Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 7, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 7, 2025

Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Johanna Moore, and George Barros

February 7, 2025, 6:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on February 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on February 6, but Russian sources claimed on February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha. Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and in the fields east of Fanaseyevka (southeast of Sudzha) during the February 6 attacks.[1] Russian sources widely claimed that Russian forces repelled all Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and on the night of February 6 to 7 but acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka (north of Fanaseyevka), Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok (east of Fanaseyevka).[2] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing on the outskirts of Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha) but that Ukrainian forces did not launch new attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka during the day on February 7.[3] Russian milbloggers continued to issue conflicting claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka. Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized the settlement, while others claimed that Ukrainian forces bypassed the settlement or that Russian forces have retaken the settlement.[4] ISW cannot independently verify Russian claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are effectively using fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to counter Ukrainian forces attacking in the area.[5]

Russian sources provided additional information about the Russian force grouping defending southeast of Sudzha. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), "Veterany" Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD), and drone operators of the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are defending in the area.[6] Russian milbloggers widely credited drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces with defending against the Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and 7 and complained that the Russian MoD did not acknowledge the Chechen drone operators.[7] Russian milbloggers also claimed that the Russian military command reportedly removed the 11th VDV Brigade's commander and that the MoD is blaming the commander for failing to sufficiently man and defend Russian positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[8]

The Kremlin continues to conduct an information campaign likely directed toward both domestic and international audiences that aims to conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's economy. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin met on February 7 with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss the state of the Russian economy.[9] Mishustin claimed that Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) rose in 2024 by 4.1 percent largely due to "intensive" growth in Russia's manufacturing industry – likely referring to Russia's boost of its defense industrial base (DIB) since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Mishustin claimed that the main contributors to the growth in Russia's manufacturing sector were the machine-building, transport engineering, automotive, and computer and electronic equipment sectors.

Mishustin claimed that inflation in Russia reached 9.52 percent in 2024, and Putin claimed that inflation was already 9.9 percent as of February 3, 2025. Russia's true inflation is quite higher than the official statistics the Kremlin is willing to publicize, however. (Several studies indicate that Russia’s inflation rate is closer to 20 percent.[10]) Mishustin highlighted Russia's low 2024 unemployment rate of 2.5 percent but only briefly acknowledged Russia's significant labor shortages, which are the reason for Russia's low unemployment.

Mishustin noted that Russian economic growth might be less significant in 2025 as it is very important to stop inflation and ensure long-term economic growth – likely a signal to prepare the Russian population to expect economic hardships in 2025. Mishustin and Putin also attempted to posture Russia's economy as stable in the face of international economic pressure. Mishustin claimed that Russia's fuel and energy complex is adapting and finding new markets.

Mishustin claimed that Russia's economy has "successfully managed" with "unprecedented sanctions pressure" in recent years and that anti-Russian sanctions are hurting the states that imposed the sanctions more than the sanctions are hurting Russia. Putin similarly attempted to posture Russia's economy as stronger and growing more rapidly than economies in the West. Mishustin and Putin notably did not mention how the Russian Central Bank raised the interest rate to 21 percent in October 2024 or how Russia has been drawing from its National Welfare Fund to finance its war effort over the last three years.[11] The liquidity portion of Russia’s National Welfare fund may run out by Fall 2025.[12]

Ukrainian military officials continue to highlight the country’s growing drone production capacity and its effectiveness on the battlefield but acknowledged that Ukraine must address its force generation issues to fully stop Russian advances in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine’s First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk stated on February 7 that Ukraine outperforms Russia in first-person view (FPV) drone production and that drone development is expanding rapidly in Ukraine.[13] Havrylyuk stated that Ukraine has introduced over 1,300 new weapon models, most of which are drones and drone munitions, since February 2022 and that Ukrainian officials approved more than 250 new drone models for use by Ukrainian forces in 2024 alone. Havrylyuk stated that while drones have become a crucial substitute for long-range missiles, Ukrainian forces require continued innovation to counter Russian defenses and stressed that international military assistance is critical for Ukraine, particularly for weapons where Ukrainian domestic production falls short.

