Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 9, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 9, 2024

George Barros, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, and Kateryna Stepanenko

June 9, 2024, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on June 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Biden Administration’s limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum. US policy still preserves at least 84 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary – territory within range of Ukrainian ATACMS. US policy restricting Ukraine’s usage of US-provided weapons has effectively created a vast sanctuary – territory in range of US-provided weapons but that Ukrainian forces are not allowed to strike with US-provided weapons – which Russia exploits to shield its combat forces, command and control, logistics, and rear area support services that the Russian military uses to conduct its military operations in Ukraine.[1] US policy still protects the vast majority of Russia’s operational rear and deep rear, and US policy forbids Ukraine from using ATACMS anywhere in Russia.[2] US President Joe Biden’s limited policy change in late May 2024 regarding the use of US-provided weapons against military targets in Russia removed a maximum of 16 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary, assuming that Ukrainian forces can strike all legitimate Russian military targets in range of Ukrainian HIMARS using GMLRS in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts. It is far from clear that Ukrainian forces have permission to do so, however. Senior US officials have described Ukraine’s ability to strike into Russia with GMLRS as being for counterbattery fire and geographically bounded to the Kharkiv area, and have stated that Ukrainian forces may strike Russian military objects “deployed just across the [Ukrainian] border,” suggesting that Ukraine may be prohibited from striking Russian military targets further in the rear or in other areas in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts that are still in range of GMLRS.[3] US officials’ statements also indicate that Ukrainian forces may be constrained from striking Russian military targets that are not actively involved in ground attacks and strikes against Ukraine.[4] The reduction of the sanctuary space’s area may be less than 16 percent, therefore.

The Biden Administration’s limited policy reversal permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike Russian military targets within Russian territory has removed at maximum only 16 percent of Russia’s ground sanctuary – a small area along the Russian-Ukrainian international border.

The US policy change, while a step in the right direction, is by itself inadequate and unable to disrupt Russian operations at scale. ISW assesses that the West maintains the ability to substantially disrupt Russian operations at scale by allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike Russia’s operational rear and deep rear areas in Russian territory.[5]

Likely Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Su-57 fighter aircraft at the Akhtubinsk Airfield in Astrakhan Oblast between June 7 and 8. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published satellite imagery on June 9 reportedly showing the Su-57 aircraft at the airfield on June 7 and damaged Su-57 following the strike on June 8 but did not explicitly claim responsibility for the attack.[6] The June 8 satellite image shows burn marks from an explosion, but the scale of the damage to the Su-57 is unclear from the provided footage. The GUR reported that Russian forces use the Su-57 aircraft to launch Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) have very few Su-57 aircraft in service. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that the GUR struck one of the six operational Su-57 aircraft and that Russian forces are constructing another six aircraft.[7] GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated that there may have been two Su-57 aircraft at the airfield during the June 8 strike and that the GUR is assessing battle damage.[8] Russian milbloggers seized on the June 8 strike to criticize the Russian military command for not constructing hangars to hide Russian aircraft from Ukrainian strikes and claimed that Russian forces could construct hangars at every military airfield in Russia for the cost of one Su-57 aircraft.[9] Su-57s cost an estimated $35 million.[10]

Ukrainian forces may have struck a Russian large landing ship or patrol boat in Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of June 8 to 9. Sky News reported on June 9 that a Ukrainian military source stated that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship in an unspecified location on the evening of June 8.[11] The source reportedly stated that Russian forces recently moved the ship from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov and that the ship is the fifth Ropucha-class ship that Ukrainian strikes have sunk or "rendered unserviceable." Sky News reported that the source stated that the strike shows that Russian forces "cannot operate with freedom" in the Black Sea and that the strike "thwart[ed] Russian shipments of ammunition and key military supplies" to unspecified locations. Ukrainian channel Crimean Wind and Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on June 9 that a Ukrainian drone struck a Russian ship near the port of Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of June 8 to 9.[12] Crimean Wind reported that satellite imagery from the morning of June 9 suggests that Ukrainian forces may not have hit a large landing ship but may have struck a Vasily Bykov-class patrol ship.[13] Crimean Wind reported that satellite imagery also shows an oil slick in the area that was not present in satellite imagery collected earlier. Ukrainian officials have not commented on the reported strike as of the time of this publication, and ISW cannot independently confirm the strike. Satellite imagery collected on June 5 indicated that Russia moved at least 18 naval vessels, including two Vasily Bukov-class patrol ships and an unspecified number of Ropucha-class landing ships, from the port in Novorossiysk, and some of the ships were reportedly sailing towards Crimea as of June 6.[14] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on June 7 that the Russian Navy likely transferred a large grouping of vessels to the Black Sea and Sea of Azov in order to reduce their vulnerability to Ukrainian drone strikes.[15]

