Toplines
The second round of legislative recall votes in Taiwan failed on August 23 with a lower turnout and proportion of votes in favor compared to the July 26 recalls. None of the 31 elections had more votes in favor than against recalling their respective legislator – the highest proportion of yes votes was only 48.4% for Ye Yuan-chih. Only six elections met the threshold where 25 percent of the electorate must vote yes to recall the legislator. These votes failed by a significantly larger margin than the first round of votes in July 2025as average proportion of votes in favor of recall compared to the July 26 recall elections dropped 8.4 percent (from 42.2 percent to 33.8 percent) and average turnout dropped 6.9 percent (from 56.1 percent to 49.2 percent). The two rounds of votes highlight the failure of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to rally the public in order to remove legislators from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT).
The DPP has undergone leadership changes amid these failures. Former Interior Minister Hsu Kuo-yung became the new DPP secretary general after his predecessor resigned on July 27.[1] The DPP-controlled Executive Yuan (EY) will also undergo senior personnel changes in the coming days. President William Lai Ching-te has so far ignored calls to resign as DPP chairman, however. DPP legislative minority leader Ker Chien-ming—one of the leaders of the mass recall campaign—has likewise sought to retain his position.[2]
The failed recall votes will likely politically strengthen the KMT, which has less incentive now to cooperate with the DPP. The Taiwanese public has demonstrated that it is unwilling to recall KMT legislators despite their obstruction of the DPP agenda and support for controversial legislation, including sweeping federal budget cuts. Taiwanese authorities are still investigating KMT officials on allegations of forging recall votes, however.
The Taiwanese EY approved the 2026 budget proposal on August 21. The budget would increase current defense spending from around 2.45 to 3.32 percent of GDP. The budget includes special funds for procurement, among other things, anti-tank missiles, artillery, attack drones, and surface-to-air missiles.[3] President Lai expressed hope that Taiwan would spend around five percent of its GDP on the military by 2030. The budget has gone to the KMT-controlled Legislative Yuan (LY) for approval. The KMT has expressed support for increases to military spending but could oppose elements of the budget.[4] The KMT has, for example, criticized the budget for allotting insufficient funds to benefits for active and retired military personnel, arguing that it would harm recruitment and retention.[5] The KMT previously cut military spending from around 2.45 to 2.08 percent of GDP amid sweeping federal budget cuts and freezes in January 2025.[6] The KMT may feel emboldened to oppose DPP legislation since it survived the recall votes. The KMT may feel increasingly emboldened to oppose legislation since it survived the recall votes.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has pushed for dialogue between the United States, South Korea, and North Korea despite Pyongyang rejecting his overtures. Lee proposed a three-step roadmap to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula on August 21. The roadmap proposes freezing, reducing, and ultimately eliminating the North Korean nuclear arsenal.[7] Senior North Korean officials have repeatedly rejected negotiations over their nuclear program, however.
Lee separately announced that South Korea would increase its defense spending after he met with US President Donald Trump on August 25.[8] Trump has repeatedly called for an increase in South Korean military spending, which has been around 2.6 percent of GDP.[9] South Korean National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said that the military spending increase supports the South Korean goal of “taking a leading role in the combined defense posture.” Wi was referencing the Lee administration’s effort to regain wartime operational control from the United States.[10]
Trump and Lee both expressed during the meeting their desire to engage North Korea diplomatically.[11] They also reaffirmed their interest in a trilateral summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. A dialogue with Kim appears unlikely despite Lee and Trump’s commitment, however. North Korea responded to the Trump-Lee meeting by rejecting diplomatic engagement until South Korea abandons its effort to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.[12]
Key Takeaways
- The second round of legislative recall votes in Taiwan failed. This highlights the failure of the ruling DPP to rally the public in order to remove legislators from the opposition KMT. The failed recall votes will likely strengthen the KMT politically and reduce its incentive to cooperate with the DPP.
- The Lai Ching-te administration approved the 2026 budget proposal, which would increase military spending from around 2.08 to 3.32 percent of GDP. The budget included special funds for procuring artillery, attack drones, and other munitions. The budget has gone to the KMT-controlled legislature for approval.
