Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 24, 2024

Apr 24, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 24, 2024

Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 24, 2024, 8:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on April 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Joe Biden announced on April 24 that the US will begin sending military equipment to Ukraine “a few hours” after signing a bill that will provide roughly $60 billion of assistance to Ukraine. Biden signed the Ukraine supplemental appropriations bill on April 24 after the US Senate passed the bill on the evening of April 23 and the US House passed the bill on April 20, and Biden emphasized the need to deliver military assistance to Ukraine as quickly as possible.[1] The Pentagon announced that the first tranche of US military assistance from this bill is worth $1 billion and includes: RIM-7 and AIM-9M air defense missiles; Stinger anti-aircraft missiles; HIMARS ammunition; 60mm mortar rounds; 105mm and 155mm artillery shells; Bradley infantry fighting vehicles; High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs or Humvees); Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs); Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; precision aerial munitions; and other equipment and transport vehicles.[2] Russian forces have recently intensified offensive operations east of Chasiv Yar and northwest of Avdiivka in Donetsk Oblast in an effort to take advantage of the limited window before US security assistance arrives in Ukraine.[3] The bill’s relatively quick passage through the US Senate has eliminated a potential source of delay, however, and US security assistance may arrive at the frontline in Ukraine within the next few weeks ahead of Russian expectations. The battlefield situation will continue to degrade until Ukrainian forces can receive and use enough military equipment at scale, however, and Ukrainian forces may still struggle to defend against Russian efforts near Chasiv Yar and northwest of Avdiivka in the near term.[4]

The United States reportedly provided an unspecified number of long-range ATACMS missiles to Ukraine in March 2024, some of which Ukraine has already used to strike Russian targets in deep rear areas. Western media reported that senior US officials stated that the United States secretly shipped an unspecified number of ATACMS with a range of roughly 300 kilometers to Ukraine in March 2024.[5] A senior US official reportedly stated that Ukrainian forces have since conducted strikes with the ATACMS missiles against a Russian military base in occupied Crimea and an unspecified target east of occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.[6] Geolocated footage published on April 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking several radar systems for a Russian S-300 air defense system southeast of occupied Volnovakha (northeast of Berdyansk).[7] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions 10 times in Babakh-Tarama (immediately east of Berdyansk) on the night of April 23 to 24.[8] It is unclear if either of these strikes is the strike to which the US official was referring, and Ukrainian military officials have yet to confirm a Ukrainian strike near Berdyansk. Ukrainian forces appear to have used ATACMS missiles in a strike against a Russian military airfield in occupied Dzhankoi, Crimea on the night of April 16 to 17 that reportedly destroyed or critically damaged four S-400 air defense launchers, three radar stations, an air defense equipment control point, and a Murom-M airspace surveillance system.[9] US officials told Western media that the United States will include additional long-range ATACMS missiles as part of the announced $1 billion tranche of security assistance for Ukraine.[10]

The arrival of long-range ATACMS missiles in sufficient quantities will allow Ukrainian forces to degrade Russian logistics and threaten Russian airfields in deep rear areas, although months of delay may have provided the Russian military time to offset the potential operational impacts that ATACMS will afford Ukraine. Ukraine used US-provided ATACMS long-range missiles to strike Russian targets in occupied Ukraine for the first time on October 17, 2023, targeting Russian airfields in occupied Berdyansk and Luhansk City.[11] Ukrainian forces likely aimed to disrupt Russian aviation support for localized Russian offensive efforts at the time but were not provided with enough ATACMS to conduct a sustained interdiction effort against Russian aviation assets at scale.[12] Cluster-munition-armed versions of the ATACMS missiles allow Ukrainian forces to conduct more efficient strikes against airfields that can more widely destroy Russian aircraft and other assets than individual missile strikes on individual aircraft.[13] These strikes may prompt Russian forces to relocate aircraft further away from the frontline, although this would likely be much more significant for Russian rotary-wing aircraft than for most Russian fixed-wing aircraft that have much longer ranges.[14] Russian forces used rotary-wing aircraft to significant effect when repelling Ukrainian mechanized assaults during Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive in Zaporizhia Oblast but have since employed far fewer rotary-wing aircraft in support of ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.[15] Russian forces are currently heavily using fixed-wing aircraft to conduct glide bomb strikes throughout the frontline, and the withdrawal of these aircraft to airfields further away from the front would likely only have marginal impacts on the loitering time Russian pilots have to conduct glide bomb strikes.[16]

