-l-afc-m23-continuent-d-avancer-dans-le-sud-kivu-sc%C3%A8nes-de-pillages-%C3%A0-uvira; https://actualite dot cd/2025/02/19/rdc-les-rebelles-de-lafcm23-sont-arrives-sange-dans-la-plaine-de-la-ruzizi; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/02/20/actualite/securite/des-pillages-et-actes-de-violence-signales-uvira; https://x.com/wembi_steve/status/1892268703145722267

[2] https://www.barrons.com/news/burundi-troops-deploy-in-east-drc-as-uk-pauses-most-aid-6a8d306f?refsec=topics_afp-news

[3] https://www.fides.org/en/news/76102-AFRICA_DR_CONGO_South_Kivu_Front_lines_between_the_M23_and_the_Wazalendo_militias_run_through_the_Ruzizi_plain

[4] https://x.com/MichaelTshi/status/1897310335994134581

[5] https://x.com/GeneralNeva/status/1891002162223661342; https://afrikarabia dot com/wordpress/le-m23-entre-a-bukavu-tshisekedi-plus-fragilise-que-jamais

[6] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/fall-drcs-goma-urgent-action-needed-avert-regional-war

[7] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf; https://africanarguments.org/2017/10/burundi-newest-biggest-rebel-group; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/fall-drcs-goma-urgent-action-needed-avert-regional-war

[8] https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-burundi-afford-to-pull-its-troops-out-of-somalia; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/118/80/pdf/n2411880.pdf

[9] https://actualite dot cd/index.php/2025/03/01/walungu-fardc-et-m23-saffrontent-bwahungu-et-muzinzi; https://x.com/RDC_Times/status/1891542245490163804; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2025/2/16/dr-congos-m23-rebels-enter-centre-of-strategic-city-bukavu-report

[10] https://www.gicnetwork.be/vacuum-governance-in-eastern-drc

[11] https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin54.html 

[12] https://actualite dot cd/2025/03/04/rdc-lafcm23-atteint-mwenga-sixieme-territoire-du-sud-kivu-affecte-par-la-rebellion; https://x.com/SimaroNgongoMba/status/1896809465447591981

[13] https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/03/06/actualite/securite/les-combattants-wazalendo-stoppent-lavancee-du-m23-vers-mwenga

[14] https://apnews.com/article/mpox-new-strain-outbreak-kamituga-eastern-congo-f9affb7a7d73c8c30daf296c51c920c7

[15] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344784525_How_much_do_artisanal_miners_earn_An_inquiry_among_Congolese_gold_miners#pf8

[16] https://actualite dot cd/index.php/2022/05/21/eac-felix-tshisekedi-developpe-laxe-kinshasa-bujumbura; https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20241027-eastern-dr-congo-grapples-with-chinese-gold-mining-firms; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2023/12/04/actualite/societe/sud-kivu-lancement-des-travaux-de-rehabilitation-de-la-route-bukavu

[17] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

[18] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf

[19] https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20241027-eastern-dr-congo-grapples-with-chinese-gold-mining-firms

[20] https://www.darfur24.com/en/2025/03/02/sudanese-army-joint-forces-rsf-deploy-new-forces-in-north-darfur/

[21] https://www.darfur24.com/2025/02/27/%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B9/

[22] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-27-2025-saf-advances-west-toward-darfur-m23-and-drc-reset-as-pressure-grows-rwanda-issp-transnational-threat-al-shabaab-central-somalia-offensive#Sudan

[23] https://sudantribune.com/article297800/

[24] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudan-army-breaks-rsf-siege-of-el; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1894375866697732347

[25] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-27-2025-saf-advances-west-toward-darfur-m23-and-drc-reset-as-pressure-grows-rwanda-issp-transnational-threat-al-shabaab-central-somalia-offensive#Sudan

[26] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/12/sudan-alarming-el-fasher-siege-hostilities-must-end-un-report

[27] https://www.giga-hamburg dot de/en/publications/giga-focus/the-war-in-sudan-how-weapons-and-networks-shattered-a-power-struggle

[28] https://www.reuters.com/world/uae-flights-flood-airstrip-un-says-supplies-weapons-sudan-rebels-2024-12-12/

[29] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.