- South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has pushed for dialogue between the United States, South Korea, and North Korea, especially to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Senior North Korean officials have rejected his overtures. Lee separately announced that South Korea will increase its military spending.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
See Topline Text
China
PRC roll-on-roll-off (ro-ro) vessels deviated from their typical routes and docked in Fujian, indicating their possible participation in an amphibious landing exercise. The PLA seeks to use ro-ro vessels to increase its sealift capacity, which would be invaluable in an invasion of Taiwan. Open-source researcher Damien Symon reported on August 23 that the ro-ros had diverted to a PLA training zone.[13] Two of the ships—the Bohai Zuanzhu and Zhong Hua Fu Xing—docked at Quanzhou port; the other five in nearby waters.[14] Data from ship-tracking software Starboard Maritime Intelligence confirmed the two docked ships were in Xiamen Bay on August 23 before following a near-identical route northward on August 24.
Civilian ro-ro vessels boost sealift capabilities by providing another means of transporting amphibious landing forces.[15] The PLA would likely try to secure sea lanes to landing beaches before dispatching civilian vessels as a mode of troop transport.[16] The PRC has accelerated its production of civilian ro-ro vessels in recent years. The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated that the PRC would produce at least 200 more ro-ro vessels, largely for commercial use but with potential military applications, between 2023 and 2026.[17] The PLA first used a large civilian ro-ro vessel in a training exercise in August 2021, when a combined arms brigade practiced long-distance troop transport using the Bohai Pearl.[18]
The PLA is developing other amphibious platforms to enhance its ability to assault Taiwan and other regional islands. The PLA announced on August 1 that it had debuted its fourth Type 075 amphibious assault vessel—the CNS Hubei—during a South China Sea exercise.[19] The PLA in March 2025 tested new “Shuiqiao” amphibious landing barges with extendable bridges capable of forming a pier.[20] The PLA Navy commissioned two Type 075 vessels between 2021 and 2022, likely to support vertical landing and air assault operations.[21]
A federal jury in California convicted US Navy sailor Jinchao Wei of espionage for transmitting classified information to a PRC intelligence officer. Such espionage risks undermining the US military advantage relative to the PRC. A PRC intelligence officer approached Wei on social media while Wei was serving as a machinist’s mate on the USS Essex amphibious assault ship in February 2022. Wei provided detailed information about the Essex’s weapons and propulsion systems as well as copies of technical manuals and sensitive information about other US Navy ships in exchange for over 12,000 US dollars. US authorities arrested Wei in August 2023.[22] The Essex participated in the 2022 Rim of the Pacific exercise alongside ships from US allies, including Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. The exercise occurred several months after PRC intelligence recruited Wei.[23]
Wei’s case is one of several PRC espionage operations targeting US Navy personnel, ships, systems, and installations in recent years. PRC intelligence recruited Petty Officer Wenheng Zhao in 2021 while he was working at Naval Base Ventura County, paying him at least 14,866 US dollars in exchange for plans for a large-scale maritime Indo-Pacific exercise and information on ground-mobile radar systems on Okinawa.[24] Defense analyst Tom Shugart noted that the PRC likely sought this information so that the PLA can target and destroy these radars before they are deployed.[25] The US Department of Justice also charged two PRC nationals with spying on behalf of the Ministry of State Security—the primary PRC intelligence organization—in July 2025. The two allegedly cooperated to gather contact information for US Navy recruits to serve as PRC assets.[26] CDOT-ISW has separately reported on the exposure of PRC espionage operations targeting overseas US Navy ships and facilities in South Korea and the Philippines.[27]
Northeast Asia
Japan
Nothing Significant To Report.
