Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 9, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 9, 2025

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel

February 9, 2025, 4:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on February 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on February 9, citing South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), that thousands of North Korean workers arrived in Russia in 2024 to take construction jobs.[1] Russian official data shows that 13,221 North Koreans entered Russia in 2024 — up to 12 times the number that entered Russia in 2023. Many of the North Korean workers are reportedly entering Russia on student visas, with 7,887 North Koreans having entered Russia in 2024 for alleged education purposes. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on February 4 that the number of North Koreans who came to Russia to study in 2024 was the highest number since 2019.[2] Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported in November 2024 that data from the Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service showed that a record number of North Koreans entered Russia for education between July and September 2024 — notably in the lead up to the reported start of North Korea's deployment of troops to Russia in early October 2024.[3]

Russia has been suffering from significant labor shortages in both its civilian and defense industrial sectors since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[4] The arrival of several thousands of North Koreans to work in civilian sectors is marginal and will not significantly alleviate Russia's labor shortages. Russia reportedly has an estimated labor shortage of 1.5 million workers as of December 2024, for example.[5] North Korea's provisions of materiel and troops to Russia have significantly increased over the course of 2024, however, and the several thousands of North Korean workers that arrived in Russia recently may be the beginning of larger influxes in the future that could more significantly help Russia's labor shortage issues. (Russian forces‘ initial use of small numbers of North Korean artillery and mortar shells grew rapidly, with 60 percent of Russian forces‘ artillery ammunition fired now being sourced from North Korea as of December 2024.[6]) Russian enterprises are also likely not paying North Korean workers the same salaries as Russian citizens, so a significant influx of North Korean workers into the Russian work force in the future could also financially benefit Russian enterprises that are having to offer high salaries to Russian citizens in order to compete against Russian military and defense industrial enterprises for employees. Significant increases in the number of North Koreans working in Russia's civilian sectors in the future could also free up Russian civilian sector employees to work in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) or fight in Ukraine.

The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397. Russia voted for Resolution 2397 in 2017 in response to North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests.[7] The resolution explicitly prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by December 2019. Russia is likely using the guise of student visas to hide Russia's violation of the resolution. 

North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine. Kim gave a speech at the North Korean Ministry of National Defense on February 9 that heavily focused on the threats the US and the West allegedly pose to North Korean security.[8] Kim criticized the US for protracting the war in Ukraine and claimed that he is "seriously concerned" about the West's alleged desire to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. Kim notably claimed that the North Korean military and people will "invariably support and encourage" Russia's "just cause" to defend its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity "in the spirit of" the June 2024 Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.

German authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training. German outlet Süddeutsche Zeitung reported on February 8, citing a classified internal German report, that the German Ministry of Defense (MoD) is investigating possible espionage connected to six drone sightings near the Schwesing Airbase, where Ukrainian forces have trained to operate Patriot air defense systems, from January 9 to 29, 2025.[9] Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that German forces attempted to jam or down the drones, including with HP-47 jammers, RADIS drone detection systems, and Wingman counter-drone systems, but that German forces failed to down the drones or locate the operators in all six instances. Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that German authorities described the drones as "specialized objects" with modifications and are likely not commercially available. Süddeutsche Zeitung noted that authorities suspect that the operators launched the drones from ships in the North or Baltic seas and that the operators could be connected to Russia. A Bundeswehr spokesperson reportedly told Süddeutsche Zeitung that the German military has observed an increase in drones flying over German military facilities in an unspecified timeframe.