A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on February 7 that Ukrainian drone strikes significantly disrupt Russian operations in this direction.[14] The battalion commander noted that Ukrainian drone operators hold some areas of their defense lines in the Pokrovsk direction almost completely independent from infantry support. The commander stated that growing drone supplies have helped sustain Ukraine’s defenses despite Russian forces outnumbering Ukrainians ten-to-one in the Pokrovsk direction. The commander highlighted that Ukrainian forces are reportedly inflicting a seven-to-one casualty ratio on Russian troops in the area but need more personnel to fully stop Russian advances in that direction.

ISW previously noted that Ukrainian drone operations have been key in defending against Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction and throughout the frontline, although Ukraine must address its morale, force generation, and training issues to completely stall the Russian advance in Donetsk Oblast.[15]

Interim Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated in an interview with the Washington Post that Syria is open to Russia retaining its air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.[16] NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW-CTP's February 7 Iran Update. Qasra is very likely referencing some form of economic relief to help improve Syria’s dire economic situation. The interim Syrian government has lobbied for economic relief from various sources since the fall of the Assad regime.[17] Cooperation with Russia could hinder European Union (EU) plans to lift sanctions on Syria, which are contingent on the new Syrian government pursuing a peaceful political future without extremism or involvement from Russia and Iran.[18] An unspecified Russian source told Bloomberg on January 28 that talks on Russian basing are “stuck.”[19] Russia has continued to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid ongoing negotiations with the interim Syrian government.[20]

Azerbaijan-Russia relations continue to sour following Russia’s refusal to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024 downing of an Azerbaijani Airlines (AZAL) passenger plane, likely shot mid-air by Russian air defense before crashing in Aktau, Kazakhstan. Azerbaijani outlet APA News, citing sources familiar with the matter, reported on February 5 that Azerbaijan is preparing to take legal action against Russia in an international court, citing recent clear evidence identifying unspecified Russian actors responsible for the crash and Russia's failure to take responsibility for the crash.[21] Azerbaijan’s intent to sue follows the Azerbaijani Ministry of Digital Development and Transport's February 4 briefing of the initial investigation results attributing the AZAL crash to unspecified "foreign objects."[22]

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev previously accused Russia of attempting to cover up the incident, calling the Kremlin’s response “surprising, regrettable, and infuriating.”[23] Russian President Vladimir Putin apologized to Aliyev on December 28 that the crash occurred in Russian airspace but stopped short of admitting Russia’s fault in the crash and taking action against those responsible – demands Aliyev set forth following the crash.[24] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced on February 7 that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not intend to make another statement regarding the AZAL plane crash.[25]

Azerbaijani outlet Report.az noted on February 6 that Azerbaijani officials have also formally notified the Kremlin of the closure of the local branch of the Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), a Russian cultural diplomacy agency, citing national security concerns and a move away from “external interference.”[26] Russia currently has over 80 Rossotrudnichestvo branches concentrated in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Central and Southeast Asia aimed at promoting Russian culture, strengthening the influence of the Russian language, supporting “compatriots abroad,” and preserving historical sites abroad with significance to Russia.[27] Moldovan and Ukrainian officials have previously warned that Russian officials use the branches to promote Russian propaganda and conduct “subversive work” abroad.[28]

Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers appointed Lieutenant General Yevhen Moysiuk and Captain Valeriy Churkin as Deputy Defense Ministers on February 7.[29] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Moysiuk earlier on February 7 from his previous role as Special Envoy for the Implementation of International Security Assurances and Development of the Defense Forces of Ukraine.[30] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Moysiuk will focus on developing Ukraine's Defense Forces, particularly regarding mobilization processes and military training, and Churkin will lead the charge on defense innovations and technological development for Ukraine's military.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces marginally advanced during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on February 6, but Russian sources claimed on February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha.
• The Kremlin continues to conduct an information campaign likely directed toward both domestic and international audiences that aims to conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's economy.
• Ukrainian military officials continue to highlight the country’s growing drone production capacity and its effectiveness on the battlefield but acknowledged that Ukraine must address its force generation issues to fully stop Russian advances in eastern Ukraine.
• Interim Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated in an interview with the Washington Post that Syria is open to Russia retaining its air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.
• Azerbaijan-Russia relations continue to sour following Russia’s refusal to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024 downing of an Azerbaijani Airlines (AZAL) passenger plane, likely shot mid-air by Russian air defense before crashing in Aktau, Kazakhstan
• Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers appointed Lieutenant General Yevhen Moysiuk and Captain Valeriy Churkin as Deputy Defense Ministers on February 7.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk.
• The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to regional government positions.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus
  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Please see topline text for updates on Ukrainian operations in Russia.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 7 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 6 and 7.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 7 that there is fighting near Mali Prokhody and Velyki Prokhody (both north of Kharkiv City and west of Lyptsi), but ISW has not observed confirmation or other Russian reporting of fighting in this area.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 7 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 6 and 7.[34]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northwest of Novomlynsk and Fyholivka (both north of Kupyansk).[35] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Dovhenke (north of Kupyansk and northwest of Dvorichna).[36] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on February 7 that Russian forces are deploying tanks with trawlers alongside several lightly armored vehicles in order to transport infantry to the frontline.[37] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are systematically attempting to cross the Oskil River near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) by transporting two to eight personnel on a rubber boat across the river, accumulating in forested areas on the west bank of the river, and then attacking neighboring settlements.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Fyholikva, and drone operators from the Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[39]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 7. Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, Zeleny Hai, and Lozova; west of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Novoserhiivka, and Hrekivka on February 6 and 7.[40]

Assessed Russian Advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 7 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked north of Lyman towards Nove, Katerynivka, and Zelena Dolyna and northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Terny, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka on February 6 and 7.[42] A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) entered the forested area south of Yampolivka but that Ukrainian forces repelled the attack, making the area a contested "gray zone."[43]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Yampolivka.[44] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on February 7 that Russian forces are deploying small infantry teams consisting of two to three people in a "conveyor belt mode" all day and night.[45] The spokesperson added that the Russian command deployed poorly trained prison recruits or those from disadvantaged families to identify Ukrainian firing points, after which well-trained Russian personnel began to attack.[46] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), citing a senior Ukrainian lieutenant, reported on February 7 that Russian forces have suffered over 1,000 casualties in assaults against Terny in an unspecified time frame but are now deploying small assault groups that are harder for Ukrainian drones to detect.[47] The WSJ reported that rain and fog hamper drone usage for Russians and Ukrainians, which provides opportunities for Russian forces to conduct large assaults with armored vehicles.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Yampolivka, and elements of the "Shrama" detachment of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating in the Serebryanske forest area.[48]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 7 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on February 6 and 7.[49]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 1L219M "Zoopark-1" counter-battery radar system – which Russian forces use to identify Ukrainian firing positions – in the Siversk direction.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself on February 7 but did not advance in this direction.[51]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian source claimed on February 7 that Russian forces seized the Avanhard Stadium and Hospital No. 3 in central Chasiv Yar and three residential areas in western Chasiv Yar.[52] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on February 7 that Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar with armored vehicle support, but Ukrainian forces destroyed a tank and an armored vehicle and damaged two additional armored vehicles during the assault.[53]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[54] Elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar).[55]

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Toretsk amid claims that Russian forces seized Toretsk as of February 7. Russian forces attacked in Toretsk itself and north of Toretsk near Dyliivka on February 6 and 7.[56]

Russian-assessed advances: Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Puzanova Street in northern Toretsk.[57]

Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 7 that elements of the Russian 109th Separate Rifle Regiment (1st "Slovyansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] [formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Druzhba (east of Toretsk) and that elements of the Russian 1st, 9th, and 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigades (all part of the 51st CAA) alongside elements of the Russian "Veterany" assault detachment (likely referring to the "Veterany" Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade [Volunteer Assault Corps]) seized Toretsk.[58] A Russian milblogger also claimed on February 7 that Russian forces seized the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk.[59] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however, and has not observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces have pushed Ukrainian forces from some positions on the outskirts of Toretsk. A Russian milblogger noted on February 7 that the Russian MoD does not consider Krymske or the Toretska mine (northeast and north of Toretsk respectively) within the administrative boundaries of Toretsk according to their maps and assessments of Russian advances.[60]

The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces intend to leverage advances in Toretsk to push towards Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk and southwest of Chasiv Yar).[61] Geolocated footage published on February 6 shows Ukrainian forces raiding Russian positions along Hryhoriia Skovorody streets in northern Toretsk, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions on the outskirts of Toretsk.[62] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces would likely leverage advances west of Toretsk and the seizure of Toretsk to push towards Kostyantynivka and pressure Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 7 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Tarasivka, Myrolyubivka, Promin, Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, and Novotoretske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Pishchane, Novooleksandriivka, Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, Udachne, Novoserhiivka, and Uspenivka on February 6 and 7.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Pishchane, Nadiivka, and Zvirove.[65]

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are accumulating near Baranivka (east of Pokrovsk) ahead of offensive operations against Tarasivka (north of Barasivka).[66] Ukrainian military expert Petro Chernyk stated on February 7 that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction lost about 300-360 personnel per day in early January 2025 but that Russian casualty numbers have decreased recently.[67] A Ukrainian platoon commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated to the Wall Street Journal that Russian forces outnumber Ukrainian forces ten-to-one but that Russian forces are losing at least seven personnel for every one Ukrainian loss.[68] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that the number of Russian attacks this week (February 1 to 7) decreased compared to last week (January 25 to 31) but that fighting remains intense.[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 7 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko, west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Andriivka, and southwest of Kurakhove near Dachne on February 6 and 7.[70]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove, and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on February 7 bud did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil, north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar, and northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne on February 6 and 7.[72]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Velyka Novosilka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[73]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 7, but Russian forces did not advance.[74] Geolocated footage published on February 5 shows Russian forces repelling a platoon-sized Ukrainian mechanized assault near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Anti-Tank Battalion (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the BARS-32 detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[76]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Kherson direction on February 7.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 112 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[77] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 81 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts; that 31 decoy drones were "lost;" and that Russian drones struck Sumy, Kyiv, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts.

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat reported on February 7 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a guided glide bomb over Zaporizhia Oblast but did not specify the means that Ukrainian forces used.[78] Unconfirmed reports suggested that Ukrainian forces used Zu-23-2 anti-aircraft guns to shoot down the guided glide bomb, though ISW is unable to verify such reports. [79]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to regional government positions. The Time of Heroes program announced on February 7 that Russian authorities appointed program participant Nursultan Mussagaleev as acting Orenburg Oblast Deputy Minister of Regional and Information Policy.[80] Orenburg Oblast Governor Denis Pasler expressed confidence that Mussagaleev's military experience in Ukraine will be an asset for the regional government. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported in October 2023 that Mussagaleev participated in the execution of civilians in Bucha.[81] Time of Heroes reported that the program has appointed 23 participants to government and business positions in Russia.[82]

