Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2025

Davit Gasparyan, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, and George Barros with Nate Trotter

February 5, 2025, 6:10pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on February 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long run. Zelensky reiterated during an interview published on February 4 that Ukraine cannot and will not compromise its sovereignty in future peace negotiations, but that Ukraine's partners are not currently providing Ukraine with sufficient military assistance for Ukrainian forces to push Russian forces from all occupied Ukrainian territory.[1] Zelensky stated that he is willing to negotiate directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin but warned that any peace agreement that significantly weakens Ukraine's ability to defend itself in the future risks another Russian invasion of Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will never recognize Russia's illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory and emphasized that there can be no compromise on Ukraine's sovereignty. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will eventually retake all its territory militarily and diplomatically but noted that the liberation of all Ukrainian territory from Russian occupation will take time. Zelensky called on Ukraine's allies to pressure Putin and demand that Russian forces withdraw from all Ukrainian territory. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine wants peace and that the United States, Europe, Ukraine, and Russia must all be represented in future peace negotiations. Zelensky's statements highlight that Putin's unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations is the true impediment to the end of the war, despite Putin's recent efforts to falsely blame Zelensky and Ukraine for the lack of progress towards peace in Ukraine.[2]

Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian Constitution bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains committed to holding elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.[3] Zelensky stated that Ukraine would have to change its constitution to hold an election outside of peace time and asked how Ukrainian servicemembers, citizens living in Russian-occupied Ukraine, and Ukrainian refugees and expatriates living abroad would be able to vote in the election before the Ukrainian government lifts martial law. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will "definitely" hold elections after the war ends but that Ukraine currently must focus on defending itself from Russian aggression. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly used deliberately false readings of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president after Ukraine, adhering to the law and constitution, did not hold elections under martial law in 2024.[4] The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.[5]

Prominent Kremlin-linked figures continue to clearly articulate Russia's disinterest in negotiations while Putin propagates the information operation accusing Ukraine of being the unwilling party. Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk, a close personal ally of Putin and father of Putin's goddaughter, reinforced the Kremlin's efforts to delegitimize Ukrainian statehood in a February 4 article, arguing that Russia must reclaim its so-called "historical lands."[6] Medvedchuk published an accompanying map depicting all Ukrainian territory east of Lviv, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi oblasts as part of "historical Russia." Medvedchuk claimed that Western support for Ukraine aims solely to collapse Russia from within and labeled Ukrainians as "modern barbarians" whom Russia must save through integration into the Russian state. Medvedchuk denied Ukraine's historical legitimacy, insisting that modern Ukraine is inherently Russian - a narrative consistently promoted by Kremlin officials and the Russian information space to justify Russia's war and occupation of Ukraine. Medvedchuk's rhetoric as a member of the Russian elite with extensive ties to Putin are representative of the Kremlin's systemic refusal to act in good faith regarding negotiations with Ukraine and the West and the Kremlin's core unwillingness to negotiate with Ukraine - a state and government it considers illegitimate.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to 350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February 2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[7] Zelensky added that Russian military personnel suffer a 2:1 wounded to killed ratio because Russian field medicine is poor, and Russian forces struggle to evacuate wounded personnel from the battlefield. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were KIA.[8] Zelensky's and Syrskyi's figures indicate that the Russian military suffered roughly 41 to 48 percent of its total casualties in Ukraine since 2022 in 2024 alone. The highest range of Zelensky's estimates are notably larger than recent Russian casualty figures from the Ukrainian General Staff and former US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.[9] Zelensky also stated that roughly 50,000 to 70,000 Russian soldiers have been classified as missing in action (MIA) since February 2022.

