Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 19, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 19, 2024

Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros

June 19, 2024, 9:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:45pm ET on June 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in Pyongyang on June 19, likely aimed in part to use military-technical cooperation with North Korea as a threat against the West to discourage further support for Ukraine.[1] Putin arrived with a delegation of Russian ministers in Pyongyang on June 19 and signed the agreement with Kim, but neither Russian nor North Korean officials have published the official text of this agreement as of the time of this publication. Putin and Kim each spoke about the agreement, claiming that it broadly covers goals and guidelines for deepening Russian–North Korean long-term relations in the political, economic, trade, cultural, humanitarian, and security fields.[2] Putin specified that the strategic partnership agreement also provides for "mutual assistance in the event of aggression" against either Russia or North Korea, then immediately criticized conversations in the West about allowing Ukraine to strike areas in Russia with Western-provided long-range weapons and F-16 jets. Putin then concluded that "in this regard," Russia does "not rule out the development of military-technical cooperation" with North Korea. Putin likely intended to signal that should the US lift its restrictions against Ukrainian using US-provided ATACMS to strike Russian territory or other restrictions against using F-16s for the same purposes, Russia will likely deepen cooperation with North Korea in the sphere of military technologies such as missiles, other arms, and satellites through the legal framework provided in this new agreement. Putin and other Kremlin officials will likely continue to leverage this threat as debates about permitting Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory continue and may also expand this threat to other issues that the Kremlin has historically framed as "escalatory" or "provocations" against Russia. Russia will likely continue to deepen its cooperation with North Korea, regardless of Western self-imposed restrictions on military aid provisions to Ukraine and policies restricting Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian sanctuary, as Russia had been doing throughout its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The Russian and North Korean governments largely framed the agreement as evidence of their mutual support as part of a common struggle against the West and signaled that Russia and North Korea share a goal to challenge the West and the current world order.[3] Putin claimed that Russia and North Korea both aim to create "a more just and democratic multipolar world order" and that both countries pursue "independent foreign policy" — setting them apart from Western states.[4] Putin also credited Kim with holding an "objective and balanced view" about the war in Ukraine. Kim and Putin also emphasized the "traditionally friendly and good" relations between Russia and North Korea "based on the glorious traditions of common history" — continuing to invoke the historical memory of the Soviet Union's support of North Korea to appeal to the propaganda of the Kim regime and the North Korean people. North Korean state media published readouts similarly emphasizing Russia's and North Korea's common cause, emphasizing that North Korea stands in solidarity with "the sacred cause of the Russian army and people who are proudly advancing towards justice and truth."[5] The Kremlin published extensive images of Putin's visit to Pyongyang, including a lavish military-patriotic parade, North Korean civilians holding flowers and celebrating Putin's arrival, and Kim personally escorting Putin to and from his plane on the tarmac — all underscoring the two regimes' emphasis on friendship and their determination to support each other.[6] Putin's visit and the Russian–North Korean strategic cooperation agreement help legitimize Kim's regime domestically and abroad, as ISW has previously noted, and Putin also discussed increasing trade between Russia and North Korea, posturing that improving trade and infrastructure also benefits their shared partner, the People's Republic of China (PRC).[7]

Putin is pursuing a coalition of friendly states with historically warm ties to the Soviet Union to act as an alternative to the West and the current world order. Putin published an article in the Vietnamese state newspaper Nhân Dân on June 19 ahead of his state visit to Vietnam largely reusing the same informational lines as his June 18 article in the North Korean state newspaper Rodong Sinmun.[8] Putin invoked the historical memory of the Soviet Union's support for Vietnam during the Vietnam War, which Putin described as a "heroic struggle against foreign invaders," and noted that it is the 30th anniversary of the Treaty of Basic Principles of Friendly Relations between Russia and Vietnam.[9] Putin praised Vietnam for pursuing an "independent foreign policy" and supporting a world order based on "principles of equality between nations and non-interference in domestic affairs," echoing his praises for North Korea on June 18 and 19. Putin also claimed that, like North Korea, Vietnam shares Russia's views on the formation of a new system of "equal and indivisible Eurasian security" — though Vietnam, like much of Southeast Asia, is not typically included in political conceptions of Eurasia.[10] Putin laid the informational groundwork for this Eurasian security structure during his visit to the PRC in May 2024 before proposing it in a speech on June 14, in which he claimed that the "Euro-Atlantic security system" is collapsing and that Western "schemes for security and prosperity in Europe do not work."[11] Putin likely aims to use the historical memory of positive relations with the Soviet Union and previous assistance to other states to form a coalition of countries that Putin could attempt to posture as a feasible alternative to NATO and bolster the Kremlin's ongoing information operations attempting to falsely portray Western countries as Ukraine's only supporters whereas the rest of the world stands behind Russia.

Russian government officials announced their intention on June 19 to suspend Russia's participation in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA). Russian Federation Council Committee on International Affairs First Deputy Head Vladimir Dzhabarov announced that the committee is proposing to suspend Russia's participation in the OSCE PA and the payment of Russia's membership fees.[12] Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko announced her support for the initiative and ordered the committee to prepare a draft decision for the upcoming July 3 plenary session.[13] Matviyenko cited Romanian authorities' recent decision to not issue visas to the Russian OSCE PA delegation as the "latest example" of the OSCE PA's anti-Russian activities. Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin instructed the Duma's International Affairs Committee to prepare a corresponding resolution for consideration in the near future and accused the OSCE PA of being a "coven... that dances to the tune of the US."[14] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Leonid Slutsky noted that the Russian State Duma will support the suspension of Russia's participation in the OSCE PA.[15] The OSCE PA is an institution of the OSCE where members can debate issues and offer policy recommendations in support of the OSCE's mandate.[16] Volodin announced Russia's intention to leave the OSCE PA in February 2024, and Russia has used OSCE PA meetings to either further its information operations or has abstained from attending meetings since it invaded Ukraine in February 2022.[17]