The Kremlin's concerted effort to remove and arrest senior Russian defense officials may be extending to civilian regional administration officials. Russian authorities arrested Tyumen Oblast Deputy Governor Vyacheslav Vakhrin on June 9, Republic of Karelia Legislative Assembly Head of the Committee on Budget and Taxes Vitaly Krasulin on May 29, Oryol Oblast Gubernatorial Advisor Sergei Lezhnev on May 27, and Krasnodar Krai Deputy Governor Sergei Vlasov on May 24 for various fraud and bribery charges.[16] Russian authorities have detained at least five senior Russian MoD officials and former military commanders since late April 2024, and The Moscow Times reported on May 24 that these are the first of dozens or hundreds of anticipated arrests.[17] An unnamed acting Russian government official told The Moscow Times that the arrests could spiral into the largest effort to remove Russian military officials in modern Russian history.[18] Russian authorities may intend to use the guise of anti-corruption campaigns to conduct a large-scale removal of Russian defense officials and could easily replicate such efforts against civilian officials in Russian federal subjects.[19] Kaliningrad Oblast deputies proposed on June 9 to dismiss any Kaliningrad Oblast governors recognized as foreign agents, possibly another mechanism or informational justification that Russian authorities may try to use to remove officials from regional administrations.[20] The removal and arrest of regional officials comes amid an apparent effort by Russian President Vladimir Putin to remove from power the political and military figures that lost his trust in 2022 and 2023.[21] Putin may also seek to disempower regional officials who have lost his trust and rebalance which regional officials have his favor. Putin notably recently platformed St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), suggesting that Beglov may currently have Putin's favor despite his past controversies.[22]

The pro-Kremlin Moldovan Victory opposition electoral bloc held its second congress in Moscow on June 9 following a series of meetings between pro-Kremlin Moldovan opposition politicians and Russian officials from June 6 to 9. Russian state news agency RIA Novosti reported that politicians of the Victory electoral bloc discussed the October 20, 2024, Moldovan presidential election and referendum on Moldova's accession to the European Union (EU).[23] US-sanctioned Moldovan politician and Victory bloc founder Ilan Shor stated that he is confident that the Victory bloc can defeat Moldovan President Maia Sandu in Moldova’s October 2024 presidential election and will "use whatever methods are necessary" to accomplish this goal and free Moldova from the "pro-European bandits" who are currently leading Moldova.[24] Shor stated that the only way to "revive Moldova" is for Moldova to join the Kremlin-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and that the Victory bloc is working towards this. Chairperson of the Victory bloc's parliamentary group Vasile Bolea claimed that Moldova is becoming the second country to turn away from Russia - referring to Ukraine as the first - and that Moldova's pro-Russian opposition will resist this.[25] Kremlin-affiliated governor of Moldova's pro-Russian autonomous region of Gagauzia Yevgenia Gutsul stated that the Victory bloc held its congress in Russia because the Moldovan government is threatening Moldovan oppositionists and claimed that Moldova will be drawn into the conflict in Ukraine if Moldovans vote to join the EU.[26]

Gutsul also met with a series of Kremlin officials and Russian governors during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), further solidifying her connections to the Kremlin. Gutsul briefly met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on the sidelines of SPIEF on June 9 and emphasized Gagauzia's desire for greater cooperation with Russia.[27] Gutsul also met with United Russia State Duma Deputy Nikolay Valuev; Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) General Director Yevgeny Primakov; Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov; St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov; and several other regional officials on June 6, 7, and 8.[28] Gutsul also attended a panel on "traditional values" with veteran Russian propagandist and RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan on June 8.[29] Gutsul also claimed that she will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin again in the future despite pressure from the Moldovan government but did not specify a time frame for this meeting.[30]

Former pro-Russian Moldovan president and current head of the Moldovan Socialist Party Igor Dodon gave interviews to Russian state news agencies TASS and RIA Novosti on June 9 in which he promoted several known Kremlin narratives targeting the current Moldovan government – many of which Moldovan opposition politicians also promoted at the Victory bloc congress.[31] Dodon claimed that the Moldovan government is militarizing Moldova and preparing Moldova for the "Ukrainian scenario" by increasing Moldova's defense spending and cooperation with NATO. Dodon claimed that the upcoming Moldovan presidential election in October 2024 will be illegitimate and unconstitutional. Dodon called on Moldova to participate in Russia-led organizations such as the EAEU and the CIS. Dodon claimed that the Moldovan government is persecuting oppositionists like Gutsul and himself. Dodon claimed that Moldovan authorities may allow Ukraine to "destabilize" the Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria or may conduct "provocations" against Gagauzia in the future.

