Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2024

Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

June 2, 2024, 8pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:45pm ET on June 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: This update was corrected to note that Dmitry Rogozin's former position was the head of Roscosmos. 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US and Singaporean officials and highlighted the upcoming Global Peace Summit during the International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 2. Zelensky met with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to discuss the battlefield situation, Ukraine's need for additional air defense systems, and the importance of Ukraine's ability to strike Russian military targets near Kharkiv Oblast.[1] Zelensky also met with Singaporean President Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, and Singaporean businessmen and emphasized Ukraine's interest in increasing its cooperation with Singapore and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).[2] Zelensky announced during the conference that 106 countries have confirmed their participation in the upcoming June 15-16 Global Peace Summit in Switzerland and noted that Ukraine invited every country to the upcoming summit except for Russia, which is the aggressor in this conflict.[3] Zelensky warned that Russian officials are attempting to disrupt the peace summit and discourage countries from attending the summit by threatening to "block" the import and export of food, agricultural, and chemical products. Zelensky also noted that the summit is an important step towards the resolution of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.[4] Ukrainian and Western media reported on June 2 that diplomatic sources in Saudi Arabia stated that Saudi Arabia will not participate in the Global Peace Summit following the May 31 announcement that the People's Republic of China (PRC) will not send a representative to the summit.[5]

The provision of Western air defense systems and the lifting of Western restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets in Russian territory with Western-provided weapons remain crucial for Ukraine to repel Russian glide bomb and missile strikes against Kharkiv City. A dozen Western countries have recently partially or completely lifted restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory.[6] These policy changes will allow Ukrainian forces to use Western-provided systems to strike Russian firing and staging areas in Russia's border areas and airspace. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces downed a number of Russian military aircraft in February 2024, many of which were conducting glide bomb strikes in the Avdiivka direction.[7] Ukrainian forces' ability to down Russian military aircraft in a frontline area indicates that Ukrainian forces will likely be able to replicate the same effects with both Ukrainian and Western-provided systems to protect northern Kharkiv Oblast and Kharkiv City from Russian glide bomb strikes launched from Russian airspace. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has previously stated that Russian forces would not be able to seize Kharkiv City if Ukrainian forces received two Patriot air defense systems to deploy to the region.[8] Russian forces have targeted Kharkiv City with glide bombs and various missile strikes in the past several weeks, although two Patriot batteries in northern Kharkiv Oblast would have limited effectiveness in defending against Russian airstrikes without the ability to fire on Russian aircraft in Russian airspace.[9]

Ukrainian field commanders are reportedly compensating for training difficulties that mobilization has exacerbated by training new personnel on the frontline. Ukrainian field commanders told the Washington Post that they have devoted significant time to teaching basic skills to newly-redeployed personnel because they do not learn these skills at training centers.[10] The Washington Post reported on June 2 that Ukrainian soldiers who had served in the rear also lack adequate skills upon arrival at the front even though many had been serving in the military prior to the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. The problems the Washington Post identified are not surprising in these circumstances. Most of the Ukrainian forces on the frontline have been fighting for more than two years and are exhausted, so Ukraine is under pressure to speedily rotate them with fresh forces and replace losses to maintain its defense.[11] There is a difficult tradeoff to make between pulling experienced soldiers from the frontline to train new personnel or accepting bottlenecks in training the new personnel. One Ukrainian officer reportedly told the Washington Post that Ukraine needs NATO instructors to train new personnel and to halve training times to one month.[12] Russian rear-area strike campaigns against even the westernmost regions of Ukraine have ensured that Ukraine has effectively no safe rear area in which it can safely train personnel, and sending personnel to train in NATO states – such as the ongoing UK-led Operation Interflex training program – both removes Ukrainian field commanders from the training process and increases the delay in deploying soldiers as Ukraine must transport these personnel to and from NATO states. Ukraine will not resolve these issues quickly, and the average overall quality of Ukrainian forces on the frontline will likely decrease as experienced personnel rotate out and newly-deployed personnel reach the frontline even as the number of available soldiers increases. New soldiers will likely learn rapidly as they fight alongside experienced veterans, however.