North Korea
Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un will attend the PRC’s 80th Anniversary of the end of World War II in the Pacific parade on September 3, a continuation of increasing diplomatic engagement between the two states. PRC state media reported on August 28 that Kim will meet with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin during the visit.[28] This visit marks Kim’s first overseas trip since he went to Russia in September 2023 and his first in-person meeting with Xi since June 2019.[29]
The PRC likely seeks to emphasize its close alignment with Russia and North Korea amid US outreach to both parties. Trump met with Putin on August 15 for negotiations on the Russia-Ukraine war and met with President Lee on August 25 to discuss inter-Korean relations.[30] Trump has repeatedly called for a summit with Kim, although Kim has rejected this idea until the United States and South Korea abandon their effort to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.[31] PRC-North Korea exchanges have decreased since 2019, while Russia and North Korea have meaningfully expanded their partnership.
Note: A version of the following text appeared in ISW’s Adversary Entente Task Force update on August 27.
North Korean state media aired footage for the first time on August 22 showing North Korean forces operating alongside Russian troops in Kursk Oblast, Russia, highlighting the longstanding ISW warning that North Korea could gain valuable tactical and technical lessons from its involvement in fighting Ukraine.[32] North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met with North Korean commanding officers, who participated in the “overseas” operations to “liberate the Kursk Region of the Russian Federation,” in Pyongyang on August 21.[33] North Korean state media posted pictures on August 22 of Kim pinning medals on the photos of North Korean soldiers who died in combat in Kursk Oblast.[34] Images of the ceremony show at least 100 North Korean soldiers killed in action—the first North Korean confirmation of casualties suffered in Kursk Oblast.[35] Ukrainian intelligence has estimated that North Korea sustained around 5,000 soldier casualties in Kursk Oblast as of August 2025.[36]
North Korean state outlet Korean Central Television (KCTV) released footage on August 22 as part of a ceremonial concert for North Korean troops who fought in Kursk Oblast, showing North Korean soldiers in combat—sometimes in North Korean-only units and sometimes alongside Russian forces and prominent Russian commanders.[37] The footage includes several tactical and technical artifacts that underline the modern combat conditions that North Korean troops experienced while fighting in Kursk Oblast, including clips of North Korean soldiers operating first-person view (FPV) drones and installing counter-drone measures to protect against Ukrainian drone strikes.[38] One clip shows Russian soldiers showing North Korean troops how to operate a captured US Mk-19 grenade launcher, and other clips showcase North Korean troops using a range of Russian- and North Korean-origin weapons in combat. The KCTV footage also shows North Korean troops executing fire team-level clearing exercises around buildings.
Kim likely agreed to send upwards of 12,000 North Korean soldiers to fight alongside Russian forces for them to acquire the sort of tactical and technical experience depicted in the KCTV footage.[39] South Korea’s National Intelligence Service warned in October 2024 that North Korean forces were interested in receiving training from Russian forces on drone operations and on how to integrate drones into wider offensive operations.[40] The KCTV footage depicts several instances of North Korean forces operating FPV drones, which have become a critical component in shaping the battlespace in Ukraine. FPV drones are generally inexpensive, easy to operate, and have an average range of 20 kilometers (sometimes more or less, depending on the model), therefore representing an attractive and low-cost addition to the North Korean arsenal. North Korea’s integration of FPV tactics is likely to pose substantial security risks on the wider Korean Peninsula as North Korea likely seeks to institutionalize lessons learned into its wider doctrine. North Korean forces also received exposure to various anti-drone techniques and technologies from Russian forces.[41] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov recently remarked that North Korea’s involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine has “transformed” the North Korean military, echoing ISW’s warnings.[42]
South Korea
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung will send National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik to attend the PRC’s Victory Day parade on September 3.[43] The PRC reportedly sought Lee’s attendance initially. South Korea rejected the invitation for Lee to avoid straining relations with the United States.[44] Nevertheless, Woo’s attendance aligns with Lee’s effort to improve relations with the PRC. Lee sent a delegation to the PRC on August 24-26, which coincided with his summit with Trump on August 25.[45] The simultaneous visits reflect Lee’s intent to engage with both the United States and PRC and avoid aligning overly with either state. The PRC has responded to Lee’s efforts by resuming cultural and economic exchanges that had been suspendedsince 2016, following the deployment of the US-provided Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.[46] PRC entertainment companies are planning South Korean musical performances in the PRC’s Fujian Province on September 13 and 14. These events would mark the first performances by South Korean artists there.[47] There have been reports of additional planned K-pop events in the PRC, including a “Dream Concert” in Hainan Province that would involve 40,000 attendees but is currently postponed.[48]
The postponement of certain concerts indicates that the PRC has not yet fully reopened to economic and cultural exchange with South Korea. This may be due to growing anti-PRC sentiment in South Korea, which the PRC leadership has criticized, blaming “far-right demagogues.”[49] Lee condemned a series of “verbally abusive and violent” anti-PRC rallies within South Korea on August 12, acknowledging and responding to PRC calls for a crackdown on such protests.[50] South Korea is anticipating a visit from CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit this October.[51] The PRC has not yet confirmed Xi’s attendance, however. The Lee administration will likely intensify its diplomatic efforts in hopes of securing the visit, which could represent a significant diplomatic breakthrough after the strained bilateral relations during South Korea’s previous Yoon Suk-yeol administration.
