Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 23, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 23, 2024

Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros

June 23, 2024, 8:30pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:35pm ET on June 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Islamic State (IS) Northern Caucasus branch, Wilayat Kavkaz, likely conducted a complex and coordinated attack against churches, synagogues, and law enforcement structures in the Republic of Dagestan on June 23.[1] Dagestan's Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that unknown actors opened fire on a Russian Orthodox church and a synagogue in Derbent at approximately 1800 local time and then reported within the same hour that another group of unknown actors opened fire on a traffic police post in Makhachkala (120 kilometers north of Derbent).[2] There are also reports of a fire at a synagogue in Makhachkala, although Russian official sources have not confirmed a second synagogue attack.[3] Dagestan announced a counter-terrorism regime following the start of the attacks, and Russian law enforcement killed five of the assailants and wounded six.[4] Social media footage shows Russian law enforcement detaining two suspects on a public beach in Makhachkala after they seemingly fled the scene of the shooting.[5] Russian media reported that seven law enforcement officials, a priest, and a church guard died in the attacks and 25 more individuals have been injured.[6] The Russian National Anti-Terrorism Committee announced the end of the counterterrorism operation in Derbent after the deaths of two suspects but small arms fire exchanges continued in Makhachkala as of 2300 local time on June 23.[7] The Baza Telegram channel claimed that two of the Makhachkala attackers identified as Osman and Adil Omarov, both of whom Russian law enforcement killed, were the sons of Sergokalinsky district head Magomed Omarov.[8] Russian Telegram channels are circulating footage reportedly filmed by Osman Omarov of the Makhachkala synagogue attack.[9] Baza reported that Russian law enforcement has also detained Magomed Omarov and are searching his home. Russian news agency Interfax claimed that Omarov's nephew also took part in the attack and Russian law enforcement killed him.[10]

The Russian branch of IS-K's Al-Azaim Media posted a statement on June 23 following the attack praising "their brothers from the Caucasus" for demonstrating what they were capable of.[11] Al-Azaim did not claim credit for the attack itself, notably, and the reference to the Caucasus strongly suggests that Wilayat Kavkaz is responsible for the attack. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure specifically warned that Wilayat Kavkaz became more active following the March 22 IS-K Crocus City Hall attack and has escalated recruitment appeals in the Northern Caucasus since April 2024.[12] Russian authorities have attempted a lackluster counterterrorism operation in the North Caucasus since March 2024 in order to combat growing IS and Wilayat Kavkaz influence but have largely focused their post-Crocus Hall response on baselessly blaming Ukraine and NATO for the attack.[13] Some Russian officials are already baselessly claiming that Ukraine and NATO are involved in the June 23 attack, emphasizing that Russia's current counterterrorism approach is likely to remain tied up in rhetorical posturing against Ukraine and the West as opposed to identifying and neutralizing IS threats within Russia itself.[14] Russia's increasingly tense relationship with its Muslim minority population, especially in the Caucasus, will likely continue to provide Wilayat Kazkaz and other extremist groups with a valuable recruitment base.[15]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukrainian forces of conducting a short-range ATACMS strike against occupied Sevastopol on June 23. The Russian MoD claimed on June 23 that Ukrainian forces launched five ATACMS missiles armed with cluster munitions against Sevastopol and that Russian forces intercepted four missiles.[16] The Russian MoD claimed that the impact from a Russian air defense interceptor caused one missile to deviate from its flight path and detonate.[17] The Russian MoD later blamed the United States for civilian casualties in Sevastopol given that the ATACMS are a US-provided system, despite acknowledging that a Russian air defense interceptor caused the missile to deviate from its flight path and detonate. A Crimea-focused Russian milblogger posted footage on the night of June 23 purportedly showing explosions near Yevpatoria and Vityne and claimed that there were explosions near Chornomorske and Mizhvodne.[18] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne Krym reported that its sources also reported explosions in Yevpatoria.[19] Footage published on June 23 purportedly shows civilians on a beach in Sevastopol during and after the missile strike deviated.[20] Russian sources claimed that cluster munitions landed on civilians near a beach in Uchuyevka Park in northern Sevastopol.[21] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed that the strike killed four people and injured 151 people.[22] Ukrainian military officials did not confirm or deny launching strikes against Sevastopol. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated that Ukraine needs to obtain special permission to use ATACMS with cluster munitions from Western partners and claimed that the Russian occupation government is at fault for civilian casualties because it had failed to warn civilians before Russian air defense systems shot down unspecified missiles over their heads.[23] ISW cannot independently verify if Ukrainian forces used ATACMS missiles armed with cluster munitions. The Russian MoD's blaming of the United States for civilian causalities is an attempt to deter the United States from providing further security assistance to Ukraine.