The arrival of ATACMS long-range missiles could also pose a significant threat to Russian ammunition depots in rear areas and may force the Russian command to choose between fortifying existing depots and further dispersing depots throughout occupied Ukraine.[17] Russian forces may already have adapted to the potential new Ukrainian strike capabilities following the use of ATACMS in October 2023, although it remains unclear if Russian forces sufficiently hardened ammunition depots or widely dispersed depots.[18] The arrival of HIMARS in Ukraine in June 2022 allowed Ukrainian forces to conduct an operationally significant interdiction campaign in support of counteroffensive operations in Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts and forced the Russian command to extend Russian logistics along longer ground lines of communications (GLOCs), which ultimately complicated the Russian provision of ammunition and supplies.[19] If the Russian command began efforts to offset the impacts of ATCAMS in October 2023, then Ukrainian ATACMS strikes in spring and summer 2024 may present fewer challenges to Russian logistics in Ukraine. Long-range ATACMS will, nonetheless, allow Ukrainian forces to threaten a wider set of Russian targets in deep rear areas, and Ukrainian forces can use the ATACMS to cause more substantial damage to Russian logistics facilities and critical bridges along key Russian GLOCs. Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics or Russian aviation assets in deep rear areas will likely be operationally significant, however, only if Ukrainian forces successfully coordinate them with ground operations to exploit the degraded Russian capabilities resulting from the strikes.

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against Russian energy and industrial facilities in Smolensk and Lipetsk oblasts on the night of April 23 to 24. Unspecified sources told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on April 24 that Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) successfully conducted drone strikes against oil depots in Yartsevo and Razdorovo, Smolensk Oblast.[20] Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin stated that the drone strikes caused fires at fuel and energy facilities in two raions in Smolensk Oblast.[21] Geolocated footage published on April 24 shows fire and smoke at oil depots near Razdorovo and Yartsevo.[22] Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed that a drone fell in an industrial zone in Lipetsk Oblast on the night of April 23 to 24.[23] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that two drones struck the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant in Lipetsk City, damaging part of a building and forcing the plant to shut down two oxygen units.[24] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted Ukrainian drones in Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, and Smolensk oblasts on the night of April 23 to 24.[25]

Russian authorities arrested Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov on April 24 on charges of accepting bribes, although other Russian sources reported that Ivanov is suspected of treason. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on April 23 that Russian authorities detained Ivanov and are investigating whether he accepted bribes, and the Moscow Basmanny Court formally arrested Ivanov on April 24 for the bribery charge.[26] Ivanov has been responsible for property management, troop quartering, housing, and medical support for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) since 2016, and the Basmanny Court stated that Ivanov accepted bribes while conducting contract and subcontract work for the Russian MoD.[27] Russian authorities also arrested Ivanov’s alleged business partner Sergei Borodin for complicity in Ivanov‘s corruption.[28] Ivanov’s lawyer stated that the defense will appeal Ivanov’s arrest.[29] Russian media reported that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) has been collecting case materials on Ivanov’s corruption for at least a month and possibly up to five years.[30] The FSB stated that FSB military counterintelligence is involved in the investigation into Ivanov, and Russian opposition sources noted that is not typical for the military counterintelligence department to handle corruption issues.[31]

Russian opposition media outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported that two sources close to the FSB stated that Russian authorities suspect Ivanov of treason, and that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the FSB to detain Ivanov under the guise of bribery after convincing the FSB that Ivanov had committed treason.[32] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov responded to Vazhnye Istorii’s reporting, claiming that he knows nothing about whether Ivanov is charged with treason and calling for an end to speculation about Ivanov’s arrest.[33] Russian sources have yet to specify what Ivanov‘s suspected treason may be connected to. Ukrainian media reported that sources in Ukrainian intelligence stated that the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a cyber infiltration of MoD networks in March 2024 and obtained official documents and confidential information about Ivanov, prompting Russian authorities to start an investigation into Ivanov.[34] The GUR sources reportedly noted that the Kremlin was already aware of Ivanov’s corruption but did not elaborate on what the reported documents about Ivanov detailed.[35] ISW has yet to observe evidence confirming the allegations of treason.

