Authors: Eloise Herdegen, Veronica Iredale, and Paul Conroy, with Karolina Hird

Data cut off: 12:30 pm ET, August 20

ISW’s Russian Occupation Update tracks the activities that occur in the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. This product line replaces the section of the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment covering activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.
 
To read ISW’s assessment of how Russian activities in occupied areas of Ukraine are part of a coerced Russification and ethnic cleansing campaign, click here.

NOTE: ISW will be temporarily reducing the publication cadence of the Russian Occupation Update to a once-weekly product and will publish the next update on August 28.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian occupation authorities are introducing new restrictions on communications in occupied Ukraine while continuing to impose the use of the Russian-controlled MAX messaging software.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to violate the Geneva Conventions by forcibly mobilizing residents of occupied Ukraine into the Russian Armed Forces.
• The Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) continues to increase its influence on children and youth in occupied Crimea by using spiritual and educational activities as a tool for indoctrination and militarization.
• The Russian “Helping Ours” Foundation expanded its operations to occupied Kherson Oblast and facilitated the deportation of an unspecified number of Ukrainian children to a Russian government-controlled medical facility in Moscow Oblast.
• Russia continues to use Ukrainian youth from the occupied territories for development and reconstruction programs both in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
• Russian occupation officials continue to train Ukrainian children to become drone operators for future service in the Russian military or the Russian defense industrial base.

Russian occupation authorities are introducing new restrictions on communications in occupied Ukraine while continuing to impose the use of the Russian-controlled MAX messaging software. Russian journalist Anastasia Kashevarova reported on August 11 that Russian mobile operators asked the Russian government to begin blocking video and audio calls on foreign messengers beginning on August 1.[1] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on August 13 that WhatsApp users in both occupied Ukraine and Russia are reporting unstable connection or lack of access to WhatsApp communications.[2] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that Russian officials have previously proposed restricting WhatsApp under the allegation that internet calls result in revenue losses for mobile operators. Residents of occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast are reportedly unable to contact people outside of occupied Ukraine using WhatsApp or Telegram video and audio calls.[3] A Ukrainian official reported on August 15 that Russian occupation authorities blocked WhatsApp and Telegram in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[4] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksiy Kharchenko reported on August 13 that it is impossible to make video or audio calls on WhatsApp or Telegram for users in both occupied Luhansk Oblast and Russia.[5] Kharchenko reported that Russian authorities are developing a broader legislative framework for restricting WhatsApp and Telegram. Russian occupation authorities have historically used various justifications for limiting internet access in occupied Ukraine. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on August 16 that mobile internet restrictions were required to protect citizens in occupied Ukraine from “terrorist attacks,” alluding to Ukraine’s campaign to strike legitimate military targets in occupied Crimea to attrit Russia’s offensive and defensive capabilities.[6]

Russia is likely restricting WhatsApp and Telegram to coerce Ukrainians living in occupied Ukraine to switch to Russia’s state-controlled MAX messaging software, which will allow Russia even greater control over communications and the information space in occupied areas. A Ukrainian official reported on August 15 that Russian occupation officials in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast announced a mandatory order for occupation officials to switch from using Telegram to using MAX, consistent with ISW’s recent assessment.[7] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on August 15 that Russian occupation authorities ordered residents to begin using MAX for apartment building chats.[8] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that using MAX will allow occupation authorities to control and oversee all discussions in apartment building communities, monitor residents, identify Ukrainian citizens who resist the occupation, and block unwanted information. Ukrainian news service Suspilne reported on August 15 that a complete block of WhatsApp and Telegram is possible in Crimea as Russian occupation administrations prepare to use MAX and urged residents of the occupied territories to use VPNs or alternate messaging services instead.

Russian occupation authorities continue to violate the Geneva Conventions by forcibly mobilizing residents of occupied Ukraine into the Russian Armed Forces. Independent Ukrainian online media outlet Hromadske published an interview with a Ukrainian veteran of Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine whom Russia forcibly mobilized into the Russian Armed Forces and whom Ukrainian forces recently captured during combat operations in Donetsk Oblast.[9] The man claimed that Russian police planted drugs in his house and forced him to serve his 12.5-year prison sentence by sending him to fight in the 1st Motor Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army (formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps) in the Pokrovsk direction. The man reported that he knew another Ukrainian from occupied Kherson Oblast who “voluntarily” signed an MoD contract to avoid trial and imprisonment. Ukrainian journalist Vladislav Esipenko reported that Russian recruiters began to visit the prison at which he was detained in occupied Kerch, Crimea, in 2023 to recruit prisoners into the Russian military.[10] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported in July 2025 that Russian police, since Spring 2024, must give criminal defendants the opportunity to sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as an alternative to prosecution and imprisonment, and that Russian authorities pay police bonuses for recruiting into the military.[11] ISW assesses that occupation authorities have likely expanded these practices to occupied Ukraine.

