By: Elizabeth O’Bagy, Christopher Harmer, Jonathan Dupree, and Liam Durfee

The Syrian Air Force is capable of aerial bombardment and close air support, aerial resupply, and aerial delivery of chemical weapons. Enumerating viable military options to neutralize Syrian air capabilities requires clear identification of the problem to solve.

If the problem is how to secure the victory of a secular Syrian opposition over the Assad regime, then disrupting aerial resupply is critical. It is also feasible without establishing a No Fly Zone (NFZ), and thus without contending with the Syrian Integrated Air Defense System (IADS).

If the problem is how to reduce air strikes as an operational and humanitarian concern, then disrupting
coordinated fixed wing air operations is also possible without establishing a NFZ, for example by sustaining long range fires upon Syrian airfields. The only reason to completely destroy the Syrian IADS is to establish full air control in order to eliminate rotary wing air strikes.

If the problem is establishing a humanitarian safe zone or corridor, a limited No Fly Zone will provide effective air cover, which is necessary. However, this would be insufficient to establish a fully “safe” zone with respect to
ground defense. Ground operations are an independent requirement.

If the problem is how to eliminate the chemical threat, then it is important to understand that chemical weapons cannot be neutralized by air. Grounding the Syrian Air Force by establishing a No Fly Zone will not prevent delivery of chemical munitions via artillery, and aerial bombardment of chemical facilities carries a high risk of collateral damage.