Ivanov’s arrest prompted Russian information space speculation about a new round of personnel changes in the Russian military and claims that the arrest is part of Kremlin factional conflicts. Russian insider sources claimed that Ivanov was a supporter of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and that his arrest is likely part of an effort to diminish the power and influence that Shoigu has cemented over the MoD since the Wagner Group rebellion in June 2023.[36] Russian insider sources differed on which faction is trying to undermine Shoigu’s position, however, with one claiming that First Deputy of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU) Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev targeted Ivanov because Ivanov had tried to fire Alekseyev and another Russian insider source claiming that a faction associated with Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitri Medvedev aims to disempower Shoigu.[37] A Russian insider source claimed that Russian oligarch Gennady Timchenko was Ivanov’s patron and that Timchenko routinely defended Ivanov to Putin.[38] A prominent Wagner-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ivanov is part of a Kremlin faction that has been lobbying for a “soft exit“ from the war in Ukraine.[39] ISW has not observed a preponderance of Russian claims suggesting that Ivanov’s arrest is associated with a specific factional dispute, however. Russian sources labeled Ivanov’s arrest the first of many expected personnel changes, specifically for Russian deputy defense ministers.[40] A Russian milblogger called the arrest the start of a “purge” within Russian military departments.[41] ISW has not observed indications that the Russian military has begun large-scale dismissals or detentions of Russian military personnel, however.

Russian ultranationalist milbloggers largely celebrated Ivanov’s arrest and used it as an opportunity to publicly criticize the Russian MoD. Russian milbloggers largely called for Russian courts to bring Ivanov to justice for his crimes and lamented the Russian MoD’s failures throughout the war, describing the arrest of an MoD official as long overdue.[42] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger tempered the other milbloggers’ celebrations, asking how much has meaningfully changed since the Russian MoD replaced many other officials throughout the war, including cycling some defense and military officials between posts rather than firing them outright.[43] Other milbloggers noted that Ivanov’s arrest brings much-desired justice even if nothing changes and that Ivanov’s arrest presents an opportunity for the MoD to clean the ”Augean stables” of their filth and corruption.[44] One milblogger even called for Russian authorities to send Ivanov to fight in the “forests of Lyman” - referring to the highly attritional, infantry-led Russian assaults in forest areas west and south of Kreminna.[45] Russian milbloggers have not directly criticized the Russian MoD or officials by name with such vitriol or magnitude since before the Wagner Group rebellion in June 2023 and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in August 2023.[46] The public nature of Ivanov’s arrest and charges appears to have opened the floodgates of broader Russian milblogger criticism of the Russian MoD, though it is unclear to what degree the milblogger community will sustain these complaints or return to its norm of self-censorship.

The Kremlin explicitly threatened Armenia if Armenia does not resume active engagement in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and resume its pro-Kremlin alignment. Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan announced on April 23 that he would not participate in the International Meeting of High Representatives for Security Issues in St. Petersburg on April 24 and 25.[47] Grigoryan’s refusal to participate in a Russian-led multilateral meeting is likely part of a continuing Armenian effort to distance Armenia from political and security relations with Russia by freezing its participation in the CSTO and refusing to participate in multilateral political and security engagements.[48] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) board meeting on April 23 to discuss promoting Russian interests in the South Caucasus, in which he claimed that the West is attempting to strategically defeat Russia by destabilizing ”other parts of the post-Soviet space, including the South Caucasus.”[49] Lavrov blamed the West for allegedly attempting to undermine and destroy Russian security and economic relations with countries in the South Caucasus. Lavrov is likely attempting to portray Armenian efforts to deepen relations with the West as a deliberate hostile Western effort against Russia to set information conditions to justify any potential future Russian efforts to coerce or force Armenia to resume its pro-Russian alignment. The Russian MFA also explicitly threatened Armenia by claiming that the West is attempting to “drag the South Caucasus into a geopolitical confrontation” between Russia and the West and warning that Armenia could “go down the wrong path,” following Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s April 5 meeting with senior EU and US officials.[50] CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov (a Kazakh official) also directly threatened Armenia if it did not resume active engagement in the CSTO. Tasmagambetov stated in an interview published on April 24 that the CSTO is aware of NATO’s activity in the South Caucasus and that the CSTO Secretariat’s analysts indicate that the balance of power in the South Caucasus may change if Armenia leaves the CSTO.[51] Tasmagambetov stated that he hopes that the likelihood of a “confrontation” between the CSTO and Armenia is “no more than hypothetical” but that such a confrontation would require all parties to consider their resources and capabilities. Lavrov’s and Tasmagambetov’s threats against Armenia were made around the April 24 Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day indicating that Russia likely intended to tie a tragedy in Armenian history with Armenia’s efforts to distance itself from Russia.

Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova deliberately misrepresented recent Qatari-mediated negotiations between Russia and Ukraine as the first face-to-face negotiations on the return of Ukrainian children forcibly removed and deported by Russia, likely in an effort to minimize Russia’s responsibility for the coordinated removal and deportation of Ukrainian children. Lvova-Belova posted deliberately misleading photos and claimed on April 24 that Qatari officials mediated face-to-face negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Doha and that the Russian delegation agreed to return 29 forcibly deported Ukrainian children from Russia to Ukraine.[52] Lvova-Belova claimed that previous statements that Russian authorities have forcibly deported thousands of Ukrainian children are “nothing more than a myth” and that Qatar is a witness to the truth, the latest talking point in Lvova-Belova's efforts to downplay and censor information about Russia’s illegal removal of Ukrainian children within Russian-controlled territory.[53] Lvova-Belova stated in an October 2023 report that Russia has “accepted” over 700,000 Ukrainian children since February 24, 2022, and the Ukrainian government has confirmed the deportation and/or displacement of 19,546 Ukrainian children as of January 2024, however.[54] Ukrainian Commissioner for Human Rights Dmytro Lubinets explicitly denied Lvova-Belova's claim about face-to-face negotiations and stated that there were “no direct negotiations” between the Russian and Ukrainian delegations on April 24.[55] Lubinets clarified that Qatari officials mediate all discussions and act as intermediaries for all negotiations on the return of Ukrainian children from Russia. Lubinets stated that the Ukrainian delegation met with Qatari International Cooperation Minister Lolwah Rashid Al-Khater to discuss the return of Ukrainian children, civilians, and prisoners of war (POWs) from Russia on April 24 and will meet with the Qatari delegation again on April 25. ISW has extensively reported on Russia’s forced deportation and removal of Ukrainian citizens, including children, and continues to assess that Russia is attempting to eliminate the Ukrainian language, culture, history, ethnicity, and identity, including through activities that appear to violate the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[56]

Moldovan authorities filed a criminal case against Yevgenia Gutsul, the Kremlin-affiliated governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, for campaign finance violations as Moldovan officials continue to warn about Russia’s threat to Moldova. Moldovan media reported on April 24 that the Moldovan Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office completed its criminal investigation into Gutsul’s connections with the Shor Party, a political party that sanctioned pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician Ilan Shor founded and financed, and filed a criminal case against Gutsul on two counts of knowingly accepting financial support from an organized criminal group.[57] The Moldovan Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office determined that Gutsul knowingly transported unaccounted funds from an organized criminal group likely based in Russia to Moldova and used those funds to support the Shor Party’s activities in Moldova while Gutsul worked as a secretary for the Shor Party from 2019 to 2022. The Moldovan Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office also charged Gutsul with knowingly organizing and paying anti-government protesters over 42.5 million Moldovan lei ($2.39 million) in illicit funds in October and November 2022. Gutsul denied the Moldovan government’s allegations and claimed that the Moldovan government fabricated the case against her.[58] The new pro-Russian Moldovan Victory electoral bloc, which is also affiliated with Shor, responded to the case and demanded that the Moldovan government end its “groundless” and politically-motivated prosecution of Gutsul.[59] The Victory electoral bloc threatened that “provocations” by the Moldovan government could “destabilize the situation in Gagauzia.” Pro-Kremlin actors may seize on and spin the legitimate criminal charges against Gutsul to justify Russian intervention and aggression in Moldova as necessary to protect Russia’s “compatriots abroad.”

Moldovan Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi stated during an interview with Bloomberg published on April 23 that Moldova is a “petri dish” of Russian hybrid warfare and election meddling.[60] Popșoi stated that Russia is using a range of covert and informational tactics to destabilize Moldova, including smuggling money into Moldova to bribe voters and protestors, creating deep fake videos of Moldovan politicians, and conducting cyberattacks against Moldovan infrastructure. Russia reportedly conducted a significant cyberattack against the Moldovan postal service and temporarily disrupted postal services in February 2024, and Moldovan authorities notably confiscated over one million dollars from Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politicians at the Chisinau airport on the night of April 22 to 23.[61] Popșoi, citing Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, noted that Russia is conducting daily rhetorical attacks against Moldova and Moldovan officials and that Moldovan officials are monitoring the possibility of a future Russian military threat to Moldova. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is likely engaged in hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing Moldovan society, degrading Moldova’s democracy, and preventing Moldovan’s accession to the EU.[62]

