Toplines
The Kremlin is setting information conditions to reject any meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine by threatening Europe. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed on December 10 that, although Russia does not intend to go to war with Europe, the Kremlin will respond to “any hostile steps,” such as the deployment of European military contingents to Ukraine and the seizure of frozen Russian assets.[1] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa similarly claimed on December 10 that Russia will deliberately target any European military contingents deployed to Ukraine.[2] Lavrov’s and Chepa’s statements come amid US, Ukrainian, and European discussions about providing security guarantees to Ukraine.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 9 that US, Ukrainian, and European negotiators will discuss security guarantees for Ukraine during an upcoming security council-level meeting on an unspecified date.[4] The Kremlin is likely setting information conditions to undermine Ukrainian and Western efforts to secure meaningful security guarantees, such as the deployment of military contingents or other military assistance, against possible renewed Russian aggression in the future.
The Kremlin preemptively rejected the legitimacy of any future Ukrainian government that it does not directly control in response to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s recent statements that he is ready to hold elections before the end of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Zelensky stated on December 9 that he is ready to hold elections in Ukraine as early as the next 60 to 90 days and asked the United States and European countries to provide election security.[5] Zelensky tasked Ukrainian parliamentarians with preparing legislative proposals to change the Ukrainian law that bans elections during martial law, likely referring to Ukraine’s Constitution.[6] Kremlin officials responded negatively to Zelensky’s statement, despite previous Kremlin demands that Ukraine hold elections as a prerequisite for any peace negotiations or agreement ending the war.[7] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on December 10 that the Kremlin has not discussed Zelensky’s willingness to hold elections and will continue to monitor the situation as it unfolds.[8] Peskov added that Russian President Vladimir Putin has long discussed the “need” for elections in Ukraine. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Zelensky of “cynicism” and claimed that his request for the United States and Europe to provide security for the elections indicates that Ukraine has lost its sovereignty.[9] Russian Ambassador-at-Large and former Russian occupation official Rodion Miroshnik claimed that Zelensky’s readiness to hold elections is an “arrogant bluff” and a “manipulation” of Ukraine’s election rules and implied that Russia will oppose any US or European efforts to ensure election security in Ukraine.[10] Miroshnik insinuated that Zelensky cannot be ready to hold elections, given that Ukraine canceled the regularly scheduled elections in May 2024 and reiterated the Kremlin’s false narrative about Zelensky’s illegitimacy. Russian state media also platformed on December 10 statements from Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk — a close personal ally of Putin who Putin initially aimed to replace Zelensky following Russia’s full-scale invasion — calling for Zelensky’s forced removal from office and criticizing the ongoing peace talks.[11] The Kremlin’s responses to Zelensky are consistent with Putin’s November 27 statements that Russia is only interested in signing peace agreements with a pro-Russian government in Ukraine and that the Ukrainian government would need to take additional steps beyond the elections before the Kremlin would consider signing any peace agreements.[12] Kremlin officials’ reactions to the prospect of elections in Ukraine further demonstrate that Russia continues to make excuses to stall any peace negotiations that do not equate to anything short of Ukraine’s surrender.
