Papers and Special Reports

This page collects our papers and special reports from 2025. It is arranged in reverse chronological order. Papers and special reports from 2024 can be found here.

  • The Critical Importance of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast (August 12, 2025) — Kremlin officials are reportedly demanding that Ukraine cede to Russia strategically vital unoccupied territory in Donetsk Oblast and freeze the frontline in other areas as part of a ceasefire agreement. The surrender of the rest of Donetsk Oblast as the prerequisite of a ceasefire with no commitment to a final peace settlement ending the war would force Ukraine to abandon its "fortress belt," the main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014, with no guarantee that fighting will not resume.

  • Russian Drone Innovations are Likely Achieving Effects of Battlefield Air Interdiction in Ukraine - August 7, 2025 — The Russian integration of combined unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack tactics and adaptations is giving Russian forces important advantages on the battlefield in Ukraine and facilitating Russian advances on key Ukrainian towns. Russian UAV adaptations are likely achieving some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI): The use of airpower to strike targets in the near rear of the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term.


  • Iraq after the Israel-Iran War, June 13 - July 3, 2025 (July 3) — Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia actors failed to mount a coordinated military and political campaign against the United States in response to the US and Israeli air campaign in Iran between July 12 and 24.
 
 
  • A Primer on Russian Cognitive Warfare (June 30) — Cognitive warfare is a form of warfare that focuses on influencing the opponent's reasoning, decisions, and ultimately, actions to secure strategic objectives without fighting or with less military effort than would otherwise be required. Cognitive warfare is Russia’s way of war, governance, and occupation, and a model for China, Iran, and North Korea. 
 
  • The Strengthening China-Russia Nexus (June 9) — The Sino-Russian nexus has solidified against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine. Moscow and Beijing have both exploited the circumstances of the war to deepen their strategic entanglement, and it has therefore become strategically impossible to separate them at this time.
 
 
  • Hiding Russia’s Weakness (May 9) — The Kremlin is projecting the narrative of a powerful Russia and a powerful Russian President Vladimir Putin to conceal the real weaknesses and limitations of Russia's capabilities and distract from Russia's battlefield failures.
 
  • Far-Right Gains in Romania Could Advance Kremlin Objectives (May 5) — A far-right candidate, George Simion, won the first round of the May 4 presidential election in Romania. Simion's first round victory comes after another far-right candidate, Calin Georgescu, won the November 2024 first round presidential election that Romanian authorities later annulled due to likely Russian interference.

  • Putin is Still Stealing Ukrainian Children (March 24) — Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine over three years ago, aiming, among other things, to steal its children and dominate its people. Russia’s well-documented crimes against Ukrainian children, often recorded by the perpetrators themselves, are deeply connected to the war’s military and political outcomes. Any negotiations that ignore these deported children will only embolden Russia to continue its crimes with impunity.
 
  • Russia is Cautiously Optimistic Following the Zelensky-Trump Meeting (March 3) — The Kremlin is falsely portraying US peace efforts as supporting Russia’s goal of dismantling Ukraine’s sovereignty, despite no official change in US policy. Russian officials and state media are misrepresenting the Zelensky-Trump meeting to rally domestic support for the war and falsely claim that peace requires a Russian victory. Some Russian officials believe the US will soon cut military aid to Ukraine, which they see as a step toward Russia’s victory, while also promoting baseless claims that the US will remove Zelensky and shift policies that undermine European security.
 
  • Putin Deepens Russia’s Ties with US Adversaries as US-Russia Talks Begin (February 27) — Russia is strengthening ties with US adversaries while pretending to seek improved relations with the Trump administration. Moscow uses diplomatic engagements to spread Kremlin narratives on the war in Ukraine and relies on these partnerships to sustain its war efforts. North Korea’s ruling party sent a delegation to Moscow on February 25, highlighting Russia’s ongoing efforts to consolidate a bloc of America’s key adversaries.
 
  • Russia Has Failed to Break Ukraine (February 24) — In 2024, Russia committed vast manpower and equipment to major offensives in Ukraine, aiming to weaken Ukrainian defenses and capture the rest of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. While Russian forces made relatively faster gains than in previous years by using slow, tactical envelopments, they have been unable to regain the operational maneuver needed for significant breakthroughs.
 
 
  • Russia's Weakness Offers Leverage (February 19) — By expanding military support to Ukraine, the United States can leverage Russia's mounting challenges in 2025 to secure key concessions in peace negotiations. Sustained aid and battlefield pressure will force Putin to confront these issues sooner, strengthening the U.S. negotiating position and maximizing its interests.
 
  • Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russia’s War in Ukraine (February 11) — The Minsk II deal, intended to end Russia’s limited invasion in 2015, instead set the stage for the full-scale invasion in 2022 by allowing Putin to pressure Ukraine into conceding control over its internal policies. The United States must learn from this failure to avoid a flawed settlement that could lead to a direct Russia-NATO conflict and endanger American lives.
 
  • Ukraine’s Kursk Incursion: Six Month Assessment (February 6) — A small group of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast have complicated the Russian military's efforts to advance in Ukraine over the last six months.  The Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast is a partial proof of concept of how limited Ukrainian battlefield activity that leverages vulnerabilities in Russia's warfighting capabilities and that surprise is still possible even on a partially transparent battlefield and that rapid maneuver is possible under the right conditions.
 
  • The Russia-Iran Coalition Deepens (January 28) — Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally shifted and intensified the Russo-Iranian relationship. Tehran has leveraged Moscow’s growing material and financial requirements to sustain its war effort and support Tehran’s own domestic and foreign policy objectives.

  • Russia's Quiet Conquest: Belarus (January 15) — Russia is in the final stage of a long-term effort to de facto annex Belarus, strengthening its military and economic position to pursue revanchist goals against the United States and NATO. As the Kremlin transforms Belarus into a strategic enabler for Russian power projection, NATO must prepare for a future where Belarus functions as an extension of the Russian Federation, amplifying Moscow’s capabilities for future conflicts.