The Russian military command continues to endorse a culture of permissiveness towards war crimes perpetrated by subordinates on the battlefield in Ukraine. Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin reported on June 18 that his office has received confirmation that Russian forces beheaded a Ukrainian soldier in Volnovakha Raion, Donetsk Oblast and displayed the severed head on a damaged Ukrainian vehicle.[18] Kostin stated that Ukrainian intelligence revealed that the Russian battalion- and company-level commanders in charge of this sector of the front ordered their subordinates not to capture Ukrainian soldiers and take them captive as prisoners of war (POWs) as required by international law, but to kill them by beheading them.[19] ISW cannot independently confirm which Russian commanders issued the order to behead the Ukrainian POW, but Kostin's report is consistent with a larger observed trend of prolific Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs that is apparently enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and upheld by Russian field commanders. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on June 19 that it has identified four servicemembers of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) who executed Ukrainian POWs near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast in late May 2024.[20] ISW has also previously observed that the 76th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Division was implicated in the execution of Ukrainian POWs and the use of Ukrainian POWs as human shields (both blatant violations of the Geneva Convention on POWs) near Robotyne in late 2023, as well as in massacres of Ukrainian civilians in Bucha, Kyiv Oblast in 2022.[21] Russian forces operating in Donetsk Oblast are under a different operational command (the Southern Grouping of Forces) than Russian forces operating in Zaporizhia Oblast (the Dnepr Grouping of Forces), but various individual units operating under these respective operational commands have well-documented lists of abuses against Ukrainian POWs in their sectors of the front.[22] The consistent perpetration of war crimes by various Russian formations that fall under different operational groupings of forces command suggests that individual tactical-level commanders are enabling their subordinates to commit such atrocities throughout the theater and that the Russian high command is doing little to maintain discipline and order amongst its troops.

The Russian government is attempting to deflect responsibility for well-documented Russian violations of international law regarding Russia's treatment of Ukrainian children by accusing the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other security structures of committing "crimes" against children. Russian State Duma Deputy Chairperson and former Russian Commissioner on Children's Rights Anna Kuznetsova presented a report developed by the Russian parliamentary investigative commission on “Kyiv’s crimes against children” during the plenary State Duma meeting on June 19, which made unfounded and absurd accusations against the Ukrainian government and military officials of crimes against children in occupied Ukraine.[23] Kuznetsova claimed that the parliamentary investigative commission developed this report in accordance with the Russian Constitution and the UN Security Council resolution of August 25, 1999, but blatantly overlooked the fact that Russia's illegal invasion and occupation of eastern and southern Ukraine violates the UN Charter and that these territories are not subject to the Russian Constitution under international law. The report accused the Ukrainian Armed Forces of wounding and killing children with artillery fire and in mining incidents since 2014 and accused the Ukrainian government of “kidnapping” children from Ukrainian-controlled territories in Donbas between 2014 and 2022 that Russia since illegally annexed in their entirety despite not occupying the entire region.[24] The report misrepresented the Ukrainian government’s evacuations of children from frontline or occupied settlements as the “kidnapping” of “about 65,000 children from the territories of Donbas and Novorossiya” since the beginning of 2022, in a blatant misrepresentation of international law. Ukraine, as the legal sovereign of the Ukrainian territories that Russia illegal occupies, has full rights to move its people away from frontline territories further to safety. Russia, as the occupying power, does not have the right to move a population it occupies away from their homes and into Russia, however. Ukraine's evacuation of its citizens is a legitimate humanitarian endeavor, while Russia's forced removal of Ukrainian citizens to Russia is illegal deportation.[25] The report also accused the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Western "private military companies," and the Ukrainian government of medical experimentation on children in occupied Ukraine, sexual abuse, human trafficking, and “the deliberate creation of a threat to the lives of children” among other unfounded accusations. The report recommended that the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) initiate the process of recognizing the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), and the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) as “terrorist organizations.” [26]

This report is likely part of an ongoing Kremlin effort to deflect domestic and international attention away from Russian violations of international law perpetrated against Ukrainian children, including mass forced deportations from occupied territories to Russia. The Russian State Duma unanimously supported the report on June 19, and Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council Valentina Matviyenko tasked the Russian government with translating this report into different languages and disseminating it across different international organizations and countries — including countries that are unfriendly to Russia.[27] Matviyenko made a revealing remark that Kyiv’s “attempt to accuse Russia of allegedly removing children looks especially cynical,” inadvertently revealing that the purpose of this unsubstantiated and false report is to confuse the international community about Russia’s violations against Ukrainian children and people.[28] The Russian State Duma notably created the Russian parliamentary investigative commission in June 2023 shortly after the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants against Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova on March 17, 2023, for illegal deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia.[29]

