Toplines
The Kremlin positively reacted to the recently released US National Security Strategy (NSS). Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 7 that the new US NSS is “largely consistent with [Russia’s] vision” and could be a “modest guarantee” that Russia and the United States will be able to continue working toward securing a peace settlement in Ukraine.[1] Peskov stated that the Kremlin considers the NSS’s call for cooperation with Russia and refraining from listing Russia as a “direct threat” to the United States as a “positive step.”[2] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated that the updated NSS is a signal that the United States is ready to discuss issues related to the “security architecture,” likely referring to European security architecture and the role NATO plays in it.[3] Medvedev stated that the NSS “unexpectedly” aligns with Russia’s ideas about the need to share security and respect the sovereignty of states. Medvedev stated that the “window of opportunity for dialogue” is now “ajar.”
Russian forces are conducting a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in northern Kharkiv Oblast, likely to disrupt Ukrainian logistics to eventually facilitate battlefield gains. The Kharkiv Oblast Infrastructure Restoration and Development Service reported on December 7 that Russian forces struck a bridge near Staryi Saltiv (east of Kharkiv City and roughly 16 kilometers from the frontline), forcing Ukrainian authorities to close the T-2111 Chuhuiv-Velykyi Burluk road near Pechenihy (southeast of Kharkiv City and roughly 40 kilometers from the front line) and the T-2104 Kharkiv City-Vovchansk-Chuhunivka highway near Staryi Saltiv.[4] Pechenizkyi Hromada Head Oleksandr Husarov reported on December 7 that Russian forces also conducted a missile strike against the Pechenihy Reservoir Dam, forcing Ukrainian authorities to suspend traffic across the dam.[5] Geolocated footage published on December 7 shows damage to the dam after the Russian strike.[6] Russian strikes on the bridge and dam likely aim to degrade Ukrainian GLOCs supplying the Vovchansk, Velykyi Burluk, and Kupyansk directions. Ukrainian forces were reportedly prepared for this scenario, such that the effectiveness of these Russian strikes on Ukrainian logistics may be limited. The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps reported on December 7 that Russian forces have long been systematically targeting the Pechenihy Reservoir Dam with missiles, Shahed-type drones, guided glide bombs, Molniya drones, and first-person view (FPV) drones but have only started to destroy the area in recent days.[7] The 16th Army Corps noted that Ukrainian forces have long been aware of the potential risks to the dam and developed contingency plans and backup routes in the event of significant damage to the dam. Russia’s BAI campaigns involve strikes against targets in the near rear and operational rear, such as roads, railways, and bridges that support Ukrainian GLOCs.[8] Russia’s BAI campaigns aim to facilitate subsequent Russian offensive operations in the weeks and months that follow by degrading Ukraine’s ability to sustain frontline defenses. Russian strikes targeting the operational rear of the Kharkiv, Velykyi Burluk, and Kupyansk directions may aim to replicate these effects in these sectors of the front as part of preparation for intensified offensive operations. Russian forces have notably been unable to replicate the successes their months-long BAI campaign brought about in the Pokrovsk direction in other sectors of the front, however, possibly because Russia can only dedicate the necessary assets to generate these effects at scale in a single operational area at a time.[9]
Russian forces also intensified strikes against bridges near the Zaporizhia-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border. Geolocated footage published on December 6 shows Russian drone strikes against a mined bridge across the Haichur River in central Andriivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka and north of Hulyaipole).[10] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s ability to cross the Haichur River will likely be the determining factor in its ability to make operationally significant advances further westward.[11] Russian forces may have destroyed the bridge in Andriivka in order to disrupt supplies to and isolate Ukrainian forces on the river’s east bank and facilitate Russian advances in the area south of the river near Oleksandrivka. The bridge strike suggests that Russian forces are confident that they will be able to cross the river at another point or will be able to rebuild the Andriivka crossing in the future.