[30] https://libyaobserver dot ly/news/sudanese-army-says-several-rsf-fighters-have-fled-libya; https://sudantribune.com/article295970/; https://sudantribune.com/article291606/; https://sudantribune.net/article294902/; ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.

[31] https://x.com/ArkoMinawi/status/1895438545663218112; https://x.com/MmfNazar79432/status/1895348504522039742; https://sudantribune.com/article279446/; https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-army-repels-new-rsf-attack-on-famine-stricken-north-darfur-camp

[32] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.

[33] https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85-25-%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B1/

[34] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1AbtYdveqw/; https://sudantribune.com/article298067/

[35] https://sudantribune.com/article298100/

[36] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce85x6w22gwo#:~:text=Zamzam%20hosts%20about%20half%20a,of%20them%20to%20flee%20again; https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/02/sudan-rsf-must-stop-attacks-on-famine-stricken-zamzam-camp/

[37] https://www.msf.org/sudan-msf-forced-halt-our-activities-violence-engulfs-zamzam-camp-north-darfur

[38] https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-impact-armed-violence-aj-jazirah-flash-update-no-01-28-october-2024; https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241026-activists-say-50-killed-in-sudan-paramilitary-attack; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-army-welcomes-first-defection-rsf-central-commander-2024-10-20/; https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2024/10/sudan-escalating-violence-al-jazirah

[39] https://apnews.com/article/sudan-war-military-rsf-6693a4a8c10baa49e8bc70506bc170d6  

[40] https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/el-fasher-and-zamzam-camp-shelling-yale-hrl-report-confirms-rsf-heavy-artillery-presence-in-north-darfur; https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-army-repels-new-rsf-attack-on-famine-stricken-north-darfur-camp

[41] https://x.com/VistaMaps/status/1896551511678746809/photo/1; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1896547821370888587;  

[42] https://sudantribune.net/article298080/

[43] https://x.com/KathrynMTyson/status/1896666056196030634

[44] https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85-25-%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B1/;  https://x.com/Elbashatbaeq/status/1895521642388082825 

[45] https://www.darfur24.com/2025/03/02/%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-12-%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8B%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A3%D8%AB%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7/

[46] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/battle-khartoum-marks-crossroads-sudans-civil-war

[47] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-13-2025-saf-announces-government-plan-and-russian-naval-base-drc-concedes-to-direct-talks-with-m23-turkeys-growing-defense-partnerships-in-africa

[48] https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1886835869698679029

[49] https://malijet dot com/actualite-sur-afrique/299915-niger--11-militaires-tues-dans-une-embuscade-pres-de-la-frontier.html; https://x.com/ighazer/status/1895922654034440349

[50] SITE Intelligence Group, “Including Rare Deadly Attack in Niger's Agadez Region, JNIM Claims Operations in Mali and Burkina,” March 3, 2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com

[51] https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1848372093945008524; www dot actuniger.com/societe/20477-attaque-a-assamaka-une-offensive-des-forces-armees-libres-fal-fait-sept-morts-et-cinq-blesses-trente-sept-suspects-interpelles.html; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1622353/politique/au-niger-entre-rhissa-ag-boula-et-abdourahamane-tiani-la-guerre-est-declaree;

[52] https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1896230071263797655

[53] https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1896230071263797655

[54] https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20250121-otages-sahel-espagnol-libere-remis-autorites-algeriennes-rebelles-fla

[55] https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20250121-otages-sahel-espagnol-libere-remis-autorites-algeriennes-rebelles-fla

[56] https://x.com/Wamaps_news/status/1896230071263797655

[57] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) database, available at www.acleddata.com.