Russian milbloggers widely criticized the Russian MoD and Russia’s occupation authorities in Crimea for failing to prevent the strike and sufficiently protect Russian civilians. Russian sources criticized Russian authorities for not using air raid sirens to alert civilians to seek shelter.[24] Several Russian milbloggers criticized Russian authorities for failing to detect and destroy all the missiles before they approached Sevastopol and for failing to build reinforced shelters within walking distance of the beach, specifically comparing the lack of shelters near this beach in contrast to Russia's efforts to build shelters in Belgorod Oblast near the international border with Ukraine.[25] Footage and imagery indicate that Russian forces have been stationing military equipment in civilian areas in Crimea since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian authorities have irresponsibly encouraged Russian tourism to occupied Crimea during wartime while the Russian military continues to leverage the occupied peninsula as a rear staging area.[26] The Russian military likely purposefully stations legitimate military targets nearby civilian areas in Crimea in an effort to deter Ukrainian strikes. Russian forces have been recorded leveraging the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and schools in occupied mainland Ukraine to shield Russian military equipment.[27] Russia is likely violating its own regulations on the application of International Humanitarian Law, which states that "the military command shall avoid deploying military objectives in densely populated areas or in their vicinity."[28]

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian motorized rifle regiment command post in Nekhoteevka, Belgorod Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 23 that Ukrainian Air Force elements and other Ukrainian units conducted the strike on an unspecified date (likely recently) and caused secondary explosions at the target site.[29] Ukrainian military correspondents shared footage of the strike on June 23.[30] Nekhoteevka is notably directly on the Russia-Ukraine border about 15 kilometers away from the current front line of troops in northern Kharkiv Oblast, so this command post was likely involved in overseeing ongoing Russian offensive operations north of Kharkiv City in some capacity.

Recent drone footage showing a Russian soldier executing a wounded fellow servicemember exemplifies the brutal culture that is pervasive within the Russian Armed Forces.[31] The footage shows one Russian soldier wounded by a first-person view (FPV) drone strike, and the other soldier executing the wounded soldier at point blank range instead of attempting to check the soldier’s injury, attempting treatment, taking his identification tags, or attempting a casualty evacuation. The attempted or deliberate killing of a fellow soldier is unprofessional, and ISW has observed instances of Russian fragging (the deliberate killing of supervisors) and other anecdotes demonstrative of a callous disregard for the lives of Russia’s own soldiers throughout the war thus far, both within Russia and amongst Russian troops on the battlefield.[32] Fragging is generally indicative of extremely poor discipline amongst troops, a disconnect between tactical level commanders and their subordinates, as well as a blatant disregard for human life. A Russian milblogger similarly reported on June 22 that commanders of various Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) units are severely mistreating their wounded subordinates and alleged that the 1st DNR Slavic Brigade (1st DNR Army Corps) is holding its own wounded personnel in prison-like conditions in Donetsk City, instead of providing them with the treatment that they require.[33] Both the fragging incident and the milblogger claims against the DNR command are indicative of a very poor culture within the Russian military, particularly the command's disregard for their subordinates and a generally low level of discipline.

