Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 17, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Mason Clark

June 17, 2023, 6:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2 pm ET on June 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least four sectors of the front on June 17. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted localized ground attacks west and south of Kreminna.[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut, and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked on the northern and southern outskirts of Bakhmut.[2] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces repelled limited Ukrainian ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.[3] Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations south, southwest, and southeast of Velyka Novosilka near the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[4] Ukrainian forces also conducted counteroffensive operations southwest and southeast of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[5] Malyar also stated that Ukrainian forces advanced up to two kilometers in multiple unspecified directions in southern Ukraine.[6]

A delegation representing seven African states met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St Petersburg on June 17, following a meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky on June 16, to propose a generalized peace plan focused on resuming international trade. The Egyptian prime minister, a Ugadan presidential envoy, and the presidents of South Africa, Zambia, Comoros, the Republic of the Congo, and Senegal previously visited Kyiv and met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on June 16, and notably had to take shelter during Russian missile strikes targeting Kyiv.[7] South African President Cyril Ramaphosa corrected his spokesperson’s earlier denials that Russian forces did not conduct attacks on Kyiv during the visit and acknowledged that “such activity does not bode well for establishing peace.”[8] Ramaphosa presented a ten-point generalized peace plan on June 16 calling for an end to hostilities and a negotiated peace settlement that would respect sovereignty and establish security guarantees for both Ukraine and Russia.[9] The proposal also calls for securing the movement of grain and fertilizers from both Ukraine and Russia and closer cooperation with African states.[10] Zelensky reiterated that negotiations are only possible after the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine and that Ukraine will not pursue negotiated settlements reminiscent of the Minsk Accords.[11]

Putin stated that the Kremlin welcomes the African states’ “balanced” approach to resolving the war in Ukraine in his meeting with the delegation, but did not comment on the feasibility of Ramaphosa’s suggested peace plan.[12] President of Comoros and current African Union Chairperson Azali Asoumani notably used language similar to the Kremlin’s preferred ”Russian world” rhetoric about the war in Ukraine while meeting with Putin, stating that stability in Eastern Europe, Africa, and the world depends on fraternal relationships between neighboring Slavic “friendly nations.”[13] Asoumani also highlighted that peace in Ukraine is important for addressing international food and energy security.[14] Asoumani’s comments and the peace plan’s inclusion of grain shipment guarantees suggest the states involved in the proposal view resolving the economic fallout from the war in Ukraine as their paramount concern. The delegation likely seeks to balance Ukraine and Russia to maintain longstanding bilateral relationships with Russia without fully tying themselves diplomatically to the Kremlin’s war.

The Kremlin will likely exploit this proposal to promote Russian information operations aiming to slow Western security assistance to Ukraine and has not demonstrated any intent to engage with any peace process meaningfully. ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin has routinely signaled a false willingness to negotiate a settlement to the war to prompt Western concessions and dissuade Western officials from sending further support to Ukraine.[15] The Kremlin previously intensified this effort to set conditions for its winter-spring 2023 offensive and is likely reamplifying this information operation in an effort to weaken Western support for Ukraine during counteroffensive operations.[16] The Kremlin also used the equally vague peace plan presented by China in the spring of 2023 to amplify this information operation and has not yet attempted to expound upon the broad suggestions in that plan.[17] The Kremlin instead attempted to use stated Chinese interest in negotiating a settlement to the war in Ukraine to pursue desired closer ties with China.[18] The Kremlin will likely use the outreach by these African states to pursue strengthened bilateral and multilateral engagement.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to signal his disinterest in formally subordinating the Wagner private military company (PMC) to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Prigozhin sarcastically criticized the MoD’s formalization efforts on June 17 after previously portraying himself as compliant with the Russian MoD’s order for volunteer formations to sign formal contracts by July 1 and claimed he attempted to submit a contract to formalize Wagner under the Russian MoD.[19] Prigozhin implied that the Russian MoD will confiscate weapons that volunteer units obtained outside of the Russian MoD’s weapon deliveries and noted that inexperienced Russian commanders with higher military education will replace what he claimed are more combat-effective volunteer commanders.[20] Prigozhin added that formalization will destroy hierarchies within volunteer formations and force volunteers to serve in the military without the Russian MoD respecting military contract deadlines. Prigozhin noted that the Russian MoD will not provide sufficient supplies or weapons for volunteers and will mistreat irregular forces. Prigozhin did not discuss the contents of his claimed formalization contract with the Russian MoD on June 17, but a Wagner-affiliated milblogger suggested that Prigozhin demanded a series of powers and concessions from the Russian military command discussed in the force generation section of this update.[21] Prigozhin’s behavior indicates that he is unlikely to subordinate Wagner forces to the Russian MoD unless such a move would grant him more political power within Russia.