Key Takeaways:

US President Joe Biden announced on April 24 that the US will begin sending military equipment to Ukraine “a few hours” after signing a bill that will provide roughly $60 billion of assistance to Ukraine.
The United States reportedly provided an unspecified number of long-range ATACMS missiles to Ukraine in March 2024, some of which Ukraine has already used to strike Russian targets in deep rear areas.
The arrival of long-range ATACMS missiles in sufficient quantities will allow Ukrainian forces to degrade Russian logistics and threaten Russian airfields in deep rear areas, although months of delay may have provided the Russian military time to offset the potential operational impacts that ATACMS will afford Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against Russian energy and industrial facilities in Smolensk and Lipetsk oblasts on the night of April 23 to 24.
Russian authorities arrested Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov on April 24 on charges of accepting bribes, although other Russian sources reported that Ivanov is suspected of treason.
Ivanov’s arrest prompted Russian information space speculation about a new round of personnel changes in the Russian military and claims that the arrest is part of Kremlin factional conflicts.
Russian ultranationalist milbloggers largely celebrated Ivanov’s arrest and used it as an opportunity to publicly criticize the Russian MoD.
The Kremlin explicitly threatened Armenia if Armenia does not resume active engagement in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and resume its pro-Kremlin alignment.
Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova deliberately misrepresented recent Qatari-mediated negotiations between Russia and Ukraine as the first face-to-face negotiations on the return of Ukrainian children forcibly removed and deported by Russia, likely in an effort to minimize Russia’s responsibility for the coordinated removal and deportation of Ukrainian children.
Moldovan authorities filed a criminal case against Yevgenia Gutsul, the Kremlin-affiliated governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, for campaign finance violations as Moldovan officials continue to warn about Russia’s threat to Moldova.
Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and Robotyne.
Russian State Duma Committee on Information Policy Head Alexander Khinshtein stated on April 24 that unspecified Russian officials will soon submit a draft law to the State Duma that would ban the extradition of foreigners who have fought in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine if the foreigners face prosecution for their military service in their home countries.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Sumy Oblast Military Administration Head Volodymyr Artyukh stated on April 24 that Russian forces are increasing air strikes and cross-border raids by sabotage and reconnaissance groups against border areas in Sumy Oblast.[63]

Positional engagements continued near Svatove and Kreminna on April 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Positional fighting continued northwest of Svatove near Berestove; southwest of Svatove near Hrekivka and Novovodyane; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny, Torske, and Yampolivka; and southwest of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area.[64]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Siversk direction (northeast of Bakhmut) on April 24, but there were no changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Vyimka.[65] Elements of the Russian “GORB” Detachment (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Spirne.[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Chasiv Yar (east of Bakhmut) on April 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division continued assault operations near Chasiv Yar.[67] Russian forces continued attacking near the Novyi Microraion in southeastern Chasiv Yar; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bohdanivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Pivdenne.[68] A Ukrainian battalion commander operating near Chasiv Yar reported on April 24 that Russian assaults against Ivanivske in the past week were unsuccessful and that Russian forces are accumulating forces near Bakhmut to replenish losses and form new assault groups.[69] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Russian forces are conducting glide bomb strikes against buildings that provide Ukrainian forces significant cover in Chasiv Yar.[70] A Ukrainian soldier operating in Chasiv Yar told the WSJ that Russian forces usually attempt to advance at dawn and dusk when drone visibility is reduced but when it is not so dark that Russian personnel need night-vision goggles. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating west and south of Ivanivske; elements of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are operating east and southeast of the Kanal Microraion (easternmost outskirts of Chasiv Yar); elements of the 1307th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are operating near Klishchiivka; and elements of the 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR AC) and a brigade tactical group of the 7th Military Base (49th CAA) are operating near Andriivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[71]