Occupation authorities are also recruiting men in occupied Ukraine between ages 18 and 30 for conscript service, upon which Russian officials attempt to coerce them to sign contracts with the Russian MoD. The Ukrainian veteran claimed that occupation officials also mobilize all men aged 18 to 30 in occupied Ukraine for conscript service in Russia.[12] The New York Times reported that occupation officials in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts ordered all men aged 18-35 to report for military duty as early as September 2022.[13] Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the MoD to conscript 160,000 men in March 2025, the largest conscription cycle in 14 years.[14] Russian law theoretically prohibits conscripts from directly participating in combat operations.[15] ISW has, however, previously reported on informal efforts by military officials to recruit conscripts for the war against Ukraine through cash bonuses, fake contract signatures, and coercion. [16] Military officials are likely making similar efforts to force conscripted Ukrainians to sign contracts with the Russian MoD and fighting for the Russian army against their fellow Ukrainians.

The Geneva Conventions prohibit occupying powers from conscripting civilians from occupied territory into the occupying armed forces. Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that an “occupying power may not compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces.”[17] The article also prohibits “pressure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment” and “any work which would involve them in the obligation of taking part in military operations.” Russia and Ukraine are both parties to the Geneva Conventions.[18] Russian efforts to recruit and conscript Ukrainians violate Russia’s obligations as a belligerent occupying power under the Geneva Conventions.

The Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) continues to increase its influence on children and youth in occupied Crimea by using spiritual and educational activities as a tool for indoctrination and militarization. The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD) reported on August 17 that the ROC is holding the “Istoky” (Origins) youth forum at the Artek International Children Center in occupied Crimea.[19] ROC representatives presented the “Brotherhood of Orthodox Scouts” scouting program during the Istoky forum.[20] The scouting program is explicitly militaristic and teaches children wilderness and survival skills, weapon handling, and subjects them to ideological indoctrination.[21] Ukrainian outlet Mezha reported on August 17 that the scouting program allows the Kremlin to prepare Ukrainian children in occupied territories for future service in the Russian military under the guise of “spiritual and educational values.”[22]

The Istoky youth forum is a continuation of the Kremlin’s wider effort to indoctrinate Ukrainian children by exposing them to a hyper-nationalist pro-Russian identity. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated that Artek functions as a “propaganda factory” with the objective of integrating Ukrainian children into the “Russian World.”[23] 2025 marks Artek’s 100th anniversary, Russia’s “Victory in the Great Patriotic War,” and the “Year of the Defender of the Fatherland.”[24] Artek is celebrating its centennial and the anniversary of these patriotic events by running over 100 events advocating Russian traditional values and patriotism throughout 2025.[25] The Istoky youth forum is part of this wider programming. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in early August that the forum will consist of debates, lectures, and workshops to “educate the younger generation based on the traditions of patriotism and civic duty, nurturing a spirit of responsibility for the Motherland’s destiny and pride in the achievements of our forefathers.”[26] The forum’s extensive syllabus focuses on commemorating Russia’s victory in the Great Patriotic War (World War II) and imbuing students with spiritual and moral values.[27] ISW has reported on the significance of the Great Patriotic War mythos in forming a new Russian nationalist ideology, and has noted that Russia uses World War II history as a tool of indoctrination in occupied Ukraine.[28] The Istoky forum will progress in six modules including “Family Values,” “Guardians of History,” and “Roots and Media” stages.[29] The programming includes trips to Russian cultural and historical sites as part of a continued effort to impose Russian identity and culture onto Ukrainian children.[30]

The Kremlin continues to instrumentalize the ROC to legitimize and pursue its oppressive actions against children of occupied Ukrainian territories. ISW previously reported that schools in occupied Kherson Oblast introduced new curricula to encourage higher birth rates among Ukrainian youth and to spread traditional Russian family values.[31] Educational programming that promotes Russian traditional and family values is a form of Russification. The “Family Values” stage of the Istoky forum includes participants as young as seven years old, and its curriculum aims to “[strengthen] family values” and emphasize the “importance of education and upbringing in shaping [a] child’s personality.”[32] These goals are in line with ROC Moscow Patriarchate Head Patriarch Kirill’s statements at the Council of the Russian Federal Assembly on January 23, 2024 when he emphasized the “importance of school” in the “formation and education of personality and moral qualities of a person.”[33] ROC doctrine is extended to occupied Ukraine as a coercive control tool, as ISW has frequently reported.[34]