South Korea has adopted a firm approach against Russia in the wake of recently intensified Russo-North Korean cooperation, suggesting that Russian efforts to threaten Seoul into withholding aid from Ukraine have failed. South Korean National Security Director Chang Ho-jin reiterated on June 23 that the type of military support that South Korea will provide to Ukraine is contingent on the depth and evolution of Russian military cooperation with North Korea.[34] Chang previously stated on June 20 that the June 19 Russia-North Korea strategic partnership agreement had encouraged South Korea to change its long-standing policy prohibiting the transfer of arms to Ukraine, and South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on June 21 that South Korea is now considering sending 155mm artillery shells and unspecified air defense systems to Ukraine.[35] Russian President Vladimir Putin notably attempted to threaten South Korea on June 20, stating that Seoul would be making “a very big mistake” if it decided to supply arms to Ukraine.[36] Russian diplomatic officials have tried to retaliate against Seoul's statement about providing aid to Ukraine and claimed that it is "blackmail" against Russia.[37] The Washington Post reported on June 22, citing data obtained by US think tank Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), that North Korea delivered over 74,000 metric tons of explosives to Russia — equivalent to about 1.6 million artillery shells — between August 2023 and January 2024.[38] The Washington Post reported that these North Korean shipments arrived at 16 sites in Russia, 12 of which were close to known ammunition storage facilities.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) detained two former senior employees of the Wagner Group-affiliated Patriot media holding on the eve of the one-year anniversary of the Wagner mutiny. Russian media outlets and insider sources reported that the FSB detained former manager of the Patriot media holding Ilya Gorbunov on June 21 and 22, and editor-in-chief of the St. Petersburg-based online publication Konkretno.ru Kirill Metelev on June 19.[39] Russian insider sources claimed that Gorbunov previously headed the “Troll Factory” belonging to deceased Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and was responsible for promoting the Wagner mutiny online on June 23 and 24, 2023.[40] Metelev was reportedly a contractor of the Patriot media holding and was responsible for posting defamatory statements online, specifically attacking Prigozhin’s stated enemy St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov.[41] Russian state media attempted to portray these arrests as unrelated to the anniversary of the Wagner mutiny, and Kremlin-run media outlet Izvestia cited an unnamed source in the Russian security structure as saying that these arrests “had nothing to do with Prigozhin.”[42] St. Petersburg local outlet Fontanka reported that Gorbunov and Matelev were detained on the charges of extortion and blackmail for demanding money from a former St. Petersburg TV channel general director Alexander Malkevich.[43] Prigozhin reportedly dissolved Patriot media holding on June 30, 2023.[44]

Key Takeaways:

• The Islamic State (IS) Northern Caucasus branch Wilayat Kavkaz likely conducted a complex and coordinated attack against churches, synagogues, and law enforcement structures in the Republic of Dagestan on June 23.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukrainian forces of conducting a short-range ATACMS strike against occupied Sevastopol on June 23. Russian milbloggers widely criticized the Russian MoD and Russia’s occupation authorities in Crimea for failing to prevent the strike and sufficiently protect Russian civilians.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian motorized rifle regiment command post in Nekhoteevka, Belgorod Oblast.
• Recent drone footage showing a Russian soldier executing a wounded fellow servicemember exemplifies the brutal culture that is pervasive within the Russian Armed Forces.
• South Korea has adopted a firm approach against Russia in the wake of recently intensified Russo-North Korean cooperation, suggesting that Russian efforts to threaten Seoul into withholding aid from Ukraine have failed.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) detained two former senior employees of the Wagner Group-affiliated Patriot media holding on the eve of the one-year anniversary of the Wagner mutiny.
• Russian forces recently seized Shumy and advanced near Donetsk City and Robotyne.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on June 22 officially transferring the Cossack Cadet Corps and the Russian Naval Cadet Corps to the jurisdiction of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 23 amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City) and within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that fighting is ongoing near and within Vovchansk and that Russian forces struck Lyptsi (northwest of Kharkiv Oblast) with 23 glide bombs on June 23.[46] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on June 23 that the Russian military is attempting to withdraw combat degraded units from the Vovchansk area, including elements of the Russian 11th Tank Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade.[47] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Yuriy Povkh previously stated on June 16 that the Russian military command is also trying to withdraw elements of the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th CAA, LMD) that have become combat-ineffective after suffering high losses.[48]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 22 and 23 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 36th and 37th motorized rifle brigades (both are part of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) advanced near Torske (west of Kreminna) with artillery support from the 19th Tank Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division).[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Stelmakhivka, Berestove, and Stepova Novoselivka; west of Svatove near Andriivka, Kopanky, and Myasozharivka; northwest of Kreminna near Novosadove, Makiivka, and Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on June 22 and 23.[50]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Siversk direction on June 22 and 23, but there were no confirmed advances along the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified elements of the Russian Airborne (VDV) forces pushed Ukrainian forces from positions within eastern, southern, and western Rozdolivka (southeast of Siversk) and have seized 50 percent of the settlement.[51] ISW had not observed visual evidence supporting this claim. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted assaults east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Spirne, and south of Siversk near Vyimka on June 22 and 23.[52] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction and elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR AC) are operating near Vyimka.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on June 22 and 23, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division advanced north of the Novyi and Kanal microraions in eastern Chasiv Yar, that Ukrainian forces withdrew across the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal, and that Russian forces have crossed the canal.[54] ISW has not observed visual evidence of Russian forces operating beyond the canal, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued assaults north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka on June 22 and 23.[55]