Southeast Asia
Philippines
The PRC operated two research vessels around Scarborough Shoal for the first time, possibly to improve maritime domain awareness to support an increased naval, coast guard, and maritime militia presence around the disputed shoal. The oceanographic research ship Xiang Yang Hong 10 conducted unknown operations around Scarborough Shoal from August 15 to 20. The Zhu Hai Yun—a research ship built as the world’s first “intelligent” drone mothership—similarly operated around Scarborough Shoal on August 18-22.[52] Data from the ship tracking software Starboard shows that the Zhu Hai Yun briefly operated around the shoal on July 26, which appears to be the first deployment of a PRC research ship to the shoal in at least the past five years. Both ships have close ties to the PRC government and military and have the capability to launch unmanned underwater vehicles.[53] The China Coast Guard (CCG) has used both ships and similar research vessels to carry out likely dual-use undersea surveys around critical locations, such as Taiwan, Guam, and other parts of the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in recent years.[54] It is unlikely that the research ships around Scarborough Shoal were searching for debris or personnel that fell in the water due to a collision between a CCG ship and a PLA Navy ship on August 11. Neither ship sailed near the collision site, and the Zhu Hai Yun’s activity near the shoal in late July suggests it may have been continuing pre-planned operations.
Scarborough Shoal is an unoccupied atoll in the Philippine EEZ west of Luzon, claimed by the Philippines, the PRC, and Taiwan. The PRC seized the shoal from the Philippines in 2012 using CCG ships, claiming it as PRC territory. The PRC has maintained control of the shoal with a growing patrol force of CCG, PLAN, and Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) ships, but has refrained from building infrastructure on the atoll. Philippine and PRC ships have frequently clashed at the shoal in recent years. The CCG and PLA Navy have used water cannons, blocking maneuvers, lasers, aerial interceptions, and jamming to harass, block, and expel Philippine government ships and aircraft that approach the area. Increasingly aggressive PRC maneuvers led to the CCG-PLA Navy collision on August 11.