Russia's labor shortage continues to hinder ongoing efforts to expand its defense industrial production. Ukraine’s First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk told Ukrainian outlet Ukriform on February 7 that Russia has over 1,300 defense industrial facilities with roughly two million employees, but that Russia continues to lack hundreds of thousands of workers.[83] Havrylyuk stated that Russia's efforts to significantly increase weapons production have exacerbated Russia's labor shortage, but that Russia has increased its production of some weapons three- to six-fold since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022 despite this. Havrylyuk noted that Russia is still not able to produce enough weapons to meet the military's needs in Ukraine and is thus relying on Iran and North Korea to supply additional weapons. About 60 percent of Russia’s shells fired against Ukraine reportedly are sourced from North Korea as of December 2024, for example.[84] Havrylyuk noted that Russia is working to increase and diversify its domestic drone production.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The independent Belarusian monitoring group Belarusian Hajun announced on February 7 that it is suspending operations, likely due to the Belarusian government’s crackdown against the group.[85] Belarusian authorities had designated the Belarusian Hajun, which tracked military activity in Belarus and reported on Russian troop movements since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, as an extremist organization in March 2022.[86] The Belarusian Hajun’s telegram page first reported on February 5 an unauthorized entry into the page that compromised user and owner data.[87] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on February 7 that Belarusian security forces detained at least one person in connection to the page shortly after the leak.[88]

Belarusian officials continue to highlight increasing military cooperation with Russia. Chairman of the Belarusian State Military-Industrial Committee Dmitry Pantus claimed on February 7 that Belarus' military-technical cooperation with Russia is at a "maximum" and highlighted the increasing number of ventures including joint aircraft manufacturing projects.[89] Pantus also noted that Belarus is actively working on organizing mass first-person view (FPV) drone production and is incorporating artificial intelligence (AI) into domestic technological developments.[90]

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8310; https://t.me/dva_majors/63979; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1887542437943394694 ; https://t.me/rybar/67820

[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/48626 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48645 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85830 ; https://t.me/rybar/67802 ; https://t.me/rybar/67810 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61959 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23539 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23542 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20973 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23562

[3] https://t.me/rybar/67802 ; https://t.me/rybar/67810

[4] https://t.me/romanov_92/46033 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1887738919980085543 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61959 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23528 ; https://t.me/rybar/67798 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23528 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20977

[5] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61937

[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/48626 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85779 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48663

[7] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/43531 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61936 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20972 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12417 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020625

[8] https://t.me/dva_majors/64056 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/49110 ; https://t.me/RSaponkov/10375

[9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76227

[10] https://swedenherald.com/article/svantesson-wants-to-expose-russian-economic-bluff

[11] https://warontherocks.com/2024/09/russia-is-on-a-slow-path-to-bankruptcy-but-how-slow/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111424

[12] https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-economy-wealth-fund-reserves-ukraine-war-moscow-inflation-stagflation-2025-1 ; https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-stagflation-rising-inflation-weak-growth-dwindling-liquid-reserves-by-anders-aslund-2025-01

[13] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3957184-ivan-gavriluk-persij-zastupnik-ministra-oboroni-ukraini.html ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/07/ukrayina-perevazhaye-rosiyu-u-vygotovlenni-fpv-droniv-ivan-gavrylyuk/ ; https://suspilne dot media/943305-ukraina-perevazae-rosiu-u-virobnictvi-fpv-droniv-gavriluk/

[14] https://archive.ph/INbWX ; https://www.wsj.com/world/its-russian-men-against-ukrainian-machines-on-the-battlefields-in-ukraine-fcbe1592

[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624

[16] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/06/syria-defense-minister-russia-bases/

[17] https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/syria-eu-sanctions-relief-crucial-why ; https://apnews.com/article/eu-syria-sanctions-easing-lifted-hts-875dc2a6dec5d54b459f580baa1426eb

[18] https://apnews.com/article/eu-syria-sanctions-easing-lifted-hts-875dc2a6dec5d54b459f580baa1426eb

[19] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-28/russia-s-hopes-to-keep-syria-bases-fade-with-talks-stalled

[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-4-2025

[21] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/07/azerbaijan-escalates-rare-standoff-russia-downing-passenger-plane; https://en.apa dot az/political/russia-wants-to-make-second-malaysian-boeing-incident-happen-azerbaijan-is-preparing-to-appeal-to-international-court-459893