The Kremlin once again rejected the Ukrainian-proposed ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes and signaled Russia’s commitment to destroying the Ukrainian power grid in the winter months. Zelensky stated on December 9 that Ukraine is ready to agree to an “energy truce” with Russia and implied that Ukraine would halt its strikes against Russian energy infrastructure if Russia ceased its strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[13] Ukrainian forces have been systematically targeting Russian oil refineries across Russia in 2025, undermining Russian revenue streams that directly fund its war effort.[14] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected Zelensky’s energy infrastructure ceasefire offer on December 10, stating that Russia is “working towards peace, not a ceasefire.”[15] Lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev accused Zelensky, the United Kingdom, and the European Union of attempting to “trick” Russia into a temporary ceasefire, likely in an attempt to justify Russia’s refusal.[16] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa, similarly attempted to justify Russia’s refusal by falsely accusing Ukraine of violating a prior US-brokered energy infrastructure ceasefire in March 2025.[17] Russia and Ukraine never agreed to any formal terms for the ceasefire, which Russia unilaterally claimed began on March 18 and did not renew.[18] ISW assessed in Spring 2025 that the Kremlin exploited the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire’s vague and unfinalized terms in order to accuse Ukraine of violating the agreements.[19] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger asserted that Russia must fully destroy Ukraine’s power grid and that failing to do so could undermine Russia’s offensive operations in Ukraine.[20] Russian forces recently intensified large combined missile and drone strike campaigns against Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of the Winter 2025-2026 heating season and appear to be launching these combined strikes every seven to 10 days in an effort to break Ukraine’s power grid.[21]
Available open-source information indicates that Russian forces have not yet seized Pokrovsk, but the situation in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area remains difficult. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but will take more time and suffer more casualties to do so. Geolocated footage published on December 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces are operating along the Donetska Railway in northwestern Pokrovsk and in northwestern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), having either maintained or recently recaptured these positions.[22] The situation for Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket remains serious, however. Russian forces continue to infiltrate into central and western Myrnohrad.[23] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are simultaneously assaulting Myrnohrad itself and its flanks and are interdicting Ukrainian logistics.[24] The Ukrainian spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces only have limited opportunities to conduct rotations due to Russian strikes and infiltration missions, requiring careful preparation for each rotation mission. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are continuing air strikes against Ukrainian fortified positions and trying to combine large strike series with ground operations. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are operating armored vehicles near Pokrovsk, and the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported that elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division took advantage of poor weather conditions to conduct a mechanized assault from southern to northern Pokrovsk.[25] Geolocated footage published on December 10 shows Russian forces conducting a platoon-sized mechanized assault in western Pokrovsk.[26] These reports indicate that Russian forces have been able to transport at least some vehicles into Pokrovsk after Ukrainian interdiction efforts successfully prevented Russian mechanized and motorized vehicle operations in the Pokrovsk direction in mid-November 2025.[27] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi indicated on December 10 that Ukrainian forces still operate in northern Pokrovsk but acknowledged that there were no Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk on an unspecified prior date, suggesting that Ukrainian forces have recently retaken limited positions within the town.[28] Syrskyi acknowledged that Ukrainian forces withdrew from the Sukhyi Yar, Lysivka, and Novopavlivka areas south to southeast of Pokrovsk on an unspecified prior date.
Ukrainian forces struck a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in the Black Sea region with unmanned surface vehicles (USV) on December 10. Ukrainian intelligence sources told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on December 10 that Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and the Ukrainian Navy struck the DASHAN oil tanker with Sea Baby USVs in the Black Sea, severely damaging the tanker and forcing it to cease operations.[29] The Ukrainian intelligence sources stated that the DASHAN oil tanker was en route toward Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai; flew the Comoro Islands flag; and carried about $60 million of petroleum products at the time of the strike. Footage published on December 10 shows at least two USVs striking the tanker.[30] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the DASHAN was in the Black Sea south of occupied Feodosia, Crimea at the time of the strike.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have struck four oil tankers in the past two weeks.[32] Ukrainian forces used Sea Baby USVs to strike the KAIRO and VIRAT oil tankers, both part of Russia’s shadow fleet, in late November 2025.[33]
Russia may be setting conditions to threaten Odesa Oblast from Russian-occupied Transnistria in an effort to fix Ukrainian forces in southwestern Ukraine. Sources in Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR)’s Public Administration told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on December 10 that the Kremlin is attempting to strengthen its presence in Transnistria by calling up reservists, bringing weapons out of storage, and launching drone production and training centers in Transnistria.[34] The GUR sources warned that these measures will increase the risk of Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups infiltrating into Odesa Oblast from Transnistria. Odesa Oblast borders Russian-occupied Transnistria to the west, and the capital of Tiraspol is about 80 kilometers from Odesa City – meaning that the deployment of Russian drone units to occupied Transnistria places Odesa City within range of Russian mid-range drone strikes. Russian forces have been successfully conducting strikes into Ukrainian rear areas at an operational depth (about 25 to 100 kilometers) across the theater using specialized drone units and likely could transfer some of these capabilities to units stationed in Transnistria.[35] The Kremlin likely seeks to divert Ukrainian resources away from the frontline and near-rear by forcing Ukrainian forces to defend against infiltration missions and drone strikes in Odesa Oblast. The GUR’s warning comes as the Kremlin has been reigniting narratives in recent weeks claiming that Odesa City is a Russian city and threatening future aggression against Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts.[36] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is setting conditions to justify future Russian efforts to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts, although Russia remains unlikely to be able to conduct such offensive operations in the near-term and will likely focus on bringing to bear asymmetric capabilities such as limited infiltration and operational-depth drone strikes.[37]
Key Takeaways
- The Kremlin is setting information conditions to reject any meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine by threatening Europe.