The Kremlin will likely try to exploit its ties to Dodon as part of its wider efforts to destabilize Moldovan democracy and influence the Moldovan government. Dodon claimed that Moldovan opposition parties must work together to defeat Sandu in the presidential election and noted that if Moldovan opposition parties do not unite behind a single candidate, there will be competition between them.[32] Dodon stated that the opposition's candidate should be a well-known person who is apolitical and not the leader of a political party but added that he may run for president if the opposition cannot agree on a candidate. Dodon stated that his relationship with Shor is "complicated" and that they have not communicated. Dodon stated, however, that they will need to cooperate as the "enemy of my enemy is my potential partner and friend." The Kremlin is likely aware that the Victory bloc's yet-to-be-announced presidential candidate has a lower chance of beating Sandu in the election if other major opposition parties, such as the Socialist Party that has a coalition with the Communist Party, also run candidates. Dodon's June 9 interviews demonstrate that Dodon understands that he will need to cooperate with Shor and the Victory electoral bloc but is currently reluctant to do so. Dodon reportedly has close ties to the Kremlin dating back to his time as president, and the Kremlin is highly likely exploiting its ties to Dodon in its overall efforts to influence the Moldovan election.[33] The parallels between the information operations that both the Victory bloc congress and Dodon promoted suggest a coordinated anti-Sandu effort. Dodon's public statements about his "complicated" relationship with Shor and his lack of cooperation with the Victory bloc so far suggest that the Kremlin, Dodon, and Shor have not yet agreed on a presidential candidate or electoral strategy, however.

Key Takeaways:

• The Biden Administration’s limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum. US policy still preserves at least 84 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary – territory within range of Ukrainian ATACMS.
• Likely Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Su-57 fighter aircraft at the Akhtubinsk Airfield in Astrakhan Oblast between June 7 and 8.
• Ukrainian forces may have struck a Russian large landing ship or patrol boat in Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of June 8 to 9.
• The Kremlin's concerted effort to remove and arrest senior Russian defense officials may be extending to civilian regional administration officials.
• The pro-Kremlin Moldovan Victory opposition electoral bloc held its second congress in Moscow on June 9 following a series of meetings between pro-Kremlin Moldovan opposition politicians and Russian officials from June 6 to 9.
• Former pro-Russian Moldovan president and current head of the Moldovan Socialist Party Igor Dodon gave interviews to Russian state news agencies TASS and RIA Novosti on June 9 in which he promoted several known Kremlin narratives targeting the current Moldovan government – many of which Moldovan opposition politicians also promoted at the Victory bloc congress.
• The Kremlin will likely try to exploit its ties to Dodon as part of its wider efforts to destabilize Moldovan democracy and influence the Moldovan government.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
• Russian officials continue efforts to coerce migrants into military service.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

A Ukrainian aircraft reportedly struck a Russian military target in Belgorod Oblast on June 9. Sky News reported that an unnamed Ukrainian military source stated that a Ukrainian fixed-wing manned aircraft struck a Russian command post in Belgorod Oblast with an unspecified weapon and that Ukrainian authorities are still clarifying the damage from the strike.[34] Sky News noted that this would be the first instance of a Ukrainian fixed-wing manned aircraft to strike a military target in Russia. Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows a fire at an unspecified building near Tsentralnoye, Rakityansky Raion, Belgorod Oblast, although the cause of the fire is unclear from the footage.[35] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov acknowledged that there was a fire at a non-residential building in Rakityansky Raion, but claimed that Russian air defenses downed several air targets over Belgorod Oblast.[36] Russian opposition outlet Astra stated that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot in Rakityansky Raion.[37]

Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 9 amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Hylboke (north of Lyptsi and Kharkiv City) and were preparing to counterattack in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) on June 8 and 9.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized several Ukrainian positions and advanced near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and launched an assault on the aggregate plant within Vovchansk.[39] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 8 that Russian forces have "failed" to successfully conduct their offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and that Ukrainian forces are continuing to strengthen their positions in this area.[40] US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan noted on June 9 that Russian forces have not made significant progress in northern Kharkiv Oblast in recent days.[41]