The New York Times (NYT) released a report supporting ISW’s prior assessment that Russian forces most likely destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam.[22] NYT cited multiple US and Ukrainian engineering experts who examined diagrams of the KHPP dam, imagery of the destroyed dam foundation, footage of the initial breach, and seismic data. The experts determined that the degree of damage to the dam’s internal structures is consistent with an explosion from within the dam’s internal structures rather than from prior damage. NYT also quoted a senior US military official as saying that the US ruled out an external attack, such as from a missile, rocket, or other projectile, as causing the explosion, and that the US believes that Russian forces most likely caused the internal explosion that caused the dam’s collapse. ISW has assessed since the destruction of the KHPP dam on June 6 that the preponderance of available evidence, reasoning, and rhetoric suggests that Russian forces deliberately damaged the dam.[23]

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least four sectors of the front.
• A delegation representing seven African states met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg following a meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky on June 16 to propose a generalized peace plan focused on resuming international trade.
• The Kremlin will likely exploit this proposal to promote Russian information operations aiming to slow Western security assistance to Ukraine and has not demonstrated any intent to meaningfully engage with any peace process.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to signal his disinterest in formally subordinating the Wagner private military company (PMC) to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• The New York Times (NYT) released a report supporting ISW’s prior assessment that Russian forces most likely destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted localized ground attacks west and south of Kreminna.
• Russian forces and Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks in the Bakhmut area and on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations near Vuhledar likely in response to Ukrainian territorial gains in the area on June 16.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to gradually mobilize Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB).
• Russian officials are planning several infrastructure projects connecting occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to occupied Crimea, likely to secure new ground lines of communication (GLOCs) for the Russian grouping in southern Ukraine.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Berestove (30km northwest of Svatove), Novoselivske (19km northwest of Svatove), and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances near Terny (17km west of Kreminna) and attacked near Spirne (11km southeast of Siversk).[25] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Rozdolivka, Vesele, and Vyimka (all 25-30km south of Kreminna).[26]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted localized ground attacks west and south of Kreminna on June 17. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Bilohorivka and Verkhnokamyanka (11km east of Siversk).[27] The Russian Southern Group of Forces spokesperson claimed that Russian forces also repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Rozdolivka, Vesele, and Yakovlivka (35km south of Kreminna).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked in the Serebrianska forest area (11km south of Kreminna).[29] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar acknowledged that Ukrainian forces continue both counteroffensive and defensive operations in eastern Ukraine.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks in the Bakhmut area on June 17. Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces have made marginal advances north of Mayorsk (21km southwest of Bakhmut) as of June 17.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[32] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that the intensity of combat operations in the Bakhmut direction has decreased and that Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive efforts around Bakhmut.[33] The Russian Center Group of Forces spokesperson claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Berkhivka and Yahidne (both within 3km northwest of Bakhmut).[34] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted sporadic ground attacks northeast and southwest of Bakhmut but that Russian forces still control Berkhivka, Yahidne, and Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[35]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on June 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Stepove (2km north of Avdiivka), Avdiivka, and Marinka (immediately southwest of Donetsk City).[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made gains north of Marinka, attacked southeast of Krasnohorivka (8km north of Avdiivka), and are consolidating areas near Pobieda (5km southwest of Donetsk City) reportedly captured within the last week.[37] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces made gains near Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka) on June 16 and near Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) on June 17.[38] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka.[39]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Vuhledar on June 17, likely in response to Ukrainian territorial gains in the area on June 16.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on Novomykhailivka (19km northeast of Vuhledar) and Vodyane (6km northeast of Vuhledar).[41]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian artillery units repelled three Ukrainian attacks and reconnaissance-in-force attempts southwest and southeast of Velyka Novosilka.[42] A Russian moblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced between Urozhaine (10km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Novodonetske (13km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[43] The milbloggger also claimed that elements of the “Kaskad” Operational Tactical Combat Formation and Russian regular forces continue to defend against Ukrainian attacks south of Velyka Novosilka. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in Novodonetske and in areas southwest of Velyka Novosilka.[44] Another Kremlin-affiliated source claimed that elements of the Russian 127^th  Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) regained nearly all lost positions in the Vremivka salient area and suggested that “Storm Z” assault detachments composed of convicts are operating in the division.[45]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 17.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Pyatykhatky (41km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) and Novopokrovka (16km southeast of Orkhiv).[47] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces entered Pyatykhatky but retreated to the settlement’s northern outskirts towards the end of the day.[48] Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured a foothold on the Russian first line of defense south of Mala Tokmachka (9km southeast of Orikhiv) but that elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelled Ukrainian advances in the area.[49] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov also noted that elements of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army) are defending against Ukrainian attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces killed a Ukrainian mechanized brigade commander, but ISW cannot confirm this claim at the time of this publication.[51]