 

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets confirmed that Russian forces recently seized Shumy and stated that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Pivnichne, southeast and east of Toretsk respectively.[56] Mashovets stated on June 23 that three to four platoon-sized Russian assault groups recently advanced from the "Mayorske" checkpoint (east of Toretsk) along the T-05-16 highway and nearby railway line in the direction of Pivnichne. Mashovets stated that Russian forces seized several houses along Hirnytsky Lane and Zalizhychna Street on the northeastern outskirts of Pivnichne. Mashovets stated that Russian forces later attacked from the Michurinska correctional colony and Mayorske concrete plant (east of Toretsk and on the northwestern outskirts of Horlivka) and pushed Ukrainian forces from Shumy (east of Toretsk and just east of Pivnichne). Mashovets noted that Shumy is a very small settlement and estimated that Russian forces advanced in an area roughly 2-2.3 kilometers deep and 3.5-3.6 kilometers wide in total. Mashovets noted that Russian forces are trying to seize positions in the forest areas southwest of Shumy, east of Pivnichne, and within eastern Pivnichne itself and suggested that Russian forces may try to intensify attacks in this direction in the future to either support Russian operations near Chasiv Yar or northwest of Avdiivka.[57] Ukrainian and Russian sources first reported that Russian forces seized Shumy on June 22.[58]

Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces advanced further in the Toretsk direction on June 23, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along Zelena, Myru, Kutuzova, and Kyiv streets within the eastern outskirts of Pivnichne.[59] Another Russian milblogger noted that there are conflicting claims about the extent of Russian advances in the area as some Russian sources are claiming that Russian forces control half of Pivdenne (southeast of Toretsk) while other sources are claiming that there is fighting on the outskirts of Zalizne (just southeast of Toretsk and just west of Pivdenne).[60] Russian forces continued assaults in the area between Shyroka Balka (southwest of Toretsk) and Niu York (south of Toretsk) on June 22 and 23.[61] Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) and 1436th and 1st motorized rifle regiments of Russia's Territorial Troops are operating in the Toretsk direction.[62]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized the remainder of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka) and Yasnobrodivka (west of Avdiivka) on June 23, although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[63] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Russian forces advanced into Vozdvyzhenka (northwest of Avdiivka and Novooleksandrivka).[64] Several other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 300 meters within eastern Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka) and advanced to the outskirts of Yevhenivka (northwest of Avdiivka and west of Sokil).[65] Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Avdiivka near Oleksandropil, Arkhanhelske, Novokalynove, Novopokrovske, and Novoselivka Persha; west of Avdiivka near Umanske; and southwest of Avdiivka near Netaylove, Karlivka, and Nevelske on June 22 and 23.[66]

 

Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued fighting in the area on June 23. Geolocated footage published on June 23 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced within western Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in an area up to 4.85 kilometers wide and 1.55 kilometers in depth southwest of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City) and that Russian forces advanced south of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[68] Russian forces continued assaults west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka.[69]

A Russian milblogger claimed on June 23 that elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) repelled several Ukrainian counterattacks north of Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novoselika) in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[70] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Prechystivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Vuhledar (southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[71]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued positional engagements in the area. Geolocated footage published on June 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Robotyne.[72] Fighting continued near Robotyne and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on June 23.[73]

 

Positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky and on the islands in the Dnipro River delta on June 23.[74] Elements of the Russian 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District) reportedly continue operating in the Kherson direction.[75]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Kalibr cruise missiles from the Sea of Azov and that Ukrainian forces shot down two missiles over Kyiv Oblast.[76] The Kyiv Oblast Military Administration reported that falling missile debris damaged civilian infrastructure.[77] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched a cruise missile over the Black Sea against Odesa Oblast, but that the missile lost its combat capability over the Black Sea.[78]

