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Russian Occupation Update

Russian Occupation Update, November 20, 2025

November 20, 2025

Russian Occupation Update, November 20, 2025

Key Takeaways

Deportation and Forcible Transfer of Ukrainian Citizens, Including Children

Russia may be planning to forcibly relocate Ukrainians to Siberia as part of a scheme to stimulate the economic growth of underdeveloped Russian regions. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 13 that Russia has launched the new “Siberia Development Program,” which aims to bolster Siberia’s economy and industrial capacity.[1] The Ukrainian Resistance Center, citing anonymous sources in occupied areas, noted that Russia is identifying residents of occupied areas to relocate to Siberia for “long-term business trips” to offset personnel shortages in critical industries that have resulted from Russia’s war in Ukraine. While ISW cannot independently confirm the Resistance Center’s reporting, Russian officials have been focusing on the development of Siberia through various means for several years, and it is feasible that they are including residents of occupied areas (who are considered Russian citizens under Russian law) in these development plans. The Russian government approved a strategy on Siberia’s socioeconomic development through the year 2035 in January 2023.[2] Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu also notably visited Krasnoyarsk (Siberia’s second-largest city) on November 7, 2025 to discuss the concept of “Siberianization” — an idea articulated by Russian political scientist Sergei Karaganov in a paper published in July 2025.[3] Karaganov’s concept of “Siberianization” is premised on government investment in Siberia’s industrial capacity and non-ferrous and rare earth metals in order to maximize the economic output that Russia reaps from Siberia.[4]

Shoigu acknowledged in an interview with Russian state outlet RBK on November 6 that the Russian government will need to “attract” people to relocate to Siberia in order to maximize the economic promise of the region.[5] Shoigu stated that both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union “sought to create such conditions for citizens to voluntarily and happily go to Siberia to build and develop the national economy,” and noted that the Russian government is providing tax benefits and administrative benefits to those who move to Siberia to work for the Angara-Yenisei Valley strategic economic program. The Soviet government had a well-documented history of deporting Ukrainians to work camps in Siberia throughout the 20th century, which Shoigu seems to be alluding to. While Russian sources did not explicitly confirm that Russia plans to relocate residents of occupied Ukraine to Siberia as part of the Siberia Development Program, Karaganov’s “Siberianization” paper specifically notes that the human and industrial resources of occupied Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast “complement” Siberia’s.[6] The paper notes that some of the “freed industrial capacity” of occupied Donbas “is transferred deep into Siberia,” — a tacit acknowledgement of the economic flows between Siberia and occupied Ukraine. Taken in tandem, Shoigu’s statements on the need to attract people to move to Siberia and Karaganov’s statements on the interconnectedness between Siberia and occupied Donbas, it is likely that Russia plans for residents of occupied areas to play some part in the development of Siberia, likely via their forced relocation.

The Russian government is likely to use coercive means to relocate Ukrainians to Siberia, including via economic incentives or the promise of employment opportunities. ISW has previously assessed that Russia views occupied Ukraine as a manpower pool and is using Ukrainian labor to make up for economic shortcomings that have resulted from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[7] This dynamic is visible both within occupied territories, as Russian officials have channeled funds into industry in occupied Ukraine in order to use Ukrainian economic assets for their own benefit, and in the Russian campaign to physically deport Ukrainians to Russia to fill personnel gaps in Russian industry. The depopulation of occupied areas of Ukraine also supports the Russian effort to repopulate those areas with Russian citizens. While the scale of deportation under the Siberia Development Program remains to be seen, it is representative of Russia’s wider occupation policy vis-a-vis Ukraine, highlighting how Russia sees Ukraine and Ukrainians are a usable economic resource.

A Donetsk Oblast occupation official claimed that Russia either deported or forcibly removed 20,000 children from Donetsk Oblast to summer camp programs in Russia and occupied Ukraine during Summer 2025. Deputy Chairperson of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) occupation government Larisa Tolstykina claimed on November 16 that 19,483 children from occupied Donetsk Oblast “rested” in summer camps and similar programs in occupied Ukraine and Russia over the course of Summer 2025.[8] Tolstykina clarified that 1,644 children attended federal health centers; 11,788 received sponsorship from Russian patron regions to attend various summer camps; third-party organizations organized summer programs for 2,435 children; and 3,616 attended the “University Shifts” program at Russian universities. ISW has previously reported at length on Russia’s efforts to use a variety of summer, health, and education camps to facilitate the deportation or removal of Ukrainian children from occupied areas for the explicit purpose of their Russification.[9] Russian officials announced plans for 53,000 children from occupied Ukraine to “spend their summer holidays” at camps in Russia and occupied Ukraine in Summer 2025, and Tolstykina’s statements suggest that children from occupied Donetsk Oblast represented about one-third of the total number of Ukrainian children who were exposed to such camps in this timeframe.[10] While such summer camp programs may only represent a “temporary” deportation of Ukrainian children, the impacts are long-term, as these summer camps are intended to expose Ukrainian children to Russian ideologies and identities.