- The Kremlin preemptively rejected the legitimacy of any future Ukrainian government that it does not directly control in response to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s recent statements that he is ready to hold elections before the end of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
- The Kremlin once again rejected the Ukrainian-proposed ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes and signaled Russia’s commitment to destroying the Ukrainian power grid in the winter months.
- Available open-source information indicates that Russian forces have not yet seized Pokrovsk, but the situation in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area remains difficult. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but will take more time and suffer more casualties to do so.
- Ukrainian forces struck a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in the Black Sea region with unmanned surface vehicles (USV) on December 10.
- Russia may be setting conditions to threaten Odesa Oblast from Russian-occupied Transnistria in an effort to fix Ukrainian forces in southwestern Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Oleksandrivka.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in The Russian Federation
Nothing Significant To Report.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Khrapovshchyna, and Oleksiivka on December 9 and 10.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka (north of Sumy City), Kindrativka, and Sadky (both northeast of Sumy City).[39]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on December 10 that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) lack sufficient manpower to sustain offensive operations near Oleksiivka and are only able to conduct sporadic casualty evacuations.[40] The milblogger added that elements of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) are continuing limited assault operations near Yablunivka and Khrapovshchyna.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 2nd Battalion of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction.[41] Drone operators of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Stetskivka (north of Sumy City).[42] Elements of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy and Chernihiv border areas.[43]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City.
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on December 10 that Russian forces seized the Vovchansk Technical School in central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[44]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Vilcha and within and near Lyman (both south of Vovchansk).[45]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near and within Vovchansk and near Starytsia, Synelnykove, Prylipka, Lyman, and toward Izbytske on December 9 and 10.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lyman.[47]
The Russian military command may deprioritize the Kupyansk (southeast of Vovchansk) effort to reprioritize the Vovchansk effort. Mashovets reported that the slow Russian rate of advance in the Vovchansk direction is unacceptable to the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces military command and that Russia plans to redeploy elements of the 14th Army Corps (AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) from the Kupyansk direction to the Vovchansk direction to facilitate intensified offensive operations and more rapid advances.[48] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces will also intensify strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk from the west, southwest, and south in the near future. Russian forces recently struck the Pechenihy Reservoir Dam and a bridge near Staryi Saltiv (east of Kharkiv City and roughly 16 kilometers from the frontline), forcing Ukrainian authorities to close the T-2111 Chuhuiv-Velykyi Burluk road near Pechenihy (southeast of Kharkiv City and roughly 40 kilometers from the front line) and the T-2104 Kharkiv City-Vovchansk-Chuhunivka highway near Staryi Saltiv.[49]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating on the northern outskirts of Vilcha.[50] Artillery elements of the 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie; east of Velykyi Burluk toward Obukhivka; and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske on December 9 and 10.[52]
Mashovets stated that the redeployment of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA) from the Velykyi Burluk direction to the Kupyansk direction has degraded the 6th CAA’s combat capabilities in the Velykyi Burluk direction.[53] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are not making significant advances in attempts to bypass a Ukrainian defensive position from the south along the Krasne Pershe-Novovasylivka line (both southeast of Velykyi Burluk and north of Kupyansk) and during attacks toward Ridkodub (southeast of Velykyi Burluk and north of Kupyansk) and near Milove and Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2
Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on December 10 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[54]
Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk toward Kutkivka; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Kurylivka on December 9 and 10.[55] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk and from Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk) and Radkivka (north of Kupyansk).[56]
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on December 9 that the intensity of fighting in the Kupyansk direction has somewhat decreased compared to recent weeks.[57] Trehubov reported that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Kupyansk from the west and south but are not making significant advances. Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces managed to trap Russian forces in Kupyansk and that Russian forces in northern Kupyansk are now facing attrition as Russia cannot extend logistics to these positions.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 3rd Separate Drofa Drone Battalion (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[58]
Russian forces continued attacks northeast of Borova toward Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Hrekivka on December 9 and 10, but did not advance.[59]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on December 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka and Yarova and toward Oleksandrivka and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; and east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske on December 9 and 10.[60]
A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian advances toward Siversk have slowed as Russian forces are only infiltrating into Lyman from the forests to the east.[61] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are prioritizing eliminating the Ukrainian salients near Zarichne and Stavky and assessed that Russian forces will soon focus offensive operations on Lyman’s flanks to cut off the town from ground lines of communication (GLOCs).