Russian occupation officials reportedly stopped the members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) delegation from taking pictures of Russian fortifications near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Rogov claimed that Russian officials “politely but very insistently” asked IAEA inspectors to delete footage of Russian defensive structures and checkpoints during their visit to the ZNPP.[52] Rogov accused IAEA officials of working for foreign intelligence agencies.[53]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues efforts to gradually mobilize Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited a military-industrial production facility in Omsk Oblast that produces tanks and thermobaric artillery systems on June 17.[54] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the facility has significantly increased output in the past few months, and Russian MoD Main Armored Directorate Head Major General Alexander Shestakov stated that all the armored vehicles are modified to meet security requirements. Shoigu also visited an arsenal storage facility for artillery and missile ammunition in Omsk Oblast, and MoD Head of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate Lieutenant General Nikolai Parshin reported to Shoigu that the facility has sent 4,000 artillery systems to Russian forces in Ukraine and plans to send an additional 700.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russia continues to rely heavily on sanctions evasion schemes to acquire critical components for missiles. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on June 17 that Russian forces do not have the capability to produce the semiconductors, chips, and processors that missiles require, but are still able to produce missiles by obtaining these components from countries that sympathize with Russia.[55] Ihnat added that Russian forces have been using recently manufactured missiles to strike Ukrainian infrastructure. Ihnat reported that Russia is rushing the production of missiles and that recently acquired missile fragments show that some missiles do not even have production labels.[56] ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin is pursuing a broad diplomatic outreach campaign to alleviate strain on the overextended Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and circumvent Western attempts to limit Russian access to microchips and other critical components of Russian military equipment.[57]

