Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 6, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 6, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark

April 6, 4:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in Moscow on April 5 and 6 to discuss further Union State integration, with Putin likely focused on strengthening Russian economic control over Belarus. Putin and Lukashenko held a one-on-one meeting on April 5 and attended a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State on April 6 to address Union State integration efforts on security, economic, defense, cultural, and humanitarian topics.[1] Putin claimed that Russian and Belarusian officials have fulfilled 74 percent of 28 Union State programs and highlighted the creation of a joint system for indirect taxes, measures to form general standards for Russian and Belarusian industrial enterprises, and efforts to unify Belarusian and Russian trade legislation.[2] Putin and Lukashenko both noted that Russian and Belarusian officials are focused on import substitution measures (likely to mitigate Western sanctions) and supporting microelectronic industries.[3] Putin stated that Russian and Belarusian officials are continuing the process of creating a joint oil and gas market and are working on drafting an agreement for the formation of a single electricity market.[4] The Kremlin is likely advancing longstanding efforts to subsume elements of Belarus’ defense industrial base (DIB), and both states are likely using Union State economic integration efforts to augment their ongoing sanctions evasion measures.[5] Putin and Lukashenko also likely highlighted strengthening economic cooperation to support their ongoing efforts to falsely reassure the Russian and Belarusian publics that Western sanctions regimes will not have long-term consequences.[6]

Putin and Lukashenko also discussed bilateral security issues during their one-on-one meeting and at the Supreme State Council meeting, but official Kremlin and Belarusian readouts offered little concrete details on these discussions. Putin and Lukashenko stated that Russian and Belarusian officials began work on a Security Concept for the Union State, but offered no details for what the joint security document would include.[7] Lukashenko stated that a single joint Russian–Belarusian regional air defense system is already operating, likely referring to the recent deployment of Russian S-400 air defense systems to Belarus.[8] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on April 6 that Lukashenko and Putin did not discuss the placement of Russian strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus following Putin’s March 25 announcement that Russia will deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus.[9]

Lukashenko delivered boilerplate rhetoric that continues to indicate that he has no intention of involving Belarus further in Russia’s war effort. Lukashenko stated that NATO is conducting a purposeful buildup of forces along the borders of the Union State and that the West has unleashed an informational, political, and economic war against Belarus and Russia.[10] Lukashenko has previously employed such rhetoric in an attempt to justify resisting Kremlin pressure to further support the Russian war effort in Ukraine by arguing that Belarus needs to protect the western flank of the Union State.[11] ISW has written at length about why Lukashenko is extraordinarily unlikely to further involve Belarus in the war in Ukraine.[12] ISW has previously assessed that Lukashenko is increasingly losing maneuvering room with the Kremlin amid the Kremlin’s steady pressure campaign to formalize the Russian-Belarusian Union State, and Lukashenko may be acquiescing to further integration measures while rejecting Putin’s likely larger demand for the direct participation of Belarusian forces in Russia’s war against Ukraine.[13]

Russian commanders are reportedly constructing specialized company-size units within key frontline formations engaged in urban combat to reinforce the diminished combat effectiveness of most Russian units. A reliable Ukrainian reserve officer released a reportedly captured document on April 6 detailing the recruitment of personnel (who receive the status of BARS reservists) to form new “Storm Z” companies within elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) and the 1st Army Corps, the armed forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic.[14] Each “Storm Z” company is created outside of conventional army unit structure and apparently is formed of newly recruited reservists and attached in some manner to existing Russian regiments and brigades, rather than adding additional assets or providing specialized training to existing frontline companies. It is unclear at this time how these “Storm Z” units fit into Russian command structures at the battalion level and above and why Russian units are forming new companies, continuing a standing Russian tendency throughout the war in Ukraine to break down doctrinal unit structures. Each company is comprised of 100 personnel, broken into four capture squads (10 personnel each), four fire support squads (10 personnel each), a 2-person company command element, a 5-person combat engineering group, an 8-person reconnaissance group, a three-person medevac group, and a 2-person UAV crew.[15] ”Storm Z” companies are intended to conduct urban combat operations or operations in complicated geographic areas to capture important and strategic objects such as strongholds, command posts, and communication centers.[16] The Ukrainian reserve officer noted that the personnel that staff these companies receive 10 to 15 days of refresher training, a remarkably short amount of time to adequately train personnel (even reservists with some experience) to perform complex combat tasks and create unit cohesion.