Air traffic control (ATC) communications from international airspace over the northeastern Atlantic Ocean appear to show the first confirmed instance of GPS jamming on commercial trans-Atlantic routes.[30] An X (formerly Twitter) account specializing in open-source and signals intelligence (OSINT and SIGINT) analysis posted on June 19 ATC communications reportedly from Shanwick Oceanic Control (overseeing the international airspace zone covering the northeastern Atlantic Ocean between the west coast of Scotland and Ireland to the southwestern coast of Iceland) stating that a flight between Madrid, Spain, and Toronto, Canada, was unable to ascend to a higher altitude due to apparent GPS jamming affecting other aircraft at the higher altitude.[31] The ATC communications noted that GPS jamming forced air traffic operating at higher altitudes along the Madrid-Toronto route to operate in a "degraded mode," to which the ATC dispatcher responded that this is the first instance of GPS jamming along Atlantic routes of which the dispatcher is aware.[32] The Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, a nonprofit advocating for improved GPS security, responded to the incident on June 19 and noted that if GPS jamming becomes a regular occurrence over the Atlantic Ocean, then "thousands of flights a day could be impacted with delays and cancellations."[33] The Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation noted that a GPS jammer is not always able to recover after experiencing jamming and assessed that the aircraft that experienced the jamming over the Atlantic was likely flying from the Baltic region or Middle East and that one of its GPS receivers had not recovered by the time it entered the Shanwick Oceanic Control Zone. The cause of the GPS disturbances has not yet been identified as of the time of this publication. ISW has previously observed high levels of GPS jamming over Poland and the Baltic region since late 2023, however, which some analysts and experts have attributed to Russian electronic warfare (EW) activity from the Kaliningrad area and near St. Petersburg.[34]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in Pyongyang on June 19, likely aimed in part to use military-technical cooperation with North Korea as a threat against the West to discourage further support for Ukraine. Russian and North Korea largely framed the agreement as evidence of their mutual support as part of a common struggle against the West and signaled that they share a goal to challenge the West and current world order.
• Putin is pursuing a coalition of friendly states with historically warm ties to the Soviet Union to act as an alternative to the West and current world order.
• Russian government officials announced their intention on June 19 to suspend Russia's participation in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA).
• The Russian military command continues to endorse a culture of permissiveness towards war crimes perpetrated by subordinates on the battlefield in Ukraine.
• The Russian government is attempting to deflect responsibility for well-documented Russian violations of international law regarding Russia's treatment of Ukrainian children by accusing the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other security structures of committing "crimes" against children.
• Air traffic control (ATC) communications from international airspace over the northeastern Atlantic Ocean appear to show the first confirmed instance of GPS jamming on commercial trans-Atlantic routes.
• Ukrainian forces recaptured positions near Starytsya and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and Donetsk City and in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
• Finnish outlet Yle, citing satellite imagery and Finnish intelligence sources, reported on June 19 that the Russian military has deployed roughly 80 percent of its equipment and personnel based near the Russian-Finnish border to support its invasion of Ukraine.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces reportedly recently recaptured Tykhe and advanced elsewhere northeast of Kharkiv City amid continued Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 19. A prominent Russian milblogger reported on June 17 and 18 that Ukrainian forces seized Tykhe (immediately east of Vovchansk) and that Russian forces conducted airstrikes against the settlement, suggesting that Ukrainian forces likely seized the settlement within the past few days.[35] Geolocated footage published on June 10 and 18 shows that Ukrainian forces also recently recaptured areas in southern and central Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk), and a Ukrainian battalion operating in the area reported on June 10 and 18 that it recaptured positions near Starytsya.[36] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Povkh stated on June 19 that Ukrainian forces have "blocked" dozens of Russian soldiers in an unspecified fortified area in Vovchansk.[37] ISW recently observed reports that Ukrainian forces encircled up to 200 Russian personnel in the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant in the central part of the city, although Povkh did not name the Aggregate Plant in his comment.[38] A Ukrainian source reported on June 18 that Russian forces struck Vovchansk with 13 guided glide bombs within a single hour, which indicates that Russian forces may prepare for a limited offensive push in Vovchansk in the coming days.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued to advance within northern Vovchansk and towards Tykhe, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[40] One milblogger claimed that there is little information about Vovchansk because much of the information is old news and reported with a "positive slant."[41] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued ground attacks near Vovchansk and north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi on June 18 and 19.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have somewhat reduced the intensity of their counterattacks within and south of Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City) but that the overall intensity of fighting in the area remains high.[43] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are bringing forward reserves in the Kharkiv direction to prepare for further counterattacks.[44]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 19 but did not make any confirmed advances. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating near Svatove reiterated concerns on June 19 that Russian forces have pulled reserves to the Svatove direction to attack towards Borova (west of Svatove) and emphasized that elements of two Russian divisions — likely the 3rd and 144th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) — are operating in the Borova direction.[45] The Ukrainian spokesperson noted that Russian forces are able to constantly replenish frontline formations with mobilized personnel who deploy to combat after two weeks of training.[46] Russian milbloggers amplified footage of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade reportedly using an Iskander ballistic missile to strike a bridge over the Oskil River just southwest of Borova, which indicates that Russian forces may be trying to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to isolate Ukrainian forces on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in preparation for potential offensive operations in the Borova direction.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces attacked towards Kruhlyakivka (also on the east bank of the Oskil River north of Borova and northwest of Svatove), which may further suggest that Russian forces are preparing for intensified offensive operations in this area.[48] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka; northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka, Makiivka, Nevske, Terny; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on June 18 and 19.[49]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces intensified attacks in the Siversk direction and advanced around Rozdolivka (south of Siversk) on June 18 and 19. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Ukrainian positions east, south, and west of Rozdolivka in a pincer movement (an attack from two flanks), allegedly resulting in Ukrainian forces retreating to Rozdolivka.[50] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian advances near Rozdolivka complicated Ukrainian forces’ ability to safely supply their positions near Rozdolivka.[51] ISW recently observed geolocated footage of Russian forces advancing on Rozdolivka’s western and eastern outskirts.[52] A Russian milblogger also claimed that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment and the 106th Guards VDV Division are advancing north of Vesele (south of Siversk) and along the nearby railway line.[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued assaults east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Vyimka; and south of Siverk near Rozdolivka on June 18 and 19.[54] A Ukrainian serviceperson fighting in the Siversk direction stated that Russian forces in this area are largely attacking in small squad-sized infantry groups of up to a dozen fighters.[55] Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) reportedly continue operating in the Siversk direction.[56]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Chasiv Yar and continued offensive operations in the area on June 18 and 19. Geolocated footage published on June 19 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced in central Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar), and Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Russian forces made unspecified advances in the settlement.[57] Russian forces reportedly launched assaults in easternmost Chasiv Yar in the Novyi Microraion and near Kanal Microraion; north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bohdanivka; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, Klischiivka, and Andriivka on June 18 and 19.[58] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are operating near Kanal Microraion; and elements of the Russian 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[59]