A Wagner-affiliated milblogger claimed that a contract, which Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin attempted to present to the Russian MoD, asked for a wide range of concessions and powers. Prigozhin previously attempted to deliver an alleged MoD-Wagner contract to the MoD on June 16 in response to the MoD’s order to formalize volunteer formations.[58] The Wagner-affiliated milblogger claimed that the contract included clauses that would ensure that Wagner would receive requested supplies and ammunition and provide Wagner with access to Russian military training grounds and organizational facilities.[59] The milblogger claimed that the contract would allow Wagner personnel to conduct special operations in other countries, train specialists in a wide range of military specialties, and conduct regime change operations on behalf of Russia. The contract reportedly would grant Wagner the power to send representatives to the MoD, request the Russian defense minister’s presence at Wagner’s meetings, and access most MoD infrastructure (except the Strategic Missile Forces).[60] The contract also reportedly stipulates that Wagner personnel would remain Wagner employees - not MoD employees - and would allow Wagner personnel to veto decisions in special operations in which they are involved.[61] If accurate, Prigozhin’s contract was an intentionally ludicrous offer he knew the MoD would reject. Prigozhin has not disclosed what was in the contract or if the contract specifically pertains to the MoD order for all personnel in volunteer formation to sign contracts with the MoD by July 1.[62]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

A Russian occupation official announced that Russian officials plan to implement several infrastructure projects connecting occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to occupied Crimea, likely to secure new ground lines of communication (GLOCs) for the Russian grouping in southern Ukraine. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian occupation officials plan to establish a ferry passenger service between Zaporizhia and Crimea by the end of 2023 and will begin to build a planned railway from occupied Crimea to Melitopol and Berdyansk in Zaporizhia Oblast in August.[63] Russian officials also announced on June 16 efforts to strengthen highways connecting Russia and occupied Ukraine.[64]

Russian occupation administrations continue to sign cooperation agreements with Russian business organizations and other Russian federal subjects at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).[65] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration signed cooperation documents with Kabardino-Balkira Republic to strengthen existing patronage programs and an economic agreement with Belgorod Oblast pertaining to production cooperation.[66] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that his administration signed 25 cooperation agreements at SPIEF, including with Chelyabinsk Oblast on deepening existing patronage programs and with KamAZ Public Joint Stock Company (PJSC) for the construction of two repair plants in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[67] Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Administration Head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed that his administration signed agreements with Republic of North Ossetia-Alania on business exchanges.[68] The Kherson Oblast Occupation Administration also claimed that its officials met with representatives of the United Arab Emirates to discuss export deals for agricultural products.[69]

Russian occupation officials claimed that evacuation efforts on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast are declining as flood waters continue to subside. Kherson Oblast Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo claimed that the flow of evacuees is decreasing as most people have evacuated flooded areas.[70] Saldo claimed that 7,800 residents in occupied Kherson Oblast have evacuated, with 2,000 staying in temporary accommodation centers. Saldo added that water levels have receded in occupied Nova Kakhovka as well as Oleshky. Ukrainian Oleshky Administration Head Yevhen Ryshchyk stated that only some areas of Oleshky hromada are no longer flooded and that some areas near the Dnipro River are still flooded.[71]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/27503; https://t.me/mod_russia/27499; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47455; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48548

[2] https://t.me/annamaliar/856; https://t.me/mod_russia/27499; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48548; 

[3] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48537; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48548; https://t.me/wargonzo/13306; https://t.me/mod_russia/27499      

[4] https://t.me/mod_russia/27503; https://t.me/mod_russia/27501; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47462 ;  https://t.me/wargonzo/13306

[5] https://t.me/vrogov/10346; https://t.me/rybar/48596; https://t.me/sashakots/40434 https://t.me/epoddubny/16430 https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47445; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47427  ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47428; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89325; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89333; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89343; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89344; https://t.me/wargonzo/13318; https://t.me/wargonzo/13316 ; https://t.me/rybar/48596; https://t.me/batalyon15/2018; https://t.me/batalyon15/2021; https://t.me/batalyon15/2023

[6] https://t.me/annamaliar/856 

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2023

[8] https://euromaidanpress dot com/2023/06/17/south-africa-leader-calls-to-negotiate-with-russia-in-10-step-peace-plan-says-putin-expected-at-brics-summit/

