Note: ISW will be temporarily suspending publication of the Russian Occupation Update for the remainder of 2025 for the upcoming holiday season. Coverage will resume the week of January 5, 2026.
Key Takeaways
- A Russian family whose son volunteered to fight in the Russian army against Ukraine recently adopted seven children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. This adoption case is emblematic of the wider intent behind Russia’s large-scale campaign to deport Ukrainian children and forcibly adopt them into Russian families.
- A Ukrainian human rights expert presented evidence that Russia has deported at least two Ukrainian children to North Korea. Russia has likely sent many other Ukrainian children to this camp and other similar camps via Russia-North Korea youth exchange programs.
- Russia continues the militarization of youth in occupied Ukraine via military training, exposure to uniformed personnel, and military-patriotic youth organizations.
- The Crimea occupation administration continues to pursue a policy of punitive nationalization to dissuade the local population from supporting Ukraine.
- Russia continues to issue passports to residents of Pokrovsk and its environs.
- The Kherson Oblast occupation administration is attempting to forge relationships with India and Afghanistan in order to attract migrant labor and increase the economic productivity of occupied areas.
- Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor continues to block access to messaging platforms in occupied Ukraine, likely to coerce residents of occupied areas to download the Kremlin-controlled MAX messenger.
- Russia’s integration of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) into the Russian energy system is reportedly nearing completion.
- The Russian government continues exploitative investment in energy production in occupied Crimea.
- Russian reconstruction efforts in occupied Mariupol continue to leave Ukrainian residents displaced and homeless, despite Russian claims that it is rebuilding and renovating housing in occupied Ukraine.
Deportation and Forcible Transfer of Ukrainian Citizens, Including Children
A Russian family whose son volunteered to fight in the Russian army against Ukraine recently adopted seven children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. ISW previously reported that Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev announced on October 22 during a meeting with the Russian Federation Council that Samara Oblast families have adopted 13 Ukrainian children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast in the last month.[1] Samara Oblast-based media reported a few days prior, on October 17, that Fedorishchev visited one family in Koshkinsky Raion who had adopted seven of the 13 children.[2] The adoptive parents told Russian media that their son went to fight in Ukraine as a volunteer because he never got mobilized, and upon leaving his home for the battlefield told his parents to “take in” children from Ukraine.[3] The mother told Russian media that she succeeded in “raising a patriot,” in reference to her biological son. Media footage shows Fedorishchev meeting with the seven children and presenting the family with a new car.[4] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne suggested that the 13 children who Russia deported to Samara Oblast are likely from the occupied Melitopol Raion.[5] The children in the video appear to range from around five years old to teenagers.
The Samara Oblast adoption case is emblematic of the wider intent behind Russia’s large-scale campaign to deport Ukrainian children and forcibly adopt them into Russian families. The adoptive Russian family clearly has prioritized the “patriotic” upbringing of its children, as evidenced by the mother’s statements about her biological son. The deported Ukrainian children are likely to be raised in a home that valorizes service in the Russian military and the destruction of Ukrainian identity. ISW has observed similar reports of adoptive Russian families exposing Ukrainian children to military-patriotic indoctrination intended to isolate children from their identities and sever their connections to their home country and families.[6] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s deportation and forced adoption of Ukrainian children likely constitute a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which classifies the transfer of children from one group to another with the intent to destroy the first group as an act of genocide.[7]
A Ukrainian human rights expert presented evidence that Russia has deported at least two Ukrainian children to North Korea. Kateryna Rashevska, a legal expert from the Ukrainian Regional Center for Human Rights (RCHR), reported on December 3 before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee that the RCHR has identified 165 “re-education camps” aimed at militarizing and Russifying Ukrainian children, located in temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and North Korea.[8] The RCHR uncovered the names of two Ukrainian children from occupied Donetsk Oblast and occupied Simferopol, Crimea, whom Russian authorities sent to the Songdowon International Children’s Camp in North Korea. Rashevska reported that Songdowon camp counselors taught children to “destroy Japanese militarists” and arranged meetings with veterans involved in the attack on the U.S. Navy Ship Pueblo in 1968. These activities reflect a broader strategic alignment between Russia and North Korea, including in their efforts to indoctrinate and militarize youth.