The “Storm Z” companies will likely primarily deploy along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City frontline, where Southern Military District (SMD) units are heavily committed to continuously unsuccessful offensive operations. The Ukrainian reserve officer stated that the document requires the establishment of “Storm Z” companies in various separate motorized rifle brigades of the 1st Army Corps (forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic) and motorized rifle regiments, tank regiments, and separate motorized rifle brigades of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (part of the 8th Combined Arms Army).[17] ISW has observed the heavy commitment of DNR forces along the entire Avdiivka–Donetsk City frontline and noted that the 150th Motorized Rifle Division has been particularly active in Marinka, on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.[18] Russian offensive operations along this frontline remain largely unsuccessful and have failed to secure more than tactical advances in the area.[19] Russian military command likely seeks to create ”Storm Z” companies and attach them to already-committed elements in order to reinforce minor tactical success and encourage further offensive operations and gains. However, due to the ramshackle construction of yet more ad hoc Russian units, as well as the already degraded quality and poor morale that is pervasive within DNR units in this area, it is unlikely that the use of these formations will lend Russian forces on this frontline a significant offensive edge.

China continues to rhetorically downplay its support for Russia and demonstrate that there are limits to the declared “no limits” Russian–Chinese partnership, but it will not be a true neutral arbiter in the war. French President Emmanuel Macron met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on April 6 and urged Xi to “bring Russia to its senses” and “bring everyone back to the negotiating table.”[20] Xi stated that China “advocates for peace talks and seeks a political solution” without going into significant detail or assigning blame.[21] China’s maintained neutral status and ongoing talks with Western leaders, refusal to blatantly condemn the West, and minimization of relations with and withholding of concrete support to Russia are likely a source of ongoing frustration for Russian President Vladimir Putin, as ISW has previously assessed.[22] However, Xi’s equivocating comments do not indicate any serious intent by Beijing to overtly pressure Russia to end the invasion of Ukraine, as would be necessary for serious peace talks.

Key Takeaways

• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in Moscow on April 5 and 6 to discuss further Union State integration, with Putin likely focused on strengthening Russian economic control over Belarus.
• Lukashenko delivered boilerplate rhetoric that continues to indicate that he has no intention of involving Belarus further in Russia’s war effort.
• Russian commanders are reportedly constructing specialized company-size units within key frontline formations engaged in urban combat to reinforce the diminished combat effectiveness of most Russian units.
• Russian forces will likely deploy these “Storm Z” units along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City frontline.
• China continues to rhetorically downplay its support for Russia and demonstrate that there are limits to the declared “no limits” Russian–Chinese partnership, but it will not be a true neutral arbiter in the war.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian officials indicated that Russian forces are able to maintain a suitable rate of artillery fire in prioritized areas of the front at the expense of other sectors.
• Russian forces may have withdrawn equipment from occupied Crimea for redeployment elsewhere in southern Ukraine out of fear of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu visited Russian Defense Industrial Base (DIB) enterprises in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast to monitor the implementation of state defense orders.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin held one-on-one meetings with Russian occupation authorities.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 6. Geolocated footage published on April 2 indicates that Russian forces likely made marginal gains northwest of Kuzemivka (15km northwest of Svatove).[23] Russian Western Grouping of Forces (Western Military District) Spokesperson Sergey Zybinsky claimed on April 6 that Russian forces destroyed three Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups and disrupted Ukrainian rotations near Dvorichna (15km northeast of Kupyansk), Pishchane (25km northwest of Svatove), and Stelmakhivka (15km west of Svatove).[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces resumed offensive operations near Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove).[25] Russian Central Grouping of Forces (Central Military District) Spokesperson Alexander Savchuk claimed that Russian forces thwarted a Ukrainian attempt to regain lost positions near Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), Hryhorivka (11km south of Kreminna), and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[27]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut on April 6. Geolocated footage posted on April 6 shows that Russian forces made a marginal advance in central Bakhmut north of the T0504 highway.[28] More geolocated footage posted on April 6 shows that Ukrainian forces repelled Wagner Group ground attacks south of Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks in Bakhmut and northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka (6km northwest) and Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest), and west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner forces made marginal advances in northwestern Bakhmut and gained an unspecified foothold near the Metallurg Stadium in central Bakhmut.[31] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing in northern, eastern, and southern Bakhmut but failed to advance near Bohdanivka.[32]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City frontline on April 6. Ukrainian Tavriisk Direction Forces Joint Press Center Spokesperson Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi reported that Russian forces sustained 4,000 losses near Avdiivka in the past week and are sending an unspecified amount of the 4,000-personnel contingent that previously undertook training in Belarus to reinforce the Avdiivka-Marinka line.[33] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Avdiivka, Novokalynove (7km north of Avdiivka), Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka.[34] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made unspecified gains towards Avdiivka, Keramik (8km north of Avdiivka), and Pervomaiske.[35]