Ukrainian field commanders' decisions to train newly-deployed personnel on the front before committing them to combat indicates that the overall quality of Ukrainian forces will likely remain higher than that of Russian forces in the near- to mid-term. Russian forces have consistently used newly-deployed mobilized personnel, penal convicts, and fresh contract and volunteer soldiers without adequate training to conduct mass, infantry-led "meat assaults" to make marginal gains in Ukraine and have proven willing to continue suffering extensive casualties for these gains.[13] The Russian force generation mechanism has largely met the replacement rate of casualties in Ukraine, however, incentivizing fast redeployments of new personnel for additional "meat" assaults over effective training. Russian milbloggers have consistently complained about ineffective Russian training since partial mobilization in September 2022, and a former Russian Storm-Z instructor recently claimed that Russian "strategic" reserves are "doing nothing for months" due to training bottlenecks resulting from an inadequate number of instructors.[14] Further Ukrainian cooperation with NATO instructors, particularly if those NATO instructors assist training in rear areas in Ukraine, provides further opportunities for Ukraine to improve its basic training mechanisms and improve the quality of newly deployed personnel.

The New York Times (NYT) published an investigation on June 2 into the forced relocation and deportation of 46 Ukrainian children from a foster home in occupied Kherson Oblast during 2022.[15] The NYT analyzed photos, social media posts, and official government documents and concluded that Russian government officials participated in the forced relocation of these children and that occupation officials are withholding the children from their parents and relatives as part of a wider effort to strip Ukrainian children of their identities. The NYT reported that a Russian federal adoption site listed 22 of these Ukrainian children for adoption in Russia and placed at least two children with Russian families. The NYT consulted legal experts who determined that the Russian intent to strip children of their Ukrainian identity is a violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and may amount to a war crime. ISW analysts assisted with the preparation of this report by reviewing some of its findings and sources.

The Telegraph reported on June 1 in a since-removed article that British officials ordered the United Kingdom's (UK) Security Service (MI5) to refocus its counterintelligence efforts towards Russian, People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iranian agents operating in the UK.[16] Unnamed government sources told The Telegraph that the growing number of PRC agents and Iranian organized criminal groups in the UK have shifted MI5's recruiting targets and that the UK's support for Ukraine had led to increased Russian spying in the UK. ISW is refraining from publishing additional details from the article until The Telegraph provides further details about the article's removal.

Russian war commentator Alexander Artamonov drew backlash from Kremlin-affiliated Russian propagandists for claiming that Ukrainians are "second-class citizens." contradicting the Kremlin’s false efforts to portray Ukrainian and Russian people as one nation. Artamonov reportedly stated on a live broadcast on a Russian state television channel on June 1 that he "does not have a very high opinion of Ukrainians" and that he "insists Ukrainians are second-class citizens."[17] Russian State Duma Deputy and convicted unregistered Russian foreign agent Maria Butina, Russian ultranationalist and former State Duma Deputy Zakhar Prilepin, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milbloggers, and other pro-war Russian commentators heavily criticized Artamonov and reiterated the false narrative that Russians and Ukrainians are actually the same.[18] Artamonov notably received backlash for contradicting the Kremlin's established false narrative that claims that Ukrainians are Russians in an attempt to delegitimize and erase Ukrainian identity and justify Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian occupation officials and Russian forces in occupied Ukraine have subjugated Ukrainian civilians in occupied territory to violence, property theft, religious persecution, forced deportation, and impressment into the Russian military — all as part of an ongoing campaign to eradicate an independent Ukrainian national and cultural identity.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US and Singaporean officials and highlighted the upcoming Global Peace Summit during the International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 2.
• The provision of Western air defense systems and the lifting of Western restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets Russian territory with Western-provided weapons remain crucial for Ukraine to repel Russian glide bomb and missile strikes against Kharkiv City.
• Ukrainian field commanders are reportedly compensating for training difficulties that mobilization has exacerbated by training new personnel on the frontline.
• Ukrainian field commanders' decisions to train newly-deployed personnel on the front before committing them to combat indicates that the overall quality of Ukrainian forces will likely remain higher than that of Russian forces in the near- to mid-term.
• The New York Times (NYT) published an investigation on June 2 into the forced relocation and deportation of 46 Ukrainian children from a foster home in occupied Kherson Oblast during 2022.
• The Telegraph reported on June 1 in a since-removed article that British officials ordered the United Kingdom's (UK) Security Service (MI5) to refocus its counterintelligence efforts towards Russian, People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iranian agents operating in the UK.
• Russian war commentator Alexander Artamonov drew backlash from Kremlin-affiliated Russian propagandists for claiming that Ukrainians are "second-class citizens." contradicting the Kremlin’s false efforts to portray Ukrainian and Russian people as one nation.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and Krynky.
• Russia continues to indoctrinate Russian minors into military-political thinking to set conditions for long-term force generation.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian military targets in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts on June 1 and 2. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a column of unspecified Russian vehicles in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast (roughly five kilometers from the Ukrainian border at the closest point), and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian drone over Kursk Oblast.[20] One Russian milblogger criticized Russian forces for continuing to operate vehicles in long columns despite repeated instances of Ukrainian strikes against Russian columns throughout the war.[21] An open-source X (formerly Twitter) account noted that unspecified Ukrainian sources stated that the column consisted of 18 Russian vehicles.[22] Russian officials and milbloggers claimed on June 2 that Ukrainian forces conducted an MLRS strike on Shebekino, Belgorod Oblast (roughly five kilometers from the border), which killed the Deputy Head of Korochansky Raion, Igor Nechiporenko, and injured several raion and settlement heads.[23] Another open-source X account, citing photos and imagery, stated that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian supply base in the industrial district of Shebekino.[24] Ukrainian officials have not commented on these strikes as of this report, and ISW cannot independently confirm the systems used in these strikes or the targets of these strikes. ISW has not observed any evidence to suggest that Ukrainian forces used Western-provided weapons in these strikes.