The presence of Ukrainian children from occupied areas at the North Korean Songdowon camp is likely connected to an expanding Russia-North Korea youth exchange initiative. Grigory Gurov, the chair of the Russian youth military-patriotic organization “Movement of the First,” announced in June 2024 that Movement of the First would send groups of school children from Russia to the Songdowon camp.[9] Gurov also claimed that there were plans to bring North Korean children to Russian summer camps such as Artek, which is in occupied Crimea. Gurov’s announcement followed North Korea and Russia signing a mutual defense agreement on June 19, 2024.[10] Russian authorities sent 250 school children to the Songdowon camp for ten days in 2024 and over 100 children in 2025.[11]
ISW previously reported that the Movement of the First is central to the Kremlin’s efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian children from occupied areas by forcibly sending them to re-education camps in Russia, and by proliferating its presence within occupied Ukraine.[12] The organization’s involvement in sending children to the Songdowon camp likely indicates that the presence of Ukrainian children in North Korea is likely not an isolated incident. Russia has likely sent many other Ukrainian children to Songdowon and other similar camps via Russia-North Korea youth exchange programs. ISW assesses that Russian authorities’ decision to send Ukrainian children to the North Korean summer camp reflects the extension of Russification and militarization efforts beyond Russia’s borders and directly implicates the North Korean regime in the deportation and indoctrination of Ukrainian children. While at Songdowon, children are expected to act as “ambassadors of Russia,” as evidenced by photos of them carrying Russian flags and wearing T-shirts with Russian national symbols.[13] Participation in such activities frames children as Russian in the eyes of the international community and the children themselves, and erodes their Ukrainian identity.
Sociocultural Control
Nothing significant to report.
Militarization of Occupied Areas
Russian occupation authorities continue to systemically militarize Ukrainian youth in occupied Donetsk Oblast through military training and direct exposure to Russian active-duty personnel. Occupied Donetsk Oblast-based outlet Donetsk News Agency claimed on December 8 that 110 young people completed the final stages of the Young Warrior Universiade at the “Extreme” training ground in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[14] The regional youth military-patriotic organization People’s Army organized the Universiade, which lasted for a month and a half and involved university and technical college students from occupied Donetsk Oblast. Active-duty Russian personnel and veterans, as well as representatives from the Main Directorate of Rosgvardia in occupied Donetsk Oblast and the Donetsk Military Commandant’s Office, instructed the youth participating in the Young Warrior initiative. Members of the Russian Pyatnashka International Volunteer Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District), which has fought in Ukraine since 2014, were involved as mentors for participants. ISW continues to assess that Russian occupation authorities are systematically militarizing Ukrainian youth through military training and direct exposure to Russian military personnel.[15] These initiatives are aimed at preparing Ukrainian youth for subsequent service in Russian military structures and eventual support for the Russian military effort against Ukraine.
Russian youth military-patriotic organizations such as the Movement of the First and Yunarmia continue efforts to indoctrinate and militarize Ukrainian youth in occupied Ukraine. The occupied Kherson Oblast branch of Movement of the First reported on December 8 that Kherson Oblast occupation authorities held a ceremony to induct 5th graders (10 to 11 year-olds) into Yunarmia at Skadovsk School No.1 in occupied Skadovsk.[16] The Movement of the First’s occupied Kherson Oblast branch stated that the children recited the oath of allegiance to Russia and sang the Yunarmia anthem at the ceremony. Movement of the First and Yunarmia are Russian youth organizations aimed at promoting military-patriotic education among schoolchildren and youth throughout Russia and occupied Ukraine.[17] Russia continues to use military-patriotic youth organizations to promote pro-Russian narratives in order to integrate Ukrainian youth into Russian society.