Ukrainian officials indicated that Russian forces are able to maintain a suitable rate of artillery fire in prioritized areas of the front at the expense of other sectors. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated on April 5 that Russian forces do not suffer artillery ammunition shortages in areas where Russian forces prioritize offensive operations, such as in the Bakhmut direction.[36] The Ukrainian State Border Guard Service stated on April 5 that Wagner Group forces still suffer from artillery shell shortages, however.[37] Dmytrashkivskyi stated on April 6 that Russian forces on the Avdiivka-Marinka line experience shell shortages closer to the weekend, suggesting that these forces burn through their allocated artillery shells too quickly and are resupplied at least partially on a weekly basis.[38]

The Kremlin appears to be perpetuating an information operation to discredit certain Ukrainian forces. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that a squad commander of the Ukrainian 53rd Mechanized Brigade near Avdiivka surrendered his squad to Russian forces, but that other Ukrainian forces intentionally fired on and killed the surrendering personnel before Russian forces could transport them to rear areas.[39] The Russian MoD made this claim in an unusually late daily report, and Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated this claim during a meeting on April 6.[40] ISW is unable to confirm this Russian claim.

Russian sources are likely exaggerating claims of offensive activity around Vuhledar. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a significant MLRS strike against Vuhledar to pre-empt a ground attack, but ISW has seen no indications of either a large series of strikes or an attack.[41] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using unguided aerial FAB-500 bombs modified for long range precision strikes near Vuhledar.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces may have withdrawn equipment from occupied Crimea for redeployment elsewhere in southern Ukraine out of fear of a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Satellite imagery shows the withdrawal of a significant amount of armored fighting vehicles, tanks, and towed artillery systems from a depot in Medvedivka (20km northeast of Dzhankoy along the M18 highway) between March 17 and April 5, though ISW cannot confirm their destination at this time.[44]

Russian forces continued defensive operations and routine shelling in southern Ukraine on April 6.[45] Ukrainian Tavriisk Direction Forces Joint Press Center Spokesperson Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi noted that Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast are not trying to storm Ukrainian positions and are instead focusing on artillery strikes and preparing defensive fortifications.[46]

Ukrainian forces continue efforts to strike Russian rear positions and logistic nodes in southern Ukraine. Russian sources claimed on April 6 that Ukrainian forces launched six HIMARS rockets at Melitopol, occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, and claimed that Russian air defense intercepted all six of the rockets.[47] Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov reported the sound of explosions in the Melitopol area and noted that Russian forces sent ambulances to the Aviamistechka airfield despite claiming that air defenses successfully intercepted all of the rockets.[48] Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Head Nataliya Humenyuk also noted on April 6 that effective Ukrainian strikes on Russian positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast have reduced the number of artillery positions from which Russian force can strike the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast.[49]