Ukrainian forces continue to strengthen their defenses in Sumy Oblast against the threat of possible future Russian offensive operations. Ukrainian Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on June 2 that Ukrainian forces are strengthening and improving their defensive lines, including the second and third defensive lines in Sumy Oblast.[25] Mysnyk stated that Ukrainian forces are identifying threatened directions and are taking the local terrain into account when constructing fortifications. A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command is transferring an unspecified number of forces to Kursk Oblast.[26]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) amid continued fighting north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 2. Geolocated footage published on June 2 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the fields north and east of Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk and northeast of Kharkiv City) during a mechanized assault on the settlement.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are unsuccessfully counterattacking in northern and central Vovchansk and in the forest areas between Hlyboke and Lukyantsi (both north of Kharkiv City).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting in Vovchansk and near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) is becoming positional.[29] Elements of the Russian 138th and the 25th motorized rifle brigades (both part of the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and a battalion, reconnaissance company, and sniper company of the 83rd Separate Guards Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in Vovchansk.[30]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 2, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 300 meters south of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[31] Fighting continued southeast of Kupyansk near Stelmakhivka; west of Svatove near Myasozharivka and Andriivka; southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny; and south of Kreminna near Dibrova and the Serebryanske forest area on June 1 and 2.[32]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction near Vyimka (southeast of Siversk) and Rozdolivka (south of Siversk) on June 1 and 2.[33] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near Rozdolivka, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to positions 2.7 kilometers away from Vyimka.[34]  A Russian source, who claims to be an employee of Russian special services, claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the “Knauf” gypsum plant in Soledar (southwest of Siversk and northeast of Bakhmut) with HIMARS.[35] The source claimed that elements of the Russian 200th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) were located at the “Knauf” gypsum plant and that the HIMARS strike killed four and wounded seven Russian servicemen. Social media users amplified footage reportedly showing the aftermath of the strike at the “Knauf” gypsum plant and claimed that more Russian elements may have been impacted in the strike.[36]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced in and around northeastern Chasiv Yar on June 1 and 2, but ISW has not observed evidence confirming these claims. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to central Kalynivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar), in a field northeast of Kalynivka, south of Chasiv Yar, and in northeastern Chasiv Yar.[37] Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Chasiv Yar and near Kalynivka, Bohdanivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar), Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar), and Niu York (southeast of Klishchiivka) on June 1 and 2.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using both TOS-1A and TOS-2 thermobaric artillery to force Ukrainian forces to abandon positions in southeastern Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar) and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in eastern  Kanal Microraion.[39] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division continue to operate near Chasiv Yar; elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC) continue to operate near Klishchiivka; and drone units of the Russian Volunteer Corps are operating in the Bakhmut direction.[40]

 

Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Avdiivka and continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on June 1 and June 2. Geolocated footage published on June 2 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced in a field west of Solovyove (northwest of Avdiivka).[41] Russian milbloggers made different claims about the extent of Russian advances near Sokil (immediately northwest of Solovyove), with some claiming that Russian forces advanced 1-1.5 kilometers near the settlement while other milbloggers claimed that fighting occurred on the outskirts of Sokil.[42] Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Novooleksandrivka and Sokil; west of Avdiivka near Umanske and Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Netaylove on June 1 and June 2.[43] The Russian MoD announced that Russian forces seized Umanske and claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novooleksandrivka, Solovyove, Sokil, and Novopokrovske (northwest of Avdiivka).[44] Elements of the Russian 1st ”Slavic” Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating near Avdiivka.[45]

 

