Key Takeaways
- Iran views the Adversary Entente as critical to its efforts to rebuild its military and prepare for future conflict.
- The Iranian military establishment has discussed acquiring Russian-made Krasukha-4 electronic warfare (EW) systems as part of its military reconstitution effort.
- Kremlin media praised the depth of the Sino-Russian economic partnership in advance of the Trump-Xi meeting to present their relationship as strong and indivisible.
- North Korea is placing greater emphasis on its strategic alignment with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia in its internal party discussions.
- Iran and the PRC are both trying to exploit the recent Israeli strike in Doha to undermine US partnerships in the Middle East.
Defense and Military-Technical Cooperation
Iran views the Adversary Entente as critical to its efforts to rebuild its military and prepare for future conflict. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet Defa Press published an article on September 15 discussing how Iran will benefit from an upcoming BRICS naval exercise.[1] BRICS, which is an international economic coalition comprised of the PRC, Russia, and others, was scheduled to conduct a combined naval exercise with Iran and others in November 2025, though BRICS has delayed the exercise indefinitely. This would mark the first combined exercise with Iranian participation since the Israel-Iran war. The Iranian article asserted that the exercise would help Iran develop “modern tactics” across multiple domains, test domestically produced weapons, and share weapons technology and intelligence with other exercise participants.[2] Indeed, combined exercises provide a controlled environment for militaries to test new tactics and equipment, enhance their interoperability, and learn from one another—all of which Tehran likely values heavily given its need to rebuild its military.
The Iranian discussion about the BRICS naval exercise came as Tehran has looked to the Adversary Entente for critical military and economic assistance. Iran has reportedly sought to buy advanced air defenses and fighter jets from the PRC and Russia in recent weeks.[3] Iran will need foreign help for the foreseeable future to reconstitute the damage that Israel inflicted upon Iranian air and air defense capabilities. Iranian officials and state media have separately emphasized in recent weeks the need to deepen economic cooperation with the PRC to withstand international sanctions.
The Iranian military establishment has discussed acquiring Russian-made Krasukha-4 electronic warfare (EW) systems as part of the Iranian military reconstitution effort. The AFGS-controlled outlet published an article on September 13 discussing efforts to strengthen Iranian air defense following the Israel-Iran war and focusing particularly on using Krasukha EW systems.[4] The Iranian military establishment has been very interested in improving its EW capabilities, particularly against the backdrop of the Russian war in Ukraine.[5] Iranian leadership has more broadly emphasized the need to improve domestic defensive capabilities since the June 2025 Israel-Iran war.[6] Russia developed the 1L269 Krasukha in 2010 as a ground-based EW system built to neutralize low earth orbit (LEO) spy satellites, ground-based radars, airborne surveillance radars, and radar-guided ordinance at ranges between 150 and 300 kilometers.[7] Russia deployed the Krasukha-4 to Syria in 2015.[8] Commander of US Special Operations Command General Raymond Thomas reported in 2018 that Russian EW attacks in Syria had disrupted communications, EC-130s, and other equipment.[9] Satellite imagery captured in January 2024 showed that Iran had deployed a Krasukha-4 system to Bandar Abbas.[10] Israel struck military targets at Bandar Abbas during the June 2025 Israel-Iran war, though it is unclear whether the Krasukha systems were impacted.[11] Israel used F-35s during its strikes into Iran, which are equipped with advanced counter-EW capabilities and can likely evade the Krasukha-4.[12] The Iranian military establishment may therefore be interested in new Krasukha-4 systems to defend against Israeli drone operations. Israel launched a wave of drones at the onset of its strike campaign in Iran to suppress air defenses and electronic countermeasures as well as to damage missile launchers.[13] Russia has used the Krasukha-4 EW system to defend against Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian military assets in the Russian rear and also explicitly credited the Krasukha-4 for the Russian ability to defend against Ukrainian ground-based counteroffensive operations in June 2023.[14] Iran is likely hoping to acquire the Krasukha-4 and integrate these operational lessons into future defensive operations against Israel.
Defense Industrial Base Cooperation
Nothing significant to report.