Sociocultural Control

The Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is expanding its youth outreach in occupied Ukraine. Occupied Zaporizhia Oblast-based outlet Zaporizhia News Agency reported on November 17 that the Berdyansk ROC diocese held its first Forum of Orthodox Youth in occupied Berdyansk. Russian Bishop Peter of Berdyansk and Primorsk, whom ROC Head Patriarch Kirill hand-appointed in May, presided over the event.[11] The Russian Federal Agency for Youth Affairs (Rosmolodezh) and the ROC Synodal Department for Youth Affairs sponsored the event.[12] ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin uses the ROC as a tool to consolidate control over occupied Ukraine, and has reported on the ROC’s previous efforts to increase its influence over Ukrainian children using spiritual and education activities as a means of indoctrination and militarization.[13]

Militarization of Occupied Areas

The Donetsk Oblast occupation administration is introducing a “war tourism” program intended to bring Russians to active war zones in occupied Ukraine. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Deputy Chairman Kirill Makarov told Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti on November 16 that Russian occupation authorities started developing a “war tourist” program in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[14] Makarov claimed that the DNR is historically associated with sites of Russian military glory, such as the Red Army’s 1943 Donbas Offensive, the war in Donbas in 2014, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The initiative is part of Russia’s Tourism-Hospitality national project, and Donetsk Oblast occupation authorities created an interdepartmental tourism headquarters to identify potential sites and routes for the project. Makarov claimed to Russian state-owned news outlet Rossiyskaya Gazeta that the military tourist project aims to preserve cultural memory and the Donbas’ role in Russian history.[15] Rossiyskaya Gazeta indicated that the military tourism program in occupied Ukraine will target children and young adults. Makarov later told Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti that Russia will invest over 1 billion rubles ($12.4 million) in the DNR’s tourism industry for 2026.[16] The increased investment in Russian-funded tourism in occupied Donetsk Oblast, along with the project’s young target audience, is likely related to Russia’s broader indoctrination efforts aiming to develop loyalty to the regime among young Ukrainians living in occupied areas. The war tourism project also enforces Russia’s ahistoric claims to Ukraine and attempts to whitewash its illegal 2014 and 2022 invasions as feats of Russian patriotism. Heavy investment in tourism in occupied areas, including Donetsk Oblast, also likely has a profit incentive — occupation administrations stand to benefit from increased tourism to the areas they control.

Russia continues to institutionalize military-patriotic education programs in occupied Ukraine. Occupied Luhansk Oblast-based outlet Luhansk Information Center reported on November 14 that the Redut Center for Youth Military-Patriotic Education opened at the Luhansk State Pedagogical University (LSPU).[17] The Redut Center seeks to “develop civic awareness, spirituality, patriotism, and responsibility” in youth. Redut Center director Dmitry Lebedinets claimed that the opening of the center is necessary because there are still youth in occupied areas who have “a negative attitude” towards Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Redut will teach youth about drone operation, rifle assembly, tactical fire training, and how to weave camouflage nets. Deputy Chairperson of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) occupation government Larisa Tolstykina also emphasized on November 16 the opening of the “Beregovoy” cadet boarding school in occupied Donetsk City in September 2025, noting that the school can accommodate 180 cadets.[18] Tolstykina also highlighted the involvement of Russian state nuclear operator Rosatom and the Russian Kurchatov Institute Research Center in providing state-approved educational programming for children in occupied Donetsk Oblast. All of these educational programs have a military-patriotic ideological intent and seek to prepare Ukrainian children and youth for future service to the Russian state — either in the armed forces or working for state-owned or state-affiliated enterprises or initiatives like Rosatom and Kurchatov.