Russian forces recently made limited advances southwest of Donetsk City amidst continued offensive operations. Geolocated footage published on June 2 indicated that Russian forces advanced north of Volodymyrivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[46] Russian forces conducted assaults west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Vodyane, Kostyantynivka, and Paraskoviivka on June 1 and 2.[47] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction (west of Donetsk City), and elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the southern Donetsk direction.[48] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that engineers of the Russian 95th Regiment (1st DNR AC) are developing remote robotic platforms to deliver ammunition and food supplies to the Vuhledar frontline.[49]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border, but ISW has not observed evidence confirming these claims. Russian forces continued offensive operations near Staromayorske and Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 1 and June 2, and the Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces gained unspecified advantageous positions on June 2.[50] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced further north in Staromayorske and that unspecified Russian forces also advanced on the settlement's eastern outskirts.[51] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized most of Staromayorske and noted that proactive Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone operations are inhibiting the Russian 5th Tank Brigade’s (36th CAA, EMD) rate of advance near Urozhaine.[52] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are employing a new “carousel” tactic during raids on Urozhaine.[53] The milblogger claimed that the “carousel” tactic allows Russian tanks to continuously fire on Ukrainian forces both at a standstill and while maneuvering. The milblogger explained that while one tank is firing at Ukrainian forces, the crew of the second tank takes position behind the first tank to reload. Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) reportedly operate near Storozheve (southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[54]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces reportedly recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area on June 2. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Myrne (northwest of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[55] Positional engagements continued near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on June 1 and 2.[56] Elements of the Russian 165th Artillery Brigade and 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka.[57] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian assault personnel of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) operating near Robotyne retrofitted a metal cage over a motorcycle, likely to protect the rider against first-person view (FPV) drone strikes.[58] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the protection is insufficient and called it a "propaganda placebo."[59] ISW has increasingly observed Russian forces using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) in ground assaults.[60]  

 

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast amid continued positional engagements in the area on June 2. Geolocated footage published on June 2 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northern Krynky on east bank Kherson Oblast.[61] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Krynky on June 1 and 2.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are "extremely active" on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[63] Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue operating near Nestryha Island in the Dnipro River Delta.[64]

 

Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on June 2 that Russian forces are using a variety of aircraft models to conduct surveillance operations in southern Ukraine to compensate for the lack of long-range radar tracking aircraft and lack of surface ships on the Black Sea.[65] Ukrainian officials reported in February 2024 that Ukrainian forces had downed two Russian A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft since the beginning of 2024 and that Russian forces have six more A-50s left.[66] Pletenchuk stated that the Russian military is using a Be-12 amphibious aircraft that it intended to decommission 10 years ago to patrol the water areas (presumably the Black Sea and Sea of Azov areas) at low speeds.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on June 2 that Russian forces launched an Iskander-K cruise missile from occupied Crimea, an S-300 air defense missile from occupied Donetsk Oblast, and 25 Shahed-136/131 drones from Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea.[67] Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed all 25 Shahed drones over Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson, Kyiv, Khmelnytskyi, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Vinnytsya oblasts.[68] Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office Spokesperson Dmytro Chubenko stated that Russian forces struck the territory of a medical facility in Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast with an Iskander-M ballistic missile, resulting in minor damage to windows and doors of the administrative building.[69] Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaly Kim reported that debris from destroyed Shahed drones caused a fire at an industrial enterprise in Kutsurub, Mykolaiv Oblast.[70] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhii Lysak stated that Ukrainian forces downed an unspecified cruise missile over Kryvyi Rih Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the evening of June 1.[71]

Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov stated on June 1 that the Dnipro Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) in Zaporizhzhia City was critically damaged after the May 31 to June 1 Russian strikes against the facility.[72] Fedorov stated that the bridge over the Dnipro HPP's dam is completely closed to traffic and that it is currently unclear when Ukrainian officials will be able to reopen the Dnipro HPP's bridge to traffic. Fedorov noted that Ukrainian officials are currently not even discussing when the Dnipro HPP will be able to generate electricity.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia continues to indoctrinate Russian minors into military-political thinking to set conditions for long-term force generation. The Russian youth movement "Movement of the First" called on June 1 for Russian youth over 16 years old to register for a competition in the field of military-patriotic education.[73] The "Movement of the First" stated that the competition will include about 50,000 Russian youth and claimed that finalists and winners have the opportunity to enter the movement's "reserve," earn extra credit when entering university, a museum trip, and train at the Russian Spetsnaz University. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger praised the effort for how it gives Russian children "boy scout" and military skills and a "patriotic education."[74]

The Russian Central Military District (CMD) Press Service reported on June 1 that the Russian 201st Military Base in Tajikistan has begun training Russian military personnel in the "FPV [first-person view] Drone Operator" specialty at the base's Training Center for Reconnaissance and Attack Unmanned Vehicle Operators.[75] The CMD Press Service reported that this training will allow Russian soldiers to use Russian combat experience in Ukraine to maintain peace and stability in Central Asia.

