Toplines

Note: This weekly update is truncated due to the Thanksgiving holiday. Normal publication scheduling will resume the week of December 1.

Reuters reported that PLA experimented with multiple types of civilian vessels in amphibious landing exercises in July and August 2025 to enhance its limited sealift capacity.[1] The exercise featured six roll-on, roll-off (RORO) ships and six deck cargo ships, both of which could support landing military vehicles at beaches. Satellite imagery from BlackSky Technology showed the cargo ships unloading vehicles onto a beach without using port facilities. The imagery also showed amphibious landing crafts approaching the beach. The PLA has used RORO ships to launch amphibious landing craft in past exercises, though the satellite imagery in this instance did not reveal which ships launched the craft.[2] The exercise separately included what Reuters assessed to be a self-propelled temporary pier system, which first debuted in 2021.

This activity reflects continued PRC preparations for a possible invasion of Taiwan. This is the first known instance of the PLA using civilian cargo ships to unload vehicles onto a beach in an exercise. The PRC debuted large barges with extendable piers that can offload vehicles and support amphibious landings in March 2025.[3]

The PLA has an estimated capacity to simultaneously move around 20,000 troops across the Taiwan Strait, which is well below the number that the PLA would require to invade Taiwan.[4] The PLA would likely need between 300,000 to over a million troops as well as their equipment in multiple waves of landings to seize control of Taiwan. Naval analyst Thomas Shugart estimated in 2022 that the PLA could increase its sealift capacity to 60,000 troops using RORO ships.[5] This estimate does not account for the other civilian vessels that could support an amphibious landing. CDOT-ISW cannot determine at this time exactly how many PRC commercial vessels could support amphibious operations. The PRC could likely expand its inventory of relevant civilian vessels further due to its immense shipbuilding industry.

Such civilian vessels are highly vulnerable, however, especially to the inexpensive, expendable weapons systems that Taiwan has prioritized acquiring. RORO and deck cargo ships do not have the same protection that the PLA vessels have. They will be especially vulnerable as they approach Taiwanese beaches, as they would enter the range of numerous short-range weapons systems and would be forced to cluster together due to the small number of viable landing sites in Taiwan. The sheer volume of civilian vessels that the PRC could deploy would still present a serious challenge to Taiwan, however, even if Taiwanese forces can destroy many of them.

Taiwan has focused on developing its drone capabilities in collaboration with foreign partners and establishing friendly supply chains to procure drones. Senior Taiwanese Foreign Affairs Ministry official Jiang Zhenwei announced on November 20 the establishment of a “drone diplomacy” initiative to bolster cooperation between the drone industries of Taiwan and partner countries. Jiang said that the initiative is meant to facilitate drone testing and training in Taiwan and deepen supply chain cooperation.[6] This comes after a senior Taiwanese delegation attended the Warsaw Security Forum in September 2025 to discuss growing defense cooperation between Taiwan and European states, especially regarding drones.[7]

Taiwan has separately worked to bolster its military resilience and readiness. Taiwanese officials inaugurated a new low-earth-orbit satellite training base on November 20. This helps Taiwan enhance communications redundancy, especially as the PRC has threatened to cut Taiwanese undersea cables.[8]

The Taiwanese National Defense Ministry separately announced sweeping command changes, which are likely part of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s effort to modernize the Taiwanese military and increase defense spending. Taiwanese media reported that the command changes affected around 40 senior officers and three Army corps.[9] Liu Jen-yuan, who is currently the Presidential Strategic Adviser and former Air Force commander, will replace Pai Hung-hui as deputy national defense minister as well.[10]

Some personnel changes reflect the National Defense Ministry emphasis on convincing the Legislative Yuan (LY) to increase defense spending. The ministry filled the position of Public Relations Office director, which has been vacant for around a year and is responsible for interfacing between the ministry and LY.[11] Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Chen Chien-Yi stayed in his position unexpectedly, which is notable since he has been helping convince the LY to increase defense spending.[12]