Russia uses Artek as a militarized cultural reeducation camp for Ukrainian children. Mezha reported that Russia uses Artek as a rehabilitation facility for Russian servicemen who were wounded in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and simultaneously as a children’s camp.[35] The Ukrainian Almenda Center of Civil Education reported that Russian instructors at Artek teach teenagers basic military affairs and that Ukrainian youth participate in militarized games, which the Crimean branch of the Russian Volunteer Society for the Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF) organizes.[36] ISW previously reported that DOSAAF is a Soviet-era youth movement promoting military skills that Russia has resuscitated since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[37] Artek recently hosted the final session of “Big Change,” which is the flagship youth project of Movement of the First.[38] ISW previously reported that Movement of the First is a Russian youth movement promoting military-patriotic education in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[39] The winners of “Big Change” are 300 Ukrainian children aged 5th to 7th grade. They will receive a “Dream Trip” to several “historical and culturally significant” places in Russia and participate in an “educational and cultural program.”[40] Artek provides Russia with a platform through which to both militarize and indoctrinate Ukrainian children.

The Russian “Helping Ours” Foundation expanded its operations to occupied Kherson Oblast and facilitated the deportation of an unspecified number of Ukrainian children to a Russian government-controlled medical facility in Moscow Oblast. Occupied Kherson Oblast-based outlet Tavria reported on August 15 that the Commissioner for Children’s Rights for occupied Kherson Oblast Irina Kravchenko and Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo organized a “rehabilitation trip” for Ukrainian children and their mothers from occupied Kherson Oblast to Moscow Oblast.[41] The Russian “Helping Ours” Foundation and the Kherson Oblast occupation Ministry of Education and Science supported the trip. The children and their mothers likely went to the “Klyazma” sanatorium in Moscow Oblast for “rehabilitation.” ISW has observed previous instances of the “Helping Ours” foundation facilitating the deportation of Ukrainian children, sometimes with parental supervision, to the Klyazma sanatorium near Moscow City, which Russia’s Federal Medical and Biological Agency (FMBA) runs.[42] ISW has previously written that Russia has reportedly deported over 1,200 Ukrainians, including children, from occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts to the “Klyazma” sanatorium since 2022.[43] A Russian occupation official recently stated on July 27 that “Helping Ours” planned to expand its operations from occupied Luhansk Oblast to occupied Kherson in August 2025, which is consistent with the timing of the deportation of children from occupied Kherson Oblast.[44]

Russia continues to use Ukrainian youth from the occupied territories for development and reconstruction programs both in Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on August 13 that Russian occupation officials are sending youth from occupied Crimea to Russia’s Kursk Oblast under the guise of volunteer humanitarian assistance programs, which Kremlin propaganda organizations facilitate.[45] Russian news outlet Crimean News reported on August 11 that the Russian Youth People’s Front is organizing trips to Kursk Oblast for Ukrainian students from the Crimean Vernadsky University, the Simferopol College of Public Catering and Trade, and members of occupation youth councils.[46] Russian news outlet Lenta’s Kursk Oblast service reported on August 18 that Crimean youth cleaned debris from residential structures and a children’s clinic in Kursk Oblast and distributed water to residents.[47] Russia also coerces Ukrainian children to take part in construction and development projects in occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on August 17 that Russian occupation administrations are creating “student labor units” in occupied Luhansk Oblast and have forced over 500 Ukrainian children to work as builders, educators, and service personnel.[48] Russian officials in occupied Kherson Oblast announced on August 17 that 260 children from both Russia and occupied Ukraine participated in the youth education forum ”Youthful South” in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[49] Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed this forum and praised the forum’s goal of involving youth in development projects in occupied Ukraine.[50]

ISW has previously reported on Russian occupation officials’ use of “youth brigades” in occupied Donetsk Oblast in order to offset labor costs and build youth buy-in for the Russian occupation.[51] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on August 12 that Russian occupation officials forced Ukrainian youth in occupied Donetsk Oblast to pour and carry water, stand guard at water distribution points, and accompany water trucks over the backdrop of the Russian-created water crisis in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[52] ISW assesses that Russian occupation officials will likely continue to utilize Ukrainian youth as a labor resource for development and reconstruction projects as this is economically beneficial to Russian occupation administrations and continues Russia’s practice of indoctrinating and militarizing Ukrainian youth.

Russian occupation officials continue to train Ukrainian children to become drone operators for future service in the Russian military or the Russian defense industrial base. Sevastopol occupation officials announced on August 12 that registration opened for the 2025 “Battle of the Drones” Festival.[53] The festival is targeted at youth aged 13 to 25 and aims to develop engineering, programming, and design skills with practical applications to drones and other unmanned technologies. Occupation officials stated that the festival will undergo professional training from Russian defense and tech industry experts, use Russian software to build, design, and control their own drones, and test their drones in competitions. ISW has previously assessed that Russia is trying to incentivize youth participation in drone training programs through “gamification” of drone operations and drone competitions such as the Battle of the Drones Festival.[54] ISW continues to assess that training programs emphasizing drone operation and development, such as the 2025 Battle of the Drones Festival, contribute to the militarization of Ukrainian youth as Russian occupation officials prepare youth for future service in the Russian military while augmenting the Russian DIB’s drone production and innovation capabilities.