 

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Toretsk (south of Chasiv Yar and west of Horlivka) direction on June 18 and 19, but ISW cannot independently verify these claims. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced to eastern Pivnichne (east of Toretsk), to the administrative borders of Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk), and on the outskirts of Niu York (south of Toretsk).[60] Russian forces reportedly attacked east of Toretsk near Pivnichne and Druzhba; southeast of Toretsk near Shumy, Pivdenne, and Zalizne; south of Toretsk near Niu York; and southwest of Toretsk near Oleksandropil.[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted intense artillery fire and drone and air strikes prior to launching offensive operations west of Horlivka.[62] The Ukrainian General Staff observed a sudden increase of Russian assaults in the Toretsk direction on the evening of June 18.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka (Pokrovsk) direction but did not make confirmed advances on June 18 and 19. Russian forces attacked northwest of Avdiivka near Novooleksandrivka, Kalynove, Sokil, Novopokrovske, Yevhenivka, and Novoselivka Persha; west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Karlivka and Nevelske.[64] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces reached the southeastern outskirts of Yasnobrodivka; advanced up to one kilometer from northern flank near Sokil and north of Umanske; and gained a foothold near the Karlivske Reservoir (southwest of Avdiivka).[65] A Russian milblogger also claimed that elements of the Russian 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) broke through Ukrainian defenses near Yevhenivka with the support from artillery elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division.[66] ISW cannot independently verify these claims, however.
 

Russian forces recently made limited advances west of Donetsk City and continued offensive operations west and southwest of the city on June 18 and 19. Geolocated footage published on June 18 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced in the fields south of Heorhiivka.[67] Russian forces reportedly continued assaults west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka, Maksymilyanivka, Kostyantynivka, and in the Vuhledar direction.[68] Russian sources continued to claim that Russian forces are attacking on motorcycles in the Vuhledar direction.[69]

Russian forces launched ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make confirmed advances on June 18 and 19. Russian forces reportedly attacked south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil and Novodarivka.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are trying to counterattack near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[71] Drone operators of the Russian 5th Separate Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating near Urozhaine; and aviation of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are operating near Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hullaipole).[72] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported that Russian forces are increasingly deploying engineering equipment and are using the Ilyich Iron and Steel Works Plant in occupied Mariupol to construct a new military base in unspecified area and to support logistics infrastructure projects on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border.

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 18 and 19 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that fighting continued near Robotyne; east of Robotyne near Verbove; northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and Novopokrovka; and north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka.[73] Russian milbloggers complained about poor communication between Russian forces and pervasive Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) system use in this sector of the front.[74]

Geolocated footage published on June 18 shows that Russian forces have made a marginal advance north of Korsunka (just northeast of Krynky in east [left] bank Kherson Oblast), but this advance most likely did not occur within the last 24 hours.[75] Positional engagements continued in east bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on June 18 and 19.[76]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a mid-sized Shahed-136/131 strike against Ukraine on the night of June 18 to 19, launching 21 Shaheds from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[77] Ukrainian air defenses destroyed 19 Shaheds over Kherson, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Khmelnytskyi, and Lviv oblasts.[78] Falling debris from destroyed Shaheds fell on industrial and residential infrastructure in Malekhiv, Lviv Oblast, and Oleksandrivskyi Raion, Kirovohrad Oblast.[79]

Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic missiles at coastal areas in Odesa Oblast on the evening of June 19, damaging recreational infrastructure.[80]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Finnish outlet Yle, citing satellite imagery and Finnish intelligence sources, reported on June 19 that the Russian military has deployed roughly 80 percent of its equipment and personnel based near the Russian-Finnish border to support its invasion of Ukraine.[81] A high-ranking Finnish military intelligence source told Yle that bases in other parts of Russia have transferred a similar amount of equipment and personnel to Ukraine. Another Finnish intelligence source told Yle that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has most significantly affected the Russian ground forces and that the Russian Air Force, Air Defense Forces, and Navy are currently better-manned than the ground forces. The source noted that there is some variety in manpower strength between bases and that some garrisons have over 20 percent of their soldiers left while other bases have fewer soldiers. Yle examined satellite imagery of Russian garrisons and bases near the border with Finland and reported that the Russian military constructed a new equipment hall that could accommodate roughly 50 armored vehicles at the Petrozavodsk equipment depot in the Republic of Karelia. The Russian military also removed almost 50 armored vehicles from a parking lot at the equipment depot between June 2023 and May 2024, and a Finnish intelligence source told Yle that the Russian military either deployed the armored vehicles to Ukraine or is refurbishing the vehicles. Yle examined imagery from a Russian base in Shuya, Karelia and reported that the Russian military has likely deployed most of the equipment from this base to Ukraine. Finnish military expert Marko Eklund told Yle that the Russian military previously kept equipment for its reserve forces at the Shuya base. Yle examined recent imagery of a Russian base in Kamenka, Leningrad Oblast, that shows that Russian forces have raised enough tents to accommodate up to 2,000 soldiers, and Eklund assessed that Russia is likely training recruits at the Kamenka base. Yle, citing satellite imagery, noted that Russian forces have decreased the number of Il-76 transport aircraft parked at the Pskov Airfield from 24 aircraft as of August 2023 to three aircraft as of May 2024. Eklund told Yle that it is difficult to estimate how quickly Russia will be able to re-equip its depleted bases near Finland and that the duration and outcome of the war in Ukraine and the effectiveness of Western sanctions will affect this timeline. ISW cannot independently verify Yle's report. Significant Russian Ground Forces deployments away from Russia’s border with Finland, if verified, would indicate that the Russian command does not perceive a significant military threat against Russia from Finland.