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 10 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Siversk and north of Pazeno (southwest of Siversk).[62] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces control 90 percent of Siversk and refuted Russian claims that Russian forces fully seized Siversk.[63] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced in about 2.2 percent and infiltrated within about 38.5 percent of Siversk as of December 10, and does not yet assess that Russian forces have seized the settlement. Ukraine’s Eastern Operational Command refuted claims that Russian forces control the town, and reported that Russian forces continue to conduct ostentatious flag raising missions within the town to aggrandize Russian advances.[64]
Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Yampil and Zakitne and toward Ozerne; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Zvanivka and Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka, Vasyukivka, and Svyato-Pokrovske on December 9 and 10.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that western Siversk is a contested “gray zone.”[66]
A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that the situation for Ukrainian forces in Siversk is “difficult” and that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are infiltrating into northern and southern Siversk.[67] The NCO noted that Ukrainian fortifications east of Siversk slowed Russian advances in the area, forcing Russian forces to infiltrate under the cover of foggy weather on Ukrainian flanks. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that the area near Siversk remains a large contested “gray zone” and noted that Russian forces are taking advantage of the chaotic situation to conduct small group infiltrations in fireteams of up to five servicemembers.[68] The brigade reported that Russian forces are unable to recover disabled armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) from previous mechanized assaults due to Ukrainian remote mining and drone interdiction.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 6th, 7th, and 123rd motorized rifle brigades (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Siversk.[69] Elements of the 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Yampil (northwest of Siversk).[70] Elements of the 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Pazeno and Vasyukivka (southwest of Siversk).[71]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on December 10 that Russian forces maintain positions in southeastern Kostyantynivka, indicating that Russian forces likely advanced to southeastern Kostyantynivka to conduct infiltrations.[72]
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Mashovets reported on December 10 that Russian forces maintain positions in southern and southeastern Kostyantynivka.[73] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along the Donetska railway in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[74] The Russian milblogger amplified an alleged Russian servicemember who claimed that Russian forces only control several homes within Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka), which Russian sources claimed to have fully seized as of December 7.[75] The Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence near Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka), noting that it is premature to make claims of Russian advances within Kostyantynivka.[76] Mashovets noted that Russian forces are unable to consolidate near Stupochky and Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka and just southwest of Stupochky).[77] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger noted that Russian logistical difficulties make Russian advances deeper into Kostyantynivka risky, and that Russian forces within Kostyantynivka are limited to small groups.[78]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar and toward Bondarne; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on December 9 and 10.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mayske and Virolyubivka (both north of Kostyantynivka).[80]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk (Kostyantynivka) direction reported on December 10 that bad weather reduces Russian artillery strikes as Russian artillery elements are dependent on drone reconnaissance for counter-battery operations.[81] The spokesperson noted that deteriorating road conditions as a result of poor weather force Russian forces to move on foot, carrying large amounts of equipment by hand rather than on motorcycles. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces continue to take advantage of poor weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone operations to conduct infiltration missions in fireteams of up to five servicemembers. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported that Russian forces are intensifying assaults toward Kostyantynivka and increasing the number of servicemembers deployed in each assault, taking advantage of foggy and cold weather conditions.[82]
Mashovets reported that the Russian military command is continuing attacks near Kostyantynivka due to its desire to report successes in the battle for Kostyantynivka and to isolate Ukrainian forces that continue to maintain a presence near Chasiv Yar.[83] Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 3rd AC (under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) operating from Bila Hora (east of Kostyantynivka) and the 8th CAA (SMD) operating from Pleshchiivka are attempting to advance into Kostyantynivka itself. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are attempting to reach the T-0594 Kostyantynivka-Bakhmut road and advance toward Kostyantynivka through Stupochky and Predtechyne.[84]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian equipment in the Kostyantynivka direction.[85] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (both of the Pacific Fleet), 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet), and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.[86]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on December 10 date but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Ivanivka and toward Novyi Donbas on December 9 and 10.[87]
A Russian milblogger claimed that the significant quantities of Ukrainian drones in the Dobropillya direction are impeding Russian forces’ operations.[88]
Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA), the 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA), and the 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya salient.[89]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