Russia appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states. Russia has been developing and improving its drone capabilities, including drone resistance to electronic warfare (EW) and Russia's own EW capabilities, in its ongoing war against Ukraine. NATO and its member states have increasingly warned of Russian sabotage and hybrid operations against NATO members throughout 2024.[10] Reports that a NATO member state is struggling to combat likely Russian reconnaissance drones demonstrate the need for NATO states to further develop their defensive capabilities as Russia continues to use its experience on the battlefield in Ukraine to innovate new technologies.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort.
• The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397.
• North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine.
• German authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training.
• Russia appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Vovchansk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia continues efforts to recruit Russians and citizens of other Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Sudzha amid continued fighting in Kursk Oblast on February 9. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted mechanized attacks southeast of Sudzha near Russkaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka.[11] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces counterattacked northwest of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo and Nikolskyi, north of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya, and southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[12]

 

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway southwest of Russkaya Konopelka.[13]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers continued to make conflicting claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka (both southeast of Sudzha). Some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces partially or completely pushed Ukrainian forces from Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, while others claimed that Russian forces failed to advance during attacks in the area.[14] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are no longer in windbreaks near Ulanok (southeast of Sudzha).[15]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Ulanok, and elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating southeast of Sudzha.[16] Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment, "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast; and elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade, 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment), and 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[17]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

 

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on February 9. Russian forces attacked near Vovchansk (north of Kharkiv City) on February 8 and 9.[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are active on the outskirts of Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[19]

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant in central Vovchansk.[20]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 9 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 8 and 9.[21]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 9 that Russian forces advanced west of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[22] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however.

Order of Battle: Elements of "Kontora" detachment of the 375th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and drone operators of the "Tilt" detachment are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[23]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 9 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka, Zahyrzove, and Zeleny Hai and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka on February 8 and 9.[24]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 9 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Ivanivka, and Novolyubivka and towards Nove and east of Lyman near Torske on February 8 and 9.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting reconnaissance-in-force missions near Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) in order to identify weak points in Ukrainian defenses.[26] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are trying to counterattack northwest of Ivanivka.[27]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 9 that Russian forces advanced 300 meters near Novolyubivka, 2.5 kilometers meters south of Ivanivka, west of Yampolivka, and one kilometer within Yampolivka.[28] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

 

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables near Zarichne (east of Lyman).[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on February 8 and 9 but did not advance.[30] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to bypass Ukrainian positions near Bilohorivka using motorcycles.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 9 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on February 8 and 9.[32] Ukrainian military officials reported on February 9 that Ukrainian forces destroyed and damaged two tanks, two armored personnel carriers, two infantry fighting vehicles, and an armored tractor in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction.[33]

Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 9 that Russian forces seized Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not seized Orikhovo-Vasylivka, however, and that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces maintain a presence in the settlement.[35] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced north and south of Orikhovo-Vasylivka.[36] ISW has not observed confirmation of any of these Russian claims, however.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[37]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 9. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself, east of Toretsk near Krymske, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 8 and 9.[38]

 

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 8 indicates that Russian forces advanced along Klymenka Street in northern Leonidivka (west of Toretsk).[39]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated that Russian forces are using civilian passenger cars during assaults in the Toretsk direction due to a shortage of armored vehicles.[40]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st "Slovaynsk" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating within Toretsk.[41]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 9. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Novotoretske, Vodyane Druhe, Novooleksandrivka, Kalynove, and Zelene Pole; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Preobrazhenka, Pishchane, Nadiivka, Novoserhiivka, Sribne, Uspenivka, Zaporizhzhia, Novoandriivka, and Udachne on February 8 and 9.[42] The Khortytsia Group of Forces also reported that Russian forces attempted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon south of Yasenove (southwest of Pokrovsk) and that Ukrainian mines damaged two tanks and two infantry fighting vehicles.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyne and Zvirove (south of Pokrovsk) and towards Nadiivka, Sribne, and Pishchane.[44] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the first Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups entered the outskirts of Pokrovsk.[45]

 

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Mine No. 3 in southeastern Pishchane.[46]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Zvirove.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 9 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced north of Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and within southeastern Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk).[48]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Udachne and advanced into eastern Zaporizhzhia, northeast of Zvirove, and one kilometer towards Sribne.[49] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on February 9 that Russian forces continue efforts to bypass Pokrovsk from the west and are constantly bringing reinforcements to the area.[50] Trehubov noted that Russian forces continue attacking in small assault groups. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian mines are preventing Russian forces from advancing near Kotlyne.[51]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Novoukrainka (southwest of Pokrovsk), and reconnaissance elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Zaporizhzhia.[52] Elements of the 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division) are reportedly operating in the Russian near rear near Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk).[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 9 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on February 8 and 9.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces control Zelenivka (southwest of Kurakhove).[55]

