Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 1, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 1, 2025

Davit Gasparyan, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel

March 1, 2025, 5:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on March 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Senior US officials are suggesting that the United States may cut all aid to Ukraine, although US President Donald Trump has not indicated any such intention. Cutting the current flow of aid to Ukraine would directly undermine President Trump’s stated goal of achieving a sustainable peace in Ukraine. The New York Times and Washington Post, citing unnamed senior Trump Administration officials, reported on February 28 that the Trump Administration is considering canceling all US military assistance to Ukraine, including any final aid shipments that former US President Joe Biden approved.[1]

Ukrainian forces, enabled by essential US assistance, are inflicting unsustainable losses on Russian forces while holding them to marginal gains. This situation, combined with the severe challenges Russia will face in 2025, offers the United States great leverage in peace negotiations. A suspension of ongoing US military assistance to Ukraine would encourage Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue to increase his demands and fuel his conviction that he can achieve total victory through war. ISW has repeatedly highlighted the importance of continued and timely Western military assistance to Ukraine and observed a correlation between the magnitude of the Russian gains in Ukraine and delays or halts in Western military support.[2] Ukrainian forces have leveraged US-supplied military systems, including Patriot air defense systems and HIMARS and ATACMS long-range strike systems, to defend against nightly Russian drone and missile strikes, enhance Ukraine's strike capabilities, complicate Russian logistics and command and control (C2), and disrupt Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian efforts, aided by the steady flow of Western aid, have significantly slowed Russian advances along the front, inflicted significant Russian personnel and equipment losses, and undermined Russia's efforts to project economic and domestic stability amid rising pressures from the war.[3] Russia's economic, force generation, and defense industrial constraints provide key opportunities that Ukraine, the United States, and its Western allies could leverage to extract concessions from Putin in peace negotiations.

The cessation of US military assistance and monetary assistance aimed at strengthening Ukraine's defense industry could help tip the balance of the war and give Russia greater advantages on the battlefield in Ukraine, increasing the likelihood of a Russian victory in Ukraine. Russia would leverage the cessation of US aid to Ukraine to seize more territory in Ukraine and attempt to exhaust European support – the approach Putin has outlined in his theory of victory.[4] Ending US aid to Ukraine and enabling further Russian gains would also embolden Putin and strengthen his belief that Russia can seize and control Ukraine and other former Soviet countries, including current NATO member states. The Kremlin will likely intensify its military campaign in Ukraine and attempt to exploit any delay or cessation of US military assistance to Ukraine - as the Kremlin did in Spring 2024.[5]

Curtailing aid to Ukraine would risk diminishing US influence in the world and emboldening US adversaries. Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have formed a bloc aimed at defeating the United States and its allies around the world and are currently testing the limits of US commitment to its allies in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region.[6] PRC President Xi Jinping stated during a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin in late February 2025 that the PRC and Russia are "true friends" who "cannot be moved away" from each other and will not be influenced by "any third party."[7] Russia established bilateral comprehensive strategic partnership agreements since the start of the war with the PRC in May 2023, North Korea in October 2024, and Iran in January 2025.[8] Putin continues to rely on Iranian drones and North Korean ballistic missiles and troops in his war against Ukraine.[9] US aid to Ukraine is a demonstration of the United States' commitment to defending democracies against ongoing and future aggression around the world, including but not limited to Ukraine, Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan. The Russia-led bloc will likely see the United States abandoning Ukraine as an indicator that the United States will abandon its other allies and will seek to test the limits of US commitment around the world. The Russia-led bloc is searching for easily exploitable divisions between the United States and its allies to isolate and weaken the United States on the global stage, allowing adversaries to rise up and dictate where and how the United States can engage the world. Cutting US aid to Ukraine plays directly into these adversaries' goals and is a step toward curtailing US influence in the world.

Putin, not Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, remains the main obstacle to a lasting peace agreement on Ukraine. Zelensky has continuously reiterated his commitment to obtaining a just and lasting peace in Ukraine through negotiations. Zelensky has indicated several times — including in his February 28 Fox News interview — that he is willing to make concessions on territory, Ukraine's NATO membership, and even his own tenure in office to secure a just and sustainable peace.[10] These concessions align with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's February 26 statement that "what Ukraine really needs is deterrence...to make it costly for anyone to come after them again in the future" and that both the United States and Europe "can be involved" in such deterrence efforts.[11]

Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have by contrast continuously reiterated their commitment to Putin's initial war aims in Ukraine, which amount to Ukraine's full capitulation, replacing the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government, and Ukrainian commitments to neutrality and demilitarization — all of which would leave Ukraine nearly helpless against future Russian aggression and destabilization efforts.[12] Putin and other Kremlin officials are repackaging these demands in efforts to appear willing to negotiate in good faith with the United States, likely to extract concessions from the United States regarding Ukraine.[13] Achieving a meaningful peace in Ukraine will require the United States and its allies to help Ukraine continue to inflict significant losses on Russia and to undertake a diplomatic and economic pressure campaign aimed at forcing Putin to abandon his insistence on full Ukrainian surrender and efforts to weaken Europe and the United States.