[22] https://azertag dot az/en/xeber/brief_of_the_preliminary_report_of_the_investigation_regarding_crash_of_azal_owned_aircraft_near_aktau_released-3403727

[23] https://aze dot media/ilham-aliyev-the-russian-side-must-apologize-to-azerbaijan/; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/07/azerbaijan-escalates-rare-standoff-russia-downing-passenger-plane

[24] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/28/putin-apologises-for-azerbaijan-plane-crash-without-admitting-russia-at-fault; https://www.france24 dot com/en/live-news/20241229-azerbaijan-says-russia-shot-at-plane-before-crash-demands-it-admit

[25] https://t.me/tass_agency/299563

[26] https://report dot az/ru/vneshnyaya-politika/rossijskoj-storone-napravleno-oficialnoe-uvedomlenie-o-prekrashenii-deyatelnosti-rossotrudnichestva/

[27] https://rs dot gov.ru/predstavitelstva-za-rubezhom/ ; https://ruskidom dot rs/россотрудничество-ру/

[28] https://glavcom dot ua/ru/interview/set-russkih-domov-kak-agentura-putina-prodolzhaet-nasilovat-evropu-853255.html ; https://eadaily dot com/ru/news/2023/08/02/v-moldavii-trebuyut-zakryt-russkiy-dom-za-propagandu-i-podryvnuyu-rabotu

[29] https://suspilne dot media/943339-zelenskij-zvilniv-general-lejtenanta-mojsuka-z-posadi-upovnovazenogo-z-garantij-bezpeki/; https://t.me/tmelnychuk/5629 ; https://suspilne dot media/943435-general-lejtenanta-mojsuka-priznaceno-zastupnikom-ministra-oboroni-ukraini/; https://unn dot ua/en/news/umerov-gets-two-new-deputies-who-they-are-and-what-they-will-be-responsible-for

[30] https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/742025-53745

[31] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/11744

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl ;

[33] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12421

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02exrb4HwbccNS79r9FJK5TADbc13F6r5Wa8roAbSMxw86pJFP2uotDNKPr9WSfFgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl

[35] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61946; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31917

[36] https://t.me/yurasumy/20981

[37] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/07/obrazyly-skryvdyly-zlamaly-karusel-poblyzu-kupyanska-vshhent-roztroshhyly-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc

[38] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/07/forsuvannya-dlya-forsu-rosiyany-postijno-stvoryuyut-placzdarmy-na-berezi-oskolu-ale-zhyvut-vony-nedovgo/

[39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31917 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12421 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/16938

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02exrb4HwbccNS79r9FJK5TADbc13F6r5Wa8roAbSMxw86pJFP2uotDNKPr9WSfFgyl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5030

[41] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25426 ; https://t.me/osb878/157

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02exrb4HwbccNS79r9FJK5TADbc13F6r5Wa8roAbSMxw86pJFP2uotDNKPr9WSfFgyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5030

[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31922

[44] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153840

[45] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/07/lovlyat-nashyh-hlopcziv-na-svoyih-zhyvcziv-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-napiv-mehanizovani-shturmy-ta-ataky-pryrechenyh/ ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/943181-pocali-agresivno-sturmuvati-v-60-i-brigadi-rozkazali-pro-posilenna-tisku-na-limanskomu-fronti/

[46] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/24480

[47] https://www.wsj.com/world/its-russian-men-against-ukrainian-machines-on-the-battlefields-in-ukraine-fcbe1592?mod=WSJ_Euronews

[48] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5472 ; https://t.me/specnazahmat/1143 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31922 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18775

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02exrb4HwbccNS79r9FJK5TADbc13F6r5Wa8roAbSMxw86pJFP2uotDNKPr9WSfFgyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5030