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance west of Avdiivka amid continued Russian offensive operations in this area on April 24. Geolocated footage published on April 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central and northern Semenivka.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novobakhmutivka (northwest of Avdiivka and just south of Ocheretyne) and advanced east of Novokalynove (northwest of Avdiivka), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[73] Several Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka), while others claimed that Russian forces control most of the settlement.[74] ISW has still not observed visual confirmation of Russian claims that Russian forces have seized most or all of Ocheretyne. Russian forces continued attacks northwest of Avdiivka near Novokalynove, Ocheretyne, Soloyiove, Novobakhmutivka, and Berdychi; west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Netaylove, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske.[75] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on April 24 that the Russian military has begun introducing reserves from the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) into battle in the Novobakhmutivka-Ocheretyne direction to reinforce the salient to support future Russian combat operations.[76] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) and 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are operating near Ocheretyne, and that elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) and 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are operating in the Novokalynove-Keramik area (northwest of Avdiivka).[77] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 239th Tank Regiment and 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are operating near Umanske (west of Avdiivka).[78] Mashovets also stated that the Russian military is reallocating armored personnel carriers from the 15th Motorized Rifle Peacekeeping Brigade, elements of which recently withdrew from Nagorno-Karabakh, to elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade operating near Ocheretyne and elements of the 90th Tank Division operating near Umanske and Yasnobrodivka.

Russian forces reportedly continue to take risks to make tactically significant gains northwest of Avdiivka. The Telegraph reported on April 24 that Russian forces made their narrow penetration towards Ocheretyne on April 20-21 by attacking during a Ukrainian brigade-level rotation on the frontline.[79] ISW is unable to confirm this report. Russian milbloggers have recently credited Russian advances near Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar to “risky” frontal attacks against Ukrainian positions without waiting for secured flanks.[80] ISW has recently observed that Russian forces only have a limited timeframe to widen their narrow breaches northwest of Avdiivka before promised US and other Western security assistance arrives at the frontline.[81]

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance southwest of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on April 24. Geolocated footage published on April 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within western Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[82] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced east and southeast of Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[83] Russian forces continued attacking west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Vodyane.[84] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue to use ”turtle” armored vehicles – armored vehicles with metal sheets welded on most sides – in combat operations near Krasnohorivka, likely to protect against first-person (FPV) drone strikes.[85] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) reportedly continue operating near Krasnohorivka.[86]

Fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on April 24, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Fighting continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine.[87] A Russian milbogger claimed that Russian forces are intensifying drone strikes near Pavlivka to prepare for assault operations in the Vuhledar direction.[88] Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Vuheldar.[89]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in Robotyne amid continued positional fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 24. Geolocated footage published on April 22 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced in central Robotyne.[90] Positional fighting continued in Robotyne and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[91] A Russian milblogger claimed that the number of ground assaults in this area has decreased significantly in the past few days but that the Orikhiv direction remains active.[92] Elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[93]

Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in Krynky, Kherson Oblast on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River amid continued positional fighting in the area on April 24.[94] Geolocated footage published on April 24 shows that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in northern Krynky, confirming that Ukrainian forces still maintain positions in the settlement.[95]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted limited missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 23 and during the day on April 24. Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported that Russian forces struck Odesa City with unspecified missiles on the morning of April 24, and Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that the strikes hit a residential area and a storage facility for decommissioned automotive equipment in the city.[96] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck the Horbaty Bridge and Ukrainian military storage warehouses in Odesa City.[97] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed a Kh-59 missile over an unspecified area of Ukraine during the day, and Ukraine’s Eastern Air Command reported that Ukrainian forces downed a Kh-69 over Synelynyk Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during the afternoon.[98] Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces struck civil infrastructure and apartment buildings in Kharkiv City with two S-300 missiles and administration buildings in Zolochiv, Kharkiv Oblast with two more S-300s during the night on April 23.[99]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian State Duma Committee on Information Policy Head Alexander Khinshtein stated on April 24 that unspecified Russian officials will soon submit a draft law to the State Duma that would ban the extradition of foreigners who have fought in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine if the foreigners face prosecution for their military service in their home countries.[100] Khinshtein appears to be responding to a video appeal from a Serbian volunteer who claimed that Russian officials denied his requests for Russian citizenship four times because he signed a contract with the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and not the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[101] The Serbian volunteer claimed that he is facing charges of mercenarism in Serbia.[102] Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have also recently sentenced some of their citizens on mercenarism charges after those citizens fought with Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Wagner Group forces in Ukraine.[103]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu inspected the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast on April 24 reportedly ahead of another launch of the Angara rocket launch vehicle, which the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center is currently developing.[104] Russia test-launched the Angara-A5 for the first time on April 11 at the Vostochnyy Cosmodrome in Amur Oblast.[105] Shoigu claimed that Russia will test launch another three Angara rockets in 2024.[106] Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Deputy Commander Colonel General Alexander Golovko also briefed Shoigu on the development of a new complex for preparing satellites at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome.[107]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian forces continue quick and cheap adaptations meant to harden military equipment against Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone strikes along the front. Russian sources amplified imagery and footage on April 24 of a Russian MT-LB infantry fighting vehicle and a Z-STS Akhmat armored vehicle with extensive metal mesh and fencing welded to cover the entire vehicle.[108] Russian and Ukrainian sources also posted footage of a Russian motorcycle with metal mesh attached to the back to protect against drone strikes and a Russian T-80 tank with extensive makeshift armor attached to its turret and its sides.[109]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) joined Kremlin officials in promoting Russian narratives intended to dismiss the future impacts of US military assistance on the battlefield in Ukraine on April 24. The North Korean MFA claimed that US military assistance to Ukraine is a “psychotropic substance” intended to temporarily ease Ukraine’s fear of a Russian victory.[110] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov and Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov claimed that new shipments of US military assistance to Ukraine will not shift the battlefield situation in Ukraine’s favor.[111] Kremlin newswire TASS intentionally misrepresented a statement by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and claimed that Kuleba stated that US military assistance will not stop Russian forces from advancing in Ukraine as Russian weapons are superior to US weapons.[112] Kuleba told the Guardian in an interview published on April 24 that no singular batch of military assistance can stop Russian forces and that it will take a united front of Ukraine and all its partners to defeat Russia.[113] The Kremlin likely originally intended to influence the US military assistance debate using this narrative, but it is unclear how the Kremlin intends to use this narrative now that the US has approved this latest military assistance bill. The Kremlin may hope to assuage domestic concerns in Russia and the Russian military about the positive impacts of US aid on the battlefield. The true impact of US military assistance to Ukraine will be seen and felt in the coming weeks as weapons and equipment arrive on the frontlines.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko reiterated boilerplate Russian narratives aimed at degrading the West during his address at the 7th All-Belarusian People’s Assembly on April 24.[114] Lukashenko reiterated standard Russian rhetoric degrading former Soviet states, the Baltics and Ukraine in particular, for pivoting away from Russia and towards the West in recent years. Lukashenko claimed that the West is responsible for the outbreak of conflicts and color revolutions globally but that efforts to influence Belarus regarding the 2020 Belarusian presidential elections failed. Lukashenko claimed that international organizations like the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and Group of 20 (G20) are declining while Russia-led international organizations have the potential to prosper.

Lukashenko also claimed that Belarus is flourishing due to its Union State agreement with Russia and increased cooperation with China.[115] Lukashenko claimed that Belarus is flourishing in multiple industries despite Western sanctions, including education, healthcare, energy, oil production, and infrastructure development. Lukashenko credited unspecified Chinese partnership with helping Belarus revamp its domestic automotive production. Lukashenko claimed that the Union State framework should serve as a “model” for international cooperation.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/23/...

[2] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3754238/biden-admi...

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/24/us/us-ukraine-russia-missiles.html ; https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/24/us-long-range-missiles-ukraine-...

[6] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/24/us/us-ukraine-russia-missiles.html ; https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/24/us-long-range-missiles-ukraine-...

[7] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1783011103624007926 ; https://tw...

[8] https://t.me/andriyshTime/21013 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/21016

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041824 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/24/us/us-ukraine-russia-missiles.html ; https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/24/us-long-range-missiles-ukraine-...

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101723

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101823

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101723

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101723

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060823%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar092823

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041324%C2%A0; ht...

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101723

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101723

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101723

[20] https://suspilne dot media/731027-droni-sbu-urazili-dvi-naftobazi-u-smolenskij-oblasti-dzerela/

[21] https://t.me/tass_agency/245436

[22] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1783009973879898215; https://t.me/feodosiyachat/132088 ; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1782960678157840597 ; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1783046676845900078; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1782969728459313593 ;

[23] https://t.me/tass_agency/245434

[24] https://t.me/astrapress/53985

[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/37878

[26] https://t.me/tass_agency/245454 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/245402 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/245406 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/245411 ;

[27] https://t.me/tass_agency/245459 ; https://t.me/moscowcourts/3088 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/245407

[28] https://t.me/tass_agency/245460; https://t.me/moscowcourts/3093

[29] https://t.me/tass_agency/245512

[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/245424 ; https://t dot me/rtvimain/95455

[31] https://t.me/deptone/9575 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/245424

[32] https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/news/2024/04/24/zamministra-oboroni-ivanova-podozrevayut-v-gosizmene-viyasnili-vazhnie-istorii/index.html?tg_rhash=a8983ea609be7d