Russian outlet Biznes Online stated on June 19 that Tatarstan officials are forming the new "Batyr" volunteer battalion.[82] Russian recruitment officer Igor Goryachev told Biznes Online that Tatarstan authorities began recruitment for the battalion on June 15 and that recruitment will continue until July 1. Goryachev stated that the "Batyr" volunteer battalion will be mainly comprised of Tatarstan natives, but residents from other federal subjects (regions) can also join the battalion. Tatarstan authorities will reportedly provide recruits with additional clothing and pay a one-time bonus of 700,000 rubles (about $8,380 USD) for signing a military service contract with the battalion and up to 1,000,000 rubles (about $12,000 USD) if the recruit signs their contract in Kazan. Goryachev stated that the unit is currently 15 percent staffed and that the first recruits will begin training in Samara Oblast this week. Goryachev clarified that the battalion will operate in occupied Ukraine and may serve as a military police support unit.

The Russian youth movement "Movement of the First" is reviving the Soviet-era "Zarnitsa" war games as part of Russia's long-term force generation efforts to support of the ongoing war in Ukraine and Russia's envisioned future existential conflict with NATO. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on June 10 that "Zarnitsa 2.0" is a revival of the Soviet-era war game and tests children's abilities to operate drones, virtual reality (VR), and weapons; practice emergency triage medicine under war-like conditions; and conduct military operations against an opponent.[83] The "Zarnitsa 2.0" website claims to teach children ages seven to 17 "traditional values" of belonging to a common cause, self-discipline for the sake of common victory, and a sense of duty to "squad and country" while also teaching children how to combat cyber threats, drone strikes, and detect "fake news."[84] The "Zarnitsa 2.0" Telegram channel stated on June 19 that 800,000 children and cadets from all of Russia's federal subjects and occupied Ukraine will participate in the games as preparation for the future when the children will "lead the fight" and counter aggression against Russia.[85] The Telegram channel claimed that the children are developing into a "worthy replacement" for the Russian servicemen fighting in Ukraine.

The Russian government appears to be acknowledging and working to address the growing issue of Russian servicemen, particularly convict recruits, committing violent crimes once they return home to Russia. Russian State Duma Committee for Family Protection, Issues of Paternity, Maternity, and Childhood Chairperson Nina Ostanina told Russian outlet Gazeta.Ru on June 19 that the Russian government needs to take steps to protect society from Russian convicts returning from the frontlines in Ukraine to Russia.[86] Ostanina noted that there have been several cases of pardoned convicts returning to Russia and murdering children and urged Russian law enforcement to step in and prevent these crimes. Ostanina called on Russian lawmakers to propose a bill requiring pardoned convicts who serve in the Russian military to have regular contact with Russian law enforcement and warned that there will be more of these crimes if the Russian government does not take action. ISW has observed repeated reports of Russian convicts returning from the frontline and killing and raping Russian civilians, including children.[87]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Ukraine's Army of Drones initiative confirmed on June 19 that Russia has developed a new "Perun" drone variant that can carry cargo weighing up to 200 kilograms (440 pounds).[88] The initiative stated that the "Perun" drone can deliver 13 times the amount of food that other drone variants can carry in one trip, evacuate wounded personnel, and support operations behind enemy lines. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 15 that former Wagner Group personnel developed the "Perun" drone.[89]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Kremlin mouthpieces continue to falsely frame Ukraine's efforts to counter Russian malign influence in Ukraine as religious persecution. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya claimed on June 19 that the UN Security Council is ignoring Ukraine's "persecution" of the Kremlin-linked Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).[90] Nebenzya claimed that Ukraine is destroying Orthodox churches and persecuting UOC MP priests for political reasons. ISW has previously reported that the UOC MP is not an independent religious organization but rather is subordinated to the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church and is an instrument of Russian hybrid warfare.[91]

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger channel continued to advertise Russian propaganda courses on June 19 that the milblogger's company is teaching in Belgrade, Serbia.[92] The Rybar Telegram channel claimed on June 11 that it also recently opened the "Rybar Media School" in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.[93]

Russian sources continued to misrepresent Armenia's efforts to distance itself from the Russian security bloc and procure military systems from the West as escalatory. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on June 19 that France is provoking another round of escalation in the South Caucasus by selling 155mm CAESAR howitzers to Armenia.[94] A Russian milblogger questioned why Armenia is still a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) if Armenia is purchasing weapons from a NATO member state.[95] Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan and French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu met in France on June 17 and signed a contract approving Armenia's purchase of French howitzers.[96]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarus continues to manage its relationships with various multinational organizations. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on June 19 that delegations from various Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members, including Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and other CIS defense ministers, visited Belarus' 1371st Engineering Base in Krasnoye, Minsk Oblast as part of a joint meeting of CIS engineering units.[97] Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin additionally welcomed representatives of various international organizations, including the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, League of Arab States, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to the "National Security Belarus-2024" international security industry exhibition in Belarus on June 19.[98]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/6154 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/42180