Russian sources continue to frame Russia as the sole guarantor of the safety of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). A prominent Russian milblogger and Putin-appointment member of the Russian Human Rights Council published a long article on April 6 lauding the Russian national guard (Rosgvardia) for guarding the ZNPP and accusing Ukraine of trying to strike the plant and exert pressure on employees to create an unsafe situation.[50] Russian sources have continuously framed Ukraine as acting irresponsibly near the plant to consolidate Russia’s control of Ukrainian energy and nuclear assets.[51]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu visited Russian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast — including the Arzamas Machine Building Plant — on April 6 to monitor the implementation of state defense orders.[52] Shoigu’s visits are likely part of an ongoing effort to investigate roadblocks within, reinvigorate, and restore the reputation of Russia’s underperforming DIB. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) amplified the DIB enterprises‘ reports that they increased ammunition production volume several times over and implemented a program to expand further weapons production capacity.[53]

Different sectors of the Russian war effort are almost certainly competing for manpower due to extreme Russian personnel shortages in all sectors caused by prior recruitment waves. Russia’s DIB, contract armed forces, private military companies (PMCs), Combat Reserve of the Country (BARS) units, and conscription authorities have all launched increasingly aggressive recruitment efforts over recent weeks to target an ever-diminishing, overlapping pool of suitable recruits.[54] Chuvashia Republic Head Oleg Nikolaev tentatively proposed on April 5 that Russian authorities equate five years of work at a defense plant with military service.[55] Implementation of such a measure would further drain Russian benefits programs for those affiliated with the war effort and could also force defense industries to compete in benefits offerings or directly enable Russians to forgo military service in favor of work in Russia’s DIB.

Russian authorities are taking further steps to prosecute Russians for avoiding service. Russian opposition outlet Important Stories amplified reports from several Omsk Oblast residents on April 6 that a small number of Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers are questioning Omsk Oblast residents who temporarily left Russia following the announcement of “partial” mobilization as to their reasons for going abroad.[56]

Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky remarked after meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 6 that the Russian MoD subordinated Balitsky’s volunteer battalion, the Sudaplatov Battalion, to the BARS-32 formation.[57] BARS formations appear to play an increasing role in volunteer recruitment and supporting irregular Russian volunteer formations, as ISW has previously reported.[58]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian President Vladimir Putin held one-on-one meetings with Russian occupation authorities on April 6. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated on April 6 that he and Putin discussed issues with water supply, constructing roads, and expanding railway infrastructure to ensure greater connectivity to Russia.[59] Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik stated that he and Putin discussed several issues concerning social, housing, and communal services, as well as education and medicine.[60] Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Head Yevgeny Balitsky reported that he and Putin discussed restoring transport infrastructure throughout occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[61] Balitsky also thanked Putin for supporting the maternity capital initiative, which he claims has already started operating in occupied territories.[62] Kherson Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo and Putin discussed issues with gas supply in occupied Kherson Oblast .[63]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian military officials provided an update on the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV) on April 6. Belarusian Head of the Combat Training Directorate Major General Alexander Bas stated that over 500 Belarusian instructors are engaged in the training of RGV troops and that Belarusian trainers seek to apply Russian lessons from Ukraine to the education of the RGV.[64] Bas emphasized the role of the RGV in upholding the security of the Union State.[65]

Belarusian forces continued combat exercises throughout Belarus on April 6. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense stated that elements of the 115th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, 38th Brest Separate Guard Airborne Assault Brigade, and the 86th Communication Brigade conducted various tactical exercises.[66]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70883 ; https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/zasedanie-vysshego-gosudarstvennogo-soveta-soyuznogo-gosudarstva ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70874;

[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70883

[3] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70883 ; https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/zasedanie-vysshego-gosudarstvennogo-soveta-soyuznogo-gosudarstva ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70874;

[4] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70883

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021723 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2023

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2023

[7] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70883 ; https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/zasedanie-vysshego-gosudarstvennogo-soveta-soyuznogo-gosudarstva