Russian milbloggers complained that the Russian MoD refusal to oust incompetent commanders only perpetuates issues within the Russian military. Some Russian milbloggers seized on the recent reappointment of former Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov as the St. Petersburg Naval Academy Head in mid-May 2024.[76] A Russian milblogger heavily and indirectly criticized Yevnemov and the MoD through a story about "Laos" (Russia) in which the "Laos" president (Russian President Vladimir Putin) refused to fire the "Grandfather" (Yevmenov) and instead moved him to another post as head of the "Laos" (Russian) naval academy, where "Grandfather's" poor leadership began degrading the school and causing teachers and students to worry.[77] Another milblogger coyly connected the "Laos" fiction to Yevmenov's new appointment.[78]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian ultranationalists called for Russia to begin utilizing public-private partnerships to provide Russian forces with electronic warfare (EW) systems amid an offense-defense technology race in Ukraine. A former Russian Storm-Z instructor and former Russian Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos) head Dmitry Rogozin called for Russia to utilize public-private partnerships to enable smaller manufacturers to produce military goods for Russian forces and allow the Russian state to diversify its purchases.[79] Rogozin stated that this approach could allow Russian state institutions to mass produce parts while smaller companies innovate and noted that Russian state-produced EW systems are already outdated by the time they reach the front.[80] Rogozin called on Russia to form "IT [information technology] Spetsnaz" units that would operate these products on the frontline and use their experiences to improve the products.[81] A prominent Russian milblogger agreed with the former Storm-Z instructor and Rogozin, claiming that Russian frontline forces are already building and innovating their own technology with help from volunteers and asking why the Russian state is producing ineffective drones.[82]

Russia continues to recruit youth to work at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan, which largely produces Iranian-designed drones. Russian opposition outlet Sota reported on June 2 that Russia is recruiting teenagers to work at the Alabuga SEZ Shahed drone production facility through the TikTok social media platform.[83] ISW has recently observed reports of Russia advertising Alabuga SEZ jobs to young people, including young people in Africa and other youth seeking educational benefits.[84]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russia is intensifying information operations aimed at discrediting the new Ukrainian mobilization law and undermining domestic trust in the Ukrainian government.[85] The Ukrainian Ground Forces reported on June 2 that Russian information operations units are spreading several fake videos portraying people dressed in Ukrainian military and police uniforms as committing violent acts against Ukrainians or debauchery on duty. The Ukrainian Ground Forces reported that Russian propagandists are filming these videos in occupied Ukraine and intentionally obscuring the locations to make them difficult to identify. The Ukrainian Ground Forces noted that Russians are using poor-quality footage to give the appearance of civilians filming them on phone cameras. Russian milbloggers have been widely spreading such videos in recent days and continued to do so on June 2.[86]

Russian sources continued efforts on June 2 to discredit the French government, likely in response to ongoing conversations about France allowing Ukraine to strike Russian territory with French-provided weapons and about France possibly sending military instructors to rear areas in Ukraine.[87]

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continued to reiterate standard Russian rhetoric about Russia-People's Republic of China (PRC) cooperation, perceived Western aggression and the war in Ukraine, and portrayed the majority of the world as with Russia and against the West.[88]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian House of Representatives Chairperson of the Belarusian National Assembly Igor Sergeenko and Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin discussed intensifying interparliamentary cooperation as part of the Union State of Russia and Belarus during their respective visits to Kazakhstan on June 2.[89] Sergeenko informed Volodin that the Belarusian National Assembly formed a group of deputies in the Union State Parliamentary Assembly, which includes 23 deputies from the House of Representatives and 13 members of the Republic Council. Sergeenko and Volodin also noted that the Belarusian and Russian turnover of goods and services reached $53.3 billion in 2023.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/01/ukrayina-ta-ssha-obgovoryly-posylennya-nashoyi-ppo-dodatkovymy-systemamy-ta-raketamy/ ; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/volodimir-zelenskij-obgovoriv-iz-delegaciyeyu-komitetu-iz-za-91293 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/10594 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/02/volodymyr-zelenskyj-i-llojd-ostin-obgovoryly-posylennya-ppo-ukrayiny-i-koalicziyu-f-16/ ; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/u-singapuri-prezident-ukrayini-zustrivsya-z-ministrom-oboron-91301