The ships may have been conducting surveys to improve maritime domain awareness in support of the PRC’s ramped-up PLA Navy and CCG operations around the shoal. The ships have the capabilities to conduct seabed mapping, conduct hydrographic surveying, and place underwater monitoring or navigational devices, all of which are useful for submarine navigation or for detecting foreign submarines in the area.[55] Hydrographic research around the shoal could serve PRC efforts to survey and prepare for a more permanent occupation of the area. The Philippines noted an increased presence of CCG and CMM ships around the shoal on August 17.[56] The PRC is unlikely to build infrastructure on the shoal directly even if it expands its patrols, however. It has been careful not to openly violate the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea that it signed with Southeast Asian countries, which forbids inhabiting any previously uninhabited features in the South China Sea.[57]
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) reported that CCG and CMM ships conducted exercises near Second Thomas Shoal for the first time since 2024. The PRC appears to be intensifying its aggression towards the Philippines in the South China Sea following the collision of two PRC vessels attempting to block a Philippine resupply vessel on August 11. The AFP observed 5 CCG ships, 9 CMM ships, and 11 smaller CCG rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIBs) and fast boats near and within Second Thomas Shoal on August 20. Some of the vessels were armed with mounted heavy machine guns—marking the first instance of this— and conducted maneuver drills and training with onboard water cannons. The AFP also spotted a PLA Navy helicopter and a PRC drone flying near the shoal.[58] The armed small boats reportedly sailed within 50 meters of the BRP Sierra Madre, which the Philippines intentionally ran aground at Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 and uses as a base for Philippine Marines.[59] CCG spokesperson Gan Yu claimed on August 22 that the CCG had conducted unspecified “control measures” against two small Philippine boats deployed from the BRP Sierra Madre within the shoal.[60] The AFP denied that there had been any coercive action near the shoal, however.[61] The PRC often claims to conduct enforcement measures in the South China Sea that are subsequently denied by other states, likely reflecting the PRC’s desire to portray a more active presence in disputed waters. The Philippine Navy (PN) observed 13 CMM ships, 2 CCG ships, and a PLA Navy tugboat operating near the shoal on August 25. The PN assessed that the tugboat was likely intended to assist any PRC ships that accidentally ran aground, rather than to remove the BRP Sierra Madre, a longstanding PRC demand.[62]
The PRC’s deployments near Second Thomas Shoal mark the first major PRC activity in the area since June 2024. PLA Navy and CCG ships disrupted a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal at that time, deploying tear gas, intentionally ramming the Philippine ships and damaging their hulls with blades, and injuring 8 Philippine sailors.[63]The PRC and the Philippines reached a “provisional arrangement” in July 2024 to avoid further escalation.[64]The Philippines sent resupply missions to the shoal largely without incident under this agreement.[65] The resumption and intensification of PRC activity around Second Thomas Shoal marks an inflection point in PRC operations. The PRC is likely attempting to assert itself following the accidental PLA Navy-CCG collision on August 11.[66]The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) publicized video footage of the collision, calling the CCG’s aggressive maneuvering near the Philippine ships “risky” and “reckless.”[67]CCG small boats have substantially improved the CCG’s ability to intercept and disrupt Philippine resupply missions.[68] The deployment of a large number of heavily armed CCG small boats likely indicates a more aggressive PRC strategy around Second Thomas Shoal.
Oceania
New Zealand released a report highlighting the danger of PRC espionage around the time that it made its first-ever espionage conviction. PRC spying in Oceania underscores its coalition-breaking efforts among the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing group. An unnamed New Zealand soldier received a two-year military prison sentence on August 20 for attempting to pass secrets to what he believed was an undisclosed foreign power. The soldier attempted to supply an undercover police officer collecting intelligence on right-wing extremists with maps and directories of military bases as well as login information for a military network.[69]
New Zealand has sought to demonstrate that it is on high alert for espionage and foreign interference by multiple actors, including the PRC. The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) released a report in August stating that the PRC, Russia, and Iran “are willing to engage in covert or deceptive activity in order to influence discussions and decisions” and that New Zealand “has been targeted by some of these activities.”[70] The report identified the PRC as the “most active” state involved in foreign interference in New Zealand.[71] NZSIS released the report weeks after Australia sentenced a PRC national for foreign interference—only the third time Australia had used this sentence.[72] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning said that New Zealand’s security intelligence agencies “have repeatedly spread rumors” and “harass and intimidate overseas Chinese in New Zealand” in an August 21 press conference.[73]
New Zealand and Australia are both members of the Five Eyes, an intelligence-sharing group that also includes the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Five Eyes coalition-building efforts in Oceania illustrate a concerted response to espionage threats by foreign powers, including the PRC. United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Kash Patel announced the opening of a law enforcement attaché office in Wellington, in part to counter “foreign intelligence threats,” in July.[74]
South Asia:
PRC-India bilateral engagements underscore efforts to normalize relations despite ongoing border tensions. The PRC likely seeks to keep India from strengthening its ties with the United States and US allies. Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar met with PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi in New Delhi on August 18, discussed strengthening bilateral ties and affirmed that the 2026 and 2027 BRICS Summits will be held in India and the PRC, respectively. The PRC and India both expressed interest in resuming direct flights between the two countries, which have been paused since the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020 .[75] Wang also met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on August 19 and discussed strengthening PRC-India ties.[76]
PRC rhetoric belies the underlying rivalry between the PRC and India. Jaishankar expressed concerns about the environmental impact of the PRC-constructed Brahmaputra dam, which could reportedly decrease the dry-season water supply by 85 percent.[77] The PRC and India remain locked in a “race for dams,” further complicated by the 2020 border clashes.[78] The PRC likely wants to present strong ties with India in order to portray regional coalitions like BRICS as united, with the PRC as the implied leader of the “Global South.”