The CCP has further escalated its pressure against Japan in response to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi saying that a war over Taiwan could threaten Japanese security. The CCP is trying to coerce Takaichi into retracting her statement and deter other countries from tying their security to that of Taiwan. The PRC postponed a trilateral summit with the Japanese and South Korean cultural ministers in Macao that was scheduled for November 24 and blamed Takaichi for the diplomatic tensions.[13] PRC authorities and private organizers have separately cancelled or postponed several Japanese movies and concerts featuring Japanese artists.[14] PRC Premier Li Qiang refused to meet with Takaichi on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Johannesburg from November 22 to 23 despite Japanese officials expressing openness to bilateral engagement.[15] The PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson said that Takaichi must retract her statement as a prerequisite to dialogue.[16] This activity comes as the CCP has imposed other forms of diplomatic, military, and economic pressure on Japan in recent days.[17]

The CCP has suggested that it could impose further pressure unless Takaichi retracts her statement. The PRC Commerce Ministry threatened additional economic measures.[18] The PRC embassy in Japan posted on X on November 21 that it has the right to take military action against Japan without United Nations  Security Council approval, citing the enemy state clauses of the UN Charter.[19] The embassy ignored the fact that the UN General Assembly determined that the enemy state clauses were obsolete in 1995.[20] Such rhetoric is meant to intimidate Tokyo rather than an indication that the PRC is preparing to attack Japan.

The CCP coercion of Japan could undermine US influence in the Indo-Pacific. The CCP seeks to demonstrate its ability to impose tremendous pressure on states that align with the United States and Taiwan. This pressure could impede US efforts to build a coalition of partners that promote regional stability and constrain PRC aggression. The CCP may be emboldened to use coercion more aggressively against the United States and its regional partners in the future if it concludes that its pressure against Japan has been effective.

PRC state media signaled support for independence movements on Japan’s Ryukyu islands as part of the CCP coercion of Tokyo. The state-run Global Times published an editorial on November 19 arguing for “Ryukyu Studies” at PRC universities, noting that Fujian Normal University recently launched the first-ever Ryukyu Studies program in the PRC.[21] The op-ed called on the state to include such studies in its “endangered disciplines” program, which is an initiative to promote declining academic fields across the country. The op-ed emphasized the historical connection between the PRC and Ryukyu islands and rejected Japanese control of the territory.[22] The op-ed also suggested that the United States and Japan are preparing to involve the Ryukyu islands in a potential military conflict against the PRC.[23] Another PRC outlet framed the discussion about the independence of the Ryukyu islands as connected to Takaichi’s comments about Taiwan.[24]

This PRC rhetoric threatens Japanese sovereignty and may be part of a long-term effort to erode Japanese control of the Ryukyu islands. PRC officials and state media have long questioned Japanese control of the islands during previous periods of heightened tensions between Beijing and Tokyo. Nevertheless, PRC universities launching Ryukyu Studies programs could set informational conditions, especially legal conditions, over the long term for the CCP to undermine Japanese territorial integrity and fuel secessionist sentiments on the archipelago. The PRC has previously used historical maps and archeological evidence from past Chinese polities to support legal arguments for its claims to disputed features in the South China Sea.[25] That could in turn jeopardize the US military position in the Indo-Pacific, as the United States maintains a significant force presence at Okinawa in the Ryukyu islands.[26] Recent polls indicate that around 70 percent of Okinawans are dissatisfied with the heavy US military presence there but only around three percent support independence from Japan.[27]

The PRC expressed objections to Japan’s export and deployment of missiles. Japan exported domestically produced Patriot surface-to-air missile interceptors to the United States for the first time since Japan loosened export restrictions in 2023.[28] Japan was only permitted to export components of foreign-licensed defense products prior to the 2023 revision. The United States requested the export to replenish its stockpile, which was used to provide systems to Ukraine. Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi also confirmed that Japan will advance plans to deploy medium-range surface-to-air missiles to Yonaguni Island, which is 110 kilometers east of Taiwan.[29] Plans to deploy Type 03 Chu-SAMs were originally proposed by former Defense Minister Gen Nakatani in January 2025, which will further reinforce Japan’s southwestern islands.[30]

Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning accused Japan of accelerating its rearmament by exporting offensive weapons and seeking to facilitate nuclear technology sharing.[31] Mao claimed that right-wing forces in Japan are violating the pacifist constitution.[32]