Economic and Financial Cooperation
Kremlin media has praised the depth of the Sino-Russian economic partnership in advance of the Donald Trump-Xi Jinping meeting to present Russia as an inextricable economic partner to the PRC. Kremlin newswire TASS has run several articles in recent days amplifying statements by Russian and PRC analysts emphasizing the strength of Russian-PRC economic cooperation. TASS similarly published an article on September 13 quoting the director of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Research Center at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, who claimed that Russia will become the “most important and most reliable supplier of energy” to the PRC with the start of natural gas supplies via the Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2) pipeline around 2031-2032.[15] These comments are especially notable because the PRC has historically refrained from establishing or advertising a reliance on any single partner for energy supplies.[16] Russia, the PRC, and Mongolia signed a memorandum of understanding on the construction of the PS-2 pipeline and its Soyuz-Vostok extension pipeline between Russia and the PRC through Mongolia on September 2, marking an inflection in energy relations between the two countries. Russian officials and media have eagerly celebrated the deal to emphasize the increased economic alignment between Moscow and Beijing.[17]
TASS separately published an interview with the PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry of September 15, wherein the ministry highlighted PRC efforts to work with Russia to develop Northern Sea Route infrastructure and deepen bilateral cooperation in the Arctic.[18] Russia and the PRC view the Arctic as a means of deepening sanctions evasion schemes, as ISW recently reported.[19] TASS’s amplification of the PRC statements on Arctic cooperation is likely to signal a coherent bilateral policy in this area—explicitly undermining Western sanctions against Russia and the countries supporting its war effort. TASS also posted an interview with a member of the Russian Customs Service public council, Alexander Degtyrev, on September 15, in which Degtyrev downplayed the decline in trade turnover between Russia and the PRC as a result of “the saturation of the domestic market” with PRC goods replacing Western products.[20] TASS also amplified several comments made by the PRC Commerce Ministry and PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian on September 15 opposing Western secondary sanctions against the PRC for its relationship with Russia and claiming that Russia and PRC trade and economic relations are not directed at, or influenced by, any other countries.[21]
The recent Russian media focus on Russian-PRC economic relations is likely meant to signal the unbreakable economic alignment between the two countries ahead of the Trump-Xi meeting. Trump recently suggested that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members should place high tariffs on the PRC due to its support for the Russian war effort—a statement that likely caused anxiety for Russia and the PRC and which will likely act as a motivator during Xi’s meeting with Trump.[22]
Political and Diplomatic Cooperation
North Korea is placing greater emphasis on its strategic alignment with the PRC and Russia in its internal party discussions. An unnamed North Korean source in Pyongyang told news outlet Daily NK that the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) has increasingly discussed its growing partnerships with the PRC and Russia in its internal messaging.[23] The source said that study sessions of party cadres focused on North Korean WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un’s calls to Central Committee officials for greater trilateral cooperation before his September 4 trip to Beijing, where he met with PRC President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The WPK’s emphasis on cooperation with the PRC and Russia in its political education reflects that Kim’s recent meeting with Xi and Putin goes beyond propaganda and represents a policy commitment by North Korea. North Korean state media have increasingly repeated Russian and PRC positions on international issues since Kim’s return from Beijing, further indicating that Pyongyang seeks to consolidate the tripartite relationship.[24] North Korea’s apparent enthusiasm to strengthen ties with the PRC and Russia comes amid indications that it is preparing to adopt a more active role on the international stage, including sending a higher-than-usual delegate to the current UN General Assembly session.[25] ISW assessed that Kim used his presence at the Victory over the recent Victory over Japan (V-J) Day parade in Beijing alongside Xi and Putin to undermine the international isolation of North Korea and position North Korea alongside the PRC and Russia as arbiters of their envisioned world order.[26]