The PRC also likely seeks to constrain India’s relations with regional partners amid broader regional coalition-building efforts. The Philippines and India held a joint patrol in the South China Sea in August, and the Philippines expressed interest in purchasing more BrahMos missiles—supersonic missiles the Philippines has hailed as a “significant game-changer” against the PRC—from India.[79] The PRC expressed dissatisfaction with a “certain non-regional country” who sought to “stir up trouble” likely referring to India.[80] The PRC’s meeting with India took place shortly before the US 50-percent tariffs against India were set to take effect. The PRC likely used this opportunity to exploit US economic policy to portray itself as a more reliable partner for India. The PRC will likely continue to attempt to drive a wedge between India and its partners.
The PRC held high-level meetings with Afghanistan and Pakistan. The PRC likely aims to project an image of neutral to positive involvement in Afghanistan while remaining cautious of engagement with the Taliban to avoid harming its relations with Pakistan. PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi met with Afghan Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani on August 20 and expressed support for bilateral patrols of the Wakhan Corridor—a thin strip of land connecting the PRC and Afghanistan. Wang also emphasized PRC support for Afghan economic initiatives and opposition to “unreasonable suppression and freezing of assets” against Afghanistan.[81] Wang also joined a trilateral meeting with Afghanistan and Pakistan on August 20, the sixth such foreign ministers meeting.[82] The PRC expressed interest in extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) between Xinjiang and Afghanistan, confirming an earlier agreement.[83]
PRC engagement with the Taliban revolves primarily around security, as the PRC aims to prevent Afghanistan from hosting terrorist groups. The PRC seeks the Taliban’s reassurance that it will not provide a base for the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an anti-PRC Uyghur militant group affiliated with the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) also active in Syria.[84] The PRC has engaged cautiously with the Taliban, seeking to maintain a diplomatic foothold without officially recognizing them as the legitimate Afghan government. The PRC accepted the credentials of the Taliban’s ambassador to the PRC in 2023 and was the first country to send an ambassador to Afghanistan since the 2021 Taliban takeover.[85] Only Russia has formally recognized the Taliban at the time of writing.[86] The PRC’s approach toward the Taliban could reflect its desire to support Russia’s stance while retaining a measure of distance in support of Pakistan. The PRC and Pakistan maintain longstanding economic and security ties, and Pakistan’s ties with the new Taliban regime remain largely untested, positioning the PRC as an ideal trilateral mediator.[87]
The PRC will likely struggle to extend CPEC through Afghanistan, given ongoing security and governance concerns. CPEC’s flagship initiative, the development of Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, has largely failed to produce the commercial gains investors anticipated.[88] Observers have expressed concern that the PRC could commandeer Gwadar as a military outpost due to its strategic position near the Persian Gulf.[89]
[1] https://www dot cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202508200094.aspx
https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202508200021
[2] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202508260334.aspx
[3] https://def.ltn dot com.tw/article/breakingnews/5151466
[4] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202508210293.aspx
[5] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202508210293.aspx
[6] https://www.ey dot gov.tw/File/519ABE515D45B854?A=C
[7] https://www.hankookilbo dot com/News/Read/A2025082116180000538; https://www.chosun dot com/politics/blue_house/2025/08/21/BRT53PCNX5EZRPCY352NGINUJE/
[8] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20250826095051504?section=politics/all&site=topnews02
[9] https://www.mk dot co.kr/news/world/11389590
[10] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20250826095051504?section=politics/all&site=topnews02
[11] https://nk.news1 dot kr/news/articles/5890904