Ukraine-based open-source organization Frontelligence Insight stated on June 9 that it observed a small number of Russian units arriving near Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts and assessed that these troops are presently unable to achieve significant results if these units launched a ground attack into Ukraine.[42] Frontelligence Insight stated that the small Russian grouping would likely be able to achieve even fewer territorial advances on the battlefield than what Russian forces have already achieved in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces likely recently seized Ivanivka (southeast of Kupyansk) amid continued Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 9. Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Ivanivka, and Russian forces likely seized the settlement within the past week.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Vilshana (northeast of Kupyansk), southwest of Ploshchanka (northwest of Kreminna), and 200 meters near Novoselivske (northwest of Svatove).[44] A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army, Moscow Military District) advanced west of Holykove (north of Kreminna).[45] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 8 that Russian forces destroyed a river crossing over the Oskil River west of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[46] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, Synkivka, and Kyslivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Berestove, Andriivka, and Tabaivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske, Hrekivka, and Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Torske and Terny; and southwest of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area and Dibrova on June 8 and 9.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced south of Siversk amidst reportedly costly offensive operations in the area. Geolocated footage published on June 8 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced in fields southeast of Rozdolivka (south of Siversk), and a Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Rozdolivka.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 9 that Russian forces suffered casualties after conducting frontal assaults against Ukrainian positions near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) without accounting for Ukrainian artillery and drone operations in the area.[49] Russian forces also continued assaults southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on June 8 and 9.[50] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating south or southwest of Siversk in the Svyato-Pokrovske (west of Siversk) direction.[51]

Russian forces recently advanced in Kanal Microraion in easternmost Chasiv Yar and continued offensive operations in the area on June 8 and 9. Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced westward to an industrial area of Kanal Microraion, and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized the industrial area.[52] Russian sources also amplified footage purportedly showing elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division raising a flag over Kanal Microraion and claimed that Russian forces have seized most of the microraion.[53] ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming that Russian forces seized the industrial area, however. One Russian milblogger complained that many Russian milbloggers are portraying Russian advances in the Kanal Microraion as a sudden breakthrough, whereas these advances were a result of more than two months of systemic Russian offensive operations since April 2024 and more than two weeks of persistent Russian strikes using glide bombs and army-level TOS thermobaric artillery systems.[54] Russian forces also continued offensive operations in eastern Chasiv Yar near Novyi Microraion; north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, Andriivka, and Klishchiivka on June 8 and 9.[55] A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade stated that Russian forces are continuing to attack in the Bakhmut direction using small assault groups and occasionally use armored vehicles.[56] The spokesperson added that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a roughly company-sized Russian mechanized assault in the Bakhmut direction. ISW observed footage published on June 5 of Russian forces conducting mechanized assaults in the Chasiv Yar area that were at least platoon-sized and may have even been larger.[57] Elements of the Russian 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar; and elements of the Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] AC) are reportedly operating near Klishchiivka.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced west of Avdiivka and continued assaults in the area. Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Russian forces advanced in the fields north and northeast of Umanske (west of Avdiivka).[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued to seize new positions west of Umanske and advanced more than one kilometer in the Skuchne (west of Avdiivka) direction.[60] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the northern outskirts of Novopokrovske (northwest of Avdiivka) and into central Novooleksandrivka (north of Novopokrovske and northwest of Avdiivka).[61] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims. Russian forces launched assaults northwest of Avdiivka near Novooleksandrivka, Novoselivka Persha, Yevhenivka, Sokil, Ocheretyne, and Novopokrovske; west of Avdiivka near Karlivka and Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske on June 8 and 9.[62] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces are mainly conducting infantry assaults in the Pokrovsk (northwest of Avdiivka) direction instead of the up-to-company-sized mechanized assaults they used to conduct during previous offensive operations in the area.[63] The spokesperson added that Ukrainian forces are restraining at least three Russian brigades in the Pokrovsk direction and that Russian forces have manpower and artillery advantages. The spokesperson observed that Russian forces fire 400 to 500 artillery shells per night and use aviation before launching infantry attacks. Elements of the Russian “Atlant” Battalion of the Central Grouping of Forces (GoF) reportedly previously operated near Ocheretyne.[64]

Russian forces recently advanced west of Donetsk City and continued offensive operations west and southwest of the city on June 8 and 9. Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in southern Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), and additional geolocated footage posted on June 9  indicates that Russian forces seized some buildings in western Krasnohorivka.[65] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that fighting continued in Krasnohorivka; west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka; and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka and Kostyantynivka on June 8 and 9.[66] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces on motorcycles advanced 1.5 kilometers in the Vuhledar (southwest of Donetsk City) direction and seized a section of the Vuhledar-Kostyantynivka (O0532) highway.[67] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Solodke (southwest of Donetsk City).[68] Elements of the Russian ”Grachi” Spetsnaz Detachment and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka; and elements of the Russian ”Karia” detachment of the 68th Army Corps (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating in the south Donetsk direction (southwest of Donetsk City).[69]

Russian forces reportedly continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske, Urozhaine, and Zavitne Bazhannya (all south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 8 and 9.[70]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 9, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne).[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling to gain a foothold in northern Robotyne due to continued Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes.[72] Elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[73]