[8] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/zasedanie-vysshego-gosudarstvennogo-soveta-soyuznogo-gosudarstva

[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-putin-lukashenko-did-not-discuss-placement-strategic-nuclear-weapons-2023-04-06/

[10] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/zasedanie-vysshego-gosudarstvennogo-soveta-soyuznogo-gosudarstva

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120122

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122022

[14] https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832673872363520?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832675596156928?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832676988735490?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832678247018497?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832679526281218?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832680893624320?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832682877526016?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832684366426112?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832685842841602?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832688107835393?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832689366016000?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832690880151552?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832692264271872?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832693627449344?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832695485612033?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832696785739778?s=20

[15] https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832673872363520?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832675596156928?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832676988735490?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832678247018497?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832679526281218?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832680893624320?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832682877526016?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832684366426112?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832685842841602?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832688107835393?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832689366016000?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832690880151552?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832692264271872?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832693627449344?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832695485612033?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832696785739778?s=20

[16] https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832673872363520?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832675596156928?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832676988735490?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832678247018497?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832679526281218?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832680893624320?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832682877526016?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832684366426112?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832685842841602?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832688107835393?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832689366016000?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832690880151552?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832692264271872?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832693627449344?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832695485612033?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832696785739778?s=20

[17] https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832673872363520?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832675596156928?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832676988735490?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832678247018497?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832679526281218?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832680893624320?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832682877526016?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832684366426112?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832685842841602?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832688107835393?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832689366016000?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832690880151552?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832692264271872?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832693627449344?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832695485612033?s=20; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1643832696785739778?s=20

[18] https://t.me/nm_dnr/10101; https://t.me/nm_dnr/10108; https://t.me/milchronicles/1718; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/81656; https://t.me/MishaDonbass/511; https://t.me/rybar/44165 ; https://t.me/rusvarg/1338; https://t.me/nm_dnr/9942 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/78954

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032723; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isw.pub/UkrWar032623; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032223; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032023

[20] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-65198757; https://www.reuters dot com/world/high-hopes-china-eu-leaders-prepare-xi-talks-2023-04-06/

[21] https://www.reuters dot com/world/ukraine-pushes-western-warplane-coalition-2023-04-06/; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-65198757; https://www.reuters.com/world/high-hopes-china-eu-leaders-prepare-xi-talks-2023-04-06/

[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2023

[23] https://t.me/rian_ru/198674 ; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1643726052521279490?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1643726256137969664?s=20

[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/25433

[25] https://t.me/wargonzo/11794

[26] https://t.me/mod_russia/25409

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023n71k3dYk3R9xsGgma2AZ9XJkgEwKV6wLy6UwXkjaX3MqH73obWkUQJaNThFRK6hl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0foQPeWN6pDsqEb1cSuVBW2gkVuuZn3kkEZHrbB9TS48tEmK7TmSwa4Dt4eiPuYh8l

[28] https://twitter.com/operativno_ZSU/status/1643926270793613313?s=20; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1643947158641549318?s=20

[29] https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1644007138723864576?s=20; https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1643939792109940736?s=20; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1643955860459122689; https://t.me/volodymyrzolkin/8087

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0foQPeWN6pDsqEb1cSuVBW2gkVuuZn3kkEZHrbB9TS48tEmK7TmSwa4Dt4eiPuYh8l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023n71k3dYk3R9xsGgma2AZ9XJkgEwKV6wLy6UwXkjaX3MqH73obWkUQJaNThFRK6hl

[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/20112; https://t.me/readovkanews/56310

[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/11794

[33] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/06/vorog-prodovzhuye-obstrilyuvaty-donechchynu-ta-zaporizhzhya-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023n71k3dYk3R9xsGgma2AZ9XJkgEwKV6wLy6UwXkjaX3MqH73obWkUQJaNThFRK6hl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0foQPeWN6pDsqEb1cSuVBW2gkVuuZn3kkEZHrbB9TS48tEmK7TmSwa4Dt4eiPuYh8l