The Kremlin launched another informational effort intended to discourage additional US and European military assistance to Ukraine by claiming that Russia has won the war in Ukraine. Kremlin newswire TASS asked former Austrian Foreign Minister and current head of the St. Petersburg State University Geopolitical Observatory for Russia's Key Issues (GORKI) Center Karin Kneissl on March 1 if Russia has won the war in Ukraine.[14] Kneissl stated that "Russia has won in the sense that it was not defeated," "the [Russian] population supports the government," and "no one expected Russia to be so stable" after years of war. This new narrative is likely part of an ongoing rhetorical effort aimed at depicting Russian victory over Ukraine as inevitable in order to deter further Western military assistance and other support of Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) recently warned that the Kremlin was preparing to declare "victory" over Ukraine amid reports that the Kremlin had ordered Russian state media personalities to intensify narratives intended to fracture Ukrainian society and discredit Ukraine among Western allies.[15]

European countries remain committed to supporting the Ukrainian military and defense industry, however, amid preparations for a European defense summit about Ukraine on March 2. Norwegian company Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace President Eirik Lie announced on February 28 that the company, which produces NASAMS air defense systems, is establishing a joint venture in Ukraine.[16] Lie stated that the company's priority will be to "mass produce" NASAMS missiles using unspecified Ukrainian technology. European leaders expressed widespread support for Ukraine following Zelensky's meeting with Trump at the White House on February 28.[17] British Prime Minister Keir Starmer welcomed Zelensky to London on March 1 and emphasized that "[Ukraine has] full backing across the United Kingdom."[18] Zelensky will attend a European defense summit in London on March 2 to discuss peace plans in Ukraine and joint defense issues.[19] Leaders from France, Germany, Denmark, Italy, Turkey, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Finland, Sweden, Czechia, and Romania, as well as NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and European Council President Antonio Costa will attend the summit.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Senior US officials are suggesting that the United States may cut all aid to Ukraine, although US President Donald Trump has not indicated any such intention. Cutting the current flow of aid to Ukraine would directly undermine President Trump’s stated goal of achieving a sustainable peace in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces enabled by essential US assistance are inflicting unsustainable losses on Russian forces while holding them to marginal gains. This situation, combined with the severe challenges Russia will face in 2025, offers the US great leverage in peace negotiations. A suspension of ongoing US military assistance to Ukraine would encourage Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue to increase his demands and fuel his conviction that he can achieve total victory through war.
• Curtailing aid to Ukraine would risk diminishing US influence in the world and emboldening US adversaries.
• Putin, not Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, remains the main obstacle to a lasting peace agreement on Ukraine.
• The Kremlin launched another informational effort intended to discourage additional US and European military assistance to Ukraine by claiming that Russia has won the war in Ukraine.
• European countries remain committed to supporting the Ukrainian military and defense industry, however, amid preparations for a European defense summit about Ukraine on March 2.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to recruit medically unfit soldiers in an effort to address personnel shortages.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on March 1 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northwest of Sudzha near Lebedevka and north of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya, Viktorovka, and Novaya Sorochina on February 28 and March 1.[21]

A milblogger claimed on March 1 that elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) requested that Russian forces conduct an airstrike with a FAB-3000 against Guyevo (south of Sudzha) following reports of a FAB-3000 strike near Kurilovka (immediately north of Guyevo) on February 28.[22]

Russian forces continued to claim on March 1 that Russian forces are operating in northern Sumy Oblast near the international border.