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky and on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta on June 9.[74] Select Russian milbloggers claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from Krynky, but other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in the settlement.[75]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukrainian Kharkiv City and Oblast officials stated on June 9 that Russian forces conducted a KAB guided glide bomb strike on Kharkiv City and damaged residential buildings.[76] Kharkiv City Council Deputy Bohdan Tkachuk stated that the Russian KAB strike was the first glide bomb strike against Kharkiv City since June 1.[77]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials continue efforts to coerce migrants into military service. Bloomberg reported on June 9 that Ukrainian and European officials assess that the Kremlin has forced thousands of migrants and foreign students to fight with Russian forces in Ukraine, specifically in recent offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[78] Bloomberg reported that a European official stated that Russian officials are increasingly threatening to not extend visas for African students and workers living in Russia unless they agree to fight with the Russian military.[79] The European official reportedly stated that these migrants and students suffer high losses in Ukraine because Russian forces use them in risky operations to conserve more highly trained units.[80] A Ukrainian official told Bloomberg that there has been an uptick in the number of foreigners among Russian military prisoners of war (POW) in Ukraine, with the majority being from Nepal or African countries.[81] Bloomberg noted that Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) General Director Yevgeny Primakov recently stated that there are 35,000 to 37,000 African students currently residing within Russia.[82]

Russian Deputy Head of the Ministry of Industry and Trade Viktor Yevtukhov claimed on June 9 that the Russian Navy will receive 50 new ships of various types throughout 2024.[83] Yevtukhov claimed that the incoming ships include small missile ships and support vessels and that the Ministry of Trade and Industry will pay great attention to producing frigates and corvettes since these ships can operate in the Far Sea Zone (naval areas not bordering Russia).[84] Ukrainian forces have conducted a successful strike campaign against Russia's Black Sea Fleet (BSF) since Summer 2023, and Russia may try to restore some of the Russian Navy’s lost capabilities.[85] The BSF has lost a significant number of vessels, including large amphibious landing ships, cruise missile carriers, and a Kilo-class submarine however, and Russia appears unlikely to replace these higher-end capability losses any time soon.[86]

Russian regional administrations continue to shoulder the Kremlin's crypto-mobilization efforts and involve other private entities to supply and train Russian young men. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Tatar-Bashkort service Idel Realii reported on June 9 that Perm Krai’s “Avangard” Military-Patriotic Education Center is offering 12 million rubles ($134,184) split into four contracts for providing food, accommodations, and basic military training grounds for recruits in Perm Krai in 2025.[87] The contracts reportedly state that Perm Krai seeks private entities to help young men (presumably Russian active reservists or students of Russian military-patriotic programs) "acquire the practical skills necessary... to quickly adapt to military service.”[88] Idel Realii reported that 90 to 120 recruits will attend five-day courses at the planned training camps and receive training instruction from four to five employees.[89] The quality of training at such ad hoc regionally funded and organized training facilities likely widely varies between different private entities tasked with training and supplying these men.

Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News amplified a video appeal from the relatives of mobilized Russian personnel from Republic of Bashkortostan on June 9 in which the relatives claimed that Russian commanders order wounded and untreated mobilized personnel to conduct assaults.[90] The relatives claimed that Russian authorities are currently detaining mobilized personnel from military unit 29601 for unspecified offenses and transfer the detained personnel to different operational directions in Ukraine for assaults.[91]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Voice of America's Bosnian Service and Bosnian investigative organization Detektor reported on June 8 that over 65 pro-Russian Telegram channels are spreading Russian propaganda justifying Russia's invasion of Ukraine in the Western Balkans and attempting to recruit Serbian, Bosnian, and Herzegovinian citizens into Russian volunteer units.[92] Detektor journalists reported that these channels appear to be pushing a clearly formed and orchestrated pro-Russian and anti-Western narrative. Voice of America's Bosnian Service noted that some of the most popular Telegram channels have between 50 and 100,000 subscribers and that these channels have connections with popular Russian milbloggers and media outlets, including the Kremlin-affiliated Rybar channel. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently met with the President of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) Milorad Dodik in St. Petersburg, and the pro-Russian Telegram channels operating in the Western Balkans are likely part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to destabilize the region.[93]

The Kremlin continued its reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western decision-making and undermining Western support for Ukraine on June 9. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed during an interview on Russian state television that the West is escalating the situation by allowing Ukraine to strike military targets in Russia with Western-provided weapons.[94] Lavrov claimed that the West is slowly escalating its war against Russia "step by step" and that Russia will decide how to respond to these hostile actions.