Balloons from Belarusian airspace continue incursions into NATO airspace in Lithuania. The Vilnius International Airport reported that it temporarily suspended operations on December 6 due to an unspecified number of balloons flying towards the airport from Belarusian airspace.[12] Lithuanian authorities have not named an actor behind the latest balloon incursion as of this writing, but aerial incursions from Belarus have forced the Vilnius International Airport to suspend operations several times in recent months.[13] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that the ongoing airspace violations are likely part of “Phase Zero” — Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[14] ISW continues to assess that Belarus is Russia’s de facto cobelligerent in the war in Ukraine, such that Belarusian incursions into NATO airspace are very likely part of Russia’s broader Phase Zero effort.[15]
Key Takeaways
- The Kremlin positively reacted to the recently released US National Security Strategy (NSS).
- Russian forces are conducting a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in northern Kharkiv Oblast, likely to disrupt Ukrainian logistics to eventually facilitate battlefield gains.
- Balloons from Belarusian airspace continue incursions into NATO airspace in Lithuania.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in The Russian Federation
Nothing Significant To Report.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in northern Sumy Oblast on December 6 and 7.
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on December 7 that current weather conditions have slightly slowed the pace of fighting in the Sumy direction.[16]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[17] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz ”Kanada” and ”Press” detachments (both of the 204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) reportedly conducting joint reconnaissance and strike operations against Ukrainian forces near Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[18] Drone operators of the 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[19] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy and Chernihiv border areas.[20]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 7 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Lyman, east of Vilcha, and in southern Vovchanski-Khutory (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[21]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vilcha, Lyman, and Synelnykove and toward Izbytske on December 6 and 7.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilcha and Prylipka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[23]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast’s border areas.[24] Elements of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Vovchansk.[25]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Kolodyazne on December 6 and 7 but did not advance.[26]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2
Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on December 7 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Kucherivka (just east of Kupyansk).[27] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 1486th Motorized Rifle Regiment (comprised of mobilized personnel, reportedly of the 6th CAA, LMD) with the claimed seizure of Kucherivka.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Kupyansk.[29]
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on December 6 and 7.[30]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on December 6 that Russian forces are struggling to make advances in the Kupyansk direction and that Russian military command likely left elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA) to hold seized positions and attack within and around Kupyansk as the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) (Moscow Military District [MMD]) no longer has sufficient forces to attack Kupyansk and the bridgehead on the Oskil River.[31] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are having significant difficulties providing logistics to their forward units as Ukrainian forces heavily target Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) through the Kindrashivka-Kalynove-Holubivka-Radkivka (all north of Kupyansk) corridor. Mashovets noted that the 68th Motorized Rifle Division and elements of the 1st GTA, likely its 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade, are having significant problems with combat capabilities within Kupyansk and in adjacent areas north of the city.
Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 121st and 122nd motorized rifle regiments (both of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division) are attacking in Kupyansk and toward Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[32]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on December 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Kolisnykivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Tverdokhlibove and toward Novoserhiivka on December 6 and 7.[33]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st GTA are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Borova.[34]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Derylove, Drobysheve, Novoselivka, Yarova, and Serednie and toward Oleksandrivka; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on December 6 and 7.[35]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[36]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 7 but did not make confirmed advances.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 6 shows a Russian servicemember operating in eastern Siversk and Russian forces raising a flag atop a building in central Siversk during what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[37]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern and southern Siversk, west of Platonivka, in eastern Zakitne (both northwest of Siversk), northwest of Ozerne (northwest of Siversk) and south of Svyato-Pokrovske.[38]
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 6 shows elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) striking a Ukrainian-occupied building in northeastern Svyato-Pokrovske (southwest of Siversk) — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[39]
Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Yampil, Zakitne, and Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka and Vasyukivka and toward Pazeno and Nykyforivka on December 6 and 7.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ozerne and Nykyforivka.[41]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have physical and fire control over the southern portion of the T-0513 Lyman-Soledar highway that passes through Svyato-Pokrovske and fire control over the northern portion of the road.[42]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly conducting reconnaissance in forested areas near Dibrova (northwest of Siversk).[43] Elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Siversk.[44] Molniya drone operators of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces in Siversk.[45]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Ivanopillya (south of Kostyantynivka).[46]
Unconfirmed Russian advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka), advanced to the outskirts of Pryvillya and Minkivka (both northeast of Kostyantynivka) and advanced near Rusyn Yar (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[47] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Virolyubivka (north of Kostyantynivka), entered northern Bezimyane, and seized Klynove (both immediately west of Virolyubivka).[48] These claims are consistent with the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) December 5 claim that Russian forces seized Bezimyane and Klynove.[49] ISW continues to assess that the Russian MoD made this claim as part of a wider Russian effort to aggrandize Russian advances for informational and political purposes and has observed Russian forces using similar tactics, such as raising flags during infiltration missions that do not change the control of terrain or the FEBA, to claim false advances for informational effects.[50]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka; north of Kostyantynivka toward Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka between Novomarkove and Minkivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and toward Berestok, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillya; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near and toward Sofiivka and Novopavlivka on December 6 and 7.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Klynove and Bezimyane.[52]
Russian milbloggers claimed on December 7 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Ukrainian-held dam along the M-03 Slovyansk-Bakhmut highway on the northeastern outskirts of Pryvillya (northeast of Kostyantynivka) to flood areas in which Russian forces are attempting to advance and extend logistics.[53] Geolocated footage published on December 7 shows the destruction of a bridge along the M-03 highway northeast of Pryvillya.[54] The destruction of the dam could impede Russian advances east in the direction of Khromivka (northeast of Pryvillya).