Russian forces continue to conduct glide bomb strikes against Ukraine, particularly targeting Kharkiv City and Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces conducted glide bomb strikes against civilian infrastructure in Shevchenkivskyi and Kholodnohirskyi raions, Kharkiv City on June 23.[79] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 22 that Russian forces have launched over 2,400 guided glide bombs against Ukraine since the beginning of June, of which roughly 700 targeted Kharkiv Oblast.[80] Donetsk Oblast Police reported that Russian forces launched a KAB-250 glide bomb against Toretsk and a D-30SN glide bomb with universal joint glide munition (UMPB) modifications against Kostyantynivka.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using glide bombs with UMPBs more frequently since this modification is more difficult for Ukrainian forces to intercept than Russian glide bombs with older unified planning and correction modules (UMPCs).[82]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia continues to codify efforts to build out its reserve over the long term. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on June 22 officially transferring the Cossack Cadet Corps and the Russian Naval Cadet Corps to the jurisdiction of the Russian MoD.[83] The Russian Ministry of Education previously oversaw the admissions and educational processes for both cadet corps, which will now fall under the Russian MoD's purview.[84] The Russian Federation Council's Scientific Committee noted on June 20 that the Russian MoD already de facto controlled both cadet corps, and that this law is intended to make this a de jure reality and eliminate a bureaucratic gap in the legislation.[85] The Cossack Cadet Corps and other Russian cadet corps are both important aspects of Russia's reserve system, as they prepare children and youth for military service and provide a military recruitment pipeline for educated and qualified recruits. The effort to officially bring the Cossack Cadet Corps under the Russian MoD is particularly noteworthy, as Putin has recently taken steps to ensure a legal basis for the enrollment of All-Russian Cossack Society members into the Russian mobilization reserve.[86] Cossack Cadet Corps leverages Cossack leadership and military-patriotic education in a way that sets them apart from other Cadet Corps that do not fall under the Cossack organizational umbrella.[87] Under the new law, all 31 of Russia's Cossack Cadet Corps will fall under Russian MoD jurisdiction—creating a larger mobilization pool of well-educated recruits for the long-term.[88]

An investigation by Bloomberg highlighted a surge in crimes committed by Russian servicemembers upon their return to Russia after fighting in Ukraine.[89] Bloomberg analyzed Russian court data that shows that crimes committed by Russian servicemembers (particularly violent crimes, theft, and drug-related incidents) increased by over 20 percent in 2023, which excludes crimes committed by ex-convict recruits who return to Russia after their deployment in Ukraine. Bloomberg noted that court data shows a 62 percent increase in indecent assaults committed against minors compared to the pre-2022 data. Bloomberg economist Alex Isakov noted that crime rates in any country at war tend to rise sharply in later stages and following a war, and Russian society will continue to deal with the ramifications of such crime cycles as it continues its war in Ukraine. RAND senior policy researcher Dara Massicot has previously assessed that the implications of mass untreated post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that the Russian medical system is unequipped to deal with will have implications on Russian society as Russian personnel return home, noting that untreated PTSD can increase the risk of criminal behavior, substance abuse, and domestic violence.[90] Russian officials also recently began to publicly express concerns over increasing violent crimes committed by convicts returning from the frontlines in Ukraine into Russian society.[91]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec's "High Precision Systems" holding company announced on June 22 that it has begun equipping BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles and BMD-4 airborne assault vehicles with "Nakidka" ("Cape") camouflage systems to protect them from Ukrainian Baba Yaga drones.[92] The "Nakidka" camouflage system reportedly significantly reduces the thermal signature of armored vehicles, making them harder to detect with infrared homing systems.[93] Russian media reported in October 2023 that Russian forces were using the "Nakidka" coating to protect tanks against US-made Javelin ATGMs.[94]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

President of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) Milorad Dodik continued the Kremlin-supported efforts to dismantle the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War. Dodik accused the United States on June 23 of ignoring the interests of other countries and interfering in internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[95] Dodik‘s statements were in response to the US Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina Michael Murphy, who accused Dodik on June 22 of worsening the political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina and noted that the idea of Republika Srpska’s “peaceful separation” is a “dangerous, illegal fantasy” that represents a threat to “fundamental US interests” in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[96] Dodik added that political entities with Bosnia and Herzegovina will decide on their internal affairs and claimed that Bosnian political belief in “Washington’s sincere desire to help Bosnian Serbs“ is a “deep misconception.”

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continued to share parts of the jointly published Russian and Belarusian report about human rights violations with the intent of deflecting the Kremlin’s ongoing human rights violations and war of conquest in Ukraine. The Russian MFA accused Australia of xenophobia, racism, human rights violations, and “Russophobia” against Russian citizens in Australia.[97] The Russian MFA, however, did not include Russia’s own mistreatment of migrants, ethnic populations, and vast repressions in Russia and occupied Ukraine.