[9] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65940655

[10] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65940655

[11] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65940655 ; https://euromaidanpress dot com/2023/06/17/south-africa-leader-calls-to-negotiate-with-russia-in-10-step-peace-plan-says-putin-expected-at-brics-summit/

[12] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71451

[13] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71451

[14] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71451

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2023

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052623 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2023

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar02242023

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032023

[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2023

[20] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/3749

[21] https://t.me/grey_zone/19178

[22] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/06/16/world/europe/ukraine-kakhovka-dam-collapse.html

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2023;

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031DWUcLJgZPAcsjmqBR9YjjQ1gqpfgA6vJ29F9aB2GEimmCRRe7LzYani2xwjRaqWl

[25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48548

[26] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48548; https://t.me/wargonzo/13306   

[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/27503

[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/27499

[29] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47455; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48548

[30] https://t.me/annamaliar/856

[31] https://twitter.com/TeeterSweeper/status/1670060683709280259; https://t.me/AFUStratCom/18521

[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/13306 

[33] https://t.me/annamaliar/856 

[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/27499

[35] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48548 

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031DWUcLJgZPAcsjmqBR9YjjQ1gqpfgA6vJ29F9aB2GEimmCRRe7LzYani2xwjRaqWl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02E7pP4EebBUbH12AKzPUPJjnqNawqRwscCm3ptZea8ApW747ce6rcjV9vqebHX9UHl

[37] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48537; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48548; https://t.me/wargonzo/13306      

[38] https://t.me/readovkanews/60972; https://t.me/wargonzo/13306   

[39] https://t.me/mod_russia/27499

[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2023

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02E7pP4EebBUbH12AKzPUPJjnqNawqRwscCm3ptZea8ApW747ce6rcjV9vqebHX9UHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031DWUcLJgZPAcsjmqBR9YjjQ1gqpfgA6vJ29F9aB2GEimmCRRe7LzYani2xwjRaqWl

[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/27503; https://t.me/mod_russia/27501

[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47462

[44] https://t.me/wargonzo/13306

[45] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7969

[46] https://t.me/vrogov/10346

[47] https://t.me/rybar/48596; https://t.me/sashakots/40434 https://t.me/epoddubny/16430 https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47445; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47427  ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47428; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89325; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89333; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89343; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/89344; https://t.me/wargonzo/13318; https://t.me/wargonzo/13316 ; https://t.me/rybar/48596; https://t.me/batalyon15/2018; https://t.me/batalyon15/2021; https://t.me/batalyon15/2023

[48] https://t.me/sashakots/40434 ; https://t.me/rybar/48596

[49] https://t.me/wargonzo/13316; https://t.me/rusich_army/9431

[50] https://t.me/vrogov/10346

[51] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/47424 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48534

[52] https://t.me/vrogov/10355

[53] https://t.me/vrogov/10355

[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/27494

[55] https://suspilne dot media/509421-obstril-pid-cas-vizitu-delegacii-z-par-vijskova-dopomoga-vid-svecii-479-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1687007405&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[56] https://suspilne dot media/509421-obstril-pid-cas-vizitu-delegacii-z-par-vijskova-dopomoga-vid-svecii-479-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1687007405&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[57] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040623

[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2023

[59] https://t.me/grey_zone/19178 

[60] https://t.me/grey_zone/19178 

[61] https://t.me/grey_zone/19178 

[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2023

[63] https://t.me/vrogov/10358 

[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2023

[65] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/905  ; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/907 ; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/10348 ; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/10347  ; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/10352  ; https://t.me/pushilindenis/3525; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2023  

[66] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/10352  ; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/907 ; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/10348 ; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/10347 

[67] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3525 

[68] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/1206 

[69] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/10359 

[70] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/904

[71] https://suspilne dot media/509653-v-oleskivskij-gromadi-nevidoma-kilkist-zagiblih-vid-pidtoplenna-stavlat-diagnoz-vadi-serca-miskij-golova/