By Jennifer Cafarella
Key Takeaway:Turkey’s President Erdogan is trying to coerce President Trump into shiftingAmerican support from Kurdish forces toward Turkey’s proxies in Syria, whichinclude al Qaeda-linked elements. Erdogan may launch a new ground operationinto Syria in order to create ground realities that could force the U.S. toreconsider his demands.
Erdogan may open a new front line inhis campaign against America’s primary anti-ISIS partner in Syria, the SyrianDemocratic Forces (SDF), in coming days. Erdogan seeks to coerce PresidentTrump into accepting Turkey and Turkish-backed opposition groups as alternativeground partners to the SDF in the fight against ISIS. The YPG dominates the SDFand is the Syrian branch of the Turkish KurdistanWorker’s Party (PKK), which is waging an activeinsurgency against the Turkish state. Erdogan views the YPG’s ascendancy innorthern Syria as his primary national security threat. Erdogan has signaledthat he will launch a cross-border operation to seize the Syrian border town ofTel Abyad, north of Raqqa City. Turkish forces are shelling the town and localsources indicate that Turkish warplanes are flyingsorties above it, although without droppingmunitions thus far. Unconfirmed reports also indicate Turkish-backed oppositiongroups may be amassing for an offensive. Erdogan may launch the operationbefore his upcoming meeting with President Trump in Washington on May 16-17.
Erdogan’s plan is to siphon SyrianArab support away from the SDF, which would block America’s planned Raqqaoperation. Tel Abyad is an Arab-majority town currently under military controlby the Syrian Kurdish (YPG). An operation against Tel Abyad, if it occurs,would open a fissure between Arabs and the YPG in northern Syria that could besufficient to neutralize the SDF as a reliable American partner force for theRaqqa operation. Turkey likely also intends to undermine Arab support for theSDF’s larger governance project in northeastern Syria by providing an optionfor independent Arab governance outside YPG control.
Erdogan has been threatening anoperation in Tel Abyad for some time. Erdogan had proposed an alternative approachto the US plan to seize Raqqa City in interviewsand in meetingswith U.S. officials in February and March 2017. Erdogan offered to use Turkishtroops and allied opposition fighters to create a 12-mile wide corridor from TelAbyad to Raqqa City. The US was reportedly unsatisfied with the proposal, whichoffered to commitonly 3,000 Turkish soldiers. The Turks reportedly claimed to be able to field 10,000Turkish-trained opposition forces, but those numbers have not materialized. TheU.S. rejection did not change Erdogan’s commitment to block the Raqqaoperation, however. Erdogan warned on April 3, 2017 that he intended to launch“new surprises” targeting ISIS, the PKK, and the YPG. Turkey recently testedAmerica’s resolve to defend the YPG in eastern Syria. Turkey launchedairstrikes against YPG headquarters in eastern Syria and YPG proxy fighters innorthern Iraq on April 25, 2017. The U.S. condemned the strike but did not takeaction in response.
Erdogan may use an operation againstTel Abyad to demonstrate his ability to rally Arab tribal support in order toforce the U.S. to reconsider. Turkey convened 50 Sunni Arab tribal leaders fromeastern Syria in the Turkish town of Sanliurfa, north of Tel Abyad, in mid-Marchto discuss resistance against the YPG. Turkey formed a new Syrian Arab militaryforce named the “EasternShield Army” on April 19, likely drawing fromthe tribes represented at the summit in Sanliurfa. The group includes membersfrom the al-Nai’mtribe, which operates near Tel Abyad, in addition to rebelfighters linked to al Qaeda that operated in eastern Syria before the rise ofISIS in late 2014. The group’s influence reportedlyextends through Raqqa and into Deir ez Zour Province, although the size of itsfighting force remains unclear. Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Isik statedon April 21 that continued cooperation between the U.S. andthe Syrian Kurdish YPG threatensto create “long-term instability” between Arabs and Kurds,signaling Turkey’s intent to exploit Arab discontent with YPG domination innorthern Syria.
An operation against Tel Abyad wouldmark the start of a second phase in Turkey’s military intervention in Syria andits first major ground operation directly against the YPG. Turkey began itsintervention in August 2016. It first seizedthe Syrian border town of Jarablus, west of Tel Abyad, from the Islamic Stateof Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) on August 26, 2016 using a similar partnered rebelforce. Turkey then cleared the remainder of the ISIS-held Syrian-Turkish borderand pushed south to recapturethe ISIS-held town of al Bab on February 23. Turkey had only limited successgaining U.S. support for its operations and has not managed to weaken America’scommitment to the SDF. The U.S. provided intermittent support to Turkey’soperations against ISIS but blocked Turkey’s move to attack the SDF near alBab. Erdogan’s resolve to prevent the SDF from taking Raqqa City has notdiminished. President Trump congratulatedErdogan for his victory in the Turkish referendum earlierthis month, which may have emboldened Erdogan to start a new phase of hisSyrian campaign. Erdogan reciprocatedon April 28, stating “I believe that we will open a freshpage with Trump” in a conference in Istanbul.
Turkey’salternative plan for Raqqa is unacceptable even if Turkey secures large-scaleArab buy in. The Syrian opposition forces that Turkey is using to support itsoperations include elements linked to al Qaeda, such as Ahrar al Sharqiya.Turkey will likely also use the Salafi jihadi group – and al Qaeda ally – Ahraral Sham, which has messaged its willingnessto participate alongside Turkey in operations toseize Raqqa. Turkey previously usedAhrar al Sham as a logistical backbone for the first phase of the Euphrates Shield operations in northern Aleppo. The form of governance that Turkey is emplacing in its de facto safe zone is meanwhile antithetical toU.S. objectives. Turkey is allowing groups like Ahrar al Sham to implement social control, for example imprisoning members of a local governing council.The US cannot allow groups like Ahrar al Sham to dominate governance in a post-ISIS Raqqa because it would create a permissive environment for al Qaeda in the long term. The U.S. must contain the escalating Turkish-YPG war, and should accept delays in the timeframe for the Raqqa operation in order to do so. Defeating ISIS must remain a priority, but the U.S. risks producing more dangerous futures by rushing into clearing operations in Raqqa under current conditions. The possible dangerous outcomes of a Raqqa operation on current trajectory include a failure to recapture the city due to a war between Turkey and allied Arabs and the YPG or an al-Qaeda rise to power in Raqqa after its recapture from ISIS.