[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74334; https://t.me/MID_Russia/42177

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2024

[4] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74334

[5] http://kcna

dot kp/en/article/q/f8323126223658ba48f6eb15bf959bd2.kcmsf;

http://kcna

dot kp/en/article/q/3eeaa20032734eae74c010c8575fc925.kcmsf;

http://www.pyongyangtimes

dot com.kp/blog?page=revolutionary&blogid=6672588dbd722505b411df79;

http://www.pyongyangtimes

dot com.kp/blog?page=revolutionary&blogid=6669021cf03df605a671c3c8

[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74330; https://t.me/MID_Russia/42172

[7] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74334; https://t.me/MID_Russia/42177

[8] https://nhandan dot vn/nga-va-viet-nam-tinh-huu-nghi-duoc-thu-thach-qua-thoi-gian-post814950.html; https://ru.nhandan dot vn/rossija-i-v-etnam-druzhba-proverennaja-vremenem-post46636.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2024; http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74317

[9] https://nhandan dot vn/nga-va-viet-nam-tinh-huu-nghi-duoc-thu-thach-qua-thoi-gian-post814950.html; https://ru.nhandan dot vn/rossija-i-v-etnam-druzhba-proverennaja-vremenem-post46636.html;

[10] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-changing-face-of-eurasia/

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74285; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2024; http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/6131

[12] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6774688 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/255458

[13] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6774688 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/255459

[14] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6774869?tg ; https://t.me/kommersant/67798 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/21139931

[15] https://t.me/slutsky_l/2759 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/21140571; https://t.me/tass_agency/255512

[16] https://www.osce.org/institutions-and-structures

[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-parliament-vote-suspending-moscows-osce-participation-2024-02-13/ ; https://pacsto dot org/events/rossiya-ne-primet-uchastie-v-sessii-pa ; https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-austria-government-organization-for-security-and-cooperation-in-europe-274afed5b65478d748de0093f81e14c5 ; https://www.dw.com/en/osce-delegates-stage-walkout-during-russian-address/a-64794329

[18] *GRAPHIC/DISTURBING IMAGERY* https://gp.gov dot ua/ua/posts/na-doneccini-okupanti-obezgolovili-ukrayinskogo-zaxisnika-generalnii-prokuror-andrii-kostin-povidomiv-pro-novi-zaxlivi-svidcennya-zlocinnoyi-politiki-rf

[19] https://x.com/andriykostinua/status/1803045680526541016?s=46

[20] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/voienni-zlochyntsi-rf-hur-identyfikuvalo-ubyvts-chotyrokh-ukrainskykh-viiskovopolonenykh.html

[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122823

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021824; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032724

[23] http://duma dot gov.ru/news/59521/

[24] http://duma dot gov.ru/news/59521/

[25] https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/634kfc.htm

[26] https://russian.rt dot com/ussr/news/1330051-vsu-sbu-terrorizm-prestupleniya-kieva

[27] http://duma dot gov.ru/news/59521/; https://t.me/MID_Russia/42182

[28] https://t.me/MID_Russia/42182

[29] https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and; https://tass dot ru/info/21138543

[30] https://x.com/giammaiot2/status/1803360534974308839

[31] https://x.com/giammaiot2/status/1803355510495719874/photo/1; https://x.com/giammaiot2/status/1803355510495719874/photo/2; https://x.com/giammaiot2/status/1803355510495719874/photo/3

[32] https://x.com/giammaiot2/status/1803355510495719874/photo/1

[33] https://rntfnd.org/2024/06/19/jamming-impacts-to-transatlantic-air-traffic/

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013124; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2024; https://x.com/auonsson/status/1775216532030713871; https://x.com/auonsson/status/1803409997482594544; https://x.com/auonsson/status/1800640556458008671

[35] https://t.me/rybar/61068; https://t.me/rybar/61063

[36] https://t.me/batallionnnn/139; https://t.me/batallionnnn/147; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/8663

[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/19/u-vovchansku-zablokuvaly-zagin-okupantiv/; https://t.me/army_tv/3945

[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2024

[39] https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1803089127388184736; https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1803089610085404912

[40] https://t.me/motopatriot/24003; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70676; https://t.me/motopatriot/24005

[41] https://t.me/motopatriot/24005

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037RLvnBxnSAuhhsKkYdREdndyzBp239H9w4oCUQvpWge2fzKWvaoJVm2HeZTfDdDxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VfmpNbMCkZf53EBZabd7itSFMQ8ndQYTfE67ByFNW7mwR3D5nJuQmXNTpA5Akkeql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Pb8fpxQmccJE5QV3oVrB5yzGbAYDLsqdnzPuBoVejRrScP4qwTh4gTkmxF4jd5c5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gSTLacnyBnBD8k4HyGqPpUv9YnCqnXqFXfNExDX8wr3pG23E8XyVG2aKDLcvyc3ml

[43] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10732; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11946; https://t.me/dva_majors/45517 ; https://t.me/rybar/61077

[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11946; https://t.me/wargonzo/20587; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70641; https://t.me/dva_majors/45517 ; https://t.me/rybar/61077

[45] https://suspilne dot media/771409-italia-peredast-zsu-kompleks-sampt-ukrainski-raketi-neptun-urazili-naftobazu-v-rosii-847-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1718795531&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/771427-golovni-novini-harkova-ta-oblasti-19-cervna-hronika-podij-dna/?anchor=live_1718795184&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2024