Administrative and Bureaucratic Control
The Crimea occupation administration continues to pursue a policy of punitive nationalization to dissuade the local population from supporting Ukraine. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on December 5 that the Sevastopol occupation administration adopted a resolution allowing Sevastopol’s occupation administration to seize property of legal entities and individuals who allegedly provide assistance to the Ukrainian military and Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR).[18] The Crimea occupation administration has seized the property of 11 commercial entities, including those majority-owned by the mother of Aleksei Kantsebosky, who allegedly donated cryptocurrency to the GUR.[19] Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov previously claimed in November 2025 that the Crimea occupation administration seized and nationalized property worth 6.9 billion rubles ($85.7 million) from Ukrainian citizens who supported Ukraine since 2022.[20] Punitive nationalization allows occupation administrations, and by extension the Kremlin, to directly profit from the occupation of Ukraine. Punitive nationalization also acts as a coercive mechanism that encourages self-censorship out of the fear of engaging in behaviors deemed to be pro-Ukraine or anti-Russia.
Russia continues to issue passports to residents of Pokrovsk and its environs even as Russian forces have not yet fully established control over the entire Pokrovsk area. The Donetsk People’s Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs (DNR MVD) reported on December 7 that it has issued Russian passports to over 300 residents of Pokrovsk and surrounding villages and posted accompanying footage showing MVD officials confiscating Ukrainian passports from residents and replacing them with Russian ones.[21] The MVD is also using the issuance of Russian passports as a propaganda opportunity, and shared footage of recently passportized residents claiming they were relieved to receive Russian documentation because of the “opportunities it offers.” Forced passportization is a critical component of the Kremlin’s wider occupation policy, as it allows Russia to consolidate administrative control over areas it occupies and use Russian citizenship to further the false claim that these areas are somehow intrinsically Russian.[22] Occupation administrations notably withhold access to critical services, including medicines and social benefits, from residents of occupied areas who do not have Russian passports, suggesting that passportization rates are likely reflective of Russia’s coercive occupation policy.[23]
Occupation Administration Mismanagement and Internal Dynamics
Nothing significant to report.
Physical and Legal Repressions
Nothing significant to report.
Economic and Financial Control
The Kherson Oblast occupation administration is attempting to forge relationships with India and Afghanistan in order to attract migrant labor and increase the economic productivity of occupied areas. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated that occupied Kherson Oblast is interested in attracting migrant labor from India to support the economic development of the region.[24] Saldo made this comment in response to a speech from the founder of the Center for Assistance to the Development of the India-Russia Strategic Partnership (DRISP), who claimed that labor flows from India to Russia would help promote Russia’s agricultural sector.[25] Saldo also stated that occupied Kherson Oblast is looking to promote cooperation with Afghanistan, agricultural exports.[26] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration is likely attempting to court Russia’s foreign partners in order to lend legitimacy to the occupation and to increase the economic productivity of occupied Kherson Oblast by relying on foreign labor and foreign investment.
Information Space Control
Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor continues to block access to messaging platforms in occupied Ukraine, likely to coerce residents of occupied areas to download the Kremlin-controlled MAX messenger. Roskomnadzor’s press service told Kremlin newswire TASS on December 4 that Roskomnadzor is “restricting” FaceTime because it can be used for organizing and conducting terror activities.[27] Roskomnadzor also noted that it has been blocking the Snapchat social media app since October 2025 for the same reason.[28] These blocks extend to occupied areas of Ukraine, which Roskomnadzor treats as legal parts of Russia in its institution of information and communications restrictions.[29] The Russian government is likely imposing heavy restrictions on messaging and social media apps in order to force people to switch over to the Kremlin-controlled MAX messenger in order to maintain access to a communications platform. Roskomnadzor has similarly restricted Telegram and WhatsApp access in occupied Ukraine while Russian officials promote MAX in parallel.[30] Ukrainian sources have warned that MAX centralizes user tracking information and makes it available to Russian intelligence services.[31]
Infrastructure and Development Projects