Russian milbloggers continued to amplify criticisms of Ukrainian Lieutenant General Yurii Sodol from a Ukrainian official on June 23.[98]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://x.com/Valle_Riccardo_/status/1804984431519698947; https://x.com/khorasandiary/status/1804983911681818833

[2] https://t.me/bbbreaking/184523; https://t.me/rbc_news/97678; https://iz dot ru/1717030/2024-06-23/strelba-v-derbente-i-makhachkale-glavnoe; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/21176167

[3] https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/23/europe/dagestan-synagogue-attack-russia-intl-latam/index.html; https://t.me/bazabazon/28836

[4] https://iz dot ru/1717030/2024-06-23/strelba-v-derbente-i-makhachkale-glavnoe; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/21175735

[5] https://t.me/bbbreaking/184542

[6] https://iz dot ru/1717030/2024-06-23/strelba-v-derbente-i-makhachkale-glavnoe; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/21177191; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/967731

[7] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/06/23/nak-ob-yavil-o-zavershenii-aktivnoy-fazy-kontrterroristicheskoy-operatsii-v-derbente-v-mahachkale-perekryty-vyezdy-iz-goroda

[8] https://t.me/bazabazon/28863

[9] https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/27118

[10] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/967736

[11] https://x.com/khorasandiary/status/1804983911681818833; https://x.com/Valle_Riccardo_/status/1804984431519698947

[12] https://ecrats.org/en/security_situation/situation/9957/; https://t.me/prokavkaz/4487

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041124; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040224; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040124

[14] https://x.com/bbcrussian/status/1804941424166670832

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar033024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032424

[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/40203

[17] https://t.me/mod_russia/40203

[18] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/62106 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/62108 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/62109 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/62116

[19] https://suspilne dot media/crimea/775039-v-okupovanij-evpatorii-prolunali-vibuhi-so-vidomo-2/

[20] https://t.me/dva_majors/45847 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27109 ; https://t.me/mash_na_volne/5757

[21] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12076 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1804897362088702192 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/62056

[22] https://t.me/razvozhaev/6925

[23] https://t.me/andriyshTime/23633

[24] https://t.me/yurist_yug/979 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47484 ; https://t.me/treugolniklpr/40720 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/45845

[25] https://t.me/dva_majors/45845 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47484 ; https://t.me/yurist_yug/979

[26] https://x.com/auto_glam/status/1804869425092313124 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2023 ;

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2023 ; https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/11/09/tanks-playground/attacks-schools-and-military-use-schools-ukraine

[28] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v2/rule23?country=ru

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FRpTxkr6rLd7QAUD7HDu6FtAkAerYzRmiRXdvopiYruGfJqfvwbZsjYMG9mgEG59l

[30] https://t.me/a_shtirlitz/29790; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/11336

[31] *GRAPHIC* https://t.me/russianocontext/3671 ; https://x.com/DefMon3/status/1804567321861599437 ; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1804589215499649096 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1804590062874554648

[32] https://thehill.com/policy/international/599792-russian-troops-attack-own-commanding-officer-after-suffering-heavy/; https://www.npr.org/2022/10/15/1129321544/russia-soldiers-shooting-training-belgorod

[33] https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1804781230744887559; https://t.me/Z13_Separ/29553;

[34] https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=186239

[35] https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20240621006000315

[36] https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/20/asia/putin-ukraine-north-korea-south-korea-intl-hnk/index.html

[37] https://t.me/rembskorea/4777

[38] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/22/russia-north-korea-military-deal-ukraine/

[39] . https://www.fontanka dot ru/2024/06/22/73742696/ ; https://www.severreal dot org/a/zaderzhany-svyazannye-s-prigozhinym-mediamenedzhery-iz-peterburga/33005617.html ; https://t.me/severrealii/25697 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/28823 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/06/23/fontanka-v-peterburge-po-podozreniyu-v-vymogatelstve-zaderzhan-byvshiy-top-menedzher-mediagruppy-patriot-i-fabriki-trolley-evgeniya-prigozhina; https://t.me/astrapress/58140; https://t.me/vchkogpu/48919; https://t.me/vchkogpu/48920; https://t.me/vchkogpu/48924; https://t.me/vchkogpu/48928; https://t.me/vchkogpu/48929