[50] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5014

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02exrb4HwbccNS79r9FJK5TADbc13F6r5Wa8roAbSMxw86pJFP2uotDNKPr9WSfFgyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl

[52] https://t.me/tass_agency/299513

[53] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/943403-boi-trivaut-u-miskij-zabudovi-osuv-hortica-pro-situaciu-u-torecku/

[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23536

[55] https://t.me/epoddubny/22388

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02exrb4HwbccNS79r9FJK5TADbc13F6r5Wa8roAbSMxw86pJFP2uotDNKPr9WSfFgyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl

[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8306; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/590

[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/48654 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48665; https://t.me/mod_russia/48648; https://t.me/mod_russia/48649

[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61965

[60] https://t.me/rybar/67819

[61] https://t.me/tass_agency/299617; https://t.me/tass_agency/299627 ;https://t.me/sashakots/51773

[62] https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1887793908739973313; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1887797476263854474;

[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025

[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5030; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5030; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61958; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153791 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153791

[65] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5030; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61955; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61958

[66] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153791

[67] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/07/velyka-mobilizacziya-v-rf-nevdalyj-pivnichnokorejskyj-debyut-ta-minus-46-000-rosiyan-ekspert-pro-boyi-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/

[68] https://www.wsj.com/world/its-russian-men-against-ukrainian-machines-on-the-battlefields-in-ukraine-fcbe1592

[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/07/cze-yak-temperatura-vpala-z-500-do-450-gradusiv-u-zsu-poyasnyly-chomu-pid-pokrovskom-pomenshalo-atak-rf/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02exrb4HwbccNS79r9FJK5TADbc13F6r5Wa8roAbSMxw86pJFP2uotDNKPr9WSfFgyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5030; https://t.me/wargonzo/24702

[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153816; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13357; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13356

[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/64055; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02o1WYM4HUhTNeLpSo3iNBsuXVqs6e1rrTXhi38x6mRCTcsVQL87oKHYrsRVaPU9wml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DaGNT3pKoNZH2CAx1ohnCMEg2QgBRdhf5XE9MVRqJbFo9FbzqzfxziwYRYv3QVcYl; https://t.me/wargonzo/24702

[73] https://t.me/wargonzo/24702

[74] https://t.me/wargonzo/24702

[75] https://t.me/Taiga_tot_samyj/1346; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1887632620487315708;

[76] https://t.me/dva_majors/64072; https://t.me/wargonzo/24711

[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/28274

[78] https://unn dot ua/en/news/the-air-force-on-the-downing-of-a-uav-in-zaporizhzhia-we-do-not-disclose-the-method

[79] https://defence-ua dot com/weapon_and_tech/scho_vidomo_pro_tajemnichij_zasib_jakim_ukrajina_zbivaje_rosijski_kabi_ta_chi_mozhe_dopomogti_konkurs_nato-17927.html ; https://t.me/soniah_hub/9085

[80] https://t.me/vremyageroev2024/805

[81] https://ssu dot gov.ua/novyny/sbu-povidomyla-pro-pidozru-rashystu-yakyi-otrymav-heroia-rosii-za-vbyvstvo-myrnykh-zhyteliv-u-buchi-video

[82] https://t.me/vremyageroev2024/805

[83] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3957184-ivan-gavriluk-persij-zastupnik-ministra-oboroni-ukraini.html

[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024

[85] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8378

[86] https://t.me/astrapress/74014; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-poland-say-wagner-fighters-arrive-belarus-2023-07-16/

[87] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8373

[88] https://t.me/astrapress/74014

[89] https://belta dot by/society/view/pantus-programma-voenno-tehnicheskogo-sotrudnichestva-belarusi-i-rossii-do-2030-goda-uzhe-formiruetsja-694348-2025/ ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/293651

[90] https://belta dot by/society/view/pantus-my-rabotaem-nad-organizatsiej-serijnogo-proizvodstva-fpv-dronov-694366-2025/ ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/293661