[12] https://nk.news1 dot kr/news/articles/5891704; https://www.chosun dot com/politics/north_korea/2025/07/29/X3X3PP4TQ5D7XC6R2E3ZF4BPWY/
[13] https://x.com/detresfa_/status/1959143058756325655
[14] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3322697/why-are-7-large-mainland-chinese-ro-ro-cargo-ships-sailing-taiwan-strait
[15] https://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Chinese-Amphibious-Warfare_Prospects-for-a-Cross-Strait-Invasion.pdf
[16] https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/10/the-pla-conducts-amphibious-training-drills-with-civilian-ro-ro-cargo-vessels/
[17] https://chinapower.csis.org/analysis/china-construct-ro-ro-vessels-military-implications/
[18] https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/10/the-pla-conducts-amphibious-training-drills-with-civilian-ro-ro-cargo-vessels/
[19] https://www.newsweek.com/china-new-warship-debuts-contested-waters-2107396
[20] https://www.andrewerickson.com/2025/03/cmsi-note-14-bridges-over-troubled-waters-shuiqiao-class-landing-barges-in-pla-navy-amphibious-operations/
[21] https://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Chinese-Amphibious-Warfare_Prospects-for-a-Cross-Strait-Invasion.pdf
[22] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-navy-sailor-convicted-spying-china ; https://www.newsweek.com/us-navy-china-spying-sailor-espionage-2116920
[23] https://news.usni.org/2022/08/01/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-aug-1-2022
[24] https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/us-navy-sailor-sentenced-27-months-prison-transmitting-sensitive-us-military-information
[25] https://news.usni.org/2023/08/10/spying-targets-point-to-chinese-interest-in-amphibious-warfare-experts-say
[26] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-charges-two-individuals-acting-agents-prc-government
[27] https://www.aei.org/articles/china-taiwan-weekly-update-july-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-july-3-2025; https://www.aei.org/articles/china-taiwan-weekly-update-march-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-march-27-2025
[28] https://www.yna dot co.kr/view/AKR20250828136600009; http://www.news dot cn/20250828/08987475b3af48048ba82f09adc37c60/c.html
[29] http://www.news dot cn/20250828/08987475b3af48048ba82f09adc37c60/c.html; https://www.nknews dot org/2025/08/kim-jong-un-to-attend-major-chinese-military-parade-in-early-september-beijing/
[30] https://www.cnn dot com/politics/live-news/trump-putin-meeting-news-08-15-25; https://www.reuters dot com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-lee-dodges-zelenskiy-moment-high-stakes-trump-summit-2025-08-26/
[31] https://www.politico dot com/news/2025/07/29/north-korea-says-kim-trump-ties-are-not-bad-but-its-not-giving-up-its-nukes-00480943
[32] https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/north-korean-tv-airs-extensive-footage-of-troops-fighting-ukraine-for-first-time/?t=1756134132&login=recaptcha&popup=signin
[33] https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1755727714-129921799/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-meets-leading-commanding-officers-of-overseas-operation-unit-of-kpa/
[34] https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/north-korea-confirms-over-100-dead-troops-from-ukraine-war-at-pyongyang-ceremony/
[35] https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/north-korea-confirms-over-100-dead-troops-from-ukraine-war-at-pyongyang-ceremony/
[36] https://www.japantimes.co dot jp/news/2025/08/13/world/politics/ukraine-military-intelligence-chief-interview/
[37] https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/north-korean-tv-airs-extensive-footage-of-troops-fighting-ukraine-for-first-time/?t=1756134132&login=recaptcha&popup=signin
[38] https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/north-korean-tv-airs-extensive-footage-of-troops-fighting-ukraine-for-first-time/?t=1756134132&login=recaptcha&popup=signin
[39] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine-operational-and-strategic-implications
[40] https://www.khan dot co.kr/article/202410232110045
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[43] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20250822060400001?section=politics/all
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[48] https://www.yna.co dot kr/view/AKR20250430083500005