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 4 to 5 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Security Services (SBU) and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Albashneft LLC oil depot in Novominskaya, Krasnodar Krai, causing a fire at the facility.[10] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko amplified footage of fire at the Albashneft oil depot and noted that the depot supplies straight-run gasoline (crude oil distillate), diesel fuel, and fuel oil to the Russian military.[11] Geolocated footage published on February 5 shows a fire at the Albashneft oil depot.[12] Krasnodar Krai Governor Venyamin Kondratyev claimed on February 5 that drone debris caused a fire at an unspecified oil tank near Novominskaya.[13]

The Russian military continues efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over military services (вид; vid) and is apparently disaggregating administrative control for Russia’s Air Force and Navy from Russia’s military districts. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on February 5 revoking Russian military district's "interservice status" and removing naval and Aerospace Forces (VKS) units from subordination to Russian military districts.[14] The decree replaces the "joint strategic command" of each military district with a "directorate" that presumably will exclusively oversee ground forces and appears to disaggregate naval and VKS assets back to the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy and VKS command, respectively. The decree states that military districts will also be involved in helping Russian citizens enter the "mobilization manpower reserve" of the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed reorganizing military districts to optimize the army's command structure in June 2024.[15]

The Kremlin appears to be attempting to re-establish military districts primarily as headquarters for Russian ground forces and disaggregate the peacetime administrative headquarters for Russia’s Navy and Air Force. Joint Russian operational groups will likely continue to be led by a combined-arms operational military command in wartime.[16] Disaggregating administrative control for Russian naval and air forces from the headquarters responsible for administrative control for ground forces would likely free up bureaucratic bottlenecks during peacetime and allow military district commanders to focus on training and preparing Russian ground forces for combat operations. Russia's efforts to refocus military districts on purely overseeing ground force assets could also help simplify and expedite Russia's activation of its ground forces during a future conflict. Russian forces will very likely continue to form and operate in interoperable joint force groupings under unified operational commanders during wartime, including during ongoing combat operations in Ukraine. It is unclear how or if this administrative restructuring will impact Russia's campaign in Ukraine in the long-term. Such a change is unlikely to affect the near-term battlefield situation since many Russian forces operating in Ukraine are currently organized under interservice groupings of forces. This restructuring may help Russian forces reconstitute multiple services more quickly than they otherwise could, as Russian ground, naval, and the air forces may not need to compete over the administrative resources of a single military district.

The Kremlin continues to prioritize domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) announced on February 4 that it will enact a new migration regime that imposes severe restrictions on migrants residing in Russia starting on February 5.[17] The law requires migrants who have committed a criminal offense or are undocumented to register with Russian authorities, regularly share geolocated photos to the MVD, and obtain MVD approval for basic activities including buying property, driving a car, accessing banking services, and traveling outside their region. The law gives the MVD the right to deport migrants who violate these restrictions without a court hearing and penalizes those who provide undocumented migrants with services. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin reported that migrant-related crimes remain a "serious concern" for Russian authorities and the public and claimed that there was an 18 percent increase in court cases against migrants in 2024.[18] Bastrykin's statements reinforce Russian ultra-nationalist narratives that migrants pose a security threat by supposedly violating laws, moving "uncontrollably" within Russia, and committing crimes. The new MVD migration regime and Bastrykin's rhetoric demonstrate that Russian authorities are increasingly prioritizing efforts to appease particularly pro-war, xenophobic Russian ultranationalists and mitigate potential domestic security risks linked to rising anti-migrant sentiment rather than offsetting Russia's labor shortages and ongoing economic struggles, in part, with migrant labor.

Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on February 5. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on February 5 that Ukraine repatriated 150 Ukrainian POWs and stated that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.[19] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War reported that the returned Ukrainian POWs suffer from serious injuries and illnesses.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia also received 150 Russian POWs.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long run.
• Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian Constitution bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains committed to holding elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to 350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February 2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 4 to 5 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• The Russian military continues efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over military services (вид; vid) and is apparently disaggregating administrative control for Russia’s Air Force and Navy from Russia’s military districts.
• The Kremlin continues to prioritize domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on February 5.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacks northwest of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo and Malaya Loknya and southwest of Sudzha near Kurilovka.[22]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Sverdlikovo and Nikolaevo-Darino (both northwest of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[23]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha), and elements of the Russian “Shadow” Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[24]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City along the international border near Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 4 and 5 but did not make any confirmed advances.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vovchansk.[26]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 5. Russian forces continued attacking north of Kupyansk toward Kindrashivka and Doroshivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Novoosynove on February 4 and 5.[27]