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Ivanopillya.[55] FPV drone operators of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sofiivka.[56] Drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[57]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on December 7 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Nove Shakhove and advanced into southern Toretske (both east of Dobropillya).[58]
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Toretske and Nove Shakhove and toward Novyi Donbas on December 6 and 7.[59]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on December 7 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Rivne (immediately east of Pokrovsk).[60] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Pokrovsk, in southern Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), north of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk), and in central Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[61]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and toward Molodetske on December 6 and 7.[62]
The Ukrainian Operation Task Force East reported on December 6 that Ukrainian forces continue operations to identify and eliminate Russian forces in Pokrovsk and prevent Russian forces from further entering Myrnohrad.[63] The Ukrainian Operation Task Force East stated that Ukrainian forces continue organizing additional logistics routes into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly interdicting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into and in Myrnohrad.[64] FPV drone operators of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Myrnohrad.[65]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on December 7 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka) and north of Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka.[66]
Russian forces attacked near and within Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Yalta and Dachne on December 6 and 7.[67]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on December 7 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on December 7 that Russian forces advanced north of Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[68]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka and Zelenyi Hai; east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove, Vorone, Stepove, and Sosnivka on December 6 and 7.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tykhe (east of Oleksandrivka on the southern bank of the Vovcha River) and Hai (south of Oleksandrivka).[70]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian counterattacks pushed Russian forces from Tykhe but claimed that Ukrainian forces do not control the settlement.[71]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 91st Separate Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored vehicles in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[72]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the eastern outskirts of Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole).[73]
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in eastern Hulyaipole after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[74]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to the Haichur River in eastern Hulyaipole and also advanced in southeastern Hulyaipole, in Varvarivka (north of Hulyaipole) and Zarichne (north of Hulyaipole on the west bank of the Haichur River).[75]
Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka, Danylivka, and Dobropillya and toward Zelene; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Krasnohirske, Pryvilne, Solodke, Rybne, Uspenivka, Pavlivka, and Zlahoda on December 6 and 7.[76] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near and within Dobropillya and near Hulyaipole.[77]
A Russian milblogger claimed on December 7 that Ukrainian forces continue to be able to use the T-0401 Hulyaipole-Pokrovske highway to transport supplies and reserves to Hulyaipole despite regular Russian drone strikes along the road.[78] The milblogger noted that Russian forces do not yet have fire control over the road. Another Russian milblogger claimed that the number of guided glide bomb strikes that Russian forces are currently conducting against Hulyaipole is comparable to the number used against Avdiivka in 2023-2024.[79] Russian forces notably employed mass glide bomb strikes to tactical effect in their seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024.[80]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Dobropillya.[81] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 14th Separate Engineering Brigade (EMD) are reportedly mining Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and then striking Ukrainian vehicles along the roads near Hulyaipole.[82] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored vehicles in Terenuvate (northwest of Hulyaipole).[83] Elements of the 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Hulyaipole.[84]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Prymorske, and Stepove on December 6 and 7.[85]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[86] Drone operators of the 247th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored vehicles in the Zaporizhia direction, and air defense elements of the 11th Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly using FPV interceptor drones to destroy Ukrainian reconnaissance and strike drones in the Zaporizhia direction.[87]
Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Kherson direction on December 7 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Borshchovyi, Vilkhovyi, and Zabych islands and advanced south of Yanarme and Berehove (all southeast of Kherson City).[88]
Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on December 7.[89]
A Russian milblogger denied reports that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups entered Prydniprovske (east of Kherson City on the west [right] bank of the Dnipro River).[90]