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova continued to criticize Russia's neighbors for perceived anti-Russian actions. Zakharova claimed during an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS on June 9 that Poland, Finland, and the Baltic countries are persecuting Russian citizens and Russian-speaking people by confiscating their documents and interrogating them.[95] Zakharova criticized Armenian Ambassador to Ukraine Vladimir Karapetyan for recently visiting Bucha and claimed that this was an "unfriendly step."[96] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger previously criticized Karapetyan for his recent visit to Bucha.[97]

Kremlin officials criticized Germany and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz for supporting Ukraine and for warning about a future conflict between the West and NATO. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 8 that Germany has "lack[ed] sovereignty" since the Second World War and is trying to balance pleasing the US, NATO, and the European Union (EU).[98] Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev criticized Scholtz for supporting Ukraine.[99]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias

[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2024; https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/30/biden-ukraine-weapons-strike-russia-00160731 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/05/30/nato-europe-us-weapons-ukraine-russia/ ; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-allows-ukraine-to-use-american-weapons-strikes-inside-russia/ ; https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/u-s-allows-ukraine-to-strike-inside-russia-with-american-weapons-72a3f8a1

[3] https://www.voanews.com/a/white-house-q-a-us-policy-evolves-with-threats-against-ukraine/7638583.html; https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/06/politics/austin-cnn-interview/index.html

[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2024; https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/30/biden-ukraine-weapons-strike-russia-00160731 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/05/30/nato-europe-us-weapons-ukraine-russia/ ; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-allows-ukraine-to-use-american-weapons-strikes-inside-russia/ ; https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/u-s-allows-ukraine-to-strike-inside-russia-with-american-weapons-72a3f8a1; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/29/us/politics/biden-ukraine-russia-weapons.html

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias

[6] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/vpershe-urazheno-su-57.html

[7] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/9864

[8] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/09/urazhenyh-litakiv-su-57-moglo-buty-dva-u-voyennij-rozvidczi-rozkryly-novi-podrobyczi-ataky/ ; https://suspilne dot media/764553-pid-cas-ataki-po-aerodromu-rf-ahtubinsk-mogli-uraziti-ne-odin-a-dva-litaki-su-57-gur/

[9] https://t.me/voenacher/67090 ; https://t.me/rybar/60774 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/17767 ; https://t.me/rybar/60781 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69949   ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44733 ; https://t.me/fighter_bomber/16998 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16155 ;

[10] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/26/7453103/

[11] https://news.sky.com/story/ukrainian-warplane-fires-weapon-at-target-inside-russia-for-first-time-13150251

[12] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/60987; https://t.me/andriyshTime/22898

[13] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/60995

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2024

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2024

[16] https://t.me/tass_agency/251084 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/251066 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/251087  ; https://t.me/severrealii/25199 ; https://karelia dot sledcom dot ru/news/item/1887421/; https://t.me/severrealii/25211 

 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/80994 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/81013 ; 

[17] https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/05/24/fsb-launches-sweeping-purge-of-military-elites-with-kremlins-approval-a85213

[18] https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/05/24/fsb-launches-sweeping-purge-of-military-elites-with-kremlins-approval-a85213

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052424

[20] https://www.newkaliningrad dot ru/news/briefs/politics/24095980-deputaty-predlozhili-dosrochno-otpravlyat-v-otstavku-gubernatorov-priznannykh-inoagentami.html?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=newkal

[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060524

[22] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74233 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024

[23] https://ria dot ru/20240609/gutsul-1951775195.html ; https://ria dot ru/20240609/moldaviya-1951792488.html

[24] https://ria dot ru/20240609/moldaviya-1951792488.html ; https://www.1tv dot ru/news/2024-06-09/478339-v_moskve_prohodit_vtoroy_s_ezd_oppozitsionnogo_moldavskogo_bloka_pobeda

[25] https://t.me/tass_agency/253755

[26] https://t.me/tass_agency/253765 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3351

[27] https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3350

[28] https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3346 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3340 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3305 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3300 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3267 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3272 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3278 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3295 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3295 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3306 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3312 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3323 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3328 ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3340

[29] https://t.me/evgheniagutul/3285

[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/25376

[31] https://tass dot ru/interviews/21049381 ; https://ria dot ru/20240609/dodon-1951705787.html

[32] https://tass dot ru/interviews/21049381 ; https://ria dot ru/20240609/dodon-1951705787.html

[33] https://www.rise dot md/articol/ruble-pentru-dodon/ ; https://www.rise dot md/articol/kremlinovicileaks/

[34] https://news.sky.com/story/ukrainian-warplane-fires-weapon-at-target-inside-russia-for-first-time-13150251 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/06/09/sky-news-ukrainskiy-voennyy-samolet-vpervye-porazil-tsel-na-territorii-rossii ; https://t.me/istories_media/6593

