Toplines
The Kremlin is setting conditions to reject the Ukrainian and European peace plan drafts after it previously rejected key points of the US-proposed 28-point peace plan that overwhelmingly benefitted Russia. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated in a TV interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on December 14 that Russia has stated its position “very clearly” and that Russia will have “strong objections” if Ukraine and Europe make amendments to the peace plan.[1] Ushakov also stated that Russia will not accept provisions related to various “territorial issues,” including any discussions of a demilitarized “buffer” zone in Donbas.[2] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a question from Zarubin about the possibility of Ukraine reneging on a peace agreement by demanding that Russia receives guarantees and a system for the implementation of any peace agreements.[3] Peskov also emphasized that the Kremlin is uninterested in reviewing the European position on the peace deal.[4] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov effectively rejected seven points of the US-proposed 28-point peace plan on December 11, including the original plan’s points on territorial swaps based on the line of contact and the provision of reliable security guarantees for Ukraine.[5]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US negotiators in Berlin, Germany on December 14 to continue negotiations to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, and German Chancellor Frederich Merz met in Berlin to discuss the 20-point peace plan.[6] Witkoff stated that negotiations will continue on December 15.[7] Ukrainian Presidential Communications Adviser Dmytro Lytvyn told Reuters that negotiations lasted for over five hours.[8]
Russian forces will likely continue to struggle to maintain the Kremlin’s desired multi-pronged offensive operations in different operational directions due to the long-term materiel and manpower costs of such operations. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian military officials have intensified exaggerated claims of advances across the frontline in recent weeks, namely focusing on the Vovchansk, Kupyansk, Siversk, Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad, and Hulyaipole directions.[9] Putin notably implied on November 27 that Russian forces would quickly translate Russian advances near Hulyaipole to operational breakthroughs in the Zaporizhia direction.[10] Russia will need to generate and concentrate substantially more manpower and materiel on each of these directions to achieve tangible operational effects, or will alternatively have to selectively prioritize offensive efforts in one frontline area, which would come at the expense of the Kremlin’s information operations that aim to falsely portray Russian forces as imminently collapsing the entire frontline.
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed on December 13 that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (GoF), which operates in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions, will need to regroup or receive troops and materiel reinforcements from other operational directions in order to continue offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction.[11] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are increasingly struggling to conduct simultaneous offensive operations in the 5th Combined Arms Army’s ([CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) area of responsibility (AOR) east and northeast of Hulyaipole and in the 36th CAA’s (EMD) AOR in the Oleksandrivka direction. Mashovets stated that the Eastern GoF’s troops and materiel are stretched along a wide frontline, which may complicate Russian forces’ further offensive operations unless the Russian military command narrows down the offensive zone near Hulyaipole or transfers additional resources from other operational directions. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces may redeploy some elements of the 36th CAA and the 29th CAA (EMD), which are currently operating in the Oleksandrivka direction, to the 5th CAA’s AoR over the coming weeks. Mashovets argued that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division and 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA) will be unable to imminently achieve tactical or operational successes. ISW assessed on December 3 that Russian forces achieved the tactical breakthrough northeast and east of Hulyaipole in mid-November 2025, likely in part by concentrating and committing a force grouping comparable in size to the one operating in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya direction.[12] Russian forces notably redeployed elements of the 76th VDV Division to the Hulyaipole direction from Sumy Oblast in September 2025; elements of the 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) from the Central GoF’s AoR to the area between Novopavlivka and Hulyaipole; and elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 69th Separate Cover Brigade (both of 35th CAA, EMD) to the 5th CAA’s AoR northeast and east of Hulyaipole.[13]
Russian efforts to start the battle for the Fortress Belt – Ukraine’s main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014 – will likely further stretch Russian resources. Mashovets assessed that offensives against the Fortress Belt’s Slovyansk and Kramatorsk strongholds would require the Russian military command to fully commit troops and materiel from the Western, Southern, and Central GoFs, and that Russian forces will not be able to get “distracted” on other directions, such as the Velykyi Burlyk or Orikhiv directions.[14] Mashovets added that Russia’s strategic challenges, such as problems with its domestic war-time economy and the defense industrial base (DIB), will also negatively impact Russia’s ability to generate sufficient forces and materiel for multi-pronged offensives. Russia will likely need to concentrate even more forces and deprioritize other frontline sectors to exploit tactical advances around Hulyaipole or to attempt to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast. The Kremlin is therefore making territorial demands of unoccupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts because it cannot militarily seize these regions at this time.
Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to degrade Russia’s oil refining and military capabilities in Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 14 that Ukrainian forces struck the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai, causing explosions and a large-scale fire.[15] Geolocated footage published on December 14 shows largescale fire on the refinery’s territory.[16] Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi reported that the refinery has a processing capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year and produces gasoline, diesel fuel, and other petroleum products.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces additionally struck the Uryupinsk Oil Depot in Volgograd Oblast, causing explosions and fires at the facility.[18] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov claimed that drone debris set fire to the Uryupinsk Oil Depot.[19] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on December 14 that Ukrainian forces likely targeted the Slavneft-YANOS Oil Refinery, one of Russia’s largest oil refineries, in Yaroslavl City, Yaroslavl Oblast.[20] Militarnyi reported that local Telegram channels reported witnessing explosions in the vicinity of the oil refinery.[21] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Yevraev issued a drone strike warning for unspecified areas of Yaroslavl Oblast on December 13.[22] Ukrainian forces also reportedly struck Dorogobuzhskaya Thermal Power Plant (TPP) in Smolensk Oblast, causing power outages in the region.[23]
Ukrainian forces also struck Russian military and energy infrastructure in occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 14 that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian PMM ferry bridge vehicles, and Kasta-2E2 and the 96L6E radar stations in occupied Crimea.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the 96L6E is an expensive component for Russia’s S-300 and S-400 air defense systems. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) published footage on December 14, which was later geolocated, that showed Ukrainian drone strikes on a Russian fuel train near occupied Yantarne, Crimea and on an oil depot near occupied Bitumne, Crimea.[25] Ukrainian forces also reportedly struck two oil depots in occupied Simferopol and a substation in occupied Dzhankoi, Crimea, and NASA FIRMS data indicates that there were fires at the oil depot in occupied Bitumne and at the Dzhankoi power substation.[26] Militarnyi reported that the strikes against the power substation likely caused power outages in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, and Russian occupation officials reported vast power outages in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[27] The Ukrainian SSO and the Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian drones struck two command posts of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division; a 9С19 Imbir radar station; a Volna-2 electronic warfare (EW) station; and a first-person view (FPV) drone operator training center in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian TOR-M2 anti-aircraft missile system and a Russian drone lab in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[29]
Key Takeaways
- The Kremlin is setting conditions to reject the Ukrainian and European peace plan drafts after it previously rejected key points of the US-proposed 28-point peace plan that overwhelmingly benefitted Russia.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US negotiators in Berlin, Germany on December 14 to continue negotiations to end Russia’s war in Ukraine.
- Russian forces will likely continue to struggle to maintain the Kremlin’s desired multi-pronged offensive operations in different operational directions due to the long-term materiel and manpower costs of such operations.
- Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to degrade Russia’s oil refining and military capabilities in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in The Russian Federation
See topline text for reports on recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 14 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Sadky and toward Myropillya, on December 13 and 14.[30]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on December 14 that elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade failed to rotate to unspecified positions in Sumy Oblast due to logistical problems, including an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) breaking down, and lack of communications systems.[31]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Battalion of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) and drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are operating in the Sumy direction.[32]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 14 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Synelnykove, Prylipka, and Vilcha on December 13 and 14.[33]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on December 14 that the fighting tempo in Vilcha has decreased for the first time in weeks and noted that Vilcha had been the most active sector of the Kharkiv frontline since late November 2025.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed on December 14 that first-person view (FPV) drone elements of Russian Rosgvardia special forces, possibly elements of the 116th Rosgvardia Special Purpose Brigade, and other artillery and drone elements continue to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) throughout Kharkiv Oblast.[35]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast with heavy bomber drones.[36]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 14.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2
Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on December 14 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk; northwest of Kupyansk toward Monachynivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk toward Pishchane; and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on December 13 and 14.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Myrove, Radkivka (both northwest of Kupyansk), and Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk) and partially entered Kupyansk from the south.[38]
The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems forces regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on December 13 that Ukrainian forces detonated a pipeline on an unspecified date that Russian forces previously used to infiltrate northern outskirts of Kupyansk.[39]
Order of Battle: Drone interceptor operators of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly targeting Ukrainian heavy bomber drones in the Kupyansk direction.[40] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[41]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on December 14.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA) are striking Ukrainian positions east of Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova).[42]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 14 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Novoselivka, and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on December 13 and 14.[43]
A Ukrainian milblogger published footage on December 13 showing Ukrainian forces conducting Nemesis drone strikes on Russian servicemembers in the Lyman direction.[44] The press service of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on December 14 that Ukrainian drone operators are striking Russian forces in the forests near Lyman.[45]
A Russian milblogger claimed on December 13 that Russian forces targeted Slovyansk with Geran strike drones.[46]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), equipment, and positions in the Lyman direction.[47]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 14 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Siversk.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not yet seized Svyato-Pokrovske (south of Siversk), contrary to other milbloggers’ claims.[49]
Russian forces attacked within and near Siversk; northwest of Siversk near Ozerne, Yampil, Zakitne, and Platonivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Vasyukivka on December 13 and 14.[50]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Yampil.[51]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in eastern Kostyantynivka – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[52]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on December 14 that Russian forces advanced along the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Donetsk highway north of Oleksandro-Kalynove (south of Kostyantynivka).[53]
Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar, Maiske, and Virolyubivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Kleban-Byk, Shcherbynivka, and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka, Novopavlivka, and Sofiivka on December 13 and 14.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sofiivka.[55]
The non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian mechanized brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on December 14 that Russian forces attempted to conduct a mechanized assault with two armored personnel carriers in the Kostyantynivka direction on December 12 and that Ukrainian forces repelled the assault.[56] The NCO stated that Russian forces attached metal sheets to the sides of armored vehicles in an attempt to protect against Ukrainian drones, which complicated but did not hinder Ukrainian forces’ ability to strike the armored vehicles. The NCO stated that Ukrainian forces are using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to conduct logistics and UGVs to evacuate wounded servicemembers. A Russian milblogger published footage and claimed on December 14 that Russian forces used two attack helicopters to strike Ukrainian positions with unguided air bombs near Kostyantynivka.[57]
Order of Battle: Various detachments of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and of the 1219th and 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiments (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kostyantynivka.[58] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles and communications systems near Sofiivka.[59] FPV drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly targeting Ukrainian vehicles in the Kostyantynivka direction.[60]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 14 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and toward Kucheriv Yar and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on December 13 and 14.[61]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) and the 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are operating in the Dobropillya salient.[62]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on December 14 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), north of Udachne, and in western Novopidhorodne (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[63]
Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Svitle and Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on December 13 and 14.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on Pokrovsk’s northern outskirts.[65]
Ukrainian military sources posted footage on December 14 showing an attempted Russian company-sized mechanized assault near Hryshyne on December 10.[66] Ukrainian military sources reported Russian forces attempted to sever the O0525 highway between Pokrovsk and Hyshyne, and that Ukrainian forces repelled the motorized-mechanized assault with drones and artillery fire.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad, and the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) reportedly advanced south of Myrnohrad.[67]
Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne on December 13 and 14 but did not advance.[68]
Russian forces attacked east of Oleksandriivka near Oleksandrohrad and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Novoselivka, Sosnivka, Oleksiivka, Verbove, and Krasnohirske on December 13 and 14 but did not advance.[69]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 14 indicates that Russian forces advanced to the T0401 Dnipro City-Melitopol highway in southern Varvarivka (northwest of Hulyaipole and on the eastern bank of the Haichur River).[70]
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Varvarivka.[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the T0401 road in northern Hulyaipole, northwest of Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole), and southwest of Nove Zaporizhzhia (north of Hulyaipole).[72]
Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions in an area of eastern Hulyaipole that Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces held.[73]
Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya and toward Olenokostyantynivka; north of Hulyaipole near Solodke and Zlahoda; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Pryvilne and Rybne on December 13 and 14.[74]
Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 16th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (EMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Hulyaipole.[75] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) reportedly continue to conduct FAB glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces in Hulyaipole.[76] Elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Hulyaipole.[77]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 14 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv toward Lukyanivske; west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Prymorske, and Plavni; and south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka on December 13 and 14.[78]
A Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on December 13 that the battalion’s drone operators set fire to a Russian hangar with five armored vehicles in an unspecified location.[79]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[80] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating towards Lukyanivske.[81] Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA) and the BARS-37 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drones and operating in the Orikhiv direction, respectively.[82] Drone operators of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[83]
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on December 14 but did not advance.