Order of Battle: Reconnaissance elements of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly targeting Ukrainian communications equipment in the Kherson direction.[91]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 241 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 150 were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[92] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched three Kh-47 M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Tambov Oblast and two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 175 drones, two of the three Kinzhal missiles, and both Iskander-M/KN-23 missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 65 drones hit 14 locations, but that the strike series was ongoing as of 0900 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, residential, industrial, and civilian infrastructure in Poltava, Donetsk, and Chernihiv oblasts.[93]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces launched over 1,600 strike drones, about 1,200 glide bombs, and almost 70 missiles against Ukraine in the past week (roughly November 30-December 6).[94]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/07/12/2025/69353d589a794769e0071bf9
[2] https://tass dot ru/politika/25837261
[3] https://tass dot ru/politika/25838931
[4] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=874810714913959&set=a.143577114703993&locale=uk_UA; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1183086-rf-zavdala-udaru-po-mostu-u-staromu-saltovi-na-harkivsini/
[5] https://t.me/gusarov_pechi/10399; https://t.me/astrapress/99070; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1183056-rf-zavdala-udaru-po-grebli-pecenizkogo-vodoshovisa-na-harkivsini
[6] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1997633132099420215; https://t.me/truexakharkiv/78713; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SDRsrJ6TRto
[7] https://t.me/corpsarmy16/1619
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2025/;
[10] https://x.com/Brokenarrow42/status/1997369552871604686?s=20; https://x.com/Brokenarrow42/status/1997369555564310555?s=20; https://t.me/verumreactor/29998 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/
[12] https://www.facebook.com/VilniusAirportOfficial/posts/1265223605635251?ref=embed_post ; https://suspilne dot media/1182828-aeroport-vilnusa-timcasovo-prizupinav-robotu-cerez-povitrani-kuli-z-bilorusi/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2025/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025/
[16] https://t.me/severnnyi/5952
[17] https://x.com/ChaMapping/status/1997377664307622135; http://t.me/armycorp44/396
[18] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6205
[19] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37087
[20] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189743
[21] https://t.me/rusich_army/27209
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32274 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32272 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19789 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30944 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69267 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19790 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/5952 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/27209
[23] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69267 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/27209
[24] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189743
[25] https://t.me/rusich_army/27209
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32274 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32272 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19789 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/5952
[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/59183 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/59185
[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/59189
[29] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189790
[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32274 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32272 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19789 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30944 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189803
[31] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3126
[32] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3126
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32274 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32272 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19789 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19790
[34] https://t.me/epoddubny/25772 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/21625; https://t.me/sashakots/58223
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32274 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32272 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19789 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19790 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30944 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189803 ; https://t.me/Belarus_VPO/80454
[36] https://t.me/voin_dv/17967
[37] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DR7ZAdmDKve/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10720; https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/1997456340097323206 ; https://instagram.com/stories/hovrenko_team/3781547977358493884/
[38] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69277 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37105; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189790 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32917
[39] https://x.com/Mocca1x/status/1997537336310308888; http://t.me/omsbr_88_official/121
[40] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69278; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32274; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32272; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37097; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37105; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37105; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69277; https://t.me/wargonzo/30944; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189803
[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37105; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69278
[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37105
[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37097
[44] https://t.me/yurasumy/25926
[45] https://x.com/ChaMapping/status/1997692889460252912; http://t.me/shock3OA/3762
[46] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1997637555030835669 ; https://t.me/rusich13sho/1297
[47] https://t.me/yurasumy/25923; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32929 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32932
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37108; https://t.me/wargonzo/30944; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69278