[2] https://president.dot gov.ua/news/volodimir-zelenskij-obgovoriv-iz-prezidentom-singapuru-samit-91321 ; https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapore-and-ukraine-sign-air-deal-during-president-zelensky-s-visit

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m0BtBErQ9vk ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/02/prezydent-ukrayiny-106-krayin-svitu-pidtverdyly-svoyu-uchast-u-samiti-myru/ ; https://suspilne dot media/759255-grafiki-vidklucenna-svitla-dniproges-u-kriticnomu-stani-pisla-rosijskogo-obstrilu-830-den-vijni-onlajn/ ; https://youtu.be/fyaCB6lf9nU ; https://suspilne dot media/759255-grafiki-vidklucenna-svitla-dniproges-u-kriticnomu-stani-pisla-rosijskogo-obstrilu-830-den-vijni-onlajn/

[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m0BtBErQ9vk ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/02/prezydent-ukrayiny-106-krayin-svitu-pidtverdyly-svoyu-uchast-u-samiti-myru/ ; https://suspilne dot media/759255-grafiki-vidklucenna-svitla-dniproges-u-kriticnomu-stani-pisla-rosijskogo-obstrilu-830-den-vijni-onlajn/

[5] https://www.finanznachrichten dot de/nachrichten-2024-06/62384226-kreise-saudi-arabien-nimmt-nicht-an-friedensgipfel-fuer-ukraine-teil-016.htm  ; https://newsukraine dot rbc.ua/news/saudi-arabia-not-planning-to-attend-ukraine-1717343291.html ; https://suspilne dot media/759629-saudivska-aravia-ne-bratime-ucast-u-globalnomu-samiti-miru-zmi/; https://www.bild dot de/politik/ausland/politik-ausland/ukraine-krieg-die-aktuelle-lage-im-live-ticker-83726300.bild.html ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053124

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052924

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2024

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2024

[10] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/02/ukraine-training-soldiers-mobilization-war/

[11] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-conscription-law-a8ccc48e6c15276c5b5035288ed016ee; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68788148

[12] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/02/ukraine-training-soldiers-mobilization-war/

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Feb%2021%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3

[14] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1001; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18

[15] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/02/world/europe/ukraine-children-russia-war.html?unlocked_article_code=1.wk0.06CT.l5g2LY0POphf

[16] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/06/01/russia-china-spies-espionage-threat-terrorists-mi5/ ; https://kyivindependent dot com/the-telegraph-mi5-to-shifts-focus-to-counter-espionage-amid-rising-russia-china-threats/; https://suspilne dot media/759271-telegraph-mi-5-dorucili-zoserediti-uvagu-na-spigunah-z-iranu-knr-ta-rf/ ; https://www.yahoo.com/news/telegraph-mi5-shifts-focus-counter-024900355.html ; https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/uk-mi5-instructed-to-focus-on-spies-from-russia-china-and-iran/ar-BB1nteUo  

[17] https://eadaily dot com/ru/news/2024/06/02/obyknovennyy-fashizm-artamonova-v-rossii-osudili-eksperta-oskorbivshego-ukraincev

[18] https://eadaily dot com/ru/news/2024/06/02/obyknovennyy-fashizm-artamonova-v-rossii-osudili-eksperta-osko ; https://t.me/sashakots/47078 ; https://t.me/zakharprilepin/22553 ; https://t.me/akashevarova/7344 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/36534

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2024

[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/39326 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44148 ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/166792

[21] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/166792

[22] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1797156780075573524

[23] https://t.me/vvgladkov/7574 ;  https://t.me/rybar/60604 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69514 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44164 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/23524 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/28241 ; https://t.me/severrealii/25277

[24] https://x.com/Tendar/status/1797209641077690500

[25] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/02/na-sumshhyni-ushhilnyuyut-fortyfikacziyi-troh-linij-oborony-z-urahuvannyam-misczevogo-relyefu/

[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/44154

[27] https://t.me/ua_42nd_ombr/330; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5712; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1797231538368663652; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1797237906676793477 ; https://t.me/army_tv/3682; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/02/na-harkivshhyni-nashi-zahysnyky-vidbyly-masovanu-ataku/ ; https://t.me/ua_42nd_ombr/330

[28] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11353 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11353 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11365 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14960 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/125649  https://t.me/rusich_army/14956 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10609

[29] https://t.me/dva_majors/44154

[30] https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1797285179070816426; https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1797285667438801263; https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1797286570912870867