 

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 9 that Russian forces advanced towards Ulakly (west of Kurakhove) and along Haharina Street in central Andriivka.[56] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Dachne – contradicting limited Russian claims from February 8 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.[57] Elements of the Russian 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[58] Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Andriivka.[59]

Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 9. Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar on February 8 and 9.[60]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka).[61]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 9, but Russian forces did not advance.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted several unsuccessful counterattacks involving two tanks and three infantry fighting vehicles in the Orikhiv direction (north of Robotyne).[63]

 

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on February 9 that Russian attacks have decreased in the area and that Russian forces are trying to create new assault groups for further attacks but that the accumulation of Russian forces is not significant enough to conduct assault operations for a long period.[64]  The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported activity in the Kherson direction on February 9.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Dnipro direction.[65]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 8 and 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 151 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 70 drones over Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Volyn, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Odesa oblasts and that 74 decoy drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian official sources reported that Russian drone strikes hit Kyiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zhytomyr, and Volyn oblasts.[67]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 9 that Russian forces launched over 10 missiles, almost 750 strike drones, and over 1,260 glide bombs against Ukraine in the past week (between February 2 and 9).[68]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia continues efforts to recruit Russians and citizens of other Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). A Russian milblogger amplified a recruitment advertisement for prospective drone operators to sign MoD contracts in Yaroslavl City, advertising one-year contracts with monthly salaries of 240,000 rubles (about $2,476) and a one-time payment of 1,345,000 rubles (about $13,877).[69] The advertisement states that people from anywhere within Russia or other CIS states can sign up and receive the benefits.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian milbloggers published footage on February 9 showing Russian soldiers installing anti-drone nets over roads, claiming that Russian forces have covered a two-kilometer stretch of road between Bakhmut and Chasiv Yar, Donetsk Oblast with these nets to shield against Ukrainian drone strikes.[70]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to eradicate Ukrainian ethnic and national identity in occupied Ukraine and to militarize Ukrainian children. Ukrainian news outlet ArmyInform reported on February 9, citing the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner's Office, that Russian occupation authorities coerced 29,000 Ukrainian children in occupied Crimea to join Russian youth military-patriotic organization Yunarmiya in 2021 and that roughly 7,500 Ukrainian children in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts joined regional Yunarmiya branches in the same time period.[71] ArmyInform noted that Russian authorities also send children from occupied Ukraine to train at the Rosgvardia Military Institute in Perm and the Nakhimov Naval School in occupied Mariupol and that Russian authorities plan to double the number of students at the Nakhimov Naval School from 240 in 2024 to 560 in 2025. ArmyInform reported that schools in occupied Ukraine hold military-patriotic lessons for schoolchildren every week and have Ukrainian children write letters of support to Russian soldiers.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://en.yna dot co.kr/view/AEN20250209000700315?section=nk/nk

[2] https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/news/2025/02/04/v-2024-godu-bolee-7-tisyach-severokoreitsev-vekhali-v-rossiyu-s-tselyu-uchebi-na-fone-soobshchenii-ob-uchastii-soldat-iz-kndr-v-voine-s-ukrainoi/index.html ; https://t.me/istories_media/8882

[3] https://zona dot media/news/2024/11/08/koreya; https://en dot yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241018006856315?section=nk/nk

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024; https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2024/12/11/a-perfect-storm

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024

[7] https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20250209000700315?section=nk/nk

[8] https://kcnawatch dot org/newstream/1739089983-55802660/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-pays-congratulatory-visit-to-ministry-of-national-defence-on-day-of-kpa-founding/; http://rodong.rep dot kp/en/index.php?MTVAMjAyNS0wMi0wOS1IMDEzQA==