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Zhuravka, Sumy Oblast (northwest of Sudzha and along the Sumy-Kursk Oblast international border), and another milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued fighting near Novenke, Sumy Oblast (immediately east of Zhuravka along the international border).[23]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Zhuravka.[24]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 28 and March 1 but did not make confirmed advances.[25]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 50 meters in Vovchansk and cleared part of the northern bank of the Vovcha River in the settlement.[26]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 1 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka, northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna, and southeast of Kupyansk near Novoosynove on February 28 and March 1.[27]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 1 that Russian forces advanced up to two kilometers along the Kindrashivka-Makiivka-Serebryanka (from northwest of Kupyansk to east of Lyman) line, while another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing toward Kindrashivka and expanding the bridgehead near the Oskil River.[28] Another Russian milblogger claimed on February 28 that Russian forces are advancing along the international border and northeast of Kupyansk near Stroivka and east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka.[29]  

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 1 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Lozova on February 28 and March 1.[30]

A Russian milblogger claimed on March 1 that Russian forces are conducting Shahed strikes against Kharkiv City and Borova and insinuated that Russian forces may be integrating Shahed strikes with ground activity.[31] ISW cannot independently confirm this claim and has not observed similar claims as of this publication.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 1 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna and northeast of Lyman near Nove, Novomykhailivka, Ivanivka, and Yampolivka on February 28 and March 1.[32]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 28 that Russian forces advanced west and up to 300 meters south of Yampolivka and continue to advance in the direction of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 1 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on February 28 and March 1.[34] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bilohorivka.[35]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances:  A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer southwest of Bilohorivka.[36]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Bilohorivka.[37]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 1 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked north of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka on February 28 and March 1.[38]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances:  A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky.[39]

A Russian milblogger claimed on March 1 that good weather conditions and intensified Ukrainian drone operations are complicating Russian activity near Chasiv Yar.[40]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including drone operators of the 215th Reconnaissance Battalion, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[41]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Krymske, Dachne, and Dyliivka; southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 28 and March 1.[42]

Assessed Ukrainian advances:  Geolocated footage published on February 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Tolbukhina Street and near the Tsentralna Mine (both in central Toretsk).[43]

A Russian milblogger claimed on March 1 that Ukrainian forces have a quantitative drone advantage near Toretsk and are actively conducting sabotage and reconnaissance missions near the Mine No. 10 waste heap in northwestern Toretsk, the Tsentralna Mine, the multi-story building block in central Toretsk, and near the Toretska Mine waste heap in northern Toretsk.[44] The milblogger characterized a considerable portion of Toretsk as a contested "gray zone" and postulated that Russian forces may transfer additional forces to Toretsk in order to reinforce the Russian force grouping in the area.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) and the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Ivanopillya (northwest of Toretsk).[45]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Pokrovsk direction on March 1 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacks northeast of Pokrovsk near Nova Poltavka; east of Pokrovsk near Baranivka, Yelyzavetivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novoukrainka, Nadiivka, Preobrazhenka, and Bohdanivka on February 28 and March 1.[46]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 433rd and 506th motorized rifle regiments (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near and within Uspenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[47]

Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, and Ulakly on February 28 and March 1 but did not make confirmed advances.[48]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction. Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne and Burlatske, north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne and Dniproenerhiya, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil on February 28 and March 1.[49]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 28 shows that Russian forces advanced south of Burlatske.[50]

Unconfirmed Russian claims: The Russian MoD claimed on March 1 that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) seized Skudne and Burlatske, following Russian milblogger claims since February 25 of seizing these settlements.[51] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced north of Burlatske.[52] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces also seized Pryvilne, but others claimed that Russian forces only reached the eastern outskirts and that fighting for the settlement continues.[53]

Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) recently replaced elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA) in fighting north of Burlatske.[54]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack southwest of Hulyaipole near Charivne on March 1 but did not make confirmed advances.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on March 1 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Pyatykhatyky and Kamyanske on February 28 and March 1.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 1 that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbaky.[57]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 1 that Russian forces seized most of Pyatykhatky.[58]  

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-11 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) reportedly continue to train in an unspecified near rear area in Zaporizhia Oblast.[59]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas in the Kherson direction on March 1 but did not advance.[60]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on February 28 to March 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 154 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[61] Ukrainian forces downed 103 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Odesa, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts, and another 51 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Shahed strikes damaged houses and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Odesa, and Cherkasy oblasts and Kyiv and Kharkiv cities.[62]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian MoD continues to recruit medically unfit soldiers in an effort to address personnel shortages. A Russian milblogger claimed on March 1 that Russian authorities are targeting vulnerable individuals, including those with alcoholism, developmental disabilities, and mental health disorders, through deception and coercion schemes to meet contract soldier recruitment quotas.[63] The milblogger also complained that Russian federal subject recruitment programs incentivize bringing another unwitting person to sign a military service contract and that the Russian MoD recently recruited at least one prisoner convicted of sexual crimes. The milblogger criticized the quality of these recruits and claimed that this is a systemic issue, and that the Russian military leadership is aware of and driving these issues. 