[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11360

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YR6mQetuW7bz9e1Zp2EyZrxrsivwi2TPDRaYLtekLSjpAEeV17Suqumdis3E4ksSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KAUnfWiBUcDqyXL2Z4SC8cZ2SnLwHENzEEnJpBnYnWEQxkp7v2b3vDeNXm3ovLGel ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/125654 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/39338 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023qWVCZXci2ckd9xoxgdjUwcNgpBs8fmdpZg4usJoq2dgH3PVFjjY9fVtqdfwS7uQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0376zGLCjXqfFYB7oQnm6fxZPCaUPWLcT2sWde3rpwNYUERDTYULc27oaLLsznzrXcl

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YR6mQetuW7bz9e1Zp2EyZrxrsivwi2TPDRaYLtekLSjpAEeV17Suqumdis3E4ksSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Ak6NEQSDEvebB7Mpwu5JVozEUma5X3ggoSpvvQ42TrRcCFg3jX2o6kTpuDBXrA6gl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KAUnfWiBUcDqyXL2Z4SC8cZ2SnLwHENzEEnJpBnYnWEQxkp7v2b3vDeNXm3ovLGel; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023qWVCZXci2ckd9xoxgdjUwcNgpBs8fmdpZg4usJoq2dgH3PVFjjY9fVtqdfwS7uQl;

[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/39338; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/125654

[35] https://t.me/russianocontext/3325; https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/538

[36] https://t.me/russianocontext/3326; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1797272973335818321

[37] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/125649; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26964; https://t.me/motopatriot/23514

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YR6mQetuW7bz9e1Zp2EyZrxrsivwi2TPDRaYLtekLSjpAEeV17Suqumdis3E4ksSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0376zGLCjXqfFYB7oQnm6fxZPCaUPWLcT2sWde3rpwNYUERDTYULc27oaLLsznzrXcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KAUnfWiBUcDqyXL2Z4SC8cZ2SnLwHENzEEnJpBnYnWEQxkp7v2b3vDeNXm3ovLGel; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023qWVCZXci2ckd9xoxgdjUwcNgpBs8fmdpZg4usJoq2dgH3PVFjjY9fVtqdfwS7uQl; https://t.me/dva_majors/44154; https://t.me/multi_XAM/1436; https://t.me/wargonzo/20274

[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11362

[40] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69500 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/11782 (Chasiv Yar); https://t.me/multi_XAM/1434 (Bakhmut direction); https://t.me/boris_rozhin/125613 (Klishchiivka)

[41] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/15598; https://x.com/StettingerN/status/1797172282713915795

[42] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69499; https://t.me/dva_majors/44156; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/125666; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11370; https://t.me/motopatriot/23503

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0376zGLCjXqfFYB7oQnm6fxZPCaUPWLcT2sWde3rpwNYUERDTYULc27oaLLsznzrXcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YR6mQetuW7bz9e1Zp2EyZrxrsivwi2TPDRaYLtekLSjpAEeV17Suqumdis3E4ksSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Ak6NEQSDEvebB7Mpwu5JVozEUma5X3ggoSpvvQ42TrRcCFg3jX2o6kTpuDBXrA6gl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KAUnfWiBUcDqyXL2Z4SC8cZ2SnLwHENzEEnJpBnYnWEQxkp7v2b3vDeNXm3ovLGel; https://t.me/dva_majors/44154; https://t.me/dva_majors/44156; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11363; https://t.me/wargonzo/20274; https://t.me/motopatriot/23503; https://t.me/rusich_army/14964

[44] https://t.me/mod_russia/39339; https://t.me/mod_russia/39335; https://t.me/tass_agency/252223

[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/125687

[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5706; https://t.me/lost_warinua/78826

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Ak6NEQSDEvebB7Mpwu5JVozEUma5X3ggoSpvvQ42TrRcCFg3jX2o6kTpuDBXrA6gl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KAUnfWiBUcDqyXL2Z4SC8cZ2SnLwHENzEEnJpBnYnWEQxkp7v2b3vDeNXm3ovLGel; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023qWVCZXci2ckd9xoxgdjUwcNgpBs8fmdpZg4usJoq2dgH3PVFjjY9fVtqdfwS7uQl; https://t.me/wargonzo/20274

[48] https://t.me/voin_dv/8893 (southern Donetsk direction); https://t.me/nm_dnr/12314 (Kurakhove direction)

[49] https://t.me/wargonzo/20286

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YR6mQetuW7bz9e1Zp2EyZrxrsivwi2TPDRaYLtekLSjpAEeV17Suqumdis3E4ksSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Ak6NEQSDEvebB7Mpwu5JVozEUma5X3ggoSpvvQ42TrRcCFg3jX2o6kTpuDBXrA6gl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KAUnfWiBUcDqyXL2Z4SC8cZ2SnLwHENzEEnJpBnYnWEQxkp7v2b3vDeNXm3ovLGel; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023qWVCZXci2ckd9xoxgdjUwcNgpBs8fmdpZg4usJoq2dgH3PVFjjY9fVtqdfwS7uQl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11364; https://t.me/rybar/60614; https://t.me/mod_russia/39339