Russia’s integration of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) into the Russian energy system is reportedly nearing completion. Occupied Zaporizhia Oblast-based outlet Zaporizhia News Agency reported on December 3 that the Zaporizhiaenergo energy operator installed a new electrical transformer substation in occupied Melitopol Raion.[32] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko suggested that the new substation is meant to integrate the ZNPP into the Russian-controlled power grid, and cited anonymous sources who reported that Russia is constructing a similar substation in occupied Enerhodar.[33] The ZNPP is still connected to the Ukrainian power grid, but has suffered frequent outages since 2022 due to damage caused to its various substations and powerlines.[34] Russia has been setting conditions throughout 2025 to disconnect the ZNPP from the Ukrainian grid and transfer it to the Russian grid, however. This condition setting includes the construction of physical infrastructure to connect the ZNPP with Russia, as well as bureaucratic steps intended to consolidate control over the ZNPP’s workforce and management structure.[35] ISW previously reported that ZNPP occupation director Yuri Chernichuk stated that the ZNPP certified all employees according to Russian legislation to bring the ZNPP closer to full integration with the Russian grid.[36] The ZNPP’s occupation authorities reported on December 4 that the plant completed its transition “to a standard organizational structure typical of Russian nuclear power plants.”[37] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky announced on December 4 that after the “end of the war,” the Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration will ensure the transfer of energy from ZNPP to the Russian grid, highlighting the fact that Russia intends to essentially seize and monopolize the ZNPP’s energy generation capacity for its own benefit after the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine.[38] The ZNPP will reportedly create 11,000 jobs and “operate in the interests of all of Russia.”[39] ISW has repeatedly assessed that the connection of the ZNPP to the Russian energy grid will pose significant risks to its nuclear security and will additionally allow Russia to continue its extractive policies towards Ukraine’s resources.[40] The ZNPP’s connection to the Russian grid will also greatly complicate efforts to reintegrate the plant into the Ukrainian grid.
The Russian government continues exploitative investment in energy production in occupied Crimea to supply southern Russia with electricity and to establish total control over critical infrastructure. Russian state-owned defense corporation Rostec claimed on December 4 that its subsidiary Technopromexport will build a new “Trudovaya” gas-turbine power plant near occupied Simferopol.[41] The new power plant will purportedly have a capacity of 135 megawatts (MW) and the ability to connect to the local power grid during peak hours. The plant will use Russian-produced gas-turbine units from Rostec subsidiary the United Engine Corporation (UEC). Rostec claimed that the power plant will supply occupied Crimea and southern Russia. Russia has constructed and launched the operation of the Balakslavskaya and Tavricheskaya thermal power plants in occupied Crimea in October 2018.[42] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in March 2019 that the two power plants would reach a combined energy production capacity of around 2,070 MW, or approximately double the energy consumption in occupied Crimea, and that Russia could export the surplus energy to other Russian regions through Russia’s Unified Energy System.[43] The construction of a turbine plant in occupied Crimea mirrors similar Russian efforts to extract resources, including energy generation, from occupied Ukraine.[44]
Russian reconstruction efforts in occupied Mariupol continue to leave Ukrainian residents displaced and homeless, despite Russian claims that it is rebuilding and renovating housing in occupied Ukraine. Mariupol occupation head Anton Koltsov stated on December 7 that the pace of restoration of critical infrastructure in occupied Mariupol, namely electricity, water, and heat supply networks, will continue into 2026.[45] Koltsov stated that the Mariupol occupation administration will create an apartment fund for occupied Mariupol residents who lost their homes due to “military actions.”[46] Koltsov indicated that the city administration plans to distribute housing to residents by the end of 2025, and that occupation authorities are waiting for the Russian State Duma to pass a federal law that would simplify the transfer of ownerless housing to municipal ownership. Koltsov stated that the apartments will undergo renovations under municipal ownership simultaneously with their reassignment. ISW previously reported that Mariupol occupation authorities continue to illegally nationalize Ukrainian residents’ housing and declare the properties as ownerless in order to demolish, reconstruct, and redistribute the properties to Russian citizens or those loyal to the occupation regime.[47]
The statements that Russian officials make on the state of housing in occupied Mariupol do not reflect the reality faced by residents, however. Russian opposition outlet ASTRA posted footage on December 4 showing occupied Mariupol residents appealing to Russian President Vladimir Putin to provide the housing that Russian occupation authorities promised them.[48] The residents claimed that occupation authorities promised compensation in the form of new apartments, but that occupation authorities are instead offering mortgages. The residents stated that the Donetsk Oblast occupation authorities demolished the residents’ apartments without their consent in 2023, and that the occupation authorities are placing residents in so-called ownerless housing. ISW has reported at length on how the Russian occupation administrations register critical infrastructure, housing, and economic objects as ownerless in order to take full legal control over nationalized Ukrainian properties.[49]