[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/59133; https://t.me/mod_russia/59135 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/59135; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/
[50] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32274; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32272; https://t.me/wargonzo/30944; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189803; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69278
[52] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69278
[53] https://t.me/yurasumy/25923; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37108; https://t.me/milinfolive/161888; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105229
[54] https://t.me/milinfolive/161888; https://t.me/geranium_chronicles/47637; https://t.me/osintpen/2184; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1997582903132209155?s=20
[55] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1997637555030835669; https://t.me/rusich13sho/1297
[56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189704
[57] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14694
[58] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32929 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32932
[59] https://t.me/wargonzo/30944; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32274; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32272; https://www.facebook.com/EastAFU/posts/pfbid0fRg37DJN7y3dhoTtnbwaxeViKgjpQoh8P7naY1vNmydyLWoxjtNPvmCaVkX78U8Fl?locale=uk_UA
[60] https://t.me/mod_russia/59184; https://t.me/mod_russia/59186
[61] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189790 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30944; https://t,me/z_arhiv/32938; https:/t.me/z_arhiv/32935
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32274; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32272; https://www.facebook.com/EastAFU/posts/pfbid0fRg37DJN7y3dhoTtnbwaxeViKgjpQoh8P7naY1vNmydyLWoxjtNPvmCaVkX78U8Fl?locale=uk_UA; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105191; https://t.me/wargonzo/30944; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189803
[63] https://www.facebook.com/EastAFU/posts/pfbid0fRg37DJN7y3dhoTtnbwaxeViKgjpQoh8P7naY1vNmydyLWoxjtNPvmCaVkX78U8Fl?locale=uk_UA
[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105191 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14693
[65] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14695
[66] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32935 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32941
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32274 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32272; https://www.facebook.com/EastAFU/posts/pfbid0fRg37DJN7y3dhoTtnbwaxeViKgjpQoh8P7naY1vNmydyLWoxjtNPvmCaVkX78U8Fl?locale=uk_UA; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189803
[68] https:// t.me/rybar/75802
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32274 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32272
[70] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69268; https://t.me/rybar/75802; https://t.me/voin_dv/17973
[71] https://t.me/rybar/75802
[72] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105189
[73] https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1997598274526794046?s=20 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/17970
[74] https://t.me/raid_413/543; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10721
[75] https://t.me/wargonzo/30944; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32944
[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32295 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32274 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32272; https://t.me/wargonzo/30944; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189803; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69268
[77] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69268; https://t.me/voin_dv/17973
[78] https://t.me/rybar/75802
[79] https://t.me/notes_veterans/26199
[80] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_28-8/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_15-8/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_5-9/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-8/
[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/17970
[82] https://t.me/voin_dv/17971
[83] https://t.me/voin_dv/17969
[84] https://t.me/voin_dv/17972
[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32295; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32274 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32272; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189803
[86] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37083 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37092 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37104
[87] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37087
[88] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31139
[89] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32295
[90] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31157
[91] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37087
[92] https://t.me/kpszsu/49234
[93] https://t.me/energyofukraine/5503; https://suspilne dot media/1183016-rosia-vnoci-atakuvala-energoobekti-na-poltavsini-ta-cernigivsini-minenergo/; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/26150 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/07/chernigivshhyna-bula-pid-masovanoyu-vorozhoyu-atakoyu-poshkodzhena-krytychna-infrastruktura/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1182886-cerez-obstrili-slovanska-6-grudna-kilkist-poranenih-zbilsilas-stalo-vidomo-pro-zagiblu-ludinu/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/54438 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/07/dlya-gasinnya-naslidkiv-rosijskyh-udariv-po-poltavshhyni-zaluchyly-robotiv/; https://www.facebook.com/vitalii.maletskyi.official/posts/1472964958169450?ref=embed_post; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1182844-rf-zavdala-masovanogo-kombinovanogo-udaru-po-kremencuku-u-misti-pereboi-zi-svitlom-vodou-ta-teplopostacannam/; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1182856-obstril-poltavsini-7-grudna-aki-poskodzenna-u-kremencuci/; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/12/07/rossiyskie-voyska-atakovali-poltavskuyu-oblast-raketami-i-dronami-v-kremenchuge-pereboi-so-svetom-otopleniem-i-vodoy; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1182966-u-gorisnih-plavnah-zaprovadili-nadzvicajnu-situaciu-cerez-obstril-energoobektiv/
[94] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/17200