[51] https://t.me/rybar/60614

[52] https://t.me/rybar/60614

[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11364

[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/8888

[55] https://t.me/z_arhiv/26967

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KAUnfWiBUcDqyXL2Z4SC8cZ2SnLwHENzEEnJpBnYnWEQxkp7v2b3vDeNXm3ovLGel ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20274

[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5704; https://t.me/voin_dv/8865

[58] https://t.me/z_arhiv/26959 ; https://t.me/pokolenie_zov/12854; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1797222562176422100

[59] https://t.me/filatovcorr/3310

[60] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2024

[61] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/15605; https://t.me/argus38/282

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02YR6mQetuW7bz9e1Zp2EyZrxrsivwi2TPDRaYLtekLSjpAEeV17Suqumdis3E4ksSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KAUnfWiBUcDqyXL2Z4SC8cZ2SnLwHENzEEnJpBnYnWEQxkp7v2b3vDeNXm3ovLGel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid023qWVCZXci2ckd9xoxgdjUwcNgpBs8fmdpZg4usJoq2dgH3PVFjjY9fVtqdfwS7uQl

[63] https://t.me/dva_majors/44154

[64] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/10784

[65] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/02/vorog-demonstruye-aviaczijnyj-zoopark-na-pivdni-ukrayiny/

[66] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2024

[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0JzsSSuCBDHjoSr2Gekojgkzy75dtM5WfM7GFfoF1WzV3GNdudCZYeDF2eQjwYDSbl ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/02/nichna-ataka-po-ukrayini-stalo-vidomo-skilky-rosijskyh-raket-vdalosya-zbyty/ ; https://t.me/ComAFUA/304

[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0JzsSSuCBDHjoSr2Gekojgkzy75dtM5WfM7GFfoF1WzV3GNdudCZYeDF2eQjwYDSbl ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/02/nichna-ataka-po-ukrayini-stalo-vidomo-skilky-rosijskyh-raket-vdalosya-zbyty/ ; https://t.me/ComAFUA/304 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/15018 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/02/plyus-odyn-u-povitryanyh-sylah-utochnyly-tochnu-kilkist-zbytyh-nad-ukrayinoyu-shahediv/ ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02fb5hwrKZVyJM9U9Jr5b4v7WaeFkAf8tAW5cEWrTmYv5hCtpLjGpjYK8Y6VLJ9EXml

[69]  https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/759437-rf-vdarila-po-izumsini-2-cervna-dvoe-ludej-distali-poranen-vid-aviaudaru-iskander-vluciv-bila-medzakladu-v-izumi/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/759299-2-cervna-golovni-novini-harkova-ta-oblasti-naslidki-udariv-rf/

[70] https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/9856 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/02/na-mykolayivshhyni-cherez-padinnya-ulamkiv-droniv-zajnyalys-skladski-prymishhennya/

[71] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/13315 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/02/agresor-byv-po-nikopolshhyni-artyleriyeyu-ta-bpla/

[72] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/759213-nini-v-kriticnomu-stani-znahoditsa-dniproges-fedorov/?utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/istories_media/6499

[73] https://t.me/mypervie/13298

[74] https://t.me/sashakots/47072

[75] https://radiosputnik dot ru/20240601/drony-1949856261.html

[76] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6691672

[77] https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/11567 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44183

[78] https://t.me/dva_majors/44184

[79] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1011 ; https://t.me/rogozin_alexey/2117

[80] https://t.me/rogozin_do/5863

[81] https://t.me/rogozin_do/5863

[82] https://t.me/dva_majors/44185

[83] https://t.me/sotaproject/81400

[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2024

[85] https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/18367 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/02/na-okupovanyh-terytoriyah-znimayut-fejkovi-syuzhety-pro-bijky-zi-sluzhbovczyamy-tczk/ ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid05kuR8WFu5aCGnJJwgxZq5EAddxTCm4XNCaZaWQmsGEoHjuGCUatYoRJedXz215zLl 

[86] https://t.me/dva_majors/44154; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/125595; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/40869; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/15693

[87] https://t.me/tass_agency/252242 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56681 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16054 

[88] https://t.me/MID_Russia/41140

[89] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/sergeenko-i-volodin-obsudili-napravlenija-intensifikatsii-mezhparlamentskogo-sotrudnichestva-638520-2024/