[35] https://t.me/wargonzo/11794; https://t.me/readovkanews/56310

[36] https://suspilne dot media/435603-v-oon-prodovzat-rozsliduvati-zlocini-rosian-ssa-nadaut-boepripasi-406-den-vijni-onlajn/

[37] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=210526464933477

[38] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/06/vorog-prodovzhuye-obstrilyuvaty-donechchynu-ta-zaporizhzhya-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[39] https://t.me/mod_russia/25435

[40] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70879

[41] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36262; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36257

[42] https://t.me/milchronicles/1740; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/23975; https://t.me/sashakots/39193

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023n71k3dYk3R9xsGgma2AZ9XJkgEwKV6wLy6UwXkjaX3MqH73obWkUQJaNThFRK6hl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0foQPeWN6pDsqEb1cSuVBW2gkVuuZn3kkEZHrbB9TS48tEmK7TmSwa4Dt4eiPuYh8l

[44] https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1643755617683644418?s=20; https://twitter.com/The_Lookout_N/status/1643885541409058816?s=20

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023n71k3dYk3R9xsGgma2AZ9XJkgEwKV6wLy6UwXkjaX3MqH73obWkUQJaNThFRK6hl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0foQPeWN6pDsqEb1cSuVBW2gkVuuZn3kkEZHrbB9TS48tEmK7TmSwa4Dt4eiPuYh8l; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/4932;https://t.me/rybar/45506; https://t.me/hueviyherson/37590 ; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/4720; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/06/vorog-prodovzhuye-obstrilyuvaty-donechchynu-ta-zaporizhzhya-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[46] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/06/vorog-prodovzhuye-obstrilyuvaty-donechchynu-ta-zaporizhzhya-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[47] https://t.me/kommunist/16798; https://t.me/basurin_e/575; https://t.me/vrogov/8585; https://t.me/vrogov/8586

[48] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1659

[49] https://suspilne dot media/436764-oboronna-dopomoga-polsi-vijska-rf-atakuut-na-4-napramkah-407-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1680765775&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/06/zastosuvannya-vorogom-aviacziyi-z-kerovanymy-aviaczijnymy-bombamy-cze-krok-vidchayu-nataliya-gumenyuk/

[50] https://ria dot ru/20230406/zaporozhe-1863236820.html; https://t.me/sashakots/39208

[51] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030323; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012723; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2023

[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/25423; https://t.me/mod_russia/25432; https://t.me/mod_russia/25412; https://t.me/mod_russia/25422; https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1643981646012760064?s=20

[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/25423; https://t.me/mod_russia/25432; https://t.me/mod_russia/25412; https://t.me/mod_russia/25422

[54] https://ircity dot ru/text/society/2023/04/05/72192860/; https://trk7 dot ru/news/155426.html; https://www.e1 dot ru/text/gorod/2023/04/05/72194627/?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=messenger&utm_campaign=e1; https://t.me/vashdozor/4163; https://t.me/Baikal_People/2261; https://news dot vtomske.ru/news/197843-vozmojno-kto-to-popal-v-finansovuyu-yamu-v-tomskoi-oblasti-usililas-agitaciya-na-slujbu-po-kontraktu; https://t.me/Govorit_NeMoskva/6908

[55] https://t.me/ChuvashiaDream/6707

[56] https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/news/2023/04/05/fsb-nachala-vizivat-na-besedu-rossiyan-uezzhavshikh-ot-mobilizatsii-za-granitsu/index.html; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/06/omskoe-upravlenie-fsb-nachalo-vyzyvat-na-doprosy-teh-kto-uezzhal-iz-rossii-ot-mobilizatsii

[57] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70881

[58] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2023

[59] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70879

[60] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70880

[61] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70881

[62] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70881

[63] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70882

[64] https://t.me/modmilby/25263; https://t.me/modmilby/25272

[65] https://t.me/modmilby/25263; https://t.me/modmilby/25272

[66] https://t.me/modmilby/25249; https://t.me/modmilby/25229; https://t.me/modmilby/25224; https://t.me/modmilby/25216