This study provides an assessment of how different rebel groups perceive Syrian al-Qaeada affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra in the context of ongoing military cooperation against both the Assad regime and ISIS. This assessment seeks to inform the development of policy to separate the Syrian opposition from Jabhat al – Nusra in Syria. Russia’s intervention in Syria may drive Syrian opposition groups closer together rather than separating moderates and extremists, because Russia considers all opposition groups illegitimate and is likely to target them indiscriminately. Such actions would contravene U.S. stated policy goals and interests.
A majority of Syrian rebel groups cooperate closely with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al- Nusra out of military necessity. These groups would in many cases succumb to the Syrian regime or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) without Jabhat al-Nusra’s support. Many Syrian rebel groups also collaborate with Jabhat al-Nusra on governance, providing a vehicle for Jabhat al-Nusra’s agenda to transform Syrian society into an Islamic Emirate that is responsive to the broader goals of al-Qaeda. Syrian rebel groups are therefore generally both unable and unwilling to challenge Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria in the near term. Jabhat al-Nusra’s influence enables it to shape the battlefield against U.S. interests, for example by attacking moderate Syrian rebel groups that partner with the U.S. Some groups are likely willing to challenge Jabhat al-Nusra, however. Others will require an incentive to do so. Still others will resist attempts to separate them from Jabhat al-Nusra, and some of these are genuinely irreconcilable. The following assessment examines major rebel groups in each of Syria’s provinces and categorizes them based on their assessed perspectives on Jabhat al-Nusra.
