By Sinan Adnan and Jessica Lewis McFate
Key Take-away: ISIS is re-establishing its former strength in Diyala province, and security in the province is deteriorating. This resurgence is likely the result of security gaps left by the forward deployment of Diyala-based Iranian proxy groups, mostly the Badr Organization, and forces from the 5th Iraqi Army division to areas in Salah ad-Din and Anbar. ISIS is likely exploiting this gap in order to compromise ISF and militia operations in Anbar province, diverting attention to Diyala and threats near the Iranian border. If the ISF and Shi’a militias cannot secure Diyala while maintaining their operations in Anbar, Iran may become more involved in Iraq to secure its own border.
ISIS has re-established itself in Diyala province causing a rapid deterioration in security and an increase in sectarian tension in the highly mixed province. The resurgence of ISIS in Diyala sheds light on security gaps caused by the deployment of Diyala-based Iraqi Security Force (ISF) units and Iranian proxy groups to Salah ad-Din and Anbar, other flashpoints along the frontline in the war against ISIS in Iraq. Recent calls from Diyala officials for the redeployment of Diyala’s security elements back to their home stations underscore competing requirements for the ISF across multiple fronts. It may additionally reveal inconsistencies in the campaign priorities of Iranian proxy groups and those of the ISF. Diyala province borders Iran, and a resurgence of ISIS in Diyala may cause Iranian proxy groups like the Badr Organization to shift resources back to Diyala from Anbar, the current campaign objective of both anti-ISIS contingents. The leader of the Badr Organization, Hadi al-Ameri, is publically recognized by the Diyala Provincial Council as the head of Diyala’s overall security, even though the Dijla Operations Command of the ISF is also based there. Diyala’s provincial government is also led by a Badr Organization member, increasing the likelihood that recent attacks by ISIS in Diyala will shift Badr’s attention to Diyala and away from Iraq’s national anti-ISIS campaign.
Background
The presence of ISIS in Diyala in 2015 is not a new phenomenon. The organization and its predecessor, -Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) were active in the province throughout the last decade. Former leader of AQI, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was personally based in Hib Hib, west of Baquba, suggesting that Diyala played a central rather than peripheral role in AQI’s national campaign. The footprint of AQI decreased following major operations of U.S. and Iraqi forces during the “Surge” between June and November 2007. During the resurgence of AQI in 2012, however, AQI’s signature VBIED attacks returned to Diyala, suggesting that AQI had reconstituted former support zones along the Hamrin Ridge and had become operational in the province once more. In November 2013, AQI, which had re-branded itself as ISIS, launched a complex attack involving three suicide bombers, two VBIEDs, and IEDs targeting the Police Headquarters in Baquba. This event indicated that ISIS had developed a more sophisticated attack capability, already witnessed elsewhere in Iraq with successful prison breaks in Abu Ghraib and Tikrit, and this capability was also present in Diyala.
Most indicators of ISIS’s activity in Diyala in 2012-2013 appeared concentrated north of the city of Muqdadiyah, a historic AQI support zone. In March 2014, however, ISIS launched an urban assault and briefly took control of central Buhriz, south of Baquba. The attack occurred two months after ISIS attacked Fallujah and Ramadi in Anbar province and three months before ISIS seized Mosul and many other northern cities, including cities in northern Diyala like Jalula and Sadia. This early attempt to capture urban terrain in Diyala’s heartland not only marked a shift in the operations of ISIS in Diyala from terrorist attacks to urban maneuvers, but it also shed light on a security gap in the province at the time. Of note, Badr forces that had been assisting the Assad regime in Syria in 2013 were absent from Diyala at the time. Badr’s veteran forces returned in June 2014 from Syria, where they had been augmenting the Assad regime along with a number of other Iranian proxy groups, reflecting a shift in Iran’s theater priorities from Syria to Iraq after the fall of Mosul. Diyala’s security in particular directly affects Iranian homeland security, as Diyala province shares a 197 km border with Iran.
The convergence of security forces upon Diyala after June 2014 created a unique security dynamic. The official military body responsible for security in the province is the Dijla Operations Command (DOC), comprised of the 5th Iraqi Army (IA) division and local and Federal Iraqi Police. However, Diyala is also a home base of a prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militia, the Badr Organization, which has been operating as an Iranian proxy since the 1980s. The leader of the Badr Organization, Hadi al-Ameri is also a native of Diyala. Following the collapse of several ISF units in northern Iraq in June 2014, the power of DOC essentially transferred to Ameri personally following his official appointment by the local government as head of Diyala security in June 13, 2014. The appointment of another Badr leader as the governor of Diyala a year later in May 2015 would enforce the authority of Ameri over Diyala’s security forces, most evident in July 2015 after recent attacks by ISIS in Diyala.
Between June 2014 and January 2015, Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias such as