Russian forces reportedly continued fighting on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta, including Karantynnyi Island (west of Kherson City), on December 13 and 14.[84]
A Russian milblogger claimed on December 14 that Russian forces operating near Kherson City do not have enough unmanned surface vehicles (USV) to conduct naval operations in the Dnipro River Delta.[85]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Mykilske (northeast of Kherson City).[86]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces launched a drone and missile strike against Ukraine overnight on December 13 and 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on December 14 that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast and 138 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones from Oryol and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[87] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched around 85 Shahed drones; that Ukrainian forces repelled 110 Russian drones in northern, southern, and eastern Ukraine; and that the missiles and 10 drones struck six locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that there were around 18 Russian drones remaining in Ukrainian airspace as of 0830 local time. Odesa Oblast Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported on December 14 that Russian forces damaged energy, transport, industrial, and civilian infrastructure in Odesa Oblast overnight.[88] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces targeted a railway bridge Zatoka, southwestern Odesa Oblast, with FAB glide bombs equipped with unified gliding and correction modules (UMPCs) for the first time on December 14.[89] Some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also launched up to 20 Geran (Shahed) drones against Zatoka.[90] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces launched over 1,500 strike drones, nearly 900 glide bombs, and 46 missiles over the week of December 7 through December 14.[91]
Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov observed that Russian forces started to target Ukraine with Shahed drones equipped with dual warheads weighing 100 kilograms.[92]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarusian Presidential Spokesperson Nataliya Eismont claimed that Belarus exchanged over 100 political prisoners and sent them to Ukraine on December 13 in exchange for Russian and Belarusian citizens wounded in Ukraine.[93] The Ukrainian Hochu Zhyt (I Want to Live) denied claims that the December 13 release of political prisoners from Belarus involved prisoner of war (POW) exchanges and accused the Kremlin of failing to comply with prior agreements on POW exchanges.[94]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/25906721; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/4566
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2025/
[3] https://tass dot ru/politika/25907927
[4] https://tass dot ru/politika/25907937
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/
[6] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-berlin-talks-zelenskyy-05c363add7a4a3583f3beada7b1fb775; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/17315 ; https://x.com/SEPeaceMissions/status/2000301101447516464
[7] https://x.com/SEPeaceMissions/status/2000301101447516464
[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zelenskiy-demands-dignified-peace-us-ukraine-officials-meet-berlin-2025-12-14/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/
[10] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78571
[11] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3134
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/
[14] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3135
[15] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32563
[16] https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1999986361869144092; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1999976795102409086; https://militarnyid dot com/uk/news/drony-atakuvaly-afipskyj-npz-u-krasnodarskomu-krayi/; https://t.me/astrapress/99530; https://t.me/astrapress/99532
[17] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32563; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/drony-atakuvaly-afipskyj-npz-u-krasnodarskomu-krayi/; https://t.me/astrapress/99530; https://t.me/astrapress/99532
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32563
[19] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/14/12/2025/693ded359a79477cdf7111bf; https://t.me/tass_agency/352837
[20] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/udarni-drony-vdruge-za-try-dni-atakuvaly-odyn-iz-najbilshyh-npz-u-rf/; https://t.me/astrapress/99526;
[21] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/udarni-drony-vdruge-za-try-dni-atakuvaly-odyn-iz-najbilshyh-npz-u-rf/
[22] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/12/14/ukraina-atakovala-neftebazu-v-uryupinske-i-neftezavod-v-yaroslavle; https://t.me/evraevmikhail/15727
[23] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/drony-urazyly-smolensku-gres-shho-sprychynylo-pereboyi-z-elektropostachannyam-v-oblasti/; https://t.me/supernova_plus/46499?single
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32563; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/14/sso-urazyly-potyag-z-pmm-ta-ryad-inshyh-czilej-na-donechchyni-ta-v-krymu/; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/vyderly-ochi-russkomu-triumfu-prymary-hur-v-krymu-vpoliuvaly-dvi-dorohovartisni-rls-okupantiv.html
[25] https://t.me/ukr_sof/2326; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/32428; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2000180352254402698; https://x.com/Brokenarrow42/status/2000229936796413992; https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/2000202808507728001