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[52] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3322497/why-has-china-sent-research-vessels-scarborough-shoal-after-collision
[53] https://www.kharon.com/brief/china-drone-ship-zhu-hai-yun-military-end-use ; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinese-research-vessels-operating-indian-ocean-2024-02-22/
[54] https://maritime-executive.com/article/china-s-research-vessels-are-drawing-attention-in-neighbors-waters ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-8-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-july-21-2025
[55] http://reuters.com/world/china/china-warns-deep-sea-spying-devices-underwater-lighthouses-that-guide-foreign-2024-10-29/
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[57] https://asean dot org/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2/
[58] https://news.usni.org/2025/08/21/china-deploys-armed-small-boats-to-secondthomas-shoal; https://x.com/TeamAFP/status/1958552246335201708
[59] https://www.sealight.live/posts/flashpoint-second-thomas-shoal-again
[60] http://www.news dot cn/world/20250822/7223295237d5411eba5c3f13bea0921b/c.html
[61] https://www.manilatimes dot net/2025/08/24/news/brawner-orders-troops-stop-china-from-boarding-brp-sierra-madre-at-all-costs/2172577
[62] https://www.pna.gov dot ph/articles/1257330
[63] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-june-21-2024; https://www.aei.org/articles/china-taiwan-weekly-update-june-21-2024/
[64] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/fyrbt/202407/t20240730_11463281.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-resupply-ship-south-china-sea-shoal-without-us-help-2024-07-21/
[65] https://news.usni.org/2024/07/29/philippines-performs-first-sierra-madre-resupply-since-inking-deal-with-china
[66] https://www.aei.org/articles/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-august-18-2025
[67] https://x.com/jaytaryela/status/1954821095976305114
[68] https://amti.csis.org/shifting-tactics-at-second-thomas-shoal/
[69] https://apnews.com/article/soldier-white-nationalist-espionage-new-zealand-sentence-c04660d4155e770aef7006aaf4e7f200
[70] https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/NZSIS-Documents/New-Zealands-Security-Threat-Environment-2025.pdf
[71] https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/NZSIS-Documents/New-Zealands-Security-Threat-Environment-2025.pdf
[72] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-08-04/chinese-national-charged-under-foreign-interference-laws/105611300
[73] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202508/t20250821_11693619.shtml
[74] https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-opens-standalone-office-in-new-zealand
[75] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202508/t20250819_11692653.shtml; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/india-china-agree-resume-direct-flights-boost-business-links-2025-08-19/
[76] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202508/t20250819_11692657.shtml
[77] https://www.newsweek.com/water-war-china-india-brahmaputra-hydropower-2119192
[78] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002216942401998X
[79] https://www.newsweek.com/philippines-brahmos-missile-india-china-south-china-sea-1892621
[80] https://www.newsweek.com/philippines-brahmos-missile-india-china-south-china-sea-1892621
[81] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202508/t20250821_11693305.shtml
[82] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202508/t20250821_11693303.shtml
[83] https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-afghanistan-china-kabul-summit-trade-0e94ac1e4ced8f44a46ab4ae9ac1c4f8
[84] https://apnews.com/article/79d6a427b26f4eeab226571956dd256e; https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/afghanistan-chinas-challenging-relationship-taliban/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-january-16-2025
[85] https://www.voanews.com/a/what-will-it-take-for-taliban-to-gain-recognition-from-china-others-/7390814.html
[86] https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-afghanistan-china-kabul-summit-trade-0e94ac1e4ced8f44a46ab4ae9ac1c4f8
[87] https://www.cfr.org/article/pakistans-support-taliban-what-know
[88] https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-struggles-to-bring-trade-to-china-built-port/7932597.html
[89] https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/7/