[35] https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1799780060498702786 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1799783598767342026 ; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1799782526342570375

[36] https://t.me/vvgladkov/7747 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/253726

[37] https://t.me/astrapress/57248 ; https://t.me/bletgorod/15257

[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11616 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69936 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47211 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16157 ; https://t.me/batalyon15/4356  ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44684 ; https://t.me/rybar/60772   

[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69936 ; https://t.me/rybar/60767

[40] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VULi4mx-oWk ; https://suspilne dot media/764195-zelenskij-pro-ppo-dla-ukraini-vze-e-domovlenosti-z-partnerami/

[41] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/jake-sullivan-national-security-adviser-face-the-nation-transcript-06-09-2024/

[42] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1799778098302656634

[43] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/8577; https://t.me/nebesnamara/78; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5766; https://t.me/c/1226880919/37181

[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11628 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11625 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/12023

[45] https://t.me/rybar/60767

[46] https://t.me/rybar/60767

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CgFjpSQVoUHNnJ8u84EC5y2ECH41aKabhna3y3A4A6PSNZYiYH2GGgLRy2zVhGfEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02cHrk8rtzeLbvHFbAg6QdqdjWbB5ACfcUjoaQoWXCMMaCoggMErRMqBfvS9oqkMUwl   ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qc6otLem28ouDc3WUw61EkE2S13EX1UqPmZ72drtXcUMT7u8vhiFF7edsrnLKUifl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hQoTT8vNJzJbbpQshZRsn3HfRTNegPZ2kDKKZeX5uRxdKCjJFyqQLB7uzxkZyMC2l  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01Ccw6QCJpNufNHm4EDdLtnjANirYebr5UhhPuVxb7yb3172T5y9m2mWcyq124uFDl; https://t.me/dva_majors/44684 ; https://t.me/rybar/60772 

[48] https://t.me/incognitogroup_live/102; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5767; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27013; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18032

[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/44684 ; https://t.me/rybar/60772 

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qc6otLem28ouDc3WUw61EkE2S13EX1UqPmZ72drtXcUMT7u8vhiFF7edsrnLKUifl  ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11644

[51] https://t.me/boevoj_dnevnik/21 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/9024

[52] https://x.com/small10space/status/1799754343484362969 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1799756992527143024; https://t.me/motopatriot/23716; https://t.me/motopatriot/23714; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27011

[53] https://t.me/rusich_army/15076 ; https://t.me/rybar/60779 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69929 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44704 ; https://t.me/batalyon15/4358; https://t.me/dva_majors/44684 ; https://t.me/rybar/60772 https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11633 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20385; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/12036

[54] https://t.me/motopatriot/23724

[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CgFjpSQVoUHNnJ8u84EC5y2ECH41aKabhna3y3A4A6PSNZYiYH2GGgLRy2zVhGfEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02cHrk8rtzeLbvHFbAg6QdqdjWbB5ACfcUjoaQoWXCMMaCoggMErRMqBfvS9oqkMUwl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qc6otLem28ouDc3WUw61EkE2S13EX1UqPmZ72drtXcUMT7u8vhiFF7edsrnLKUifl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hQoTT8vNJzJbbpQshZRsn3HfRTNegPZ2kDKKZeX5uRxdKCjJFyqQLB7uzxkZyMC2l; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18025; https://t.me/bahshiddemon/1143 ; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/rus/news/2024/06/9/7459929/

[56] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/09/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-okupanty-namagayutsya-borotysya-z-nashymy-dronamy-molytvamy/

[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2024

[58] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69948 (Chasiv Yar); https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126318 (Klishchiivka)

[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5768; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/457; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5769;

[60] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18033

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot/23752; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27015

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02CgFjpSQVoUHNnJ8u84EC5y2ECH41aKabhna3y3A4A6PSNZYiYH2GGgLRy2zVhGfEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZNURQXJYjyhvm12Wi5LSPvaJdBftkCY24temeF84cJ7fEwKEFHpQX2ECWRLcPw6Ll  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02cHrk8rtzeLbvHFbAg6QdqdjWbB5ACfcUjoaQoWXCMMaCoggMErRMqBfvS9oqkMUwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qc6otLem28ouDc3WUw61EkE2S13EX1UqPmZ72drtXcUMT7u8vhiFF7edsrnLKUifl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hQoTT8vNJzJbbpQshZRsn3HfRTNegPZ2kDKKZeX5uRxdKCjJFyqQLB7uzxkZyMC2l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01Ccw6QCJpNufNHm4EDdLtnjANirYebr5UhhPuVxb7yb3172T5y9m2mWcyq124uFDl ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/09/za-tyzhden-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vidbulosya-ponad-220-atak/; https://t.me/mod_russia/39547; https://t.me/mod_russia/39546; https://t.me/dva_majors/44684 ; https://t.me/rybar/60772; https://t.me/wargonzo/20385;  https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18033; https://t.me/motopatriot/23729; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27015; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/12023; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56818; https://t.me/motopatriot/23745