[26] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/vazhka-nich-dlya-rosijskoyi-ppo-syly-oborony-urazyly-dvi-naftobazy-klyuchovu-pidstantsiyu-ta-dva-radary-v-krymu/; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/90988
[27]https://t.me/tass_agency/352833; https://t.me/tass_agency/352834; https://t.me/tass_agency/352862; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/vazhka-nich-dlya-rosijskoyi-ppo-syly-oborony-urazyly-dvi-naftobazy-klyuchovu-pidstantsiyu-ta-dva-radary-v-krymu/; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/90988
[28] https://t.me/ukr_sof/2326; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32563; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/12/14/sso-urazyly-potyag-z-pmm-ta-ryad-inshyh-czilej-na-donechchyni-ta-v-krymu/; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/32428; https://t.me/andriyshTime/48380
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32563
[30]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DZtuQKvRDWkVLPQfeaCah2X39VDQVagb9nMJUzaTBmBYbVeCyjDng7DzeUCdXghcl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32542; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32540; https://t.me/wargonzo/31093; https://t.me/severnnyi/6021
[31] https://t.me/severnnyi/6026
[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37358; https://t.me/mod_russia/59407
[33]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DZtuQKvRDWkVLPQfeaCah2X39VDQVagb9nMJUzaTBmBYbVeCyjDng7DzeUCdXghcl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32542; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19805; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32540; https://t.me/wargonzo/31093; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14826
[34] https://t.me/severnnyi/6021
[35] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14826; https://t.me/milinfolive/162317
[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105600
[37]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DZtuQKvRDWkVLPQfeaCah2X39VDQVagb9nMJUzaTBmBYbVeCyjDng7DzeUCdXghcl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32540; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19805; https://t.me/wargonzo/31093; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14826; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32542
[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37384; https://t.me/wargonzo/31093
[39] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1188606-sob-uraziti-trubu-akou-rosiani-perekidali-sili-do-kupanska-znadobilosa-tri-tonni-vibuhivki-ahilles/; https://t.me/fedorenkoys/1624; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/14/try-tonny-vybuhivky-syly-oborony-pidirvaly-trubu-yakoyu-okupanty-zahodyly-v-kupyansk/
[40] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105616
[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/46222
[42] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2000056319496380477; https://t.me/boevoekteschenie/1388
[43]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DZtuQKvRDWkVLPQfeaCah2X39VDQVagb9nMJUzaTBmBYbVeCyjDng7DzeUCdXghcl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32542; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/1980; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32540
[44] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/25359
[45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/14/shrony-i-pihota-signum-vrazhaye-okupantiv-na-lymanskomu-napryamku/; https://t.me/umftteam/771
[46] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/190539
[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/59407
[48] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32987; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37372; https://t.me/motopatriot78/46238;
[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/46246; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2025/
[50]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DZtuQKvRDWkVLPQfeaCah2X39VDQVagb9nMJUzaTBmBYbVeCyjDng7DzeUCdXghcl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32542; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32540; https://t.me/wargonzo/31093; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37372
[51] https://t.me/motopatriot78/46222
[52] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2000176211847467476; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v7lg81R3FvY
[53] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32984
[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/190524; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0DZtuQKvRDWkVLPQfeaCah2X39VDQVagb9nMJUzaTBmBYbVeCyjDng7DzeUCdXghcl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32542; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32540; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37361; https://t.me/wargonzo/31093
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37361
[56] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1188726-na-kostantinivskomu-napramku-rosijska-armia-vidnovila-ataki-bronetehnikou-golovnij-serzant-93-brigadi-pro-situaciu/
[57] https://t.me/dva_majors/84995
[58] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1188726-na-kostantinivskomu-napramku-rosijska-armia-vidnovila-ataki-bronetehnikou-golovnij-serzant-93-brigadi-pro-situaciu/
[59] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14740
[60] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14742