[9] https://archive.ph/TzHaC; https://www.sueddeutsche dot de/politik/bundeswehr-alarmiert-drohnen-sichtungen-patriot-standort-schwesing-li.3198286?reduced=true; https://www.politico.eu/article/german-military-suspects-russia-espionage-spy-defense-war-drone-key-airbase/

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071124

[11] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23616; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31989; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85946;

[12] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154069; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85946; https://t.me/yurasumy/21022;

[13] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1888577987970269403; https://t.me/zogrussia1/911

[14] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23605; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23616; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31983; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85946; https://t.me/yurasumy/21022

[15] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23616

[16] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5480; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23616

[17] https://t.me/mod_russia/48712; https://t.me/dva_majors/64231; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23614; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85925; https://t.me/voin_dv/13283; https://t.me/basurin_e/16970; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85940

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/4231

[19] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12436

[20] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1888457919169237245; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/21551

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098

[22] https://t.me/yurasumy/21008 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154047 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61989

[23] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/49214 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/16966

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreN

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23619; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85947

[26] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23619

[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23619

[28] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23619; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23622; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154047  

[29] https://t.me/voin_dv/13288

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl

[31] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098

[33] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5100; https://dpsu.gov dot ua/ua/news/45984-video-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-prikordonniki-pidbili-7-odinic-bronetehniki-voroga; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/09/chergovyj-nevdalyj-shturm-rosiyan-prykordonnyky-nakryshyly-bronetehniky/;

[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/48707 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48708

[35] https://t.me/yurasumy/21019

[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154047

[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23614; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154016

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098

[39] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25478; https://t.me/azov_media/6543

 

[40] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5101

[41] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85930

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62000; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61985; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31966; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31969; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85926; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85951 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62000; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62002

[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098

[44] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61988; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61985; https://t.me/rybar/67870 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21012; https://t.me/yurasumy/21031; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61988

[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85955

[46] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1888319277305917824; https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/4121

[47] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8349; https://t.me/nova_afu/169

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl

[49] https://t.me/rybar/67870  ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61985; https://t.me/motopatriot78/31981;   https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85951; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85955;

[50] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/09/spovilnena-dynamika-ta-zhodnogo-prosuvannya-u-zsu-rozpovily-pro-manevry-voroga-bilya-pokrovska/

[51] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31981

[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85951; https://t.me/astrapress/74088;

[53] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/17268

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid07DuJ2NuyMrsuYL9hzGm69qBw8Lpp297vUMnHW1byThs6tMpN3vmwuuWdvgUaLWX4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61992; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154047

[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61992

[56] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61992; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/154047

[57] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61992; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025

[58] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13363

[59] https://t.me/yurasumy/21010

[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZsYzpkRCyxw4LmWV4g2qwvQ3wpP1Ze9HH9mDwCuukFeum4jZaAMBSCiXaTZbML3nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mppRU36W2SmV6dnjV5vmmZUpEDboHEHAs3d7chYaYrQu7vWyUTXdgFYpSs4eVreNl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5098

[61] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25479; https://t.me/ombr_110/465

[62] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12049

[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23625

[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/09/u-okupantiv-nemaye-velykogo-kulaka-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-znyzylas-kilkist-shturmiv/

[65] https://t.me/rogozin_do/6712

[66] https://t.me/kpszsu/28367

[67] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/944271-armia-rf-vdarila-dronom-po-sinelnikivskomu-rajonu-dnipropetrovsini-so-vidbuvaetsa-na-misci-podii/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/19363; https://t.me/kpszsu/28367

[68] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13273; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/09/armiya-rf-posylyla-povitryanyj-teror-ponad-2000-udariv-po-ukrayini-za-tyzhden/

[69] https://t.me/sashakots/51800  

[70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61998; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85964 

[71] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/09/kadetski-klasy-orlyata-rosiyi-i-liga-z-peregoniv-droniv-dity-v-okupacziyi-stayut-potenczijnym-vijskovym-rezervom-armiyi-rf/