[33] https://t.me/tass_agency/245496 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/245496

[34] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2024/04/24/7452765/ ; https://t.me/RBC_ua_news/93123 ; https://suspilne dot media/731447-zastupnika-sojgu-arestuvali-pisla-specoperacii-gur-dzerela/

[35] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2024/04/24/7452765/ ; https://t.me/RBC_ua_news/93123 ; https://suspilne dot media/731447-zastupnika-sojgu-arestuvali-pisla-specoperacii-gur-dzerela/

[36] https://t.me/russicatrend/4000 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/47754 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/47756 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/47755

[37] https://t.me/russicatrend/4000 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/47755

[38] https://t.me/vchkogpu/47796

[39] https://t.me/grey_zone/22935

[40] https://t.me/rybar/59455 ; https://t.me/rybar/59459 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40765 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9881

[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9881 ;

[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/40790; https://t.me/rybar/59458; https://t.me/dva_majors/40765; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9881; https://t.me/akashevarova/7273 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19543; https://t.me/dva_majors/40756; https://t.me/dva_majors/40763; https://t.me/readovkaru/6515 ; https://t.me/rsotmdivision/15607

[43] https://t.me/rybar/59455

[44] https://t.me/rybar/59458; https://t.me/dva_majors/40765; https://t.me/... https://t.me/akashevarova/7273 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19543; https://t.me/dva_majors/40756; https://t.me/dva_majors/40763

[45] https://t.me/dva_majors/40763

[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[47] https://armenpress dot am/arm/news/1135523.html ; https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/32917746.html

[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[49] https://t.me/MID_Russia/38961

[50] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[51] https://iz dot ru/1686007/valentin-loginov/balans-sil-na-kavkaze-v-sluchae-vykhoda-armenii-iz-odkb-mozhet-izmenitsia

[52] https://t.me/malvovabelova/3235

[53] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011224

[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20O...

[55] https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/5521 ; https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/5526

[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-occupation-playbo...

[57] https://moldova1 dot md/p/27795/evghenia-gutul-will-stand-trial-in-the-case-of-the-illegal-financing-of-the-former-sor-party ; https://moldovalive dot md/the-criminal-case-against-bashkan-of-gagauzia-eugenia-gutsul-was-sent-to-the-court/

[58] https://t.me/evgheniagutul/2749

[59] https://t.me/tass_agency/245475 ; https://iz dot ru/1686980/2024-04-24/blok-pobeda-prizval-prekratit-ugolovnoe-delo-protiv-glavy-gagauzii-gutcul ; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/20633681 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042124

[60] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-23/russian-poised-for-po...

[61] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042324 ; https://radiomoldova dot md/p/30740/moldova-s-post-office-hit-by-cyberattack-services-disrupted ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-23/russian-poised-for-po...

[62] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass... ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ; https:... ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042124 ; https:...

[63] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/731413-najbilsi-zagrozi-ce-povitrani-ataki-ta-drg-golova-sumskoi-ova-pro-situaciu-na-kordoni-oblasti/

[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YPmVdEDUYT3iQzYb5C...

[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YPmVdEDUYT3iQzYb5C... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02X8bZiCuNhV1KKFW8zt... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wKqYoX8fA1zZAPk29H...

[66] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/13988 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66785

[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66766 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37891 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37892

[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YPmVdEDUYT3iQzYb5C... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02X8bZiCuNhV1KKFW8zt... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wKqYoX8fA1zZAPk29H... ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37893 ; https://t.me/rybar/59451 ; https://t...

[69] https://suspilne dot media/730767-grosi-vid-britanii-ta-danii-golosuvanna-v-senati-ssa-za-dopomogu-ukraini-791-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1713975975&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lmIgGAJ-lgo

[70] https://www.wsj.com/world/inside-a-besieged-ukrainian-city-where-soldier...

[71] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1803

[72] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/189; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5237

[73] https://t.me/z_arhiv/26586 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22029; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26586; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121263

[74] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66760 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9893 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121300...

[75] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YPmVdEDUYT3iQzYb5C... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02X8bZiCuNhV1KKFW8zt... ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wKqYoX8fA1zZAPk29H... ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37893 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37887 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66760 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9873 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9893 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19547 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40729 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40747 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55765; ht...

[76] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/191

[77] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1804

[78] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1805 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1806

[79] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/04/24/russia-advances-5-mile...

[80] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[81] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...