[46] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/771427-golovni-novini-harkova-ta-oblasti-19-cervna-hronika-podij-dna/?anchor=live_1718795184&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11924; https://t.me/dva_majors/45566

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKUXFGNAeRAPoKJp8wNNS8W4iSnMLAbhN6AYsLD493jXUh79SVCkxo2s5yUQcBHal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VfmpNbMCkZf53EBZabd7itSFMQ8ndQYTfE67ByFNW7mwR3D5nJuQmXNTpA5Akkeql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Pb8fpxQmccJE5QV3oVrB5yzGbAYDLsqdnzPuBoVejRrScP4qwTh4gTkmxF4jd5c5l

 

[49] https://t.me/rybar/61068; https://t.me/dva_majors/45517 ; https://t.me/rybar/61077; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gSTLacnyBnBD8k4HyGqPpUv9YnCqnXqFXfNExDX8wr3pG23E8XyVG2aKDLcvyc3ml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Pb8fpxQmccJE5QV3oVrB5yzGbAYDLsqdnzPuBoVejRrScP4qwTh4gTkmxF4jd5c5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VfmpNbMCkZf53EBZabd7itSFMQ8ndQYTfE67ByFNW7mwR3D5nJuQmXNTpA5Akkeql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKUXFGNAeRAPoKJp8wNNS8W4iSnMLAbhN6AYsLD493jXUh79SVCkxo2s5yUQcBHal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037RLvnBxnSAuhhsKkYdREdndyzBp239H9w4oCUQvpWge2fzKWvaoJVm2HeZTfDdDxl; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/19/protyvnyk-namagavsya-vytisnyty-syly-oborony-z-deokupovanyh-naselenyh-punktiv-luganshhyny/

[50] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18127; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18131; https://t.me/motopatriot/23997 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57041 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11950 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/12181

[51] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18127 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/12181

[52] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2024

[53] https://t.me/motopatriot/23997

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gSTLacnyBnBD8k4HyGqPpUv9YnCqnXqFXfNExDX8wr3pG23E8XyVG2aKDLcvyc3ml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKUXFGNAeRAPoKJp8wNNS8W4iSnMLAbhN6AYsLD493jXUh79SVCkxo2s5yUQcBHal

[55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/19/na-siverskomu-napryamku-vorog-povnistyu-vidmovyvsya-vid-vykorystannya-bronetehniky-pid-chas-atak/; https://www.youtube.com/live/ATMs7DTROxo?si=MOe3HKAR9BZbAw4L&t=525

[56] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/15089

[57] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1803434420667359249; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1803434436148531558; https://t.me/OBiloshytskiy/592; https://t.me/rybar/61068; https://t.me/dva_majors/45517; https://t.me/rybar/61077; . https://t.me/rybar/61068

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037RLvnBxnSAuhhsKkYdREdndyzBp239H9w4oCUQvpWge2fzKWvaoJVm2HeZTfDdDxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKUXFGNAeRAPoKJp8wNNS8W4iSnMLAbhN6AYsLD493jXUh79SVCkxo2s5yUQcBHal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VfmpNbMCkZf53EBZabd7itSFMQ8ndQYTfE67ByFNW7mwR3D5nJuQmXNTpA5Akkeql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Pb8fpxQmccJE5QV3oVrB5yzGbAYDLsqdnzPuBoVejRrScP4qwTh4gTkmxF4jd5c5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gSTLacnyBnBD8k4HyGqPpUv9YnCqnXqFXfNExDX8wr3pG23E8XyVG2aKDLcvyc3ml; https://t.me/rusich_army/15289 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/45526 ;

https://t.me/dva_majors/45517 ; https://t.me/rybar/61077; https://t.me/wargonzo/20587; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11954 ; https://t.me/project_nd/88 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/127259

[59] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/36977 ; https://t.me/IronHelmets/3208 (Chasiv Yar); https://t.me/project_nd/88 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/127259 (Kanal Microraion)

[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gSTLacnyBnBD8k4HyGqPpUv9YnCqnXqFXfNExDX8wr3pG23E8XyVG2aKDLcvyc3ml; https://t.me/stanislav_osman; https://t.me/rybar/61087; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27077; https://t.me/motopatriot/24000 ; https://t.me/rybar/61087 ; https://t.me/stanislav_osman/6280 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70630 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18134 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18129 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18131 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70648 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57045 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/12370; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/12377; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11948 ;

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037RLvnBxnSAuhhsKkYdREdndyzBp239H9w4oCUQvpWge2fzKWvaoJVm2HeZTfDdDxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKUXFGNAeRAPoKJp8wNNS8W4iSnMLAbhN6AYsLD493jXUh79SVCkxo2s5yUQcBHal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gSTLacnyBnBD8k4HyGqPpUv9YnCqnXqFXfNExDX8wr3pG23E8XyVG2aKDLcvyc3ml; . https://t.me/rybar/61087 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18134 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18129 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18131 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70648 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27077; https://t.me/wargonzo/20587; https://t.me/motopatriot/24002

[62] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/12370; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18134 https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18129 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18131

[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2024

[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKUXFGNAeRAPoKJp8wNNS8W4iSnMLAbhN6AYsLD493jXUh79SVCkxo2s5yUQcBHal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VfmpNbMCkZf53EBZabd7itSFMQ8ndQYTfE67ByFNW7mwR3D5nJuQmXNTpA5Akkeql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Pb8fpxQmccJE5QV3oVrB5yzGbAYDLsqdnzPuBoVejRrScP4qwTh4gTkmxF4jd5c5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gSTLacnyBnBD8k4HyGqPpUv9YnCqnXqFXfNExDX8wr3pG23E8XyVG2aKDLcvyc3ml; https://t.me/rybar/61068 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20587