[40] https://t.me/vchkogpu/48919; https://t.me/vchkogpu/48920

[41] https://t.me/vchkogpu/48924; https://t.me/vchkogpu/48920

[42] https://iz dot ru/1716806/2024-06-23/byvshego-top-menedzhera-mediakholdinga-patriot-zaderzhali-v-sankt-peterburge?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop

[43] https://www.fontanka dot ru/2024/06/22/73742696/ ; https://www.severreal dot org/a/zaderzhany-svyazannye-s-prigozhinym-mediamenedzhery-iz-peterburga/33005617.html ; https://t.me/severrealii/25697 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/28823 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/06/23/fontanka-v-peterburge-po-podozreniyu-v-vymogatelstve-zaderzhan-byvshiy-top-menedzher-mediagruppy-patriot-i-fabriki-trolley-evgeniya-prigozhina; https://t.me/astrapress/58140

[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2023

[45] https://t.me/wargonzo/20664 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/17763 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70962 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12069 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16280 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57114 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10765

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0261DpzR92mbZUeg6TbVBi9NvDpJbwcWffZqprbALXJgK5JmfZH8uKuzry82YLMGqSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmoSZ3iZgec9DPHqoNBzRqrMciij3DUDYwpqqazVNNw4934hrVWkdY6GuqhCumQgl

[47] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/23/armiya-rosiyi-vyvodyat-svoyi-pidrozdily-z-pid-vovchanska-nazar-voloshyn-nazvav-prychynu/

[48] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/16/na-harkivshhyni-vorog-namagayetsya-vidvesty-pidrozdily-yaki-vtratyly-boyezdatnist/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2024

[49] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/127728; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27102  

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e8nPAjwGU4SLW5xEXVt68MMZMTKFchTPtnomBmMsw7iH9r3b3zUFGoE1BHJ2NY4Cl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zJCui8Y8t5QJ4Lxy4QjbB8sV8TFRh7htr1dCjzQcV3xL2fV1GfrPZWQ9K27SjiG5l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmoSZ3iZgec9DPHqoNBzRqrMciij3DUDYwpqqazVNNw4934hrVWkdY6GuqhCumQgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0261DpzR92mbZUeg6TbVBi9NvDpJbwcWffZqprbALXJgK5JmfZH8uKuzry82YLMGqSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KuQnrWbKzb1ea8hN77BahAxbirgdsxostDBkQ1UrckwjWAbjNbvmS4KxdBH7kbWQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0T3yStJ75MbViqfARsTZ4m6exjFZLjb6no8haRXs5Qcv7fp45bH2RWB4t5XTwwmgCl

[51] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18169

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmoSZ3iZgec9DPHqoNBzRqrMciij3DUDYwpqqazVNNw4934hrVWkdY6GuqhCumQgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zJCui8Y8t5QJ4Lxy4QjbB8sV8TFRh7htr1dCjzQcV3xL2fV1GfrPZWQ9K27SjiG5l

[53] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/127694 (Siversk direction) ; https://t.me/sons_fatherland/15194 (Vyimka)

[54] https://t.me/multi_XAM/1466 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12064  ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27106

[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmoSZ3iZgec9DPHqoNBzRqrMciij3DUDYwpqqazVNNw4934hrVWkdY6GuqhCumQgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zJCui8Y8t5QJ4Lxy4QjbB8sV8TFRh7htr1dCjzQcV3xL2fV1GfrPZWQ9K27SjiG5l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e8nPAjwGU4SLW5xEXVt68MMZMTKFchTPtnomBmMsw7iH9r3b3zUFGoE1BHJ2NY4Cl

[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1971; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02FjcuKocJakPpTibLBVR3en7kudAKEXEBo57JNJxC38vWKNquMrbBq8TW5gPgxiWgl

[57] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1971; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02FjcuKocJakPpTibLBVR3en7kudAKEXEBo57JNJxC38vWKNquMrbBq8TW5gPgxiWgl ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1972; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02FjcuKocJakPpTibLBVR3en7kudAKEXEBo57JNJxC38vWKNquMrbBq8TW5gPgxiWgl

[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2024

[59] https://t.me/motopatriot/24162 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27104 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18171 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70943 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12071 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57125

[60] https://t.me/rybar/61183

[61] https://t.me/rybar/61183 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zJCui8Y8t5QJ4Lxy4QjbB8sV8TFRh7htr1dCjzQcV3xL2fV1GfrPZWQ9K27SjiG5l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0261DpzR92mbZUeg6TbVBi9NvDpJbwcWffZqprbALXJgK5JmfZH8uKuzry82YLMGqSl