[1] https://t.me/akashevarova/8127

[2] https://t.me/sprotyv_official/7496

[3] https://ria-m dot tv/ua/news/385437/meshkantsi-melitopolya-masovo-skarjatsya-okupanti-obmejili-spilkuvannya-z-ridnimi-z-ukraini-cherez-telegram-(skrin).html

[4] https://t.me/andriyshTime/41805

[5] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/29015

[6] https://t.me/razvozhaev/13828 

[7] https://t.me/andriyshTime/41805 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-august-4-2025

[8] https://t.me/sprotyv_official/7504 

[9] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_xkLyA2j70w

[10] https://ru.krymr.com/a/news-krym-/33503145.html

[11] https://verstka.media/kak-policeiskie-otpravlyayut-zaderzhannyh-na-voinu-vmesto-suda

[12] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_xkLyA2j70w

[13] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/09/25/world/russia-ukraine-putin-news

[14] http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202503310001 ; https://www.dw.com/en/how-russia-recruits-troops-in-occupied-ukrainian-territories/a-72289013

[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/hiding-russia%E2%80%99s-weakness

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-august-13-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2025

[17] https://redcross.org.ua/en/news/2025/01/102618/

[18] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/state-parties?activeTab=

[19] https://cpd.gov dot ua/international-direction/ssha/militaryzacziya-ditej-na-tot-skautskyj-ruh-rpcz-u-krymu/ 

[20] https://mezha dot net/eng/bukvy/russian-orthodox-church-militarizes-youth-in-occupied-crimea-s-artek-camp/ ; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1092646-u-krimu-posilili-vpliv-rpc-dla-militarizacii-ditej-ta-molodi-centr-protidii-dezinformacii/ 

[21] https://cpd.gov dot ua/international-direction/ssha/militaryzacziya-ditej-na-tot-skautskyj-ruh-rpcz-u-krymu/

[22] https://mezha dot net/eng/bukvy/russian-orthodox-church-militarizes-youth-in-occupied-crimea-s-artek-camp/

[23] https://www dot facebook dot com/sprotyv dot official/posts/pfbid02FyFqPnvEVTqBS5ZzzN8QTBb1gPDjJvdSmpEQmtEZTvMVsU32icphC7898knfLnZel?locale=uk_UA

[24] https://events dot myrosmol dot ru/en/forums/istoki/

[25] https://intent dot press/en/news/war/2025/in-the-tot-of-ukraine-russians-will-teach-children-to-fight-from-the-age-of-7/

[26] en dot kremlin dot ru/catalog/regions/CR/events/77726/print

[27] https://events dot myrosmol dot ru/en/forums/istoki/

[28] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025 

[29] https://events dot myrosmol dot ru/en/forums/istoki/

[30][30] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-april-8-2025; https://events dot myrosmol dot ru/en/forums/istoki/

[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-june-9-2025

[32] https://events dot myrosmol dot ru/en/forums/istoki/

[33] https://mospat dot ru/en/news/91290/ 

[34] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-may-19-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-april-8-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023

[35] https://mezha dot net/eng/bukvy/russian-orthodox-church-militarizes-youth-in-occupied-crimea-s-artek-camp/

[36] https://almenda dot org/en/artek-in-the-tot-from-recreation-camp-to-propaganda-machine/  

[37] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-july-21-2025

[38] https://будьвдвижении dot рф/news/v-arteke-startovali-finaly-bolshoy-peremeny-dlya-shkolnikov-5-7-klassov-i-uchastnikov-mezhdunarodnog/ 

[39] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2025

[40] https://будьвдвижении dot рф/news/v-arteke-startovali-finaly-bolshoy-peremeny-dlya-shkolnikov-5-7-klassov-i-uchastnikov-mezhdunarodnog/

[41] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/9247 

[42] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-july-29-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-april-3-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2023 

[43] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-april-3-2025

[44] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/19470

[45] https://t.me/sprotyv_official/7495

[46] https://gazetacrimea dot ru/news/krymskie-studenty-v-chetvyertyy-raz-otpravilis-na-pomoshch-mirnym-zhitelyam-i-boytsam-v-kurskuyu-obl/?ysclid=meiw57t8ow453048505

[47] https://news-kursk dot ru/society/2025/08/18/79376.html?ysclid=meiw8710ln351697566

[48] https://t.me/sprotyv_official/7512

[49] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/5943

[50] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/5943

[51] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-august-12-2025

[52] https://t.me/sprotyv_official/7493

[53] https://t.me/razvozhaev/13661

[54] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-july-3-2025