See topline text for assessed Ukrainian advances, refinements of areas under Russian claims, and assessed Russian infiltrations in the Pokrovsk direction.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), southeast of Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk), and east of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[90]
Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi (Chervonyi) Lyman, Razine, Bilytske, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad and Sukhetske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Zvirove, Novomykolaivka, and Molodetske on December 9 and 10.[91]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Bilytske and Starlink terminals in Myrnohrad.[92] Elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones over Myrnohrad.[93] Assault elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly continuing to operate in Myrnohrad.[94] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian forces in northwestern Myrnohrad and western Pokrovsk.[95] Drone operators and other elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Sukhetske and striking Ukrainian forces near Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk).[96] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) reportedly continue to operate in Rodynske.[97] Drone operators and other elements of the 137th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) and the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division [MRD], 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovks direction.[98] TOS-2 thermobaric artillery elements of the 10th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Regiment (41st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[99]
Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Yalta, Filiya, and Dachne on December 9 and 10 but did not advance.[100]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on December 10 but did not advance.
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 10 shows Ukrainian forces operating on the northern outskirts of Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka) – an area where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[101]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Stepove, Vorone, Sosnivka, Vyshneve, Verbove, and Krasnohirske on December 9 and 10.[102] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tykhe (east of Oleksandrivka).[103]
A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Oleksandrivka direction stated on December 10 that the Russian military command is deploying additional elements of the 29th CAA (EMD) to fight in this direction after resting and reconstituting.[104] The Ukrainian commander reported that Russian forces continue to exploit poor weather conditions and use infiltration tactics to advance in the Oleksandrivka direction.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly conducting FAB glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Mayak (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[105]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on December 9 indicates that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) advanced in central Ostapivske (north of Hulyaipole at the junction of the Haichur and Yanchur rivers).[106] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces’ ability to cross the Haichur River will likely be the determining factor in Russia’s ability to make operationally significant advances further westward towards Hulyaipole, and Russian advances across the river near Ostapivske could threaten to isolate Ukrainian forces near Hulyaipole from Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovske-Oleksandrivka area (north of Hulyaipole along the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway).[107]
Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on December 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in eastern Hulyaipole in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[108]
Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole; north of Hulyaipole near Danylivka, Andriivka, Yehorivka, and Dobropillya, and toward Zelene and Varvarivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Rybne, and Pryvilne; and east of Hulyaipole near Zatyshshya on December 9 and 10.[109] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near and within Hulyaipole, west of Dobropillya, and near Ostapivske.[110]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly conducting FAB guided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Bratske (northwest of Hulyaipole).[111] Drone operators and other elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade, the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade, and the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (all of the 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Hulyaipole.[112] Thermobaric artillery elements of the 25th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological, and Chemical Defense Regiment (5th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Hulyaipole.[113]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Western Zaporizhia direction on December 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and Bilohirya, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Stepove, Shcherbaky, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on December 9 and 10.[114]
A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported that Ukrainian forces only employ tanks in direct fire mode in exceptional cases, mainly to repel Russian mechanized assaults when artillery and first person view (FPV) drone operators are insufficient to disable Russian armored fighting vehicles (AFVs).[115]
Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Prymorske.[116] Drone operators of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian communications antennas and positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[117]
Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that its elements struck two 1L125 Nyuby-SV radars and a 9A83 launcher for an S-300V surface-to-air missile (SAM) system at unspecified locations in the Zaporizhzhia direction.[118]
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on December 10 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on December 9 and 10.[119]
The Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration reported on December 10 that Russian forces shelled a hospital in Kherson City.[120] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 10 that Russian forces strike apartment buildings regardless of civilian presence and threatened to strike Ukrainian State Emergency Service personnel responding to Russian strikes against Karantynnyi Island (west of Kherson City).[121]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kherson City.[122] Drone operators and artillery elements of the 98th VDV Division are also reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Ponyativka, Mykilske (northeast of Kherson City), Prydniprovske, and Antonivka (both east of Kherson City).[123] Elements of the 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[124] Artillery elements of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City) direction.[125]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 80 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, of which roughly 50 were Shahed-type drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[126] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 50 drones and that 29 drones struck seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, residential, industrial, and civilian infrastructure in Sumy, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Chernihiv oblasts.[127]
Ukrainian and international reporting indicate that recent Russian strikes continue to generate significant civilian harm and infrastructure disruption. Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that 94,647 households in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast between December 1 and 7 were left without power after Russian drone strikes damaged energy infrastructure.[128] The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported on December 10 that civilian causalities in Ukraine are 24 percent higher in 2025 than during the same period in 2024, attributing a significant share to Russian strikes, and confirmed that Russian attacks killed 1,420 civilians and injured 6,545 over the previous six months, including medical workers, journalists, emergency responders, and humanitarian personnel.[129]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed a law on December 9 ratifying the agreement between Belarus and Russia on the formation of a unified electricity market within the Union State framework.[130] The agreement reportedly establishes the legal basis for the Union State to establish, operate, and develop unified electricity markets and defines the purchase and sale of energy procedures.
Lukashenko also signed a law on December 9 ratifying the intergovernmental agreement between Belarus and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on trade in the service and investment sectors.[131] The agreement reportedly creates a free trade zone in service industries between Belarus and the UAE and establishes guarantees for maintaining trading conditions.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
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[2] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/12/10/v-rossii-rasskazali-ob-otvete-na-vvod-voysk-stran-evropy-na-ukrainu/
[3] https://x.com/GiorgiaMeloni/status/1998479953126633794 ; https://suspilne dot media/1185198-prezident-finlandii-vvazae-so-mirna-ugoda-dla-ukraini-zaraz-blizca-niz-bud-koli/; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-09/finland-s-stubb-says-quite-close-to-peace-deal-in-ukraine
[4] https://suspilne dot media/1185160-zelenskij-rozpoviv-pro-nastupni-kroki-sodo-mirnogo-planu/
[5] https://suspilne dot media/1185154-zelenskij-zaaviv-so-zvernuvsa-do-ssa-ta-evropi-abi-voni-zabezpecili-bezpecne-provedenna-prezidentskih-viboriv/
[6] https://zakon.rada.gov dot ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80#Text
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[10] https://tass dot ru/politika/25863737
[11] https://smotrim dot ru/article/4820362; https://t.me/tass_agency/352314
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[13] https://suspilne dot media/1184284-castina-sum-znestrumlena-cerez-ataku-rf-na-shodi-pid-cas-bojovogo-polotu-zaginuv-pilot-1385-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1765307055&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
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[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2025/
[20] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/12/10/raskryt-proschet-zelenskogo-po-energeticheskomu-peremiriyu/; https://t.me/yurasumy/25955
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[22] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1998578513415385297; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/817
[23] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DSEobkyjKNg/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=NTc4MTIwNjQ2YQ==; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1998698285268168899?s=20; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10745; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1998761756374822990 https://t.me/kyriienko_press/552; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10747
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[25] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/881; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1185876-pocali-aktivni-dii-z-samogo-ranku-u-pokrovsku-sili-oboroni-vidbivaut-mehanizovanij-sturm-okupantiv/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/10/shukaty-progalyny-stvoryuvaty-tochky-tysku-v-rajoni-myrnograda-osnovnyj-akczent-okupantiv-na-infiltracziyu-pihoty/
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[28] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1185118-na-pevnomu-etapi-u-pokrovsku-ne-bulo-nasih-vijsk-sirskij-pro-oboronu-pokrovska-i-mirnograda/
[29] https://suspilne dot media/1186044-sbu-atakuvali-se-odin-tanker-tinovogo-flotu-rosii/
[30] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1998810743094084016
[31] https://t.me/rybar/75868
[32] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105406; https://t.me/rybar/75868
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/
[34] https://suspilne dot media/1185636-rf-aktivizuetsa-u-pridnistrovi-perekidae-agentiv-specsluzb-ta-rozgortae-virobnictvo-droniv-dzerela/
[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2025/
[36] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32407 ;
https://t.me/severnnyi/5981 ;
[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/31007
[40] https://t.me/severnnyi/5981
[41] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105388
[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37215
[43] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/190076
[44] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3129
[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37221; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37245