The Ukrainian government confirmed that Russia has forcibly mobilized over 45,000 Ukrainians from occupied areas into the Russian military since 2022.[19] Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) Secretary Dmytro Usov stated on November 18 that Russia forcibly mobilized 46,327 Ukrainians living in occupied territories as of July 1, 2025.[20] This figure includes both those mobilized via contract recruitment and those drafted. The vast majority (over 35,000) were residents of occupied Crimea, where Russia has been building out mobilization infrastructure since its 2014 annexation of the peninsula. Usov emphasized that one in every six POWs held by Ukraine is actually a Ukrainian citizen.[21] Usov also noted that the Russian General Staff has created four units comprised predominantly of Ukrainian POWs — the Bohdan Khmelnytskyi Battalion, the Maxim Kryvonos Battalion, the Martyn Pushkar Detachment, and the Oleksandr Matrosov Detachment. Usov’s statements confirm the massive scale at which Russia has been systematically violating international law in order to build out its manpower pool. ISW has previously reported on Russia’s illegal mobilization of residents of occupied Ukraine, as well as its illegal use of Ukrainian POW units such as the Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and Maxim Kryvonos battalions in active combat.[22]

Russia’s heavily militarized Rosgvardia internal security force continues its active engagement in the militarization of Ukrainian children. Rosgvardia’s occupied Zaporizhia Oblast branch held “Conscript’s Day” for schoolchildren in occupied Melitopol on November 14.[23] Rosgvardia claimed that the event contributed to the patriotic education of the “future defenders of the Fatherland.”  Members of Rosgvardia’s Smerch-A Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR) showed Ukrainian children Russian military equipment, talked to children about the social benefits of serving with Rosgvardia, and discussed opportunities for study at Russian military academies. ISW continues to observe Rosgvardia’s growing role in the militarization of schoolchildren in occupied Ukraine and continues to assess that it serves a dual role of introducing law enforcement oversight into schools while preparing Ukrainian children for potential future service to the Russian state.[24]

Kremlin officials highlighted the role that the Young Guard, the youth wing of the ruling United Russia party, is playing in the occupation of Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy and United Russia Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev attended events commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the founding of the Young Guard of the United Russia party in Moscow on November 17.[25] Medvedev claimed that over 6,500 members of Young Guard took part in the “reconstruction” of occupied Ukraine and emphasized that the Young Guard “preserves Russia’s sacred values and traditions” in young people. Russian President Vladimir Putin also shared his remarks at Young Guard anniversary events, thanking members of the organization who are serving in the Russian military in its war against Ukraine.[26] United Russia’s Young Guard serves a recruitment function for the Russian armed forces and is also actively involved in the militarization of children in occupied Ukraine.[27] Young Guard is therefore part of the wider militarization ecosystem operating in occupied Ukraine.

Administrative and Bureaucratic Control

Nothing significant to report.

Occupation Administration Mismanagement and Internal Dynamics

Nothing significant to report.

Physical and Legal Repressions

The Russian government is taking steps to increase repressions against youth in occupied Ukraine for perceived anti-Russian activity. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on November 17 that lowers the age of criminal responsibility for assisting in “terrorist activity” or participating in “subversive crimes” from 16 to 14 years old.[28] Under the new law, minors may now face 10 to 20 years of imprisonment for acts of sabotage. The legislation also increases penalties for involving minors in sabotage activities and prohibits courts from issuing more lenient sentences than mandated. The Ukrainian non-governmental organization Crimean Tatar Resource Center (CTRC) noted that the new law legalizes repressions against Ukrainian youth in occupied areas.[29] ISW has previously reported that Russian authorities systematically use “extremism” and “treason” charges to punish perceived pro-Ukrainian or anti-Russian behavior in occupied territories, and has observed instances of Russian officials placing youth in compulsory punitive psychiatric treatment for such activities.[30]  The new law similarly enables Russian officials to criminalize any manifestation of Ukrainian identity or pro-Ukrainian sentiment among minors, which likely includes speaking the Ukrainian language, displaying Ukraine’s national symbols, or expressing support for the Ukrainian military, by labeling these actions as terrorism — or subversion — related. The legislation will likely also pressure parents, guardians and teachers to avoid expressing pro-Ukrainian views to their children, as this could be interpreted as involving minors in terrorist activities.

Economic and Financial Control

The Crimea occupation administration continues to reap benefits from the punitive nationalization of Ukrainian property assets. Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov claimed on November 15 that the Crimean occupation administration seized and nationalized property worth 6.9 billion rubles (about $85.7 million) from Ukrainian citizens who support Ukraine to fund social infrastructure projects and landscaping in occupied Crimea.[31]  ISW has previously reported on the accelerated rate of Russian seizure and nationalization of property objects as a punitive measure against Ukrainians in occupied Crimea and to generate profit from its occupation of Ukraine.[32]  The Crimea occupation administration has seized and nationalized about 3,500 property objects worth 4.8 billion rubles (about $59.6 million) between 2022–2024, and transferred at least 2,548 land plots to Russian servicemembers.[33] The Crimea occupation administration sold 25 property objects in the first six months of, earning 2.2 billion rubles (about $27.3 million) — almost half of what it generated in the first two years of the full-scale invasion.[34]

Information Space Control

Nothing significant to report.