[58] https://youtu.be/DzdrxhGx37s?si=tmESiQrDYx7OkOT4

[59] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-october-25-2023; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-russias-deadly-blunder-in-mali; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250304-rebelles-du-fla-et-jihadistes-du-jnim-envisagent-de-mener-des-op%C3%A9rations-conjointes-dans-le-nord-du-mali

[60] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4019115?v=pdf; https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4019115?v=pdf; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/laccord-dalger-cinq-ans-apres-un-calme-precaire-dont-il-ne-faut-pas-se-satisfaire

[61] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4019115?v=pdf; https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4019115?v=pdf; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/laccord-dalger-cinq-ans-apres-un-calme-precaire-dont-il-ne-faut-pas-se-satisfaire

[62] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250304-rebelles-du-fla-et-jihadistes-du-jnim-envisagent-de-mener-des-op%C3%A9rations-conjointes-dans-le-nord-du-mali; https://youtu.be/DzdrxhGx37s?si=tmESiQrDYx7OkOT4

[63] https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Flore-Berger-The-silent-threat-Kidnappings-in-Burkina-Faso-GI-TOC-March-2023.pdf

[64] https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Flore-Berger-The-silent-threat-Kidnappings-in-Burkina-Faso-GI-TOC-March-2023.pdf

[65] https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Flore-Berger-The-silent-threat-Kidnappings-in-Burkina-Faso-GI-TOC-March-2023.pdf

[66] ACLED database, available at www.acleddata.com.

[67] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240105-libye-le-gouvernement-d-union-nationale-annonce-l-arrestation-de-l-%C3%A9mir-local-de-l-%C3%A9tat-islamique

[68] https://undocs.org/S/2021/655; https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/394/29/PDF/N2239429.pdf?OpenElement; https://libyasecuritymonitor.com/aqim-uses-southern-libya-to-transport-fighters-to-mali-un-report

[69] https://undocs.org/S/2021/655; https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/394/29/PDF/N2239429.pdf?OpenElement; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/431/79/pdf/n2343179.pdf; https://libyasecuritymonitor.com/aqim-uses-southern-libya-to-transport-fighters-to-mali-un-report

[70] https://libyasecuritymonitor.com/aqim-uses-southern-libya-to-transport-fighters-to-mali-un-report

[71] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/431/79/pdf/n2343179.pdf; https://thearabweekly dot com/tunisia-dismantles-isis-cell-southern-city-tataouine

[72] https://apnews.com/article/morocco-islamic-state-sahel-plot-2eed405c45bd6dc068fe31b25f76315e

[73] https://thearabweekly dot com/morocco-foils-terrorist-plot-targeting-security-sites-arrests-isis-linked-suspects; https://apnews.com/article/morocco-islamic-state-sahel-plot-2eed405c45bd6dc068fe31b25f76315e

[74] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/morocco-foils-attacks-by-cell-loyal-islamic-state-2025-02-24

[75] https://reliefweb.int/report/world/seventeenth-report-secretary-general-threat-posed-isil-daesh-international-peace-and-security-and-range-united-nations-efforts-support-member-states-countering-threat-s2023568-enar; https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2024%2F556&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False

[76] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamic-state-march-africa; https://www.moroccoworldnews dot com/2023/10/358411/moroccos-bcij-arrests-4-isis-affiliated-suspects; https://www.moroccoworldnews dot com/2024/01/360459/moroccos-bcij-dismantles-four-member-isis-cell; https://www.moroccoworldnews dot com/2024/02/361097/moroccos-bcij-arrests-isis-affiliated-suspect-near-rabat

[77] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamic-state-march-africa

[78] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/answers-from-the-sahel-wassim-nasr-journalist-france24-on-his-interview-with-deputy-jnim-leader-mohamed-amadou-koufa

[79] https://x.com/Boswall_Jacob/status/1887087758012784713; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/answers-from-the-sahel-wassim-nasr-journalist-france24-on-his-interview-with-deputy-jnim-leader-mohamed-amadou-koufa

[80] https://acleddata.com/2023/07/26/actor-profile-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-hts; https://youtu.be/DzdrxhGx37s?si=LRS0gMwjEzhRcq6X

[81] https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2020-09-17-mali-drugs-research-paper.pdf; https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Human-smuggling-and-trafficking-ecosystems-MALI.pdf