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/02/28/trump-presidency-news/#link-U4SPRIDWBNBPZBXDLEHMNTMD7E; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/28/us/politics/trump-ukraine-weapons.html

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-sustained-counteroffensive-denying-russia%E2%80%99s-prolongation-war; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/it%E2%80%99s-time-west-embrace-ukraine%E2%80%99s-way-war-not-doubt-it; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates-june-1-september-30-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2024

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine

[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/why-you-cant-be-iran-hawk-and-russia-dove ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-deepens-russias-ties-us-adversaries-us-russia-talks-begin 

[7] https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/24/china/china-xi-putin-call-trump-pivot-russia-intl-hnk/index.html

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-deepens-russias-ties-us-adversaries-us-russia-talks-begin ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032123 

[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-deepens-russias-ties-us-adversaries-us-russia-talks-begin

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020525; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025 ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/11/zelenskyy-europe-cannot-guarantee-ukraines-security-without-america; https://news.sky.com/story/zelenskyy-suggests-hes-prepared-to-end-ukraine-war-in-return-for-nato-membership-even-if-russia-doesnt-immediately-return-seized-land-13263085; https://www.foxnews.com/media/zelenskyy-speaks-out-after-public-spat-trump-vance-dustup-bad-both-sides  

[11] https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-with-brian-kilmeade-of-fox-news/

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2024; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66181; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/peace-is-impossible-while-vladimir-putin-denies-ukraines-right-to-exist/; ] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/russia-ukraine-so-called-referenda-in-the-occupied-territories-are-in-blatant-breach-of-international-law/; https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/30/europe/putin-russia-ukraine-annexation-intl/index.html; https://press.un dot org/en/2022/ga12458.doc.htm

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Ukraine%20Indicators%20Update.pdf ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66181 ; https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-lanned-ukraine-invasion-march-2021-vyorstka/32379171.html

[14] https://tass dot ru/interviews/23272449

[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2025

[16] https://www.euractiv dot com/section/defence/interview/diversify-supply-chains-build-stockpiles-work-with-ukrainian-tech-norways-missile-maker-says/

[17] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz9n5jq42pdo

[18] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg4k137ezlgo

[19] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg4k137ezlgo

[20] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/28/starmer-to-hold-talks-with-zelenskyy-and-meloni-before-ukraine-defence-summit

[21] https://t.me/wargonzo/25044; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33026; https://t.me/dva_majors/65662

[22] https://t.me/dva_majors/65696; https://t.me/swodki/465841; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/43865

[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/65662; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33025

[24] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33025

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031frKwcfzQKsFhG7kFj3hoVWG8FPvGbFatwKBLj8pEpH8CHiLWWGeHZCzPwjXpbzml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03QYWxT4KYWfPw79MaxFN1cb2UnhvYYTuR6scRxUJNmBiuHRrm2MZY3tyxdzHto4Tl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5872; https://t.me/synegubov/13298

[26] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24653

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03531YT22MEm2avWPoYc1UyfTQtQx3p3uH8vQqfZUfNVVEtS9HU67aa8fh2vshXsZRl ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20722 ; https://t.me/urazovo/21691

[28] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20722  ; . https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62516

[29] https://t.me/urazovo/21691 

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03531YT22MEm2avWPoYc1UyfTQtQx3p3uH8vQqfZUfNVVEtS9HU67aa8fh2vshXsZRl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031frKwcfzQKsFhG7kFj3hoVWG8FPvGbFatwKBLj8pEpH8CHiLWWGeHZCzPwjXpbzml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03QYWxT4KYWfPw79MaxFN1cb2UnhvYYTuR6scRxUJNmBiuHRrm2MZY3tyxdzHto4Tl ; https://t.me/synegubov/13298  ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5872

[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24650

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03531YT22MEm2avWPoYc1UyfTQtQx3p3uH8vQqfZUfNVVEtS9HU67aa8fh2vshXsZRl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031frKwcfzQKsFhG7kFj3hoVWG8FPvGbFatwKBLj8pEpH8CHiLWWGeHZCzPwjXpbzml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03QYWxT4KYWfPw79MaxFN1cb2UnhvYYTuR6scRxUJNmBiuHRrm2MZY3tyxdzHto4Tl

[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24629  

[34]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031frKwcfzQKsFhG7kFj3hoVWG8FPvGbFatwKBLj8pEpH8CHiLWWGeHZCzPwjXpbzml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03QYWxT4KYWfPw79MaxFN1cb2UnhvYYTuR6scRxUJNmBiuHRrm2MZY3tyxdzHto4Tl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5872 ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/24967