Economic stability is likely a key motivation for the increased North Korean enthusiasm for cooperation with the PRC and Russia. Kim reportedly emphasized economic cooperation with the PRC in his remarks to Central Committee officials before visiting Beijing.[27] The South Korean central bank attributed North Korea’s recent acceleration in economic growth to closer cooperation with Russia.[28] North Korea and Russia are constructing the first road bridge between them, which will increase the flow of people and goods across the border.[29]
North Korean leaders likely see strengthening security ties with Russia and the PRC as a means to protect themselves from what they perceive as growing military cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. WPK Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Pak Jong-chon criticized ongoing US-Japan-South Korea military exercises as a “demonstration of nuclear war” on September 14.[30] North Korea’s ratification of a mutual defense pact with Russia in June 2024 demonstrated its focus on obtaining security guarantees, even as Kim Jong Un calls for developing nuclear and conventional forces.[31] The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged in May 2025 the possibility of Russian technology transfer to aid North Korean missile development.[32]
Iran and the PRC are both trying to exploit the recent Israeli strike in Doha to undermine US partnerships in the Middle East. They are specifically trying to discredit the United States as a reliable security guarantor to the Gulf States by leveraging their frustration toward Israel.[33] Iranian officials have consistently condemned the Israeli airstrike as a violation of international law and portrayed it as a direct threat to the security of the Gulf states.[34] Iranian officials have also misrepresented the degree of US knowledge of the Israeli strikes since September 9, even though US officials reportedly lacked the warning required to discourage Israel from attacking.[35] Iran is likely trying to divide the United States from its regional partners and help build a regional consensus against Israel, which risks disrupting the Abraham Accords.[36]
The PRC is also attempting to discredit the United States in response to the Israeli strike, but this effort does not appear coordinated with Iran. PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian claimed that the Israeli strike was a deliberate effort to undermine Gaza ceasefire negotiations and claimed that the strike is a threat to regional security.[37] PRC state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) highlighted the strikes in its coverage and featured several reports and speakers claiming that the United States had advance warning of the strikes.[38] One CCTV commentator claimed that, even if the United States had little warning of the Israeli strike, “the clear judgment [the PRC] is seeing” is that the United States did not attempt to stop the strike.[39] This is consistent with prior PRC efforts to undermine US influence in the Middle East, particularly among the Gulf states, and the PRC likely aims to expand its own influence among the Gulf states at US expense.[40] These PRC efforts come amid ongoing PRC-US negotiations in Europe and expected negotiations between US President Donald Trump and PRC President Xi Jinping in the coming days.
The Russian response to the Israeli strike breaks with the Iranian and PRC narratives, likely to avoid drawing ire from the United States. The Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry condemned the Israeli strike, and Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed that Israel conducted the strike despite the “repeatedly declared interest of the United States. . . in the negotiations between Israel and Hamas being crowned with success.”[41] Lavrov proceeded to praise the US role in efforts to peacefully resolve the war in Ukraine.[42] These Russian statements do not blame or implicate the United States for the Israeli strike or portray the United States as an unreliable security guarantor in the Middle East, as the Iranian and PRC responses have. The Kremlin likely seeks to avoid generating friction with the Trump administration, as the United States and European countries consider additional sanctions against Russian energy exports and secondary sanctions against countries that purchase Russian energy exports.[43] Russia is reliant on revenues from its energy exports to continue its war in Ukraine and maintain the facade of economic strength under existing Western sanctions.[44] The Russian need to balance diplomatic relations with the United States remains a point of divergence from the Iranian and PRC efforts to undermine US influence in the Middle East. This narrative divergence will not necessarily undermine Russia’s relations with other members of the Adversary Entente, however, as each state is pursuing its own objectives in its responses.