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on February 5 that Russian forces seized Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[28]

Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 5 that Russian forces seized Novomlynsk (northeast of Kupyansk), but ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of January 31.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Novomlynsk had a population of roughly 15 people before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kalynove (north of Kupyansk), south of Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk and along the international border), southwest of Dvorichna, west of Synkivka (both northeast of Kupyansk), and north of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[31]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are using convict recruits and mobilized personnel – some of whom have only one to two weeks of training – in infantry assaults in the area.[32]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Kucherivka (east of Kupyansk).[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Lozova and east of Borova near Kopanky on February 4 and 5.[34]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Serhiivka and near Zelenyi Hai (both east of Borova), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Yampolivka, and Kolodyazi and east of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova on February 4 and 5.[36]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Torske, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking towards Siversk and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on February 5.[38]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Verkhnokamyanske, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[39]

The commander of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Siversk direction stated on February 5 that Russan forces are conducting assaults and accumulating forces and personnel in the area.[40] The commander noted that Russian forces are conducting assaults during the day and at night and are prioritizing targeting Ukrainian drone operator positions with artillery and drone strikes.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 5 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking within and near Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on February 4 and 5.[41]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing in central Chasiv Yar and into Shevchenko Microraion (southwestern Chasiv Yar).[42] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces have become more active in the northern part of Chasiv Yar and that they are trying to advance to central Chasiv Yar near the Avanhard Stadium.[43] Zaporozhets noted that the number of Russian assaults in the Chasiv Yar direction has increased by 97 percent compared to December 2024. Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are conducting frontal assaults in central Chasiv Yar and noted that Russian forces are using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles despite muddy ground conditions. Russian forces are also conducting highly attritional attacks with civilian vehicles.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in and near Chasiv Yar.[44]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area of February 5. Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk; on the northern outskirts of Toretsk; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 4 and 5.[45]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Sierova and Hryhoriia Skovorody streets in northern Toretsk.[46]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in a forest area southeast of Torske, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[47]

Zaporozhets noted that the number of Russian assaults in the Toretsk direction has increased by 30 percent compared to December 2024 and that Russian forces are increasingly conducting frontal assaults in Toretsk.[48]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[49]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid ongoing Russian offensive operations in the area on February 5. Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Kalynove, Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Promin; south of Pokrovsk near Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Uspenivka on January 4 and 5.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked along the Sribne-Zaporizhzhia-Nadiivka line (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[51] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Russian forces used vehicles to transfer assault groups to forward positions north of Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed seven Russian vehicles.[52]

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[53]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Sribne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and likely seized the settlement.[54] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed on February 4 that Russian forceslikely seized Sribne.[55]

Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 5 that Russian forces seized Baranivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian forces operating in the settlement.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers along the railway line from Kotlyne towards Pokrovsk, marginally advanced northeast of Udachne, and that unspecified Russian VDV forces consolidated positions near Sribne and Zaporizhzhia.[57]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Kurakhove amid ongoing offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on January 5. Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Uspenivka and Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Ulakly, Kostyantynopil, and Rozlyv; and southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka on January 4 and 5.[58]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in a field southwest of Dachne.[59]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Dachne, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces have seized the settlement.[60] Other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Dachne and that fighting for the settlement continues.[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced up to the T-0515 Kostyantynopil-Andriivka-Pokrovsk highway northwest of Petropavlivka (northwest of Kurakhove), and up to the northeastern outskirts of Andriivka.[62]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated on February 5 that the situation near Dachne remains very tense and that Russian forces are using reconnaissance, first person-view (FPV), and fiber-optic drones in this direction.[63] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are losing up to a platoon's worth of infantry in the Kurakhove direction each day and are using fewer armored vehicles in the area.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including its 68th Tank Regiment and 381st Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, are reportedly operating near Dachne and Kurakhove.[64] Elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil, and elements of the 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating west of Kurakhove).[65]

Russian forces continued attacks west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 4 and 5 but did not make confirmed advances.[66]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 5 but did not advance. Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on February 4 and 5.[67]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 5 that Russian forces advanced in fields northwest of Myrne (southwest of Hulyaipole and northeast of Robotyne), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[68]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces and Armed Forces struck a Russian Buk air defense system in an unspecified location in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on February 4 to 5.[69]

Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi stated on February 5 that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) postponed a planned personnel rotation of its mission at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in occupied Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast due to a lack of security guarantees from Russia for the rotation.[70]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Kherson direction on February 5.

Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on February 5 that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and five Starlink terminals operated by Russian forces in southern Ukraine in the past day.[71]

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[72]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces launched 104 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts and two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast on the night of February 4 to 5.[73] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 57 drones over Poltava, Kharkiv, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, and Cherkasy oblasts, and that 42 drones were ”locally lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on February 4 that Russian Shahed drones struck the Saltivskyi and Osnovyanskyi raions of Kharkiv City.[74] Kirovohrad Oblast Military Administration Head Andriy Raykovych stated on February 5 that Russian drone debris damaged a residential area in the oblast.[75]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian soldiers and their relatives continue to complain of poor treatment by the Russian military command and poor provisioning among frontline units. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on February 5 that over 160 people, most of whom are relatives of soldiers of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) signed a petition addressed to Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov demanding an investigation into the brigade regarding illegal transfers of personnel between units and demanding the removal of the brigade's commander.[76] The Russian military command reportedly replaced the command of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade in November 2024 following a scandal in which the brigade's command submitted inaccurate reports of Russian advances in the Siversk direction, where the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade is currently operating.[77] Soldiers of the 9th Company, 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) also recently recorded an appeal for assistance claiming that they lack adequate food, clothing, and medical supplies, and that their command threatened to conduct drone strikes against their subordinates for failing to report on time.[78] A soldier of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) claimed that his commander beat him after he refused to rotate to a frontline position in the Zaporizhia direction under artillery fire.[79]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod published footage of a Russian T-90 tank on February 5, and a Russian milblogger claimed that the footage shows a T-90 equipped with an active protection system that can reportedly intercept first-person view (FPV) drones, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).[80] ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a draft bill to the Russian State Duma on February 5 to ratify the Russian-Belarusian security agreement that Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed on December 6, 2024.[81]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCJRwlH948E ; https://www.kyivpost.com/post/46632

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCJRwlH948E ; https://www.kyivpost.com/post/46632

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024 ; https://www.president dot gov.ua/ua/documents/constitution/konstituciya-ukrayini-rozdil-v ; https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/hlm/prgm/cph/experts/ukraine/ukr.constitution.e.pdf

[6] https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27660/5045245/

[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCJRwlH948E ; https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/46632

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/20/sotni-tysyach-soldativ-golovnokomanduvach-zsu-nazvav-vtraty-armiyi-rf-mynulogo-roku/

[9] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20575 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120924

[10] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20595 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jwHAD4BFMDeYoY1De5DGvRnGnmr31cfV56cyWZELYuMbUGPvFivnubniFqPWtgWZl

[11] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8754 ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8755

[12] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11009; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25360; https://t.me/dva_majors/63865; https://t.me/milinfolive/141340; https://t.me/bazabazon/34831

[13] https://t.me/tass_agency/299122 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/299123 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/299157 ; https://t.me/kondratyevvi/8428

[14] https://t.me/tass_agency/299228 ; http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/document/0001202502050007 ; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/05/02/2025/67a366509a79472bd62fc9e9 ; https://iz dot ru/1834296/2025-02-05/putin-otmenil-mezhvidovoi-status-voennykh-okrugov-v-rossii ; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1006470

[15] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/24/06/2024/66794f549a7947208052aa55

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2023-0 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2024

[17] https://t.me/mediamvd/36335 ; https://t.me/mediamvd/36336; https://www.svoboda dot org/a/v-rossii-vstupil-v-silu-rezhim-spetsvysylki-migrantov/33304315.html

[18] https://sledcom dot ru/news/item/1951309/

[19] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13230; https://suspilne dot media/941561-ukraina-i-rf-proveli-obmin-polonenimi/

[20] https://koordshtab.gov dot ua/posts/ukrayina-povernula-z-rosiyskoyi-nevoli-150-zakhysnykiv-1889; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/10645