[35] https://t.me/tass_agency/303322

[36] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20722

[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24620

[38]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031frKwcfzQKsFhG7kFj3hoVWG8FPvGbFatwKBLj8pEpH8CHiLWWGeHZCzPwjXpbzml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03QYWxT4KYWfPw79MaxFN1cb2UnhvYYTuR6scRxUJNmBiuHRrm2MZY3tyxdzHto4Tl

[39] https://t.me/tass_agency/303313

[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/25044

[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24643

[42]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03531YT22MEm2avWPoYc1UyfTQtQx3p3uH8vQqfZUfNVVEtS9HU67aa8fh2vshXsZRl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031frKwcfzQKsFhG7kFj3hoVWG8FPvGbFatwKBLj8pEpH8CHiLWWGeHZCzPwjXpbzml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03QYWxT4KYWfPw79MaxFN1cb2UnhvYYTuR6scRxUJNmBiuHRrm2MZY3tyxdzHto4Tl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5872

[43] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1895541308405793150; https://t.me/b4_101/106 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1895497225389895965; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87072

[44] https://t.me/rybar/68454

[45] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13476

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03531YT22MEm2avWPoYc1UyfTQtQx3p3uH8vQqfZUfNVVEtS9HU67aa8fh2vshXsZRl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031frKwcfzQKsFhG7kFj3hoVWG8FPvGbFatwKBLj8pEpH8CHiLWWGeHZCzPwjXpbzml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03QYWxT4KYWfPw79MaxFN1cb2UnhvYYTuR6scRxUJNmBiuHRrm2MZY3tyxdzHto4Tl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5872

[47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32988  

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03531YT22MEm2avWPoYc1UyfTQtQx3p3uH8vQqfZUfNVVEtS9HU67aa8fh2vshXsZRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031frKwcfzQKsFhG7kFj3hoVWG8FPvGbFatwKBLj8pEpH8CHiLWWGeHZCzPwjXpbzml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03QYWxT4KYWfPw79MaxFN1cb2UnhvYYTuR6scRxUJNmBiuHRrm2MZY3tyxdzHto4Tl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5872; https://t.me/wargonzo/25044; https://t.me/dva_majors/65662

[49] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02n2qpHh8NDrHFEWm3Lv8UwP96FaUtecgDhL8sAqTj6ZMZyEnMwTZMa7mpR4YBChVSl; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87115; https://t.me/rybar/68442; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03531YT22MEm2avWPoYc1UyfTQtQx3p3uH8vQqfZUfNVVEtS9HU67aa8fh2vshXsZRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031frKwcfzQKsFhG7kFj3hoVWG8FPvGbFatwKBLj8pEpH8CHiLWWGeHZCzPwjXpbzml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03QYWxT4KYWfPw79MaxFN1cb2UnhvYYTuR6scRxUJNmBiuHRrm2MZY3tyxdzHto4Tl

[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8513; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5837

[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/49531 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/49533 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/49539; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025

[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33024

[53] https://t.me/rybar/68442; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87115; https://t.me/dva_majors/65662

[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33024

[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03531YT22MEm2avWPoYc1UyfTQtQx3p3uH8vQqfZUfNVVEtS9HU67aa8fh2vshXsZRl

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03531YT22MEm2avWPoYc1UyfTQtQx3p3uH8vQqfZUfNVVEtS9HU67aa8fh2vshXsZRl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031frKwcfzQKsFhG7kFj3hoVWG8FPvGbFatwKBLj8pEpH8CHiLWWGeHZCzPwjXpbzml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03QYWxT4KYWfPw79MaxFN1cb2UnhvYYTuR6scRxUJNmBiuHRrm2MZY3tyxdzHto4Tl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25044 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02n2qpHh8NDrHFEWm3Lv8UwP96FaUtecgDhL8sAqTj6ZMZyEnMwTZMa7mpR4YBChVSl

[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33010   

[58] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33010  

[59] https://t.me/mod_russia/49541

[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03531YT22MEm2avWPoYc1UyfTQtQx3p3uH8vQqfZUfNVVEtS9HU67aa8fh2vshXsZRl

[61] https://t.me/kpszsu/29719

[62] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/38944 ; https://t.me/synegubov/13292 ; https://t.me/idelrealii/40217 ; https://t.me/severrealii/29786; https://t.me/astrapress/75546; ttps://suspilne dot media/960049-rosia-atakuvala-dronami-harkiv-svitovi-lideri-pidtrimali-zelenskogo-pisla-peremovin-z-trampom-1102-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1740818328&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/4630 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02n2qpHh8NDrHFEWm3Lv8UwP96FaUtecgDhL8sAqTj6ZMZyEnMwTZMa7mpR4YBChVSl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24619 

[63] https://t.me/akashevarova/7822 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1895792595265339742