[1] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/777172/%D9%87%D9%85%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%E2%80%8C-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D8%AC%D9%88%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8
[2] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/777172/%D9%87%D9%85%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%E2%80%8C-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%B3-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D8%AC%D9%88%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-september-10-2025/ ; https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Europe-Triggers-Iran-Sanctions-Snapback.html ;
[4] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/775757/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2025/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-4-2025/
[7] https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/f039dd3d04fa0226088d1257319579a7
[8] https://thedefensepost.com/2018/05/01/russia-syria-electronic-warfare/
[9] https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/09/opinions/syria-electronic-warfare-russia-nato
[10] https://nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/op61-RSI_Russia-Iran_Notte-Lamson_CNS-Occasional-Paper.pdf
[11] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/article-858489 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936499900335951967 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/23436
[12] https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/product/an-asq-239-f-35-ew-countermeasure-system
[13] https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/12/middleeast/israel-iran-strikes-intl-hnk
[14] Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 24, 2024 | Institute for the Study of War ; Russian20Offensive20Campaign20Assessment2C20June20152C20202320PDF.pdf
[15] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/25045195
[16] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/The20Strengthening20China-Russia20Nexus.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-august-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-2-2025/
[17] https://www.interfax dot ru/business/1045247
[18] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/25057621
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-september-10-2025/
[20] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/25055749
[21] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/25059883; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/25058469; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/25057909
[22] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115196697263809382; https://interfax dot com/newsroom/top-stories/113563/; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24935697; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-china-bless-vast-new-power-siberia-2-pipeline-gazprom-says-2025-09-02/
[23] https://www.dailynk dot com/20250910-1/
[24] https://www.yna dot co.kr/view/AKR2025091609=19100504?section=nk/news/all
[25] https:// www.yna dot co.kr/view/AKR20250908156500504? section=nk/news/all
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-september-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-september-3-2025/
[27] https://www.dailynk dot com/20250910-1/
[28] https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/north-koreas-economy-grows-at-fastest-pace-in-eight-years-bok-report/
[29] https://www.nknews.org/2025/09/putin-stresses-importance-of-new-border-infrastructure-linked-to-north-korea/
[30] https://www.yna dot co.kr/view/MYH20250914000300038?section=nk/video/index
[31] https://www.yna dot co.kr/view/AKR20250913033800504?section=nk/news/all
[32] https://en.yna dot co.kr/view/AEN20250519004200315
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-12-2025/
[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-12-2025/; https://t.me/alakhbar_news/62616 ; https://x.com/IRIMFA_EN/status/1965503736056610964 ; https://x.com/IRIMFA_EN/status/1965877098200891454 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/776526/ ;https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/244406/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/20/3397082/
[35] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/21/3397362/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/20/3397082/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/19/3396792 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/21/3397316/; https://x.com/IRIMFA_EN/status/1965503736056610964 ; https://x.com/IRIMFA_EN/status/1965877098200891454; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-12-2025/
[36] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-12-2025/
[37] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-condemns-israel-strike-doha-concerned-about-escalation-2025-09-10/; https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202509/t20250910_11705822.shtml;
[38] https://tv.cctv dot com/2025/09/11/VIDE6rA4sdiXxGtMY9DC2DfC250911.shtml?spm=C45404.PlcSaTuIQb0E.ENSvHePEGND5.58 ; https://tv.cctv dot com/2025/09/11/VIDE1VyYGRPqOkINpDAjTy17250911.shtml?spm=C45404.PlcSaTuIQb0E.ENSvHePEGND5.96 ; http://www.news dot cn/world/20250910/8225d42afedc4d37988378f064ad1439/c.html
[39] https://tv.cctv dot com/2025/09/11/VIDE6rA4sdiXxGtMY9DC2DfC250911.shtml?spm=C45404.PlcSaTuIQb0E.ENSvHePEGND5.58 ; https://tv.cctv dot com/2025/09/11/VIDE1VyYGRPqOkINpDAjTy17250911.shtml?spm=C45404.PlcSaTuIQb0E.ENSvHePEGND5.96 ;
[40] https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/trump-sends-message-gulf-no-longer-chinas-playground-zineb-riboua; https://gulfif.org/caught-between-giants-how-the-gcc-states-can-navigate-the-u-s-china-trade-dispute/; https://www.brookings.edu/articles/forecasting-chinas-strategy-in-the-middle-east-over-the-next-four-years/; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/chinas-middle-east-policy-shift-from-hedging-to-wedging/
[41] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2046350/; https://t.me/MID_Russia/65289
[42] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2046350/;
[43] https://www.reuters.com/world/eus-19th-russia-sanctions-package-delayed-trump-applies-pressure-2025-09-16/; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c62zxp1y5lwo; https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-russia-new-sanctions-proposals-trump-oil-purchases/33530878.html; https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/12/europe/russia-ukraine-peace-talks-paused-kremlin-intl
[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-september-10-2025/; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AETF%20Update%2C%20July%202%2C%202025%20PDF.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-august-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-august-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2025/