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32433; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19796; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32407 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19795; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32405; https://t.me/wargonzo/31007; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14796
[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37221; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37245
[48] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3129
[49] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/
[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3129
[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/59269
[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37221; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37245; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32433; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19796
[53] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3128
[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/31007 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14796
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32433; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19796 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32407;https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19795; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32405; https://t.me/wargonzo/31007; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14796
[56] https://t.me/dva_majors/84740 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/5979; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/23611; https://t.me/wargonzo/31007 ;
[57] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/09/vytyagnuly-kyshku-yaka-zavysla-sama-po-sobi-u-kupyansku-rosiyany-potrapyly-v-klasychnu-pastku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uu50wPIJ4ps
[58] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45825;
https://t.me/motopatriot78/45840 ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/84764 ;
https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/09/vytyagnuly-kyshku-yaka-zavysla-sama-po-sobi-u-kupyansku-rosiyany-potrapyly-v-klasychnu-pastku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uu50wPIJ4ps
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32433; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19796 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32407;https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19795; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32405
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32433; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19796 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32407;https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19795; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32405; https://t.me/tass_agency/352305; https://t.me/wargonzo/31007
[61] https://t.me/rybar/75859
[62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45857; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45856; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45842
[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45856; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45804
[64] https://www.facebook.com/EastOC/posts/pfbid0XkeKvHKANXknQgVSMV4swU4gC3ywApDasWjtVTFWshThH9ECbQoifYsMAyqM1p2Zl?locale=uk_UA; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1185560-ok-shid-zaperecilo-okupaciu-siverska-na-doneccini/
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32433; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32407; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32405; https://t.me/dva_majors/84740; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37210; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37235; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37245; https://t.me/wargonzo/31007
[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37235; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37245
[67] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/10/zi-shodu-jomu-ne-vdayetsya-rosiyany-prosochuyutsya-v-siversk-z-pivdnya-ta-pivnochi/
[68] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/10/miska-pastka-siverska-vorozhi-grupy-znykayut-u-kilzoni-pid-kontrolem-ukrayinskyh-droniv/; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1EtZ3hyqrs/
[69] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45856; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45857
[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45825; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45840
[71] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45842
[72] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3131
[73] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3131
[74] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45822; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/190121
[75] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45818; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/
[76] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45811
[77] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3131
[78] https://t.me/rybar/75865
[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32433; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32407; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32405; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37210; https://t.me/wargonzo/31007
[80] https://t.me/wargonzo/31007
[81] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/10/zazvychaj-tyagnut-iz-soboyu-bauly-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-pogoda-vplyvaye-na-taktyku-ataky-ta-oborony/
[82] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/10/likvidacziya-z-rozlotom-pid-kostyantynivkoyu-rosijski-shturmovi-grupy-nyshhat-vydovyshhno/
[83] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3131
[84] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3130
[85] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14719
[86] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3130
[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32433; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32407; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32405; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45823; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37242; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37245
[88] https://t.me/rusich_army/27244
[89] https://t.me/dva_majors/84747; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45825 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45840 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/17999