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32565; https://t.me/wargonzo/31093; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32542; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32540
[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/84967; https://t.me/motopatriot78/46222
[63] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32981; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32977
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32565; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32542; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32540; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105620
[65] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69405; https://t.me/wargonzo/31093
[66] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/901; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1188752-armia-rf-namagalasa-sturmuvati-grisine-ataku-vidbili/; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/32413; https://t.me/taifun_army/497; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/32415; https://t.me/skala425/742; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosijska-shturmova-motokolona-ne-zmogla-proyihaty-cherez-reshtky-vid-poperednogo-shturmu-ta-bula-znyshhena/; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/32413; https://t.me/taifun_army/497
[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105620; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32981
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32565 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32542 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32540
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32565 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32542 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13457 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32540
[70] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2000119457780560159; https://t.me/Osintpen/2232; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10771; https://t.me/voin_dv/18039
[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/59390; https://t.me/mod_russia/59392; https://t.me/mod_russia/59394; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69410; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/190583; https://t.me/epoddubny/25865; https://t.me/rybar/75955; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105629; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32970; https://t.me/rusich_army/27342
[72] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/190571 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/190587 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32974;
[73] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1999948625598881878; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1999935965675360262; https://t.me/Mavic_57/80; https://t.me/voin_dv/18026
[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32565 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32542 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13457 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32540 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/84963 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31093 ; https://t.me/rybar/75955 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105629 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/190587
[75] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1999948625598881878; https://t.me/Mavic_57/80 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1999930249254191386; https://t.me/voin_dv/18031
[76] https://t.me/voin_dv/18043
[77] https://t.me/voin_dv/18041; https://t.me/voin_dv/18042
[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32565; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32542; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13457; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32540; https://t.me/wargonzo/31093; https://t.me/wargonzo/31093; https://t.me/dva_majors/85002
[79] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/roniny-vyyavyly-angar-z-rosijskoyu-tehnikoyu-ta-pidpalyly-jogo/; https://t.me/Ronins_65/775; https://militarnyi.com/uk/tag/zaporizhzhya/
[80] https://t.me/dva_majors/84996
[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/85002
[82] https://t.me/dva_majors/85002; https://t.me/mod_russia/59409
[83] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37355; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37360; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37371;
[84] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37370; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/190528 ; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31359
[85] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/25368
[86] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37358
[87] https://t.me/kpszsu/49748
[88] https://t.me/odeskaODA/12858; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1188734-rf-atakuvala-odesinu-aki-naslidki-2/
[89] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69408; https://t.me/rybar/75956; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/190596; https://t.me/epoddubny/25864
[90] https://t.me/sashakots/58416; https://t.me/epoddubny/25864; https://t.me/milinfolive/162327
[91] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/17310
[92] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6693; https://militarnyid dot com/uk/news/rosiyany-osnastyly-shahed-podvijnoyu-bojovoyu-chastynoyu-vagoyu-u-100-kg/
[93] https://belta dot by/society/view/ejsmont-bolee-100-chelovek-iz-pomilovannyh-prezidentom-otpravleny-v-ukrainu-v-obmen-na-belorusov-i-754051-2025/
[94] https://x.com/hochuzhit_com/status/1999917269808550315