[21] https://t.me/mod_russia/48574

[22] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23431; https://t.me/dva_majors/63861; https://t.me/yurasumy/20939

[23] https://t.me/tass_agency/299175; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23431; https://t.me/yurasumy/20939

[24] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85677; https://t.me/tass_agency/299173

[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4936

[26] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23434

[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4936 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2538

[28] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2538

[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/48568 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2025

[30] https://t.me/sashakots/51715

[31] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85709 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20937

[32] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/04/u-nyh-systema-pobudovana-na-vtratah-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv-na-kupyanshhyni-vidpravlyayut-pomyraty-vtemnu/

[33] https://t.me/voin_dv/13214

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4936

[35] https://t.me/tass_agency/299142 ; https://t [dot] tme/DnevnikDesantnika/2344

[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4936

[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/2344

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598

[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23436

[40] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/05/syly-oborony-na-siverskomu-napryamku-kozhen-metr-cze-borotba/

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85678; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4936

[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23432; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85678; https://t.me/wargonzo/24655

[43] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/05/vulychni-boyi-ta-bandzaj-ataky-yak-tryvaye-bytva-za-chasiv-yar-i-toreczk/

[44] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5466 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23432; https://t.me/mod_russia/48561

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l

[46] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1886756420382593114; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/1886851695310680459; https://x.com/Zeldamices/status/1886860436026384828

[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/2344

[48] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/05/vulychni-boyi-ta-bandzaj-ataky-yak-tryvaye-bytva-za-chasiv-yar-i-toreczk/

[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/48567

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20935

[51] https://t.me/yurasumy/20928

[52] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4936

[53] https://x.com/SibirPrizrak/status/1887124860800843826; https://t.me/urga_74/3428; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8293?single; https://t.me/rusich_army/20587

[54] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=636703722216235; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8296

[55] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2537; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025

[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/48568

[57] https://t.me/yurasumy/20928 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23441

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20598 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4936 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20927

[59] https://t.me/mechanized33/739; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8292

[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/20945

[61] https://t.me/dva_majors/63861 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61905

[62]https://t.me/z_arhiv/30813

[63] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/05/novopavlivskyj-napryamok-rosiyany-shturmuyut-na-bagi-ale-finishuyut-u-chornyh-paketah/

[64] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13343 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13351

[65] https://t.me/voin_dv/13229 ; https://t.me/sashakots/51717

[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l

[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yqp5FiNyxxSkLQcfVRxqA4VyBV8oLXYtQrgV5xZ2e7EZcAQiELodbPVXRLCsNtUql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02oqnBEvxZX4JdyughFxnf8RZ1m5zjnAcS3tkxF3hZ3QJVXwAZAL5QJdScwjU8N813l

[68] https://t.me/wargonzo/24655

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20595

[70] https://mfa.gov doot ua/news/komentar-rechnika-mzs-georgiya-tihogo-shchodo-vidterminuvannya-rotaciyi-magate-na-zaes; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/941491-cerez-vidsutnist-bezpekovih-garantij-z-boku-rf-magate-vidterminuvalo-rotaciu-misii-na-zaes-mzs-ukraini/

[71] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0XGd4eUSENGAYX4Aj7YDq8GkjetQqR8cHfqs9aRHa6VP9ZgwUXpaToKyUaRLbBm45l

[72] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/43453

[73] https://t.me/kpszsu/28101

[74] https://t.me/synegubov/12968 ; https://suspilne dot media/941043-zelenskij-nazvav-kilkist-zagiblih-na-vijni-ukrainciv-zsu-znisili-komandnij-punkt-u-kurskij-oblasti-1078-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1738739630&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[75] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BHRKFwZbi/; https://suspilne dot media/941043-zelenskij-nazvav-kilkist-zagiblih-na-vijni-ukrainciv-zsu-znisili-komandnij-punkt-u-kurskij-oblasti-1078-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1738740702&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[76] https://t.me/astrapress/73832

[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024; https://t.me/rybar/67725

[78] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/21957

[79] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/21941

[80] https://t.me/milinfolive/141343 ; https://t.me/uvznews/2832

[81] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1006495