[1] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russia-is-turning-deported-ukrainian-children-into-bargaining-chips/; https://ria dot ru/20251022/rossiya-2049925738.html
[2] https://t.me/samara450media/61072
[3] https://t.me/samara450media/61072
[4] https://t.me/samara450media/61072; https://t.me/samara450media/61079
[5] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1178354-rosiani-vivezli-u-rf-12-ditej-sirit-iz-timcasovo-okupovanoi-teritorii-zaporizkoi-oblasti/
[6] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/11/06/it-s-like-they-re-coming-out-of-a-cult-ukraine-tackles-russian-indoctrination-of-repatriated-children_6747195_4.html; https://kyivindependent.com/without-shame-russias-childrens-commissioner-casually-discusses-kidnapping-a-ukrainian-child/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-children-abducted-by-russia-left-with-psychological-scars-campaigners-2024-06-15/
[7] https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf
[8] https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/the-abduction-of-ukrainian-children-by-the-russian-federation; https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/testimony_of_kateryna_rashevska.pdf
[9] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21237471
[10] https://www dot themoscowtimes.com/2024/06/19/russia-north-korea-sign-mutual-defense-deal-as-kim-pledges-support-for-ukraine-invasion-a85461
[11] https://www dot nknews.org/2025/07/north-korean-summer-camp-welcomes-over-100-russian-kids-for-weeklong-program/; https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2024/07/22/russian-school-children-begin-summer-camp-in-north-korea-amid-ever-closed-ties-en-news;
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-25-2025/
[13] https://www dot nknews.org/2025/07/north-korean-summer-camp-welcomes-over-100-russian-kids-for-weeklong-program/; https://t.me/primorskyru/8826
[14] https://dan-news dot ru/obschestvo/kurs-molodogo-bojca-proshli-bolee-sotni-molodyh-rebjat-dnr/; https://www.donetsk dot kp.ru/online/news/6711066 ; https://news-front dot su/2025/12/08/v-dnr-proshel-finalnyj-etap-universiady-molodoj-voin-sredi-studentov-vuzov-i-uchrezhdenij-spo/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-october-23-2025/
[16] https://tavria dot tv/news/society/v-skadovskoj-shkole-%e2%84%96-1-proshlo-posvyashhenie-v-ryady-yunarmii/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-31-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2025/
[18] https://t.me/razvozhaev/16413
[19] https://t.me/tass_agency/351682
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-november-20-2025/
[21] https://t.me/news_mvddnr/14423; https://dan-news dot ru/exclusive/bolee-300-zhitelej-krasnoarmejska-poluchili-rossijskie-pasporta/; https://www.donetsk.kp dot ru/online/news/6710712/
[22] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/24-210-0120ISW20Occupation20playbook.pdf
[23] https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2025/10/23/i-took-a-russian-passport-to-live
[24] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/25832207
[25] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/25832207
[26] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/25829467
[27] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/25813347
[28] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/25819201
[29] https://ctrcenter dot org/uk/rosiya-zablokuvala-facetime-na-svoyij-terytoriyi-ta-na-tot-ukrayiny-zokrema-v-krymu
[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-november-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-8-2025/
[31] https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1154720-rosiani-obmezuut-robotu-telegram-i-whatsapp-u-krimu-ak-zalisatisa-na-zvazku/
[32] https://zonews dot ru/news/melitopolskij-rajon-poluchil-novuju-elektropodstanciju/
[33] https://t.me/andriyshTime/47805
[34] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-328-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine
[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-25-2025/
[36] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-25-2025/
[37] https://ria dot ru/20251204/stantsiya-2059718191.html
[38] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/25821203
[39] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/25821203
[40] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-3-2025/
https://www.crimea dot kp.ru/online/news/6704737/
[42] http://en dot kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60073
[43] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/60073
[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-november-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-october-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-november-6-2025/
[45] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/25839853
[46] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/25839793 ; https://www.donetsk.kp dot ru/online/news/6710194/
[47] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-may-5-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-10-2025/
[48] https://t.me/astrapress/98877
[49] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-october-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-october-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-may-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-21-2025/