[65] https://t.me/rybar/61068; https://t.me/dva_majors/45517 ; https://t.me/rybar/61077; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18132 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20587; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/12374 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57043 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/127282

[66] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70628

[67] https://x.com/sternenko/status/1803126915165028543; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1803154706304225670; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1803158223014248821; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1803161497930960998; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1803168829704430020; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27086

[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037RLvnBxnSAuhhsKkYdREdndyzBp239H9w4oCUQvpWge2fzKWvaoJVm2HeZTfDdDxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fKUXFGNAeRAPoKJp8wNNS8W4iSnMLAbhN6AYsLD493jXUh79SVCkxo2s5yUQcBHal; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VfmpNbMCkZf53EBZabd7itSFMQ8ndQYTfE67ByFNW7mwR3D5nJuQmXNTpA5Akkeql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Pb8fpxQmccJE5QV3oVrB5yzGbAYDLsqdnzPuBoVejRrScP4qwTh4gTkmxF4jd5c5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gSTLacnyBnBD8k4HyGqPpUv9YnCqnXqFXfNExDX8wr3pG23E8XyVG2aKDLcvyc3ml; https://t.me/dva_majors/45517 ; https://t.me/rybar/61077; https://t.me/wargonzo/20587 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/9230; https://t.me/TOF_VMF/3367 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27085

[69] https://t.me/TOF_VMF/3367 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27085

[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Pb8fpxQmccJE5QV3oVrB5yzGbAYDLsqdnzPuBoVejRrScP4qwTh4gTkmxF4jd5c5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gSTLacnyBnBD8k4HyGqPpUv9YnCqnXqFXfNExDX8wr3pG23E8XyVG2aKDLcvyc3ml; https://t.me/voin_dv/9230

[71] https://t.me/voin_dv/9230; https://t.me/rybar/61068

[72] https://t.me/voin_dv/9236 ; https://t.me/rybar/61090

[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Pb8fpxQmccJE5QV3oVrB5yzGbAYDLsqdnzPuBoVejRrScP4qwTh4gTkmxF4jd5c5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gSTLacnyBnBD8k4HyGqPpUv9YnCqnXqFXfNExDX8wr3pG23E8XyVG2aKDLcvyc3ml; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10063; https://t.me/wargonzo/20587; https://t.me/dva_majors/45517 ; https://t.me/rybar/61077

[74] https://t.me/dva_majors/45517 ; https://t.me/rybar/61077

[75] https://x.com/fGr6JW3waJ1FKMN/status/1803247266716852420; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1803355899894899144

[76] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Pb8fpxQmccJE5QV3oVrB5yzGbAYDLsqdnzPuBoVejRrScP4qwTh4gTkmxF4jd5c5l; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10063; https://t.me/dva_majors/45517 ; https://t.me/rybar/61077; https://t.me/batalyon15/4409

[77] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Pb8fpxQmccJE5QV3oVrB5yzGbAYDLsqdnzPuBoVejRrScP4qwTh4gTkmxF4jd5c5l; https://t.me/kpszsu/15550; https://t.me/ComAFUA/316; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/19/ppo-vnochi-znyshhyla-19-iz-21-vorozhyh-raket/

[78] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Pb8fpxQmccJE5QV3oVrB5yzGbAYDLsqdnzPuBoVejRrScP4qwTh4gTkmxF4jd5c5l; https://t.me/kpszsu/15550; https://t.me/ComAFUA/316; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/19/ppo-vnochi-znyshhyla-19-iz-21-vorozhyh-raket/; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10064; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/14553

[79] https://t.me/kirovogradskaODA/9524; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/19/vorog-atakuvav-shahedamy-oleksandrijskyj-rajon-kirovogradshhyny-ye-poshkodzhennya/; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/14554

[80] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10068

[81] https://yle dot fi/a/74-20093440

[82] https://m.business-gazeta dot ru/news/637571

[83] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/en/putin-s-zarnitsa-2-0-how-russians-involve-ukrainian-children-in-military-training/

[84] https://зарница dot будьвдвижении.рф

[85] https://t.me/zarnitsa2_0/248

[86] https://www.gazeta dot ru/social/news/2024/06/19/23279755.shtml; https://t.me/ninaostanina/7120; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/06/19/eti-lyudi-predstavlyayut-opasnost-dlya-obschestva-deputat-gosdumy-nina-ostanina-prizvala-zaschitit-rossiyan-ot-byvshih-zaklyuchennyh-kotorye-vozvraschayutsya-s-voyny

[87] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2024 ; https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-russia-murder-rates-soldiers-b2536050.html ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2023

[88] https://t.me/armyofdrones/1191

[89] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/12256 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2024

[90] https://russiaun dot ru/ru/news/2180624 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/42167

[91] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023

[92] https://t.me/rybar/61095

[93] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061124 ; https://t.me/rybar/60820 ; https://t.me/rybar/60828l

[94] https://t.me/tass_agency/255530

[95] https://t.me/sashakots/47411

[96] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2024 ; https://massispost dot com/2024/06/armenia-and-france-sign-military-technical-cooperation-agreement/; https://en.armradio dot am/2024/06/18/armenia-french-knds-company-sign-agreement-on-military-technical-cooperation/; https://x.com/papikyan_suren/status/1802783434752020827; https://x.com/SebLecornu/status/1802937545463918812 ; https://x.com/SebLecornu/status/1802937545463918812

[97] https://t.me/modmilby/39596

[98] https://t.me/modmilby/39594 ; https://t.me/modmilby/39587 ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/253598; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/253588