[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1971; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1972; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02FjcuKocJakPpTibLBVR3en7kudAKEXEBo57JNJxC38vWKNquMrbBq8TW5gPgxiWgl

[63] https://t.me/motopatriot/24199; https://t.me/motopatriot/24190 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/12517 ; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/41077

[64] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57112 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57108 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/127663

[65] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12053 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18162 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70933

[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KuQnrWbKzb1ea8hN77BahAxbirgdsxostDBkQ1UrckwjWAbjNbvmS4KxdBH7kbWQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0261DpzR92mbZUeg6TbVBi9NvDpJbwcWffZqprbALXJgK5JmfZH8uKuzry82YLMGqSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmoSZ3iZgec9DPHqoNBzRqrMciij3DUDYwpqqazVNNw4934hrVWkdY6GuqhCumQgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zJCui8Y8t5QJ4Lxy4QjbB8sV8TFRh7htr1dCjzQcV3xL2fV1GfrPZWQ9K27SjiG5l ; https://t.me/rybar/61183  ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20664 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18162 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57108 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/127663

[67] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/567; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5881

[68] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70970 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27108 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70943

[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmoSZ3iZgec9DPHqoNBzRqrMciij3DUDYwpqqazVNNw4934hrVWkdY6GuqhCumQgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zJCui8Y8t5QJ4Lxy4QjbB8sV8TFRh7htr1dCjzQcV3xL2fV1GfrPZWQ9K27SjiG5l ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20664

[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/9305

[71] https://t.me/zov_kam/11068 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1804857661998965184  (Prechystivka) ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70932 (Vuhledar)

[72] https://t.me/russianocontext/3671 ; https://x.com/DefMon3/status/1804567321861599437 ; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1804589215499649096 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1804590062874554648

[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmoSZ3iZgec9DPHqoNBzRqrMciij3DUDYwpqqazVNNw4934hrVWkdY6GuqhCumQgl ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70970

[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0T3yStJ75MbViqfARsTZ4m6exjFZLjb6no8haRXs5Qcv7fp45bH2RWB4t5XTwwmgCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KuQnrWbKzb1ea8hN77BahAxbirgdsxostDBkQ1UrckwjWAbjNbvmS4KxdBH7kbWQl ; https://t.me/rusich_army/15362

[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/45857

[76] https://t.me/ComAFUA/320

[77] https://t.me/kyivoda/18024

[78] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10130

[79] https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/1491 ; https://t.me/citykharkivua/52114

[80] https://unn dot ua/en/news/zelensky-russia-has-sent-more-than-2400-cubic-meters-to-ukraine-since-the-beginning-of-june-alone-about-700-of-them-to-kharkiv-region

[81] https://dn.npu.gov dot ua/news/dvi-liudyny-zahynulo-chetvero-zaznaly-poranen-na-donechchyni-vnaslidok-vorozhykh-atak

[82] https://t.me/dva_majors/45816

[83] https://ria dot ru/20240622/zakon-1954746091.html

[84] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6775208

[85] https://ria dot ru/20240622/zakon-1954746091.html; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6775208

[86] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/20337169; https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/2024-03-24-PDF-Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment.pdf

[87] https://www.ponarseurasia.org/cossacks-as-a-case-study-of-russias-paramilitarization/

[88] https://www.ponarseurasia.org/cossacks-as-a-case-study-of-russias-paramilitarization/; https://vsko dot ru/kazache-obrazovanie/kazachi-kadetskie-korpusa/

[89] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-22/why-russia-is-facing-a-crime-wave-when-war-on-ukraine-ends

[90] https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/05/31/dara-massicot-believes-that-russia-faces-twin-personnel-crises-in-its-armed-forces

[91] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024

[92] https://t.me/tass_agency/256267

[93] https://iz dot ru/1585561/2023-10-07/maskirovochnoe-pokrytie-nakidka-rossiiskikh-tankov-sposobno-otrazhat-rakety-javelin

[94] https://iz dot ru/1585561/2023-10-07/maskirovochnoe-pokrytie-nakidka-rossiiskikh-tankov-sposobno-otrazhat-rakety-javelin

[95] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/21174587

[96] https://kosovapress dot com/en/murphy-atmosfera-politike-ne-bosnje-me-e-keqe-se-lufta-dodik-pergjegjes

[97] https://t.me/MID_Russia/42435

[98] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/70964; https://t.me/marybezuhla/1683