Infrastructure and Development Projects

Nothing significant to report.

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[1] https://sprotyv.org dot ua/kreml-gotuye-deportaciyu-ukrainciv-z-tot-do-sybiru/; https://t.me/sprotyv_official/7926
[2] government dot ru/docs/47638/
[3] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/business/articles/2025/11/07/1152865-shoigu-v-krasnoyarske-pristupil-k-sibirizatsii-rossii
[4] https://fedpress dot ru/news/54/society/3191764; government dot ru/docs/47638/; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/25553329; https://www.rbc dot ru/economics/06/11/2025/690c82d99a7947895ed7e661; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/business/articles/2025/11/07/1152865-shoigu-v-krasnoyarske-pristupil-k-sibirizatsii-rossii
[5] https://www.rbc dot ru/economics/06/11/2025/690c82d99a7947895ed7e661
[6] https://cceis.hse dot ru/data/2025/07/16/1983422830/ПоворотнаВосток2_0,илиСибиризацияРоссии.pdf
[7] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/24-210-0120ISW20Occupation20playbook.pdf
[8] https://dan-news dot ru/exclusive/pochti-20-tys.-detej-iz-dnr-otdohnuli-v-etom-godu-za-predelami-regiona/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/24-210-0120ISW20Occupation20playbook.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-june-19-2025/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-28-2025/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-may-19-2025/
[12] https://zonews dot ru/news/v-berdjanske-proshel-pervyj-forum-pravoslavnoj-molodezhi/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-april-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-may-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-21-2025/
[14] https://ria dot ru/20251116/dnr-2055303295.html ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8209987 ; https://dan-news dot ru/obschestvo/v-dnr-razrabotajut-koncepciju-voennogo-turizma/
[15] https://rg dot ru/2025/11/17/reg-dnr/v-dnr-vvedut-voennyj-turizm-dlia-osmysleniia-roli-donbassa-v-istorii-strany.html
[16] https://ria dot ru/20251116/dnr-2055303812.html
[17] https://lug-info dot ru/news/otkrytie-centra-voenno-patrioticheskogo-vospitanija-redut-sostojalos-v-luganske/
[18] https://dan-news dot ru/exclusive/bolshinstvo-uchebnyh-zavedenij-dnr-prisoedinilis-k-shkole-minprosveschenija/; https://dan-news dot ru/exclusive/znanija.-tradicii.-otechestvo.-obzor-novoj-kadetskoj-shkoly-internata-v-donecke/
[19] https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1167454-bilsist-z-krimu-rosia-primusovo-mobilizuvala-majze-47-tisac-ziteliv-tot/
[20] https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1167454-bilsist-z-krimu-rosia-primusovo-mobilizuvala-majze-47-tisac-ziteliv-tot/
[21] https://www.unian dot net/war/plen-vsu-kazhdyy-shestoy-rossiyskiy-voennoplennyy-yavlyaetsya-grazhdaninom-ukrainy-13200291.html#goog_rewarded
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_28-11/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-13/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-13/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_5-12/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-november-6-2025/
[23] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/25626443
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-october-30-2025/
[25] https://dan-news dot ru/obschestvo/medvedev-rasskazal-skolko-molodogvardejcev-vosstanavlivaet-donbass/
[26] https://dan-news dot ru/politics/putin-otmetil-geroicheskie-usilija-molodogvardejcev-po-zaschite-rodiny/
[27] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2023; https://www.warchild.org.uk/sites/default/files/2025-09/Return_Every_Child_Report_WCUK.pdf
[28] http://kremlin dot ru/acts/news/78475; http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202511170011?pageSize=10&index=1
[29] https://ctrcenter dot org/uk/rf-planuye-prytyagaty-ditej-vid-14-rokiv-do-kryminalnoyi-vidpovidalnosti-za-dyversiyu-ta-teroryzm
[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-october-2-2025/
[31] https://t.me/Aksenov82/8519;
https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1165256-okupanti-zaavili-so-vitratat-69-milariv-vid-nacionalizacii-majna-na-proekti-v-krimu/
[32] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-july-17-2025/
[33] https://krymsos dot com/krymsos-naczionalizacziya-obyektiv-prava-vlasnosti-instrument-tysku-na-neloyalnyh-meshkancziv-krymu/
[34] https://t.me/va_konstantinov/6757

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