[90] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45834; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45833; https://t.me/rusich_army/27244
[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32433 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32407 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32405 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45834 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37242 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37245
[92] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14712; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14717
[93] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14706
[94] https://t.me/mod_russia/59280; https://t.me/mod_russia/59278
[95] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1998578513415385297; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/817; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1998578513415385297; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/817
[96] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45837
[97] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45815
[98] https://t.me/dva_majors/84746; https://t.me/Sib_army/8610
[99] https://t.me/mod_russia/59289
[100] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32433; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32407; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32405
[101] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1998811758644142561; https://t.me/pj_notes/2077
[102] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32433 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32407; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13448 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32405
[103] https://t.me/rusich_army/27255
[104] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uu50wPIJ4ps; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/10/vvodyat-v-omanu-svoye-komanduvannya-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-vorog-vidpravlyaye-v-bij-svizhi-pidrozdily/
[105] https://t.me/voin_dv/17997
[106] https://t.me/voin_dv/17988; https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/1998447613386043620?s=20; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22887; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10742; https://x.com/GeoRaccoon/status/1998535558214156305
[107] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/
[108] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10743; https://t.me/stepova_61/1687
[109] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32433 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32407; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13448 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32405 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31007 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/84740 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/17998
[110] https://t.me/dva_majors/84740 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/17993
[111] https://t.me/voin_dv/17997
[112] https://t.me/voin_dv/17993 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/18001
[113] https://t.me/voin_dv/17996
[114] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32433; https://t.me/wargonzo/31007; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37206; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37210; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37234
[115] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/09/yak-zminyuyetsya-rol-tankiv-na-vijni-65-ta-brygada-pokazala-robotu-svoyih-ekipazhiv-na-orihivskomu-napryamku/; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0xLVSP5VbKpmTNp5qBmXqmYXCbLbmFEd2h82krsFrTCvmrFy3MqG6yx1iyzh7fo9tl&id=100085694807468&rdid=i1gIeZp7wklr37BU
[116] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37215; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37209; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37210; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37211; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37220
[117] https://t.me/wargonzo/31006
[118] https://t.me/risk_dept/205; https://t.me/DIUkraine/7481
[119] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32433; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32407; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13448; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32405
[120] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/47107; https://suspilne dot media/kherson/1185782-armia-rf-obstrilala-likarnu-u-dniprovskomu-rajoni-hersona-poranenij-pracivnik-medzakladu/
[121] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31225; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31230; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31233
[122] https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/2811; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31276
[123] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31212; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31215; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31218; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31221
[124] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37215
[125] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37215
[126] https://t.me/kpszsu/49413
[127] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/54633 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/10/vorog-atakuvav-obyekty-infrastruktury-na-sumshhyni-ta-odeshhyni/ ; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/26221 ; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1185216-rosijskij-bezpilotnik-atakuvav-civilnij-obekt-u-korukivskomu-rajoni-vinikla-pozeza/ ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/26251 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1185214-vijska-rf-atakuvali-tri-rajoni-dnipropetrovsini-zaginuv-colovik-se-dvoe-poraneni/ ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/16rfn1VmuB/ ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1185246-najbilsa-vid-pocatku-vtorgnenna-ataka-na-ananiv-na-odesini-pid-udarom-opinilasa-kriticna-infrastruktura/
[128]https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1185662-energetiki-dnipropetrovsini-vidnovili-elektropostacanna-dla-95-tisac-simej-aki-buli-znestrumleni-cerez-obstrili/
[129] https://www.youtube.com/live/l5zkULHAwnM ; https://suspilne dot media/1185488-u-2025-v-ukraini-na-24-bilse-zertv-vijni-niz-minulogo-roku-verhovnij-komisar-oon/ ; https://t.me/Ukraine_MFA/7718 ; https://suspilne dot media/1185540-mzs-ukraini-zaklikalo-miznarodnu-spilnotu-posiliti-tisk-na-rf-pisla-dopovidi-oon/
[130] https://t.me/pul_1/19419
[131] https://t.me/pul_1/19418