[63] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/09/na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-odna-ukrayinska-brygada-strymuye-try-vorozhyh/

[64] https://t.me/btr80/17561

[65] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/15847; https://t.me/inquisition59/153 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1799772581073178865; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18034

[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZNURQXJYjyhvm12Wi5LSPvaJdBftkCY24temeF84cJ7fEwKEFHpQX2ECWRLcPw6Ll ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02cHrk8rtzeLbvHFbAg6QdqdjWbB5ACfcUjoaQoWXCMMaCoggMErRMqBfvS9oqkMUwl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qc6otLem28ouDc3WUw61EkE2S13EX1UqPmZ72drtXcUMT7u8vhiFF7edsrnLKUifl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01Ccw6QCJpNufNHm4EDdLtnjANirYebr5UhhPuVxb7yb3172T5y9m2mWcyq124uFDl; https://t.me/dva_majors/44684 ; https://t.me/rybar/60772; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18031; https://t.me/wargonzo/20385; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18034;  https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18034

[67] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11642; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11626

[68] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27014

[69] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69953 (Krasnohorivka); https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69925 (south Donetsk direction)

[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01Ccw6QCJpNufNHm4EDdLtnjANirYebr5UhhPuVxb7yb3172T5y9m2mWcyq124uFDl; https://t.me/voin_dv/9026; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/12023

[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qc6otLem28ouDc3WUw61EkE2S13EX1UqPmZ72drtXcUMT7u8vhiFF7edsrnLKUifl  ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20385

[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/44684 ; https://t.me/rybar/60772 

[73] https://t.me/vrogov/16058

[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02cHrk8rtzeLbvHFbAg6QdqdjWbB5ACfcUjoaQoWXCMMaCoggMErRMqBfvS9oqkMUwl; https://t.me/dva_majors/44684  ;  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Qc6otLem28ouDc3WUw61EkE2S13EX1UqPmZ72drtXcUMT7u8vhiFF7edsrnLKUifl ;  https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/9859; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126400

 

[75] https://t.me/rybar/60767 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44684 ; https://t.me/rybar/60772   ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11634; https://t.me/wargonzo/20383

[76] https://t.me/synegubov/9921; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/1456

[77] https://www.youtube.com/live/W9_0Wjze5Ec?feature=shared ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/764219-9-cervna-golovni-novini-harkova-ta-oblasti-naslidki-udariv-rf/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/764571-rosia-vperse-za-ponad-tizden-vlucila-po-harkovu-kerovana-aviabomba-udarila-po-privatnomu-sektoru/

[78] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-09/russia-ukraine-war-africans-forced-to-fight-and-die-for-the-kremlin

[79] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-09/russia-ukraine-war-africans-forced-to-fight-and-die-for-the-kremlin

[80] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-09/russia-ukraine-war-africans-forced-to-fight-and-die-for-the-kremlin

[81] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-09/russia-ukraine-war-africans-forced-to-fight-and-die-for-the-kremlin

[82] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-09/russia-ukraine-war-africans-forced-to-fight-and-die-for-the-kremlin

[83] https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2024/06/09/23208265.shtml

[84] https://argumenti dot ru/army/2024/06/903438 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/126376

[85] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea

[86] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea

[87] https://www.idelreal.org/a/v-permskom-krae-potratyat-12-millionov-na-provedenie-sborov-po-obucheniyu-osnovam-voennoy-sluzhby/32985135.html

[88] https://www.idelreal.org/a/v-permskom-krae-potratyat-12-millionov-na-provedenie-sborov-po-obucheniyu-osnovam-voennoy-sluzhby/32985135.html

[89] https://www.idelreal.org/a/v-permskom-krae-potratyat-12-millionov-na-provedenie-sborov-po-obucheniyu-osnovam-voennoy-sluzhby/32985135.html

[90] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/19010

[91] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/19010

[92] https://ba dot voanews.com/a/proruski-telegram-bih-regrutovanje-dezinformacije/7647932.html

[93] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/41359 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74231

[94] https://t.me/MID_Russia/41461 ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1955159/

[95] https://tass dot ru/interviews/21052407

[96] https://t.me/tass_agency/253780

[97] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2024

[98] https://t.me/tass_agency/253724 ; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/2748

[99] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/501 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/253678 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/253676